Gamarra v. Supervisor Paul

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLERK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 5:26 pm, Sep   16, 2024

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JEAN PAUL GAMARRA, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against- 24-CV-6167(GRB)(ST)

SUPERVISOR PAUL,

Defendant.

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GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is the application of pro se plaintiff Jean Paul Gamarra (“Gamarra” or

“Plaintiff”) to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) filed together with a three-page handwritten

document entitled “Laymenterm Complaint.” See Docket Entry “DE” 1-2. Upon review of

Plaintiff’s submissions, the Court finds that he is qualified by his financial position as reported in

his IFP application to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. Accordingly, the application

to proceed IFP (DE 2) is granted. However, for the reasons that follow, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible claim and the complaint is thus dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff is no stranger to this Court. By Order dated November 4, 2021, this Court

accepted the transfer of jurisdiction request from the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia under Eastern District of New York criminal docket number 21-CR-00556 wherein

Gamarra is the defendant. See 21-CR-00556, DE 2. Gamarra had been convicted in the District

of Columbia of Threats Against the President in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871 and Threatening

and Conveying False Information Concerning the Use of an Explosive in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 844(e) and was sentenced in the District of Columbia on October 14, 2021 to time served with

three years’ supervised release in addition to a special assessment fee. (Id. at DE 2 at 2.) Given

that “Gamarra has minimal ties to the Washington, DC area, was raised in New York, and has

resided with his ex-wife and children in Copaigue, New York since his release to bail

supervision [] in August 2020”, together with the fact that he “is currently supervised in the

EDNY, [and] has no intention to return to the District of Columbia”, a request was made to

transfer jurisdiction of the supervised release to this Court. (Id.) Additionally, the following

special conditions of supervised release were imposed: “1) Stay away from the area around the

White House; 2) Avoid contact with parties under the protection of the Secret Service; 3)

participate in mental health treatment; 4) Comply with mental health medications; and 5)

Cooperate with Secret Service as instructed.” (Id.) Since the November 3, 2021 acceptance

jurisdiction over the supervised release, this Court has held several conferences with the most

recent on May 2, 2023. (See 21-CR-556 at DE 16, 19, 23-24, 26, 29.)

II. The Complaint1

On August 29, 2024, Gamarra filed a three-page handwritten document entitled

“Laymenterm Complaint” with an additional four pages of exhibits.2 The submission is difficult

to comprehend. The caption reflects that the defendant is “Supervisor Paul” and in its entirety,

Gamarra alleges:

Biven tort 362 § 540

Honorable Brown, the Plaintiff is filing to Exparte criminal court malpractice of

Sentancing Guidelines that was Illeugally Arraigned a 8th Amendment contortion

1 Excerpts from the complaint have been reproduced here exactly as they appear in the original. Errors in spelling,

punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected or noted.

2 The exhibits consist of: (1) a copy of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1516-1518(a); (2) an excerpt from an unidentified source

concerning hearsay exceptions with a handwritten notation that reads: “The victim requested help from criminal

activity defining men rea diminish capacity from criminal activity committed by the criminal affecting the victim”;

and (3) a JS 44 Civil cover sheet form. (See DE 1 at 4-7.)

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criminal Habius corpus from the Superior Court for the DC court district

jurisdiction. The case being filed is to start a Official Internal investigation when

the Court is Entitled by Honor’s Jurisdiction for the US Marshal to Enforce the

Entitle Jurisdiction title 18 § 1518. The Defendant was given Admissable

Creditable Evidence of a Falsfied Court order, that the Plaintiff Has the 2nd

Fraudulent Court order. The case the Plaintiff is requesting is to do a full

investigation to find the Admissable Just cause Evidence the Defendant Admitted

on His Own Admission that He lost it in from of his Ranking US marshal Agency

Official. The Illegal Just Cause Admissable Evidence for the Sentancing Guide

Line UnJust conviction with Evidence Defendant Lost is the same criminal

Fraudulent Jurisdiction.

The Internal Investigation is to Retain all the Lost Evidence to the US marshal

Agency Detective Jurisdiction of Fed. R. Crim. P. 8.

The Civil Case Attorney Prose with Council Request is to Entitled the Civil

Jurisdiction to your Honor’s Private Chamber for the US Marshal Agency to

Have Detective Jurisdiction Persay. Also Before the US Marshal Agency Enforce

Jurisdiction, Honorable Sir must Entitle the Jurisdiction to Enforce First for Your

honor to have Fiduciary Judicial Constitution Officer Private Chamber

Jurisdiction.

Your Honor, without transferring 1 case to Another, please Entitle Informa Pauris

Jurisdiction to Also Provide Entitled Payment to All the Law Official to pay

them, plus pay Plaintiff child support since (Gamarra vrse Oboma 2014 FDC).

[Gamarra’s signature]

Citation on Copy 1 Copy 2.

Plaintiff Manadamus Exparte RJI

Prisoner Petititions

The JS 44 540 mandamus is to start a case to Expart the Criminal Malipractice

Sentancing Guidline Issued From the Treasonist DC Municipality to the Federal

DC Court, called the DC Superior Court Criminal Federal Attorney Malpractice.

The Litigation Appellate Attorney Disclosure Pro Se with ineffectiveness

Assistance of Council from proprietary case unnoted is, the Illegal Habeas Corpus

of Malpracticing Mandamus is illegagally possed on Plaintiff using the Federal

Bar/Jurisdiction, Docket, or other Law Court that should Not Have Jurisdiction to

Plaintiff personal space, Home, Business venture, Children, Family, Officer of the

Law that do want to Enforce the Law when the Judicial Constitution officer

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Honorable Brown Entitled the Jurisdiction to Enforce.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Second Circuit has established a two-step procedure wherein the district court first

considers whether a plaintiff qualifies for in forma pauperis status, and then considers the merits

of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Potnick v. E. State Hosp., 701 F.2d 243, 244 (2d

Cir. 1983). Upon review of Plaintiff’s IFP application (DE 2), the Court finds that Plaintiff is

qualified to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. Accordingly, the

application to proceed IFP is granted and the Court next turns to the merits of the complaint.

I. Sufficiency of the Pleadings

As Judge Bianco summarized,

A district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action

is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). The Court is required to dismiss the action as

soon as it makes such a determination. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

It is axiomatic that district courts are required to read pro se complaints liberally,

see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010), and

to construe them “‘to raise the strongest arguments that [they] suggest [ ].’”

Chavis, 618 F.3d at 170 (quoting Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d

Cir. 2010)). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must

assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the

complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir.

2010), aff’d, --- U.S. ----, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 185 L. Ed. 2d 671 (2013) (citing

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . . are

not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

Notwithstanding a plaintiff’s pro se status, a complaint must plead sufficient facts

to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

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acted unlawfully.” Id.; accord Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128

(2d Cir. 2011). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff’s factual allegations must also be sufficient

to give the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Patrick v. Bronx Care, No. 14-CV-7392 (JFB)(AKT), 2014 WL 7476972, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y.

Dec. 31, 2014).

DISCUSSION

I. The Complaint Fails to Allege a Plausible Federal Claim

Though difficult to comprehend, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to pursue a civil

rights claim pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) against the sole defendant, “Supervisor Paul”. (Compl.,

DE 1 at 1.)3 “A Bivens action is a judicially-created remedy designed to provide

individuals with a cause of action against [individual] federal officials who have violated

their constitutional rights,” Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2007), and

“is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under [§ 1983].” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 675. A Bivens claim requires that the plaintiff show the defendant’s personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because

vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that

each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

3 Plaintiff wrote “Biven tort 362 § 540” which the Court understand to reference the Nature of Suit Codes on the JS

44 Civil Cover Sheet. Indeed, Plaintiff has included that form as an exhibit to his complaint and has checked the

boxes for “362 Personal Injury-Medical Malpractice” and “540 Mandamus & Other”. (See DE 1 at 6.)

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violated the Constitution.”); Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]n

Bivens actions, a plaintiff must allege that the individual defendant was personally

involved in the constitutional violation.”). Further, the Supreme Court has expressly held

that “a Bivens cause of action may not lie where, as here, national security is at issue.”

Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 494 (2022).

Here, as is readily apparent, Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible Bivens claim.

Indeed, although Plaintiff names “Supervisor Paul” as the sole defendant, he is not at all

mentioned in the body of the complaint nor are there any allegations of conduct or

inaction attributable to him. (See Compl., DE 1 in toto.) “‘Dismissal is appropriate

where a defendant is listed in the caption, but the body of the complaint fails to indicate

what the defendant did to the plaintiff.’” Dean v. Annucci, No. 22-CV-0746, 2023 WL

2325074, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2023) (quoting Cipriani v. Buffardi, No. 06-CV-889,

2007 WL 607341, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007). Where a Section 1983 or Bivens

claim fails to allege the personal involvement of the defendant, it fails as a matter of law.

See Johnson v. Barney, 360 F. App’x 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order).

Nor has Plaintiff adequately alleged the deprivation of some constitutional right.

Although Plaintiff includes “8th Amendment” in his complaint, his scant allegations make

it impossible for the Court to analyze any such claim. As the Supreme Court made clear,

“[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555).

Further, Plaintiff’s reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1518, which proscribes acts to

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obstruct the communication of certain information to criminal investigators of health care

offenses, does not provide a basis to impose liability against the defendant. This criminal

statute does not provide a private right of action. Garay v. United States Bancorp, 303 F.

Supp.2d 299, 303 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (obstruction of justice is a criminal matter for which

there is no private cause of action) (citations omitted); see also Leeke v. Timmerman, 454

U.S. 83, 85 (1981) (a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the

prosecution or non-prosecution of another); Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp.,

21 F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir. 1994) (criminal statutes do not provide private causes of

action).

Thus, even upon a liberal construction, the Court cannot reasonably discern a

plausible federal claim. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 sets forth the “General Rules of Pleading” and

provides, in relevant part: “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: . . . (2) a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; . . . .”

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “‘[T]he statement need only give the defendant fair notice of

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” McCray v. Lee, 963 F.3d

110, 116 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted)); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do

justice.”). Indeed, the purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted

so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an

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adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.”

Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). A pleading that only tenders naked assertions devoid of

further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal citations and alterations

omitted). Importantly, pro se pleadings are not exempt from the notice requirements of

Rule 8, see Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2004), and must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,”

Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A court may

dismiss a complaint that is “so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible

that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42

(2d Cir. 1988).

Further, Rule 8 requires that a pleading must contain “a demand for the relief

sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 8(a)(3). When a complaint fails to satisfy the Rule 8 pleading standard, including

a demand for relief, a district court may dismiss the complaint sua sponte. See, e.g.,

Rodriguez v. Nassau Cnty. Police Dep’t, No. 18-CV-00203, 2018 WL 2725421, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2018) (citing France v. Nassau Cty. Jail, 14-CV-2547, 2014 WL

1871937, *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2014) (dismissing pro se complaint that, inter alia, did

not seek any relief)).

Here, even upon a liberal construction, it is readily apparent that Plaintiff’s

complaint does not comport with Rule 8’s requirements. The vague and scant allegations

do not provide Defendant with fair notice or demonstrate that Plaintiff is entitled to relief.

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Thus, the complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

III. State Law Claims

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over

all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that

they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States

Constitution.” However, courts “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim”

if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court explained that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims

are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction

doctrine - - judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity - - will point toward declining

to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).

Here, given the absence of a plausible federal claim, the interests of judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity weigh in favor of not exercising supplemental jurisdiction at

this time over any state law claims that may be reasonably construed from complaint.

Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state-

law claims contained in Plaintiff’s complaint.

III. Leave to Amend

A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least once when

a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Shomo

v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). However, leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42; see also In re McDonald, 489

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U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (“Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious

or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s limited resources. A part of the Court’s

responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of

justice.”).

In an abundance of caution and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants leave

to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order.

Any amended complaint shall be clearly labeled “Amended Complaint”, shall bear the same

docket number as this Memorandum and Order, 24-CV-6167(GRB)(ST), and shall include any

and all claims against any defendant from whom Plaintiff seeks relief. Because an amended

complaint completely replaces the original complaint, Plaintiff shall include the nature of the

claims, facts in support thereof, and a demand for relief. To be clear, Plaintiff shall include conduct

or inaction attributable to any individual so named as a defendant. Plaintiff would be well-advised

to comply with the numbered paragraphs requirement embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

in any amended complaint.4 Plaintiff is on notice that judgment shall enter and this case will be

closed unless he timely files an amended complaint.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s IFP application (DE 2) is granted; however, the

4 Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:

(a) Caption; Names of Parties. Every pleading must have a caption with the court’s name, a title, a

file number, and a Rule 7(a) designation. The title of the complaint must name all the parties; . . . .

(b)Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered

paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. . . .

FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a)-(b). See Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005) (“where the absence of numbering

or succinct paragraphs does not interfere with one’s ability to understand the claims or otherwise prejudice the

adverse party, the pleading should be accepted”).

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complaint (DE 1) is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Plaintiff is granted

leave to file an amended complaint in accordance with this Memorandum and Order within thirty

(30) days from the date at the bottom of this page. Plaintiff is on notice that judgment shall enter

and this case will be closed unless he timely files an amended complaint. The Clerk of the Court

shall mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff at his address of record

and note such mailing on the docket.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order

would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose

of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Gary R. Brown

Gary R. Brown

United States District Judge

Dated: September 16, 2024

Central Islip, New York

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