Opinion

Joe v. FDNY

Court
District Court, E.D. New York
Filed
Aug 15, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.6%

“A pro se complaint should not [be] dismiss[ed] without [the Court] granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”

How later courts described this case

  • “A pro se complaint should not [be] dismiss[ed] without [the Court] granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------x

Willie L. Joe,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

24-CV-1205(EK)(RML)

-against-

Fire Department of New York; City of

New York; Kevin Simpkin; Jane Doe

(Driver of the Car that Struck the

Ambulance),

Defendants.

------------------------------------x

ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Willie Joe brings this action, invoking the

Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 1

Compl.

ECF No. 1. His request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915 is granted. ECF No. 2. For the reasons below,

the Complaint is dismissed as untimely, but plaintiff is granted

until July 10, 2024 to file an amended complaint.2

Background

Plaintiff Joe is a citizen of Clayton, North Carolina.

Compl. 2-3. Proceeding pro se, he alleges that on November 1,

2013, an ambulance hit him while he was crossing a street in

1 The action was transferred to this court from the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York on February 22, 2024.

ECF No. 4.

2 The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption

to conform to the above.

Brooklyn, New York, resulting in unspecified (but “serious”)

injuries. Compl. at 5-6. Joe sues the Fire Department of New

York, the City of New York, Kevin Simpkin (the driver of the

ambulance), and a Jane Doe (the driver of the car that struck

the ambulance).

Plaintiff engaged counsel to represent him in a

lawsuit and believed that a case was pending. This belief arose

from the fact that, years after he engaged counsel, one of the

“defendant[s] show[ed] [his attorney] the video of the accident,

[and the defendant] said that he was going to court to have my

case dismiss[ed].” Id. Plaintiff’s counsel subsequently told

him “that [he] did not have a case.” Id. at 5. The doctor who

treated plaintiff after his accident would not testify in court.

Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was “represent[ed] in bad faith.”

Id. Mr. Joe’s Complaint sounds in negligence, though he does

not expressly assert any cause of action by name; he seeks $1

million in damages for his injuries from the accident. Id. at

6.

Standard of Review

A district court must dismiss an in forma pauperis

action that “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 3 A claim is plausible “when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57,

63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)). Although all allegations contained in the complaint

are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal

conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Pro se complaints are “held to less stringent

standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys, and the Court

will read a pro se complaint liberally and interpret it to raise

the strongest arguments it suggests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537

F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Still, a pro se plaintiff is not

exempt from “compliance with relevant rules of procedural and

substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.

1983).

Discussion

It is apparent from the face of the complaint that

plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. Thus, he fails to state a

3 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order

accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal

quotation marks.

claim upon which relief may be granted. Akassy v. Hardy, 887

F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2018).

In diversity cases, “federal court[s] sitting in New

York must apply the New York choice-of-law rules and statutes of

limitations.” Baker v. Stryker Corp., 770 F. App'x 12, 14 (2d

Cir. 2019).4 New York negligence claims are subject to a three-

year statute of limitations. New York Civil Practice Law and

Rules (“CPLR”) § 214(4); see also Spinnato v. Unity of Omaha

Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 3d 377, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).

Subject to certain exceptions that are not implicated here, a

negligence claim “accrues upon the date of injury . . . even if

the plaintiff is unaware that he or she has a cause of action at

the time of injury.” Kampuries v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 204 F.

Supp. 3d 484, 490–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).

Based on plaintiff’s allegations, the negligence claim

accrued on November 1, 2013 — the date of the accident.

Plaintiff thus had until October 31, 2016 to file this action.

The complaint does not suggest any basis for equitable tolling.

Indeed, it is settled that the failure to find an attorney to

4 Plaintiff has adequately alleged that all defendants are New York

citizens. Plaintiff is a North Carolina citizen. He alleges $1 million in

damages. Although plaintiff does not specify what his injuries are, he

states that they are “serious.” Compl. at 5-6. To plead the amount in

controversy, plaintiff need only demonstrate a “reasonable probability” that

the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied, Tongkook Am., Inc. v.

Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 784 (2d Cir. 1994). Since plaintiff

proceeds pro se, the Court assesses that, for now, plaintiff has sufficiently

pled that he meets the amount in controversy threshold necessary for

jurisdiction in federal court.

who will file a case is not a basis for tolling. Qui Yun Li v.

Holder, 352 Fed. Appx 574, 575-76 (2d Cir. 2009). Thus, Mr.

Joe’s claims are time-barred and must be dismissed. See

Kimberly W. v. Saul, No. 21-cv-00042, 2021 WL 880110, at *3 (D.

Conn. Mar. 9, 2021) (“While statute of limitations defenses are

ordinarily raised by the defendant. . . courts can and do

dismiss cases on their own initiative under Section 1915(e)(2)

when an IFP plaintiff’s complaint reveals that [his] claim is

clearly untimely.”); Kantor-Hopkins v. Cyberzone Health Club,

No. 06-CV-643, 2007 WL 2687665, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 10, 2007)

(noting that “pro se status and ignorance of the law do not

merit equitable tolling” of the statute of limitations).

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed without

prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Chavis v. Chappius, 618

F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A pro se complaint should not

[be] dismiss[ed] without [the Court] granting leave to amend at

least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any

indication that a valid claim might be stated.”).

Plaintiff is granted until September 14, 2024 to file

an Amended Complaint to set forth facts sufficient to establish

compliance with (or toll) the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff is advised that the Amended Complaint must

comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The

rule requires that plaintiff provide a short, plain statement of

a claim against each named defendant and facts sufficient to

allow each defendant to understand plaintiff’s complaints. See

Twombly v. Bell, 425 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff is also advised that the Amended Complaint

will completely replace the original Complaint, must be

captioned, “Amended Complaint,” and must bear the same docket

number as this Memorandum and Order: 24-CV-1205 (EK)(RML). No

summons shall issue at this time and all further proceedings

shall be stayed. If plaintiff fails to amend the Complaint by

July 10, 2024, as directed by this Order, or cure the

deficiencies discussed herein, judgment of dismissal shall be

entered.

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this

Memorandum and Order to plaintiff and to note the mailing on the

docket. For free, limited-scope legal assistance, plaintiff may

wish to consult the City Bar Justice Center’s Federal Pro Se

Legal Assistance Project in Brooklyn by calling (212) 382-4729.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3), that any appeal would not be taken in good faith

and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for the

purpose of any appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.438,

444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United State s District Judge

D ated: August 15, 2024

Brooklyn, New Yo rk

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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