Gruen v. Gruen

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Yoel Gruen,

Plaintiff,

24-cv-00094 (NRM) (LB)

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Ahuva Gruen et al.,

Defendants.

NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Yoel Gruen filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

that Defendants violated his constitutional rights, including under the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). Compl. 4, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed

in forma pauperis, Pl.’s Appl., ECF No. 2, is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

The action is dismissed for the reasons discussed below.

Background

Plaintiff’s allegations appear to stem from a matrimonial action in New Jersey.

See Compl. at 10. Based on the Court’s review of various documents filed by Plaintiff

that appear to be copies of court filings from the matrimonial action, Plaintiff alleges

that Judge Lisa Puglisi of the New Jersey Supreme Court entered a default judgment

of divorce against Plaintiff in favor of his former wife, Ahuva Gruen, while Plaintiff

was involuntarily hospitalized. See Ex. (March 27, 2024) at 25, ECF No. 7.

Plaintiff names eighteen defendants, including New Jersey state court judges

Deborah Halon-Schron, Lisa Puglisi, Laurie Poppe and Gregory Gliedman (the

“Judicial Defendants”); attorneys Cipora Winters, Diana L. Anderson, Leah

Lederberger, and Jacob Silver (the “Attorney Defendants”); Ancora Psychiatric

Hospital, a psychiatric hospital located in New Jersey; physicians, psychologists, and

social workers employed by Ancora Psychiatric Hospital, including Elizabeth Sunnu,

Asanda Badar, Jared Moore, Andiree Evans, and Yvonne Pyne-Bailey (the “Ancora

Defendants”); three non-profit organizations including the Organization for the

Resolution of Agunot (“ORA”), Sister to Sister, and the Shalom Task Force (the “Non-

Profit Defendants”); and, Plaintiff’s former wife, Ahuva Gruen. Compl. at 8.

The allegations fall into several categories. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Cipora Winters, an attorney, trained his former wife “with divorce planning

techniques” that included “using trickery tactics against the Plaintiff” and that

Winters conspired with Ahuva Gruen to falsely accuse Plaintiff of stealing marital

assets and to arrange for his false arrest. Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges that several of

the Attorney Defendants and Judicial Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights under

HIPAA and Plaintiff’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment in connection

with court orders subjecting Plaintiff to involuntary hospitalization and other

unfavorable judicial rulings. Id. at 4, 10–12. Plaintiff also alleges that Ancora

Psychiatric Hospital and the Ancora Defendants violated his HIPAA rights and Fifth

Amendment rights by divulging information about his medical condition to others,

including some of the Attorney Defendants and Plaintiff’s former wife, without his

permission. Id.

As to the Non-Profit Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that they “organized a

devious and malicious protest and rally in public paying and teaching women and

children” to falsely represent to the public that they are the victims of domestic

violence for “political and monetary gains.” Id. at 12. Plaintiff alleges that the Non-

Profit Defendants organized women to file “false orders of protection against

men . . . false court proceedings against men, false incarcerations against men,” and

to “us[e] and abus[e] the court system against men and innocent children causing

parental alienation.” Id. While he does not say so explicitly, it appears from a liberal

reading of the Complaint that Plaintiff is contending that the Non-Profit Defendants

are in some way responsible for Plaintiff’s wife’s decision to divorce him and the

court’s improper entry of his judgment of divorce.

Plaintiff makes two additional specific allegations against two of the Attorney

Defendants. As to Defendant Leah Lederberger, Plaintiff alleges that she delayed

filing her cross-motion in a New Jersey court proceeding, pushing off a court date and

“abusing the court system for financial gains,” thereby violating Plaintiff’s rights to

due process. Id. As to Attorney Defendant Jacob Silver, Plaintiff alleges that he lied

before the New Jersey state court (in front of Judicial Defendant Gliedman),

understating the extent of his involvement with Non-Profit Defendant Shalom Task

Force and refusing to “ethically remove himself from representing Plaintiff due to a

conflict of interest” while aiding Plaintiff’s former wife, Defendant Ahuva Gruen. Id.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id. at 13.

The Court also notes that Plaintiff appears to have filed several actions in other

courts arising from the same allegations Plaintiff makes here with many of the same

claims against many of the same parties. Based on Plaintiff’s submissions to this

Court of filings in the New Jersey action, it appears to the Court that a final judgment

was entered in the matrimonial action, that Plaintiff sought but did not receive in

forma pauperis to appeal that judgment, and that Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed

the Appellate Division’s denial of in forma pauperis status to the Supreme Court of

New Jersey. See Pl.’s Ltr. (May 13, 2024) at 1, ECF No. 10 (noting submission

contains Plaintiff’s “motion for reconsideration to proceed as indigent filed by Plaintiff

to the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division”); Pl.’s Ltr. (Sept. 23, 2024)

at 1, ECF No. 15 (describing filing as containing Plaintiff’s “notice of appeal in the

Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey”). Plaintiff also appears to have filed a

nearly identical action in the United States District Court for the District of New

Jersey. See Pl.’s Ex. ( May 28, 2024) at 4, ECF No. 11. It appears from Plaintiff’s

brief to the Third Circuit seeking to appeal the district court’s decision that the court

dismissed his action for failure to state a claim. Id.

Standard of Review

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim is plausible

‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Matson v. Bd. of

Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)). Although at this stage the Court must assume that all of the factual

allegations in the complaint are true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In addition to requiring sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for

relief, pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff must

provide a short, plain statement of claim against each defendant named so that they

have adequate notice of the claims against them. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678 (Rule 8

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation”). A pleading that only “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement’” will not suffice. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 557). To satisfy this standard, the complaint must, at a minimum,

“disclose sufficient information to permit the defendant ‘to have a fair understanding

of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis

for recovery.’” Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation

omitted).

It is axiomatic that pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than

pleadings drafted by attorneys, and the Court is required to read the plaintiff’s pro se

complaint liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 15

(1980); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191–93 (2d Cir. 2008).

Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an in

forma pauperis action where it is satisfied that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” “An action is frivolous when

either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations are

the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d

Cir. 1998) (cleaned up).

Discussion

I. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that federal district courts are prohibited

from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals

from state court judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414–15

(1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Here, because Plaintiff

alleges that his matrimonial proceedings concluded with a final judgment in state

court (i.e., the judgment of divorce that he claims was unlawfully obtained), the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims against the Judicial Defendants.

Plaintiff is now complaining of injuries caused by the state court judgments rendered

before this action commenced and is asking this Court to review and reject those

judgments; thus, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his claims against

the Judicial Defendants. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 284 (2005) (limiting the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to “cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court

review and rejection of those judgments”); Hop Wah v. Vargas, No. 24-cv-3146, 2024

WL 3835092, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2024) (barring Plaintiff’s claims against

defendant Judge under Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

II. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 provides redress for deprivation of federally protected rights by

persons acting under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,

155–57 (1978). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing

both (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated

and (2) that the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48–49 (1988).

a. The Judicial Defendants

Even if the Plaintiff’s claims against the Judicial Defendants were not barred

by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Judicial Defendants are immune from suit. “It

is well settled that judges generally have absolute immunity from suits for money

damages for their judicial actions.” Butcher v. Wendt, 975 F.3d 236, 241 (2d Cir.

2020); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991). “Judges are . . . subject to

suit only for (1) ‘nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial

capacity’; and (2) ‘actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of

all jurisdiction.’” Brady v. Ostrager, 834 F. App’x 616, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12). The complete absence of jurisdiction requirement means

that “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in

error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d

72, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978)); see

also Cora v. Lebron, No. 24-cv-327, 2024 WL 308244, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2024).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims against the four Judicial Defendants arise entirely from

actions they took during state court proceedings in their capacity as judges. See

Compl. at 10–12. Plaintiff pleads no plausible facts to suggest that the actions taken

by these Defendants were not taken within their judicial capacity, nor that they were

not acting within their jurisdiction as judges when they took the actions that Plaintiff

challenges. Id. The Judicial Defendants are thus immune from Plaintiff’s suit for

monetary damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Judges Deborah Halon-

Schron, Lisa Puglisi, Laurie Poppe, and Gregory Gliedman are dismissed for failure

to state a claim and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Montero v.

Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A complaint will be dismissed as ‘frivolous’

when ‘it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.’” (quoting Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)); Manchanda v. Reardon, No. 23-cv-9292, 2024

WL 382116, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2024).

b. The Attorney Defendants

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring claims under § 1983 against the

Attorney Defendants, his claim fails. “It is well-settled that private attorneys and

law firms . . . do not act under color of state law and are not state actors for purposes

of Section 1983 simply by virtue of their state-issued licenses to practice law.” Manko

v. Steinhardt, No. 11-cv-5430, 2012 WL 213715, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2012)

(collecting cases). Even court-appointed attorneys do not become state actors by

virtue of their appointment by the court. Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65–66

(2d Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is well-established that court-appointed attorneys performing a

lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to defendant do not act ‘under color of state

law’ and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Lederberger, Silver, Winters, and Anderson are

dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

c. Plaintiff’s Claim Against Ahuva Gruen

Plaintiff’s former wife, Ahuva Gruen, a private actor, is not a proper party

under § 1983 because she does not act under the color of state law, and the

Constitution regulates only the conduct of government actors and not private parties.

See Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002). “[C]onduct,

no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,” is generally beyond the reach of § 1983.

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretzky,

457 U.S. 991 (1982)); cf. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531

U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (“[S]tate action may be found if, though only if, there is such a

‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private

behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’” (quoting Jackson v. Metro.

Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974))).

Here, any claim under § 1983 against Ahuva Gruen fails because she is a

private individual, and Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that she acted under the

color of state law or conspired with another state actor who did so. Thus, Plaintiff’s

claims are not plausible and are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See, e.g.,

Grant v. Adult Protective Serv., No. 22-cv-775, 2022 WL 504409, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.

18, 2022) (plaintiff’s claims fail because defendants are private individuals and

plaintiff has failed to plead plausible factual allegations to support claims for state

action or a conspiracy with state actors).

d. The Non-Profit Defendants

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert constitutional claims against the Non-

Profit Defendants (ORA, Sister to Sister, and the Shalom Task Force), his claim fails

for substantially the same reasons the Court dismissed the claims against Plaintiff’s

former wife. The nonprofit organizations are private entities, and Plaintiff has failed

to plead a plausible claim for state action. See Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 323 (the

Constitution regulates only the conduct of government actors and not that of private

parties); Batiste v. City of New York, No. 22-cv-9772, 2022 WL 17177966, at *3 n.2

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2022) (noting that the YMCA, as private not-for-profit corporation,

is generally not liable under § 1983). Plaintiff’s claims against the Non-Profit

Defendants are dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

e. The Ancora Defendants

Plaintiff could potentially assert a claim under § 1983 against at least some of

the Ancora Defendants because they may be state actors (i.e., acting within their role

as employees of a New Jersey state psychiatric hospital), but Plaintiff has failed to

plead the essential elements of a § 1983 claim against these Defendants. Plaintiff

alleges that the Ancora Defendants (along with others) violated his rights under the

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Compl. at 4, 10–12. The

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government,

whereas the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states.

Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002). Because no defendant is a

federal actor, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not applicable here.

See Lau v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 23-cv-1385, 2024 WL 3219810, at

*11 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2024) (“Defendants are not state actors and so cannot be the

targets of a Fifth Amendment due process claim.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fifth

Amendment claims against Ancora Psychiatric Hospital, Elizabeth Sunnu, Asanda

Badar, Jared Moore, Andiree Evans, and Yvonne Pyne-Bailey are dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

Liberally construed, Plaintiff may be seeking to assert a Fourteenth

Amendment claim against those same parties that the alleged disclosure of his

personal health information violates his rights. See generally Hancock v. County of

Rensselaer, 882 F.3d 58, 66–67 (2d Cir. 2018); Davidson v. City of Bridgeport, 487 F.

App’x 590, 592 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Personal medical information is protected by

substantive due process.”); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994)

(recognizing a constitutional right to privacy in personal information under the due

process clause). Here, Plaintiff makes vague and conclusory allegations that many of

the named Defendants discussed his medical conditions during the matrimonial

proceedings. See Compl. at 11. He does not provide any details as to the nature of

any of these alleged disclosures and why they were unlawfully made in the context of

his divorce proceeding. As Plaintiff makes no plausible factual assertions in support

of his claim, this Court “[is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as

a factual allegation,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;

Friedman v. Chocolatte Espresso B. LLC, No. 22-cv-1645, 2024 WL 1835336, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2024) (noting that the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations were not

“accompanied by sufficient factual content to render his claim plausible”). However,

because Plaintiff could, at least in theory, state a claim under § 1983 for a substantive

due process violation against a state actor in connection with that actor’s

impermissible disclosure of his private health information, this claim is dismissed

without prejudice. The Court does not express a view that there are facts in this case

that could support such a claim, only that such a claim could be a cognizable cause of

action under the right circumstances.

III. There Is No Private Right of Action Under HIPAA

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) prohibits

the disclosure of medical records without a patient’s consent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-

1 to -7. However, there is no private right of action under HIPAA. Meadows v. United

Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 242 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“[W]e hold that there is no

private right of action under HIPAA, express or implied.”); Morales v. N.Y. Univ., No.

22-cv-6452, 2023 WL 1785546, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2023); Morrison v. Shneur, No.

21-cv-2096, 2021 WL 4949028, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2021). As HIPAA does not

confer a private right of action, Plaintiff may not maintain an action under HIPAA

against any of the Defendants for their alleged disclosed of his personal information.

Plaintiff’s HIPAA claims are thus dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Denial of Leave to Amend

A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least

once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim

might be stated.” Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation omitted) However, while “pro se plaintiffs are generally given

leave to amend a deficient complaint, a district court may deny leave to amend when

amendment would be futile.” Subbotovskiy v. Touro Univ., No. 23-cv-982, 2023 WL

8829173 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2023) (quoting Hassan v. U.S. Dep’t of Veteran Affs., 137

F. App’x 418, 420 (2d Cir. 2005)). The Court has carefully considered whether leave

to amend is warranted here and decided it is not; the Court has determined that

Plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified here by amending his complaint and re-

pleading his claims. See Ashmore v. Prus, 510 F. App’x 47, 49 (2d Cir. 2013).

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the complaint, filed in forma pauperis,

is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and mail a copy of this Order

and the judgment to Plaintiff.

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3), that any appeal from

this order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status

is denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–

45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/NRM

NINA R. MORRISON

United States District Judge

Dated: September 30, 2024

Brooklyn, New York