Scriven v. Barnum

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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Charles Scriven,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

24-CV-4025(EK)(MJ)

-against-

Jeremy Barnum,

Defendant.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

On June 3, 2024, plaintiff Charles Scriven filed this

action against defendant Jeremy Barnum, the Chief Financial

officer of Chase Bank. Proceeding pro se, Scriven invoked the

court’s federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Compl., ECF No. 1. The Court grants Plaintiff’s application to

proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). As

set forth below, however, the complaint is dismissed.

Background

This is one of two cases that this plaintiff has filed

against this defendant. See Scriven v. Barnum, No. 24-CV-1805.

Barnum filed the first action — which this Court subsequently

dismissed with prejudice — on March 8, 2024. In that case,

Scriven alleged that he had purchased a car from South Shore

Mitsubishi with financing provided by Chase Bank. See No. 24-

CV-1805, ECF No. 4, Am. Compl. at 5. He contended that “Mr.

Barnum . . . breach[ed] the contract by failing to perform his

duty by not accepting negotiable instrument.” Id. at 6. The

“negotiable instrument” at issue, per that Complaint, was a

“notice of claim to interest.” Id. On February 16, 2024, the

car was repossessed. Id. at 6.

By Memorandum and Order dated April 24, 2024, this

Court dismissed that action with prejudice because there is no

private right of action under the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.

§ 504, and because the operative complaint did not state a valid

claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692. See Scriven v. Barnum, No. 24-CV-1805, 2024 WL 1769318

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2024).

Six weeks later, Scriven filed the instant action

against the same defendant, again asserting a claim under the

Federal Reserve Act. See ECF No. 1, Compl. at 6. The new

complaint also adds a breach of contract claim under 41 U.S.C.

§ 6503, regarding the purchase of a 2019 Mercedes Benz — the

same car discussed in the Court’s April 24 Order. Id. He seeks

“all payments reverted back to him due to the breach for all

past payment.” Id. at 7.

Standard of Review

To state a valid claim, a complaint must plead “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).1 A claim

is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing a pro se

complaint, the Court must be mindful that the plaintiff’s

pleadings should be held “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S.

5, 9 (1980).

Still, when a plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis, the court must dismiss a complaint that fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

Discussion

“The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion,

holds that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes

the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were

or could have been raised in that action.” Brown Media Corp. v.

K&L Gates LLP, 854 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2017); see also

Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398

(1981). Res judicata bars an action if “(1) the previous action

involved an adjudication of the merits; (2) the previous action

1 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order

accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal

quotation marks.

involved the same plaintiffs or those in privity with them;

[and] (3) the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or

could have been raised in the prior action.” Monahan v. N.Y.C.

Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285 (2d Cir. 2000). “Even claims

based upon different legal theories are barred provided they

arise from the same transaction or occurrence.” Cieszkowska v.

Gray Line N.Y., 295 F.3d 204, 205 (2d Cir. 2002).

Scriven’s new claims arise from the same events that

were at issue in his prior litigation. See Scriven, No. 24-CV-

1805, 2024 WL 1769318. And his previous action involved an

adjudication on the merits: the conclusion that the Federal

Reserve Act confers no private right of action led to dismissal

for failure to state a claim. Id.; see Fair v. Verizon Commc'ns

Inc., 621 F. App’x 52, 53 (2d Cir. 2015); Berrios v. New York

City Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2009).

Scriven raised (or could have raised) the same claims

presented in this action in the first action. Id. Now, he

seeks to relitigate claims already adjudicated and to assert new

legal theories based upon the same operative facts. Therefore,

the complaint is barred by res judicata. See Salahuddin v.

Jones, 992 F.2d 447, 449 (2d Cir. 1993) (district court’s sua

sponte dismissal of pro se complaint on res judicata grounds was

“not only appropriate but virtually mandatory”).

Moreover, Scriven fails to state a claim under Section

6503. That statute is inapplicable to Scriven’s claim because

it applies only to contracts with the federal government, not

between private parties. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 6502, 6503.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this action must be — and

is — dismissed.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)

that any appeal of this Order would not be taken in good faith

and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose

of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-

45 (1962). The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment

and close this case. The Clerk is also directed to mail a copy

of this Memorandum and Order to plaintiff and to note the

mailing on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United State s District Judge

D ated: August 22, 2024

Brooklyn, New Y o rk