The opinion
United States District Court
Eastern District of New York
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Bouchara Halwani, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Order
- against - No. 23-cv-3686 (KAM) (PK)
Brightside Health, Inc.,
Defendant.
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Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States District Judge:
Bouchara Halwani brought this wrongful death and medical
malpractice action individually and as representative of the
estate of her deceased daughter, Lara Halwani, against
Brightside Health, Inc. (“Brightside Health”), Brightside
Medical, P.C. (“Brightside Medical”), Beth Tafuri, LCSW, and
Lissa Goldstein, M.D. Ms. Halwani voluntarily dismissed her
claims against Brightside Medical, Dr. Tafuri, and
Dr. Goldstein, and she settled her claims against Brightside
Health. The Court approved the settlement in accordance with
Local Civil Rule 83.2(b). (ECF No. 50, Corr. Order; see also
Order, Aug. 7, 2024.) The defendants now move to seal
paragraphs 7 through 15 of Ms. Halwani’s affirmation in support
of her motion for settlement approval. (ECF No. 55-4, Defs.’
Mem. Supp. Mot. Seal Portions of Pl.’s Affirmations (“Mot.”);
see ECF Nos. 38, 39, 41, 43, Affirmation Supp. Mot. Approval of
Settlement (“Affirmation.”).
The public has a presumptive right of access to judicial
documents. Olson v. MLB, 29 F.4th 59, 87 (2d Cir. 2022). A
document is “judicial” if it would “reasonably have the tendency
to influence a district court’s ruling on a motion or in the
exercise of its supervisory powers, without regard to which way
the court ultimately rules or whether the document ultimately in
fact influences the court’s decision.” Id. at 89 (quoting Brown
v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2019)). The weight of the
presumption depends on the “role of the material at issue” in
the exercise of the judicial power and the “resultant value of
such information to those monitoring the federal courts” Id. at
88–89 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049
(2d Cir. 1995)). A court may not seal a judicial document
unless the presumption is outweighed by a countervailing
interest. Id. at 88.
The defendants correctly concede that Ms. Halwani’s
affirmation, including the nine paragraphs at issue, is a
judicial document. (See ECF No. 58, Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot.
Seal, at 1.) The affirmation was submitted in connection with
Ms. Halwani’s motion to approve the settlement between herself
and Brightside Health. Thus, it had at least a “tendency to
influence” the Court’s ruling on the motion regardless of the
extent to which it actually did. See Olson, 29 F.4th at 89
(quoting Brown, 929 F.3d at 49); F.P. ex rel. Paino v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., No. 23-cv-5798 (HG), 2023 WL 6930677, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2023) (holding that motion papers concerning
motion to approve infant compromise under Local Civil Rule
83.2(a) were “judicial documents because they were necessary for
the Court’s review of the parties’ proposed settlement”).
Accordingly, the presumption of public access applies to the
affirmation, including paragraphs 7 through 15.
The defendants argue, however, that paragraphs 7 through 15
of the affirmation enjoy only a “weak” presumption of public
access because they concern Ms. Halwani’s allegations against
the dismissed and non-settling defendants, not her allegations
against Brightside Health, and thus are “not necessary for the
public to understand . . . the reasons for the Court’s approval
of the settlement” between Ms. Halwani and Brightside Health.
(Mot. 6–7.)
The Court respectfully disagrees with the defendants’
argument. Here, the weight of the presumption of public access
is “relatively strong” because the motion to approve the
settlement “disposed of the parties’ case.” See Paino, 2023 WL
6930677, at *3. Even assuming that the information in
paragraphs 7 through 15 does not directly affect the merits of
Ms. Halwani’s claims against Brightside Health, it still
concerns named defendants and remains part of the course of
events that prompted this action. The information that the
defendants seek to keep sealed could have influenced how
discovery progressed and how the evidence was presented at
trial, which contextualizes the parties’ respective litigation
risks and thus the reasonableness of their settlement. See
Camac v. Long Beach City Sch. Dist., No. 09-cv-5309 (MKB) (GRB),
2012 WL 3277228, at *3 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2012) (finding
confidentiality interest outweighed by public right of access
and “interests in providing a fulsome exploration” of proposed
settlement), R&R adopted, 2013 WL 991355 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13,
2013).
The defendants further argue that any presumption of public
access is outweighed by the “privacy interests” of the non-
settling defendants. (Mot. 8–10.) The defendants articulate
these privacy interests only in conclusory fashion, however,
asserting simply that “the references to these dismissed
defendants” serve “merely to harass and embarrass them.” (See
id. 9–10.) A “fear of professional embarrassment” or
“[g]eneralized concern[s] of adverse publicity” cannot overcome
the relatively strong presumption of public access that applies
here. See Lumiere v. United States, No. 18-cv-9170 (BCM),
2019 WL 6338175, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2019) (quoting
Bernsten v. O’Reilly, 307 F. Supp. 3d 161, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)).
Though medical privacy can support sealing court filings in some
cases, the patient – not the provider – is the party with the
right to invoke that privacy interest. See ABC v. XYZ Corp.,
No. 18-cv-11653 (JGK) (JLC), 2019 WL 1292503, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 19, 2019) (denying defendants’ request to seal their
identities because “unlike [plaintiffs], [defendants] ha[d] no
medical privacy or protection of minors claim that would justify
a redaction of the business’s names”), R&R adopted, 2019 WL
1304466 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2019).
The defendants next argue that the presumption of public
access is overcome because the statements in paragraphs 7
through 15 of Ms. Halwani’s affirmation are merely “conclusory,
unverified[,] and unsupported allegations.” (Mot. 10–11.)
Though public court filings “can be misleading,” courts still
must presume that they will be “understood for what they are.”
Brown, 929 F.3d at 52. Here, it is apparent to any reasonable
viewer of the docket that Ms. Halwani’s statements in paragraphs
7 through 15 of her affirmation were never subject to
adversarial testing and “do not reflect the [C]ourt’s own
findings.” See id. Those statements reflect only Ms. Halwani’s
view of the facts at the time she made a calculated decision to
resolve the case. The Court cannot act under the assumption
that a reader would take Ms. Halwani’s statements out of that
context.
Finally, the defendants argue that the presumption of
public access is overcome based on the parties’ confidentiality
provision in their settlement agreement. (Mot. 11–13.) But
“the mere fact that information is subject to a confidentiality
agreement between litigants is not a valid basis to overcome the
presumption in favor of public access to judicial documents.”
See Coleman v. Cty. of Suffolk, 174 F. Supp. 3d 747, 756
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting In re General Motors LLC Ignition
Switch Litig., No. 14-mc-2543 (JMF), 2015 WL 7574460, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2015)).
Regardless of whether the defendants “may have an action
for breach of contract” based on Ms. Halwani’s “alleged failure
to adhere to [her] obligations under the confidentiality
agreement,” the Court “makes no finding whatsoever on that
question,” see Aioi Nissay Dowa Ins. Co. Ltd. v. ProSight
Specialty Mgmt. Co., Inc., No. 12-cv-3274 (JPO), 2012 WL
3583176, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012), nor does it retain
jurisdiction to resolve any disputes that may arise under the
parties’ settlement agreement regarding the confidentiality
provision or any other matter, see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 382 (1994).
Accordingly, because the defendants have not established
that the presumption of public access to judicial documents is
overcome with respect to paragraphs 7 through 15 of
Ms. Halwani’s affirmation in support of her motion for
settlement approval, the defendants’ motion to seal is
respectfully denied.
So ordered.
ba,
Dated: September 10, 2024 f? a,
Brooklyn, New York we oe e+) Ltr
Kidda. Matsumoto
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York