Abadi v. Adams

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

AARON ABADI,

Plaintiff,

24-CV-1897 (LTS)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

ERIC LEROY ADAMS, ET AL.

Defendants.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the court’s federal question

jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated his rights. By order dated April 22, 2024, the Court

granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of

fees. The Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons set forth below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially

plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that

the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79

(2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating

legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those

facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action under the court’s federal question jurisdiction. Named as

Defendants are: (1) New York City Mayor Eric Adams; (2) the City of New York; (3) former

New York City Mayor Bill De Blasio; (4) the New York City Department of Health and Mental

Hygiene (“NYCDOH”); (5) NYCDOH Commissioner Dave A. Choksi; (6) the United States of

America; (7) the Center for Disease Control & Prevention (“CDC”); (8) former CDC director

Rochelle Paula Walensky; (9) the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”); (10) former director of

the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Anthony Stephen Fauci; (11) the World

Health Organization (“WHO”); (12) Pfizer, Inc.; (13) Moderna, Inc.; (14) the Eco-Health

Alliance (“EHA”), a nonprofit organization;1 (15) X Corp. (formerly Twitter); (16) Alphabet

Inc., the owner of Google; and (17) Meta Platforms, Inc., the owner of Facebook.

For the purposes of this order, the Court will refer to the City of New York, Adams, De

Blasio, NYCDOH, and Choksi as the “City Defendants”; it will refer to the United States, CDC,

Walensky, NIH, and Fauci as the “Federal Defendants”; it will refer to Pfizer and Moderna as the

“Pharmaceutical Defendants”; and it will refer to X, Alphabet, and Meta as the “Social Media

Defendants.”

The following allegations are taken from the complaint, which is 116 pages long and

attached to an additional 199 pages of exhibits. On August 16, 2021, the then-Mayor of the City

of New York, Bill De Blasio issued Emergency Executive Order #225 (“EEO 225”), which

required vaccination for all indoor entertainment, recreation, dining, and fitness in the City. (ECF

1, at 17.) On August 31, 2021, Mayor De Blasio issued Executive Order #78 (“EO 78”), which

required all City employees and employees of City contractors who either show proof of

vaccination, or proof of negative Covid tests each week. (Id.) On December 13, 2021, NYCDOH

Commissioner Choksi issued an order, which went into effect on December 27, 2021, requiring

all employers in the City to exclude any employee who was not vaccinated. (Id. at 18.) These

orders did not contain an exception for “those recovered from Covid, who have natural

immunity.” (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff alleges that he contracted Covid in late 2020, and he therefore

“possess natural immunity, rendering any vaccination procedure medically unnecessary.” (Id. at

21.)

1 Plaintiff alleges that EHA “specializes in studying diseases stemming from

deforestation and increased human-wildlife interaction. The organization’s research encompasses

a range of illnesses, including SARS, Nipah virus, MERS, Rift Valley fever, Ebola, and COVID-

19.” (Id. at 46.)

Plaintiff was interested in a job with the New York City Department of Sanitation as a

contract manager, “which has been [his] line of work for about thirty years.” (Id. at 11.) It was “a

very unique position, and Plaintiff is and was uniquely qualified.” (Id. at 22.) He “tried to apply

for the job, but was not permitted to even apply for this job as he is not vaccinated.” (Id. at 11.)

Plaintiff alleges that “he went online with an effort to apply for a job and was greeted with a very

clear statement saying, ‘As of August 2, 2021, all new hires must be vaccinated against the

COVID-19 virus, unless they have been granted a reasonable accommodation for religion or

disability.’” (Id. at 22-23.) Because Plaintiff did not have grounds for a religious or disability

accommodation, he maintains that he could not have applied for any of the permitted

exemptions. (Id. at 23.) He further asserts that “[f]orcing” him to vaccinate even though he had

“natural immunity . . . would be putting him at a significant risk unnecessarily” and would be

“stripping him of his constitutional rights.” (Id. at 24.)

Plaintiff alleges that

[t]he United States executive branch administration, including bodies such as the

NIH, CDC, individuals like Dr. Walensky, and Dr. Fauci, as well as organizations

like the WHO, Pfizer, Moderna, and others, actively promoted Covid-19 vaccines

while allegedly concealing adverse effects, misrepresenting efficacy, and

contributing to the issuance of NYC Vaccine Mandates.

(Id. at 29.) Moreover, “[s]ocial media giants like Facebook, Google, and Twitter purportedly

colluded with the federal government with pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer and Moderna to

censor dissenting views that contradicted the official narrative on vaccines.” (Id. at 29.) These

entities “conspired to deprive [Plaintiff] (and those similarly situated) of their rights, coercing

them into vaccination under the threat of significant harm.” (Id. at 29.)

The Federal Defendants engaged in “dissemination of misinformation, distortion of data,

and deceitful practices in their zealous promotion of widespread vaccination across the American

population.” (Id. at 44.) They “provided advice, issued guidance and recommendations,

encouraged, and facilitated the implementation of vaccination campaigns.” (Id. at 44.) The WHO

“create[ed] guidance and advocat[ed] for global vaccination initiatives without conducting

thorough tests and studies to validate the safety and efficacy of such measures.” (Id. at 45.)

Pfizer and Moderna “actively promoted and distributed their respective vaccines, despite

being aware of inadequacies in the vetting process, insufficient studies, and limited testing

protocols.” (Id. at 45.) The Pharmaceutical Defendants “align[ed] themselves” with the other

defendants and “contributed to the dissemination of misleading information regarding the

effectiveness and benefits of the vaccines.” (Id. at 46.) They were also “complicit in encouraging

censorship programs aimed at suppressing any information that case doubt on their assertions.”

(Id. at 46.)

Plaintiff asserts that EHA “in collaboration with the NIH and Dr. Fauci, allegedly

engineered the COVID virus with the approval and support of the United States government.”

(Id. at 48.)

On November 1, 2022, Mayor Adams rescinded the December 2021 employer vaccine

mandate. (Id. at 50.) On February 10, 2023, Mayor Adams rescinded the municipal employee

vaccine mandate. (Id. at 50.) On March 6, 2023, Mayor Adams ended the vaccine mandate for

indoor public facilities. (Id. at 50.)

In addition to being discouraged from applying for the Department of Sanitation job,

Plaintiff alleges, without providing any factual support, that his company, National

Environmental Group, LLC, “was obstructed from pursuing numerous lucrative international

projects,” including “a significant $285 million power plant contract with a member of Dubai’s

royal family.” (Id. at 56.) He alleges no facts connecting this alleged injury to any acts or

omissions of the Defendants. Plaintiff also “experienced significant emotional distress due to be

denied access to various public spaces in New York City.” (Id. at 57.) For example, Plaintiff was

unable to visit “his cherished movie theater,” “[d]eprived of access to the gym,” and “barred

from visiting indoor malls.” (Id. at 57.) Being unable to enjoy these public spaces “resulted in

profound anguish comparable to imprisonment.” (Id. at 57.)

Plaintiff asserts the following “causes of action”: (1) claims under the Fifth, Ninth, and

Fourteenth Amendments for violation of his “right to refuse unwanted and medically

unnecessary care”; he brings these claims against the City Defendants for the “direct violation”

and against all other defendants, except EHA, for “aiding and abetting” the “direct violation” (id.

at 60); (2) unconstitutional “conditions” and violations of his right to due process, against the

City Defendants for the “direct violation” and against all other defendants, except EHA, for

“aiding and abetting” (id. at 70); (3) equal protection claims against the City Defendants for the

“direct violation” and against all other defendants, except EHA, for “aiding and abetting” (id. at

82); (4) claims for false imprisonment against the City Defendants for the “direct violation” and

against all other defendants, except EHA, for “aiding and abetting” (id. at 85);2 (5) Section 1983

“deprivation of rights” against the City Defendants, the Federal Defendants, the Social Media

Defendants, the pharmaceutical companies, and the WHO (id. at 87); (6) claims against the City

Defendants that the City’s vaccine mandates violate federal Emergency Use Authorization

(“EUA”) statutes (id. at 89)3; (7) claims against the City of New York and the NYCDOH that the

2 “The plaintiff contends that his situation constitutes false imprisonment, arguing that

confinement extends beyond physical containment. While he is not confined to his residence, he

is completely restricted from accessing various public venues, as outlined extensively in the

Executive Order.” (Id. at 85.)

3 Plaintiff asserts that the EUA statute mandates “informed and voluntary consent,” and

that “[s]ince the NYC Vaccine Mandates coerces Plaintiff by making enjoyment of his

constitutionally and statutorily protected bodily integrity and informed consent rights contingent

upon receiving an experimental vaccine, it cannot be reconciled with the letter or spirit of the

EUA statute.” (Id. at 90 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3).)

vaccine mandates are “arbitrary and capricious” (id. at 95); (8) New York constitutional claims

for equal protection against the City Defendants (id. at 98); (9) claims against the City

Defendants that the vaccine mandates are a violation of the “separation of powers doctrine” (id.

at 101), which appear to refer to the New York City Charter; (10) claims against the City

Defendants for violations of New York State “Public Health Law” (id. at 105); (11) First

Amendment claims for “illegal censorship” against the Federal Defendants, the Social Media

Defendants, and the pharmaceutical defendants (id. at 107-08); (12) tort claims against all

defendants for breach of fiduciary duty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and “injurious

falsehoods” (id. at 110); and (13) negligence claims against Fauci, NIH, the United States, and

EHA (id. at 112).

Plaintiff seeks a variety of declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as money damages.

Plaintiff has previously brought a similar action against the City of New York, in which

he asserted various constitutional claims under Section 1983 arising from the City’s enactment of

EEO 225, which required persons to be vaccinated against Covid-19 in order to enter certain

indoor venues, and EO 78, which required employees of the City to be vaccinated or take weekly

tests for COVID-19. In that action, Plaintiff alleged substantially the same facts as he does in this

action and, as he does in this action, he asserted that the executive orders violated his

constitutional rights to equal protection and bodily integrity, and subjected him to false

imprisonment. By order dated February 4, 2022, Judge Paul A. Engelmayer denied Plaintiff’s

request for a preliminary injunction after engaging in extensive discussion of Plaintiff’s claims,

including his likelihood of success on the merits. ECF 1:21-CV-8071, 24.4

4 Plaintiff appealed the court’s order and, by order dated June 16, 2022, the Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal because “it lacks an arguable basis in law or

in fact.” No. 22-268 (2d Cir. June 16, 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

By order dated July 15, 2022, Judge Engelmayer granted the City’s motion to dismiss for

substantially the same reasons the court cited in denying Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary

injunctive relief. ECF 1:21-CV-8071, 34. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, and, by order dated

May 8, 2023, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. No. 22-1650-cv (2d Cir. May 8, 2023);

see ECF 1:21-CV-8071, 43 (mandate). The Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff’s claims for

injunctive and declaratory relief were moot because the challenged vaccination requirements had

expired, and there was no evidence in the record to suggest that the City would likely reinstate

the restrictions. ECF 1:21-CV-8071, 43, at 2-4.

The Court of Appeals further held that the repeal of the policies did not render Plaintiff’s

claims for money damages moot, but it found that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring them.

Specifically, the Court of Appeals determined that he failed to allege an injury in fact as a result

of EEO 225’s restrictions on unvaccinated people entering certain indoor facilities. According to

the court,

The Amended Complaint merely alleges, in a conclusory fashion, that Plaintiff

was “banned from . . . tens of thousands of public places throughout the city.”

There is no allegation that Abadi ever attempted to enter an establishment and was

turned away, or that he was denied any service because of the policy; his alleged

injury is entirely “conjectural or hypothetical.”

ECF 1:21-CV-8071, 43, at 5 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016)).

The Court of Appeals also held that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the City’s

employment vaccination requirement because he did not allege that he was a City employee, or

that he applied for employment with the City, or was denied employment with the City. The

court explicitly rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that he has standing because “he was interested in

applying for employment with the City but decided against it because of the vaccination

requirement.” Id. at 6. The court concluded, “Abadi was not prevented from applying for a job

because he was unvaccinated; he simply chose not to apply.” Id. His alleged injury was “purely

hypothetical” and insufficient to confer standing. Id. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal,

but vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to the district court with

instructions to enter a judgment of dismissal without prejudice. Id.

In response to the Court of Appeals’ order, by order dated July 5, 2023, Judge

Engelmayer granted the City’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. That order stated,

Abadi is therefore not precluded by the dismissal of his claims in this litigation to

pursue a new action challenging, inter alia, extant city vaccination polices.

However, such an action must be brought in a separate lawsuit. As the Circuit

noted, “both the Key to NYC program and the City’s employment vaccination

requirement have expired.” Any challenge that Abadi may bring, therefore, would

be directed to a new policy, and properly must be the subject of a new lawsuit.

ECF 1:21-CV-8071, 45.

While this action appears to be Plaintiff’s attempt to respond to the dismissal of his

previous case without prejudice, Plaintiff challenges the same policies and sets forth substantially

the same set of facts as he did in the prior action.

DISCUSSION

A. Standing

Plaintiff appears to assert two sets claims based on separate but overlapping injuries.

First, he alleges that the City Defendants, “aided and abetted” by the other defendants, enacted

policies that discouraged him from applying from a job with the City and prevented him from

visiting various indoor entertainment facilities because he was unvaccinated.5 Second, he

appears to allege that the Federal Defendants, the WHO, the Social Media Defendants, EHA, and

5 Although Plaintiff’s claims seeking an injunction preventing the City Defendants from

implementing the vaccination mandates are moot for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals

in this prior action, see ECF 1:21-CV-8071, 43, at 2-4, his claims for money damages arising

from implementation of the vaccine mandates were not mooted by the repeal of the policies. See

id. at 4.

the Pharmaceutical Defendants put forth information and guidance that Plaintiff believes was

inaccurate or misleading. As discussed below, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring either of these sets

of claims.

The doctrine of standing “limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a

lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330,

338 (2016) (citations omitted). Standing is, therefore, “the threshold question in every federal

case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498

(1975). “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.” Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury

in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely

to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 338 (citing Lujan, 504

U.S. at 560-61). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden” of establishing

standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. At the pleading stage, “the plaintiff must ‘clearly . . . allege

facts demonstrating’ each element” of standing. Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 338

The injury-in-fact requirement is “first and foremost” among the three elements of

standing. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An injury in fact consists of “an invasion of a

legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations

omitted). A harm is “concrete” if it actually exists and is “particularized” if it affects the plaintiff

personally and individually. Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 339-40. “For an injury to be particularized,

it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 339 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504

U.S. at 560 n.1). In contrast, “when the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared in

substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not

warrant exercise of jurisdiction.” Warth, 422 US. at 499.

An “actual” injury is one that has already occurred, while a plaintiff seeking to show an

injury is “imminent” must demonstrate that the harm is “certainly impending,” Clapper v.

Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), or that there is

a “substantial risk the harm will occur,” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158

(2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff cannot establish a harm 1s “imminent”

through bare allegations “of possible future injury” contingent on a “highly attenuated chain of

possibilities.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409-10.

1. Claims arising from the City’s Vaccine Mandates

The primary injury that Plaintiff complains of is his allegation that he wanted to apply for

a position with the City’s Department of Sanitation, but he did not do so because the job listing

stated that all new hires must be vaccinated or have been granted an accommodation. (ECF 1, at

22-23.) However, the Court of Appeals in Plaintiff’s prior case explicitly held that these

allegations are insufficient to demonstrate an injury in fact. See ECF 1:21-CV-8071, 43, at 6.

Plaintiff’s allegations in his prior action were nearly identical to those he offers here.® The Court

of Appeals rejected Plaintiff’s contention that he has standing to bring his claims based on his

allegation that “he was interested in applying for employment with the City but decided against it

because of the vaccination requirement.” /d. Here, as in his prior action, “[Plaintiff] was not

prevented from applying for a job because he was unvaccinated; he simply chose not to apply.”

6 Specifically, Plaintiff alleged in the prior action, “Plaintiff was interested in an available

job with the City of New York’s Department of Sanitation, as a contract manager, which has been

this Plaintiff’s line of work for about thirty years. Plaintiff attempted to apply for that job, but

was not permitted to even apply for this job as he is not vaccinated.” ECF 1:21-CV-8071, 22, at

7.

11

Id. Because Plaintiff’s allegations in this action are virtually identical to those deemed

insufficient in No. 21-CV-8071, this Court holds that his alleged injury is “purely hypothetical

and does not confer standing.” /d. (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339.)

Plaintiff also states that he was unable to visit a movie theater, frequent restaurants, go to

the gym, or visit a “multitude of indoor venues” because of the City’s vaccine mandate. (ECF 1,

at 57.) These allegations do not appear to be a focus of the complaint and it is unclear whether

Plaintiff intends to assert claims based on this alleged injury. In any event, the Court of Appeals’

decision in Plaintiff’s prior action forecloses his assertion that his generalized inability to visit

various City establishments constitutes an injury in fact. Here, as in Plaintiff’s prior action,

“Tt]here is no allegation that [Plaintiff] ever attempted to enter an establishment and was turned

away, or that he was denied any service because of the policy; his alleged injury is entirely

‘conjectural or hypothetical.” ECF 1:21-CV-8071, 43, at 5 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339).

Plaintiff therefore lacks standing to bring claims arising from his alleged inability to

apply for a job with the City or his inability to visit various indoor City establishments. He

specifically lacks standing to bring his “direct” claims against the City Defendants or his claims

that the remaining defendants “‘aided and abetted” the City Defendants in denying his rights.

2. Claims arising from dissemination of “misinformation”

Plaintiff also asserts claims against the non-City Defendants that appear unrelated to the

City’s vaccine mandates. Plaintiff alleges that non-City defendants, including the Federal

Defendants, the WHO, and the Pharmaceutical Defendants “actively promoted Covid-19

vaccines” while allegedly concealing side effects and “misrepresenting [the] efficacy” of the

vaccines. (ECF 1, at 29.) He maintains that the EHA “engineered” the Covid-10 virus (id. at 48),

while the Social Media Defendants “censored dissenting views” that contradicted the “official

narrative” about the vaccine (id. at 29).

12

Any alleged injuries Plaintiff sustained as a result of these actions are not concrete and

particularized. They have not affected Plaintiff “in a personal and individual way.” Lujan, 504

U.S. at 560 n.1. Instead, any alleged injuries sustained as a result of these defendants’ actions are

generalized grievances that Plaintiff “suffers in some indefinite way in common with people

generally.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno., 547 U.S. 332, 345 (2006). Plaintiff therefore lacks

standing to bring his claims against the United States, CDC, Walensky, NIH, Fauci, WHO,

Pfizer, Moderna, EHA, X Corp., Alphabet, and Meta.

For the reasons discussed above, the Court dismisses this action without prejudice for

lack of standing.

B. Leave to Amend is Denied

Plaintiff is an experienced litigator who has litigated at least ten other cases in this court,

most of which asserting claims arising from the response of governments and businesses to the

Covid-19 pandemic.7 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has previously held that Plaintiff lacked

standing to bring substantially similar claims to those he asserts here, and, in filing this

complaint, Plaintiff failed to cure those deficiencies. In light of this litigation history, the Court

finds that Plaintiff was or should have been aware when he filed this complaint that it lacked

merit. See Sledge v. Kooi, 564 F.3d 105, 109-110 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing circumstances where

frequent pro se litigant may be charged with knowledge of particular legal requirements).

7 See, e.g., Abadi v. Biden, No. 23-CV-8440 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2023) (dismissed for

lack of standing); Abadi v. American Airlines Inc., No. 23-CV-4033 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y.); Abadi v.

Apple, Inc., No. 23-CV-3367 (PGG) (VF) (S.D.N.Y.); Abadi v. British Airways PLC, No. 21-CV-

10825 (PGG) (SN) (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2023) (voluntarily dismissed); Abadi v. NYU Langone

Health System, No. 21-CV-11073 (RA) (GWG) (S.D.N.Y. second amended complaint filed Apr.

24, 2024).

Because was on notice at the time he filed this action that he lacked standing to bring his claims,

the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses this action without prejudice for lack of standing.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf.

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates

good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in this action.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 28, 2024

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge