Nestor Cassini v. County of Nassau

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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Marianne Nestor Cassini and Gemeaux Ltd.,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiffs, 22-CV-01696 (DG) (AYS)

-against-

County of Nassau, et al.,

Defendants.

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DIANE GUJARATI, United States District Judge:

On March 27, 2022, Marianne Nestor Cassini (“Mrs. Cassini”) and Gemeaux Ltd.

(“Gemeaux,” and together with Mrs. Cassini, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action against

Defendants County of Nassau; Brian Curran, in his official capacity as Nassau County Public

Administrator (the “Public Administrator”); Jeffrey DeLuca; Kenneth Mahon; Judge Margaret C.

Reilly of the Surrogate’s Court of the State of New York, County of Nassau (“Judge Reilly”);

Rosalia Baiamonte; Jeffrey Miller; William Doyle Galleries, Inc. (“Doyle Galleries”); James

Dzurenda, in his official capacity as Nassau County Sheriff (the “Nassau County Sheriff”);

Joseph Fucito, in his official capacity as New York City Sheriff (the “New York City Sheriff”);

and John and Jane Does 1-10. See Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1.

On August 5, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the operative Amended Complaint. See Amended

Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), ECF No. 25.1

In summary, Plaintiffs allege that they have suffered various injuries as a result of events

1 Although the Complaint also listed Oleg Cassini, Inc. (“OCI”) and Cassini Parfums Ltd.

(“CPL”) as plaintiffs in this action, see Compl. at 1, 3, the Amended Complaint removed OCI

and CPL as plaintiffs “without prejudice, based upon the representation by [Defendant

Baiamonte] (through her counsel) that she solely has the authority to retain counsel and

commence litigation on behalf of said corporations.” See Am. Compl. at 1, 3, 12 n.3.

that took place in connection with over a decade of litigation in the Surrogate’s Court of the State

of New York, County of Nassau (the “Surrogate’s Court”) relating to the estate of Oleg Cassini.2

More specifically, the Amended Complaint alleges that various assets, of which Plaintiffs claim

ownership, have been mismanaged and/or stolen from Plaintiffs, including real property located

at 313 McCouns Lane, Oyster Bay Cove (the “McCouns Lane Property”) and approximately

seven hundred fifty-five items removed from various properties and sold at auction in 2019 by

Defendant Doyle Galleries. The Amended Complaint further alleges that Mrs. Cassini suffered

various harms when she was held in contempt, arrested, and detained for a total of approximately

eight months for failing to comply with orders issued by the Surrogate’s Court.

The Amended Complaint asserts twelve Causes of Action: (1) violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1962 – Civil RICO, against Defendants DeLuca, Mahon, Reilly, Baiamonte, and Miller

(collectively, the “RICO Defendants”), see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120-37; (2) violation of the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section

1983”), against Defendants Reilly, the County of Nassau, the Public Administrator, the Nassau

County Sheriff, and the New York City Sheriff, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 138-43; (3) violation of the

Fourth Amendment right against unlawful seizure, brought pursuant to Section 1983, against

Defendants Reilly, the County of Nassau, the Nassau County Sheriff, and the New York City

Sheriff, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 144-55; (4) violation of the Eighth Amendment right against

excessive bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punishment, brought pursuant to Section 1983,

against Defendants Reilly, the County of Nassau, and the Nassau County Sheriff, see Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 156-60; (5) conspiracy to violate civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and

2 Familiarity with the detailed procedural history and background of this action and the relevant

proceedings, decisions, and orders in state court is assumed herein.

1986, against all Defendants, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 161-62; (6) abuse of process, in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and New York State Law, against the RICO

Defendants, the County of Nassau, and the Public Administrator, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 163-65; (7)

conversion, against the RICO Defendants and Defendant Doyle Galleries, see Am. Compl.

¶¶ 166-68; (8) breach of fiduciary duty, against Defendants Baiamonte, DeLuca, and the Public

Administrator, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 169-73; (9) constructive trust, against Defendants Baiamonte,

the Public Administrator, and Doyle Galleries, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 174-76; (10) intentional

infliction of emotional distress, against all Defendants, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 177-80; (11) trespass,

against all Defendants excluding the New York City Sheriff, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 181-82; and

(12) unjust enrichment, against the RICO Defendants and Defendant Doyle Galleries, see Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 183-85.

Plaintiffs request that the Court issue an order awarding Plaintiffs the following relief:

“[e]stablishing a constructive trust over all Plaintiffs’ property remaining in the possession of

any of the Defendants and all monies in Defendants’ possession or control obtained through the

sale of property belonging to Plaintiffs;” “[e]njoining all Defendants from taking any action vis-

à-vis Plaintiffs and/or the Oleg Cassini Estate until further order of this Court or the New York

State Appellate Division;” “[a] declaratory judgment declaring that Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights have been violated by Defendants in the manner described and alleged in and by” the

Amended Complaint; compensatory damages in the amount of $350,000,000.00; treble damages

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); punitive damages “in amount to be determined by this Court;”

attorney’s fees and costs; and such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and

proper. See Am. Compl. at 38.3

3 In citing to the Amended Complaint, which does not contain internal pagination, the Court

Pending before the Court are (1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Motion to

Dismiss”), see Defendants’ Notice of Motion, ECF No. 64; Affidavit of Rosalia Baiamonte, Esq.

in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss (“Baiamonte Affidavit”), ECF No. 64-1;4

Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Joint Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint (“Defs.’ Br.”), ECF No. 64-39; Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Further

Support of Their Joint Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (“Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No.

66, and (2) Defendants Baiamonte and Miller’s Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(c) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Motion for Sanctions”), see Notice of Motion, ECF No.

69; Affirmation of Jeffrey A. Miller, Esq. in Support of Motion for Sanctions (“Miller

Affirmation”), ECF No. 69-1;5 Baiamonte Affidavit, ECF No. 69-6;6 Rosalia Baiamonte’s and

Jeffrey A. Miller’s Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Sanctions

(“Sanctions Br.”), ECF No. 69-44; Rosalia Baiamonte’s and Jeffrey A. Miller’s Joint Reply

Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Their Motion for Sanctions (“Sanctions Reply”),

ECF No. 71.

refers either to paragraph numbers or to the page numbers generated by the Court’s electronic

case filing system (“ECF”). The Court also refers to the page numbers generated by ECF in

citing to the exhibits attached to the Amended Complaint. Unless noted otherwise, all other

citations are to the cited document’s internal pagination.

4 Together with the Baiamonte Affidavit, Defendants submitted thirty-seven exhibits

(“Baiamonte Exs.”). See ECF Nos. 64-2 to 64-38. In citing to these exhibits, the Court uses

the letters assigned to the exhibits in the Baiamonte Affidavit and refers to the page numbers

generated by ECF.

5 Together with the Miller Affirmation, Defendants Baiamonte and Miller submitted four

exhibits. See ECF Nos. 69-2 to 69-5.

6 The Baiamonte Affidavit and accompanying exhibits were filed in connection with both the

Motion to Dismiss, see ECF Nos. 64-1 to 64-38, and the Motion for Sanctions, see ECF Nos.

69-6 to 69-43.

Plaintiffs oppose both motions. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (“Pls.’ Br.”), ECF No. 65; Declaration of Kristina S. Heuser, Esq. in

Opposition to F.R.C.P. Rule 11 Motion (“Heuser Declaration”), ECF No. 70;7 Memorandum of

Law in Opposition to F.R.C.P. Rule 11 Motion (“Sanctions Opp.”), ECF No. 70-9.

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted, the Amended

Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, and the Motion for Sanctions is denied.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background8

A. Relevant Individuals and Entity

Oleg Cassini, the internationally renowned fashion designer, died in March 2006 and was

survived by his wife, Mrs. Cassini, and two daughters from a prior marriage, Christina Cassini

and Daria Cassini. See Am. Compl. ¶ 3; Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 3, ECF No. 25-2 (Matter of Cassini, 182

A.D.3d 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2020)). Daria Cassini died in 2010. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 4.

Christina Cassini died in 2015, after which attorney John J. Barnosky and Alexandre Cassini

Belmont (together, the “Objectants”) became the executors of Christina Cassini’s estate and

successor administrators of Daria Cassini’s estate. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 4.

Plaintiff Gemeaux is a New York corporation of which Mrs. Cassini serves as Chief

7 Together with the Heuser Declaration, Plaintiffs submitted eight exhibits. See ECF Nos. 70-1

to 70-8.

8 The following facts, which are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, are drawn from

the Amended Complaint, the exhibits attached to the Amended Complaint (“Pls.’ Exs.”), ECF

Nos. 25-2 and 25-3, and certain documents that are subject to judicial notice and/or

incorporated by reference in or integral to the Amended Complaint, as to which there appears

to be no dispute regarding authenticity, accuracy, or relevance.

Executive Officer and is a fifty-percent shareholder. See Am. Compl. ¶ 4.9

B. The Accounting Proceeding and Removal of Mrs. Cassini as Executor

Oleg Cassini’s last will and testament was admitted to probate in August 2007, and,

pursuant to its terms, Mrs. Cassini was appointed executor of Oleg Cassini’s estate. See Pls.’ Ex.

2 at 2, ECF No. 25-3 (Matter of Cassini, 182 A.D.3d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2020)). Mrs.

Cassini served as executor of the estate for several years. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 3.

Litigation involving various claims to the estate’s assets thereafter ensued, including a

petition filed by Mrs. Cassini in or about January 2011 in the Surrogate’s Court for judicial

settlement of her intermediate account as executor (the “Accounting Proceeding”). See Pls.’ Ex.

1 at 4; Nassau County Surrogate’s Court File No. 343100/G. Mrs. Cassini’s petition reflected

that the estate had total gross assets of more than $56 million, including OCI and CPL. See Pls.’

Ex. 1 at 4.

In 2013, Christina Cassini commenced a proceeding for the removal and immediate

suspension of Mrs. Cassini as executor. See Baiamonte Ex. C at 4; see also Baiamonte Ex. B at

4. In an Order dated March 13, 2014, Judge Edward W. McCarty, III (“Judge McCarty”) –

Nassau County Surrogate at that time – declined to revoke letters testamentary issued to Mrs.

Cassini without a hearing. See Baiamonte Ex. B at 13. However, in the March 13, 2014 Order,

Judge McCarty described various examples of the conduct of Mrs. Cassini that warranted the

immediate suspension of letters testamentary issued to Mrs. Cassini, including that Mrs. Cassini

“filed numerous contradictory statements with the [Surrogate’s Court] regarding the ownership

of estate assets;” that Mrs. Cassini “filed a deficient account and in response to multiple

9 The other half of Gemeaux is owned by Mrs. Cassini’s sister, Peggy Nestor. See Am. Compl.

¶ 4.

schedules, merely provided that the information was not yet available;” that “[w]hile ostensibly

acting as trustee of the supplemental needs trust set up under the decedent’s will, [Mrs. Cassini]

set up a different trust in contravention to the decedent’s wishes and without court permission”

and “further paid herself the balance of the supplemental needs trust and sidestepped the

requirements of SCPA 1805 . . . by claiming that the funds were her own and not the

decedent’s;” and that Mrs. Cassini had “personal claims which amount[ed] to almost the entire

estate which put[] her in position of conflict with the beneficiary.” See Baiamonte Ex. B at 13-

14. Also in the March 13, 2014 Order, Judge McCarty appointed the Public Administrator of

Nassau County – at that time, Defendant DeLuca – as temporary administrator of Oleg Cassini’s

estate and scheduled a hearing on the revocation of letters for May 16, 2014. See Baiamonte Ex.

B at 14; see also Baiamonte Ex. C at 5.

The relevant parties appeared before the Surrogate’s Court for a hearing on Mrs.

Cassini’s removal as executor on May 30, June 2, and June 5, 2014. See Baiamonte Ex. C at 5.

The parties entered into a Stipulation, which was placed on the record in open court before Judge

McCarty. See Baiamonte Ex. C at 5. By Decree dated November 3, 2014, Judge McCarty

ordered, inter alia, “that the Letters Testamentary previously issued to [Mrs. Cassini], as

Executor of the Estate of Oleg Cassini, are revoked, based upon [Mrs. Cassini’s] resignation

deemed made on June 5, 2014 from that fiduciary post” and “that Letters of Administration

C.T.A. shall issue to Jeffrey DeLuca, the Public Administrator of Nassau County . . . , to serve as

the Administrator C.T.A. of the Estate of Oleg Cassini.” See Baiamonte Ex. C at 6; see also

Baiamonte Ex. D at 3-4.

Meanwhile, in May 2014, Christina Cassini, individually and as administrator of Daria

Cassini’s estate, filed objections to Mrs. Cassini’s intermediate account. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 4;

Nassau County Surrogate’s Court File No. 343100/G.

C. 2015 Surrogate’s Court Orders: Authorizing Public Administrator to Run

OCI and CPL and Granting Summary Judgment

Judge McCarty issued an Order, dated August 3, 2015, that authorized and directed the

Public Administrator (at that time, Defendant DeLuca) to run the day-to-day operations of OCI

and CPL and all their respective assets and properties. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 4; Baiamonte Ex. E at 4,

8. The August 3, 2015 Order also, inter alia, suspended any authority of Mrs. Cassini and Peggy

Nestor to perform any acts as managers, directors, or officers of OCI and CPL. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at

4; Baiamonte Ex. E at 8.

Then, in an Order dated November 5, 2015, Judge McCarty, upon a decision dated

October 9, 2015, granted the Objectants’ motion for summary judgment, sustaining certain

specified objections to Mrs. Cassini’s account. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 4; see generally Baiamonte

Exs. G, H. The November 5, 2015 Order determined that the shares of OCI and CPL identified

in Schedule A of Mrs. Cassini’s account were assets of the estate and directed Mrs. Cassini to

turn over all stock certificates and financial banking records for OCI and CPL to the Public

Administrator (at that time, Defendant DeLuca), as administrator C.T.A. of the estate. See Pls.’

Ex. 1 at 4; see generally Baiamonte Exs. G, H.

D. 2016 Surrogate’s Court Proceedings and Orders: Withdrawal of Counsel,

Stay, Appointment of Receiver, and Trial

In or around December 2015, Mrs. Cassini’s attorneys moved for leave to withdraw from

representing Mrs. Cassini and requested, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 321(c), that the matter be

stayed “for a period of not less than 30 days after notice to appoint another attorney has been

served on [Mrs. Cassini].” See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 5-6; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.10 The

10 Commencing in early 2010, Mrs. Cassini was represented in the estate litigation, including in

Objectants did not oppose the motions for leave to withdraw. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 6. However,

despite knowing that Mrs. Cassini’s counsel was seeking to be relieved and seeking to have a

stay imposed pending service of a notice to appoint successor counsel, the Objectants cross-

moved to appoint a receiver, and the Public Administrator (at that time, Defendant DeLuca)

joined in that cross motion. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 6.

By Order dated March 14, 2016, Judge Reilly – who had become Surrogate in or around

January 2016, see Am. Compl. ¶ 18 – granted, with respect to the Accounting Proceeding,

Reppert Kelly’s motion for leave to withdraw and provided for a stay of all proceedings for 30

days, which stay took effect as of the date of the March 14, 2016 Order. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 11.

Nevertheless, proceedings took place on April 6, 2016, without Mrs. Cassini’s participation, in

the context of the Accounting Proceeding. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 11-12.

On June 8, 2016, a conference was held, during which Judge Reilly directed that the trial

of the Accounting Proceeding would proceed on July 25, 2016. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 13; Pls.’ Ex. 2

at 3. By Order dated July 1, 2016, Judge Reilly, in effect, granted the Objectants’ cross motion

to appoint a receiver, and appointed Rosalia Baiamonte as Receiver. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 15. On or

about July 11, 2016, Mrs. Cassini made two pro se motions: (1) to adjourn the trial to allow her

an additional 60 days to locate and retain competent counsel and allow them sufficient time to

review the file so as to represent her properly, and (2) to vacate the July 1, 2016 Order, inter alia,

appointing a receiver. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 15.

Mrs. Cassini’s motion for an adjournment remained undecided when the trial commenced

on July 25, 2016. See Pls.’ Ex. 2 at 4. At trial, soon after the parties gave their appearances,

the Accounting Proceeding, by J. Vincent Reppert of Reppert Kelly, LLC and Charles H.

Kaplan of Sills Cummis & Gross P.C. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 5; see also Pls.’ Ex. 2 at 2.

Mrs. Cassini again requested an adjournment so that she could secure counsel with adequate time

to prepare, which request was denied. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 17; Pls.’ Ex. 2 at 5. According to the

decision after trial, the trial took place on July 25, 26, and 27, 2016 and the evidence presented

included exhibits numbered up to 171 and 3 witnesses. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 17.

By Order dated October 19, 2016, Judge Reilly, inter alia, directed Mrs. Cassini “to

perform certain tasks and deliver certain information and documents to the receiver.” See Pls.’

Ex. 1 at 17-18. The October 19, 2016 Order “recited, among other things, that at a conference,

the receiver advised the court of [Mrs. Cassini’s] continued lack of cooperation and ongoing

refusal to comply with the receiver’s requests for access, information, and documents, thus

impeding the receiver’s attempts to ascertain and preserve the property belonging to OCI and

CPL, and that the receiver made an oral application, in which both the Public Administrator and

the objectants joined, to direct [Mrs. Cassini] to comply with all requests for access, information,

and documents contained in a prior correspondence of the receiver.” See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 18.

By Order dated December 12, 2016, Judge Reilly denied, as “moot,” Mrs. Cassini’s

motion to adjourn the trial, stating that the same relief was requested and denied at the trial, and

that the trial had taken place. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 18.

E. 2017 Surrogate’s Court Orders: Denial of Motions to Vacate, Civil

Contempt, and Arrest Warrant

By Order dated March 6, 2017, Judge Reilly denied Mrs. Cassini’s motion to vacate the

July 1, 2016 order, which order had, in effect, granted the Objectants’ cross motion to appoint a

receiver, upon Mrs. Cassini’s default, and appointed a receiver. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 18.

By notice of motion dated April 12, 2017, Mrs. Cassini moved pro se to “vacate and

declare null and void all Decisions, Orders, Judgments and Proceedings entered or occurring in

this proceeding after March 14, 2016 to the date immediately preceding the decision on this

motion on the grounds that all proceedings were automatically stayed pursuant to CPLR 321(c)

until 30 days after notice to appoint a new attorney was served on [Mrs. Cassini] following the

Court’s March 14, 2016 order granting her attorney’s application to withdraw due to health

reasons” and for other and further relief. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 19-20 (alterations accepted). In her

affidavit submitted in support of her motion, Mrs. Cassini argued that the proceeding was stayed

pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 321(c) when her attorney was determined to be unable, due to health

reasons, to continue representing her. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 20. According to Mrs. Cassini, the stay

continued until 30 days after the attorney for the adverse party sent the notice to appoint attorney

required by N.Y. C.P.L.R. 321(c). See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 20. Mrs. Cassini asserted that no such

notice was ever given and, therefore, all motions, orders, decisions, judgments, and proceedings

that happened after March 14, 2016, including but not limited to the order, in effect, granting the

cross motion to appoint receiver, as well as the trial, were null and void and must be vacated.

See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 20.

The Objectants set forth various arguments in opposition to Mrs. Cassini’s motion to

vacate, and the Public Administrator (at that time, Defendant DeLuca) also opposed the motion

for the same reasons set forth in the Objectants’ opposition. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 20.

In reply, Mrs. Cassini contended, inter alia, that the choice to proceed pro se was

involuntarily forced on her by the court. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 20.

The Surrogate’s Court issued an Amended Order dated November 13, 2017, in which it

determined that Mrs. Cassini’s motion was without merit and denied the motion. See Pls.’ Ex. 1

at 21.

Meanwhile, around the time that the motion practice was taking place on Mrs. Cassini’s

motion to vacate, the Receiver moved, inter alia, to hold Mrs. Cassini in civil and criminal

contempt for her alleged failure to comply with the October 19, 2016 Order. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at

21. By Order dated November 14, 2017, the Surrogate’s Court deemed Mrs. Cassini to be in

civil contempt for her failure to comply with the court’s October 19, 2016 Order, and directed

that she could purge her contempt by complying with the October 19, 2016 Order within 10 days

of the filing of the November 14, 2017 Order with notice of entry. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 21. The

Surrogate’s Court then issued an Order dated December 21, 2017 in which it determined that

Mrs. Cassini had failed to purge her contempt and ordered that a warrant of arrest and

commitment would issue directing the Nassau County Sheriff to arrest Mrs. Cassini and take her

into custody, and to bring her before the Surrogate’s Court to be committed to jail until she

complied with the October 19, 2016 Order. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 21; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 67.

F. The Arrests of Mrs. Cassini, Sale of McCouns Lane Property, and Doyle

Galleries Auction

The Amended Complaint alleges that Mrs. Cassini was “brutally seized and effectively

kidnapped off of the street by six agents of the New York City Sheriff at 54th Street and Fifth

Avenue in front of the University Club at 7:18 p.m. on the evening of May 3, 2018” and that

“[f]rom there, the New York City Sheriff immediately took Mrs. Cassini to a holding pen in

Long Island City and held her[] there overnight against her will and without due process of law.”

See Am. Compl. ¶ 68. The Amended Complaint further alleges that Mrs. Cassini was injured

when she was “unlawfully seized off the street and thrown into a vehicle with her hands cuffed

behind her back, hitting the door and falling to the floor like a rag doll” and that Mrs. Cassini

“heard someone saying, ‘Does she have a pulse?’ right before she passed out.” See Am. Compl.

¶ 69. The Amended Complaint alleges that Mrs. Cassini was released on or about November 2,

2018. See Am. Compl. ¶ 80.

The Amended Complaint alleges that, while Mrs. Cassini was incarcerated, the RICO

Defendants conspired together to execute the seizure of Mrs. Cassini’s real property – the

McCouns Lane Property – and its contents. See Am. Compl. ¶ 73.

The record reflects that in an Order dated May 23, 2018, Judge Reilly noted, inter alia,

that Mrs. Cassini was taken into custody for her failure to comply with the requirements of the

court’s October 19, 2016 Order and that Mrs. Cassini had continued to refuse to provide

information required by the October 19, 2016 Order, including information necessary for the

Receiver to gain access to the McCouns Lane Property, and Judge Reilly authorized the Receiver

to take all steps reasonably necessary to gain access to, manage, and operate the McCouns Lane

Property. See Baiamonte Ex. S at 5.

The record further reflects that by Order dated May 30, 2018, Judge Reilly ordered that

the Receiver is authorized to sell numerous items, “all of which belong to [OCI and CPL] or the

Estate” (the “Company Items”), and that the Receiver shall undertake the following procedures

with respect to such sale(s):

1. The Receiver shall be authorized to engage the services of one or more auction

service companies to which the Company Items will be consigned.

2. The Receiver shall create an inventory of all Company Items that she intends to

sell through consignment, and shall provide the inventory of such items to

counsel for Marianne Nestor Cassini, with a copy to the additional parties listed

below. The Receiver may distribute such inventory on a rolling basis.

3. Within 14 days of being provided with the complete or partial inventory of

Company Items, counsel for Ms. Cassini may provide evidence to the Receiver

that certain inventoried items do not belong to the Companies.

4. Upon considering such evidence, the Receiver shall determine whether the

disputed property belongs to the Companies, and shall communicate such

determination to counsel for all parties in writing.

5. If the Receiver determines that items disputed by Ms. Cassini are Company

Items, and Ms. Cassini continues to dispute that determination, she may, within

5 days of receiving the Receiver’s determination, make an application to the

Court by Order to Show Cause for an order determining the ownership of the

disputed items.

6. Any Company Items not timely disputed by Ms. Cassini under the procedures

set forth herein, and any item the Court determines to be an asset of the

Companies under the procedures set forth herein, shall promptly be sold.

See Baiamonte Ex. EE at 4-5.

The record also reflects that on October 18, 2018, the District Court of Nassau County

issued an Order granting OCI a judgment of possession with the warrant stayed until November

19, 2018, noting that after November 19, 2018, OCI may proceed to evict Mrs. Cassini. See

Baiamonte Ex. U at 3; see also Baiamonte Exs. V at 2 (Warrant of Eviction noting that “[f]inal

decision in favor of the petitioner(s) has been granted based on the judgment of possession

entered in the Nassau County District Court – 1st District on 11/01/2018, which awarded the

petitioner(s) the delivery of the premises: (1) Oleg Cassini Inc” and commanding the Sheriff of

Nassau County to remove Mrs. Cassini, John Doe, Jane Doe, “[a]nd all other persons from the

following described premises, located in the County of Nassau and to put said petitioner(s) in full

possession thereof: (1) 313 McCouns Lane, Oyster Bay, NY 11771-3123”), W (Landlord and

Tenant Judgment entered on November 1, 2018), X (Order of Dismissal dated October 15, 2019

issued by the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of the State of New York for the 9th & 10th

Judicial Districts dismissing appeal of November 1, 2018 judgment). By Order dated March 25,

2019, Judge Reilly authorized the Receiver to proceed with the sale of the McCouns Lane

Property as set forth in the Purchase Option Agreement and Residential Contract of Sale

approved by the court. See Baiamonte Ex. BB at 6; see also Baiamonte Ex. CC at 4 (Decision &

Order on Motion dated May 20, 2019 issued by the Supreme Court of the State of New York,

Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department (the “Appellate Division”), inter alia, denying

leave to appeal the March 25, 2019 Order and dismissing the appeal purportedly taken as of

right).

During this time period, Mrs. Cassini and Peggy Nestor entered into a Stipulation and

Order, dated November 1, 2018 and So-Ordered by Judge Reilly, setting forth, inter alia, that

“[w]ithin five (5) days of the execution of this Stipulation by counsel for the parties therein, the

Receiver shall be provided with all keys to the Premises [15 East 63rd Street, New York, New

York] if they have not already been provided;” that “[t]he Receiver shall be entitled to

commence the process of removing items from the Premises, including books and records and

any other items existing at the Premises but excluding fixtures;” that “[t]he Receiver is permitted

in her sole discretion to retain professionals or other third parties to assist in the packing and

removal of items from the Premises;” and that Mrs. Cassini and Peggy Nestor “shall not interfere

in any way with the Receiver’s actions set forth herein.” See Baiamonte Ex. FF at 3.

As alleged in the Amended Complaint, “[o]n January 10, 2019, Mrs. Cassini observed a

large Doyle Galleries truck parked in[] front of her townhouse located at 15 East 63rd Street,

New York, New York” and “further observed Ms. Baiamonte in front of the premises directing

the removal of property therefrom.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 83. The Amended Complaint further

alleges that “[s]hortly thereafter, Mrs. Cassini contacted representatives of Doyle Galleries to

make them aware that property they had and/or were looking to abscond with belonged to her,

her sister, Peggy, and/or Gemeaux Ltd.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 84.

The Amended Complaint alleges that “[i]n order to further their conspiracy and steal

additional assets of Plaintiff, the insatiable RICO defendants needed to get Mrs. Cassini out of

the way” and that “on January 22, 2019, Mrs. Cassini was entrapped and arrested in Judge

Reilly’s courtroom after having been ordered to appear there by the Judge.” See Am. Compl.

¶ 85. The Amended Complaint further alleges that “[a]lmost immediately upon jailing Mrs.

Cassini for the second time, on or about February 12, 2019, Defendants and/or their agents broke

down the door to and trespassed upon and seized Mrs. Cassini’s residence located at 135 East

19th Street, New York, New York and all of the art, furniture and valuables contained therein.”

See Am. Compl. ¶ 87. The Amended Complaint alleges that Mrs. Cassini was released from jail

on March 27, 2019. See Am. Compl. ¶ 107.

The Amended Complaint alleges that “[t]he RICO defendants disregarded Plaintiffs’

proof of ownership and proceeded, with the assistance and cooperation of Doyle Galleries, to

catalogue and sell Plaintiffs’ property at auction.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 91. The Amended

Complaint further alleges that “[a] sale of the contents of the residence was held on June 27,

2019 by Doyle Galleries,” where “[a]pproximately seven hundred fifty-five items were sold.”

See Am. Compl. ¶ 93.

G. February 2020 Appellate Division Decisions

The Appellate Division issued four Orders dated February 13, 2020 in connection with

Mrs. Cassini’s various appeals from the Surrogate’s Court. See Pls.’ Exs. 1, 2; Baiamonte Exs. F

(Matter of Cassini, 180 A.D.3d 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2020)), I (Matter of Cassini, 180

A.D.3d 775 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2020)).

The Appellate Division affirmed, insofar as appealed from, Judge McCarty’s August 3,

2015 Order granting “that branch of the objectants’ motion which was to appoint a temporary

receiver to the extent of appointing the Public Administrator to run the day-to-day business

operations of OCI and CPL.” See Baiamonte Ex. F at 6. The Appellate Division also affirmed

Judge McCarty’s November 5, 2015 Order, which Order, inter alia, granted “those branches of

[the Objectants’] motion which were for summary judgment sustaining” certain objections to

Mrs. Cassini’s account, which resulted in the determination that the shares of OCI and CPL

identified in Schedule A of Mrs. Cassini’s account were assets of the estate. See Baiamonte Ex. I

at 6; see also Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 4; Baiamonte Ex. H at 5-6. The Appellate Division reversed Judge

Reilly’s Order dated December 12, 2016, granted Mrs. Cassini’s motion for an adjournment of

the trial date, and remitted the matter to the Surrogate’s Court for a new trial in the Accounting

Proceeding. See Pls.’ Ex. 2 at 9.

In addition, the Appellate Division decided appeals by Mrs. Cassini “from three orders of

the Surrogate’s Court (Margaret C. Reilly, S.), dated March 6, 2017, November 14, 2017, and

December 21, 2017, respectively, and an amended order of the same court dated November 13,

2017.” See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 1. The Appellate Division reversed the Order dated March 6, 2017,

which Order denied Mrs. Cassini’s motion to vacate the July 1, 2016 Order; granted Mrs.

Cassini’s motion; and vacated the July 1, 2016 Order, which Order had, in effect, granted, upon

Mrs. Cassini’s default, the Objectants’ cross motion to appoint a receiver and appointed a

receiver. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 36-37. The Appellate Division noted that while it concluded “that

[Mrs. Cassini] must be provided with the opportunity to respond to the cross motion [to appoint

receiver] on its merits,” the Appellate Division also nevertheless concluded that “based on the

evidentiary showing made on the cross motion by the objectants, the receiver should remain in

place as a temporary receiver pending a new determination of the cross motion,” noting that

while Mrs. Cassini’s “right to counsel, and her rights under CPLR 321(c) should be protected, so

too should the objectants’ rights to prevent dissipation or looting of the estate and its assets.” See

Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 38-39. The Appellate Division also reversed the Amended Order dated November

13, 2017 – which had denied Mrs. Cassini’s motion to vacate and declare void all decisions,

orders, and judgments entered after March 14, 2016, as violative of the CPLR 321(c) stay – and

granted Mrs. Cassini’s motion “to the extent of vacating all decisions, orders, and judgments

entered in all proceedings herein between March 14, 2016, and July 25, 2016” but “otherwise

den[ied] such motion.” See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 39.11 Further, the Appellate Division dismissed Mrs.

Cassini’s appeal from the Order dated November 14, 2017, which Order had, inter alia, granted

the Receiver’s motion to hold Mrs. Cassini in contempt; dismissed Mrs. Cassini’s appeal from

the Order dated December 21, 2017, which Order had, inter alia, directed that a warrant of arrest

and commitment issue; and declined to grant leave to appeal with respect to the December 21,

2017 Order. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 39.

H. October 2020 Surrogate’s Court Decision and Order

Following the Appellate Division’s February 13, 2020 Orders, the Objectants filed, inter

alia, “[a] motion for an order reconfirming the appointment of the Receiver, Rosalia Baiamonte,

Esq. . . . : (1) pursuant to CPLR 6401, as receiver of [OCI] and [CPL]; and (2) reconfirming the

grant to Baiamonte of [various receivership powers].” See Baiamonte Ex. M at 4-5. By

Decision & Order dated October 27, 2020, Judge Reilly granted the motion in full, noting that

the receivership powers granted to Baiamonte are addressed in a separate order issued by the

Surrogate together with the Decision & Order. See Baiamonte Ex. M at 8, 14. In the separate

Order, also dated October 27, 2020, Judge Reilly ordered that “the Receiver has been granted all

of the customary and usual powers of a Receiver, including the exclusive power to represent,

operate, manage, govern, preserve, administer and maximize the value of the assets of OCI and

CPL.” See Baiamonte Ex. N at 4.

I. 2021 State Court Conversion Action

On or about August 4, 2021, Gemeaux, Mrs. Cassini, and Peggy Nestor filed a complaint

against Doyle Galleries in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County,

bringing a cause of action for the tort of conversion under New York law (the “2021 Conversion

11 Plaintiffs appear to overstate the scope of the vacatur.

Action”). See Gemeaux Ltd. v. William Doyle Galleries Inc., No. 157251/2021, 2021 WL

6249530, at *1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 7, 2021), aff’d, 210 A.D.3d 408 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t

2022). The complaint in that case alleged, inter alia:

On June 27, 2019, Doyle sold at auction to various persons and/or entities a

substantial number of items of property owned by one or more of the plaintiffs,

which property had been wrongfully removed from a townhouse owned by [Mrs.

Cassini], located at 135 E. 19th St. in New York County, and from Gemeaux’s

place of business at 15 E. 63rd St. in New York County. On June 27, 2019, Doyle

sold at auction to various persons or entities a substantial number of items of

property owned by one or more of the plaintiffs, which included property located

at 313 McCoun’s Lane in Oyster Bay, Long Island. The foregoing auction included

of 755 lots of personal property, the bulk of which was owned by one or more of

the plaintiffs.

See Gemeaux Ltd., 2021 WL 6249530, at *2 (quoting complaint in the 2021 Conversion Action);

see also Baiamonte Ex. II at 4.

By Decision and Order dated December 7, 2021, Justice Laurence Love of the Supreme

Court of the State of New York, New York County dismissed the complaint in its entirety, noting

that “[t]hrough a review of all the documents submitted this court finds documentary evidence to

warrant dismissal of this action.” See Gemeaux Ltd., 2021 WL 6249530, at *2. By Decision and

Order dated November 1, 2022, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate

Division, First Judicial Department affirmed, noting that Defendant “presented documents,

including a Surrogate Court order and so-ordered stipulation, definitively disproving the claim”

and that “Defendant’s documents further establish that this action seeks to relitigate issues of fact

previously decided in the Surrogate’s Court’s action, which plaintiffs failed to appeal.” See

Gemeaux Ltd., 210 A.D.3d at 409.

J. The Instant Action

The Amended Complaint alleges that, as of the date of the filing of the Amended

Complaint, August 5, 2022, there had been no trial in the Accounting Proceeding and Mrs.

Cassini had received no distributions from her husband’s estate. See Am. Compl. ¶ 116. The

Amended Complaint further alleges that Mrs. Cassini “has been made to pay millions of dollars

in legal fees” and “has had her personal and corporate property invaded and stolen, and was

illegally incarcerated twice for a total period of eight months.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 116.

The Amended Complaint’s First Cause of Action alleges violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 –

Civil RICO. See Am. Compl. at 26. The Amended Complaint alleges that the RICO Defendants

“engaged in a racketeering scheme that resulted in the theft of Mrs. Cassini’s Nassau County

residence and the extremely valuable contents thereof, as well as the damage and destruction of

and theft of property from Plaintiffs’ two Manhattan properties.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 121. The

Amended Complaint further alleges that “[w]ith the blessing and at the direction of Judge Reilly,

property that Mr. & Mrs. Cassini cherished since they began living in their Nassau County home

in 1978 was sold by the Receiver callously and for a fraction of its value” and that the

“transaction at a bargain sale price has all the earmarks of ‘an inside job.’” See Am. Compl.

¶¶ 127-28. The Amended Complaint additionally alleges, inter alia, that Judge Reilly removed

Mrs. Cassini from the management of OCI and CPL; that Defendant Baiamonte was and remains

unqualified to serve as Receiver and that under the Receiver’s incompetent management,

Defendant Baiamonte “has allowed these prospering businesses to become shells of their former

thriving selves;” that Defendants “ransacked a townhouse that was owned by Mr. & Mrs. Cassini

since 1977 as joint tenants with rights of survivorship;” that Defendants Baiamonte and Miller

“and their co-conspirators have been paid more than 6 million dollars in fees and commissions,

upon court order issued by Defendant Reilly;” and that now the Receiver is trying to sell off the

two companies, OCI and CPL, “owned exclusively by Mrs. Cassini.” See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 122-

24, 129, 131, 134. The Amended Complaint alleges that “[t]he acts hereindescribed constitute

predicate acts sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirement of the RICO statute” and that

“[s]pecifically, the RICO defendants have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1957 relating to engaging in

monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314

and 2315 relating to interstate transportation of stolen property, have likely committed mail

fraud, bank fraud, and have surely violated the New York State Penal Law by committing acts of

kidnapping, fraud, embezzlement, larceny, bribery, and extortion.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 136.

The Amended Complaint’s Second Cause of Action alleges violation of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is brought pursuant to Section 1983. See Am. Compl.

at 29. The Amended Complaint alleges that “Defendants Judge Reilly, the County of Nassau,

the Public Administrator, the Nassau County Sheriff, and the New York City Sheriff, acting

under color of state law and pursuant to official policy or custom, violated Plaintiffs’ rights

afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in a variety of ways.”

See Am. Compl. ¶ 139. The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants Reilly, the County of

Nassau, the Public Administrator, and the Nassau County Sheriff deprived Plaintiffs of property

without due process of law and that Defendants Reilly, the County of Nassau, the Nassau County

Sheriff, and the New York City Sheriff also deprived Mrs. Cassini of her liberty without due

process of law. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 140-41. The Amended Complaint alleges that “the actions

of Defendants Judge Reilly, the County of Nassau, the Public Administrator, the Nassau County

Sheriff, and the New York City Sheriff violated Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights in that

Defendants’ conduct shocks the conscience, was outrageous and egregious under the

circumstances, and Defendants’ was truly brutal and offensive to Mrs. Cassini’s human dignity.”

See Am. Compl. ¶ 142. The Amended Complaint alleges that “[t]he Nassau County Sheriff and

New York City Sheriff were deliberately indifferent regarding the conduct of their deputies and

others under their supervision, and the treatment to which Mrs. Cassini was subjected.” See Am.

Compl. ¶ 143.

The Amended Complaint’s Third Cause of Action alleges violation of the Fourth

Amendment right against unlawful seizure and is brought pursuant to Section 1983 against Judge

Reilly, the County of Nassau, the Nassau County Sheriff, and the New York City Sheriff. See

Am. Compl. at 30. The Amended Complaint alleges that “[t]he person of Mrs. Cassini and all

Plaintiffs’ houses, papers, and effects were seized” and that the seizure was unreasonable and

without just or probable cause. See Am. Compl. ¶ 146. The Amended Complaint alleges that

“[t]he false arrest of Mrs. Cassini, perpetrated by the New York City Sheriff under color of state

law, caused her to sustain severe injuries to her eye and bruising and pain throughout her body”

and that “excessive force was used to effectuate the arrest.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 147. The

Amended Complaint alleges that “Mrs. Cassini endured two separate periods of confinement and

was held in jail for a total of eight months” and that “[s]uch arrest and confinement was

predicated upon purported violations of orders that the New York State Appellate Division has

since found unlawful.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 149. The Amended Complaint alleges that Mrs.

Cassini was routinely brought to court from jail in leg and hand shackles, with her hands cuffed

behind her back, causing her wrists to bleed. See Am. Compl. ¶ 150. The Amended Complaint

alleges that Judge Reilly refused to allow the shackles to be removed even for hearings and

ordered the guards to move Mrs. Cassini about the courtroom to “teach her a lesson” and that

Defendants John Does “lifted Mrs. Cassini under each arm and dragged her around the

courtroom with her arms behind her back and leg chains dragging.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 151. The

Amended Complaint alleges that “[t]he treatment of Mrs. Cassini by said Defendants, who were

at all relevant times acting under color of state law and pursuant to official policy or custom, was

not only excessive because it was wholly unnecessary, but also physically and morally

demeaning, and extremely painful in every way.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 152.12 The Amended

Complaint alleges that Mrs. Cassini “was eventually released upon habeas corpus motion to

Nassau County Supreme Court Judge Jack Libert.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 155.

The Amended Complaint’s Fourth Cause of Action alleges violation of the Eighth

Amendment right against excessive bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punishment and is brought

pursuant to Section 1983 against Defendants Reilly, the County of Nassau, and the Nassau

County Sheriff. See Am. Compl. at 32. The Amended Complaint alleges that “[t]he treatment of

Mrs. Cassini by the Nassau County Sheriff’s Office, perpetrated under color of state law and

pursuant to official policy or custom, was excessively harsh, cruel, entirely unwarranted, and

certainly unusual.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 158. The Amended Complaint alleges that “[c]onfining

Mrs. Cassini to jail for any period of time, but certainly for the excessive period of time she was

actually confined (freed the first time upon the imposition of excessive and punitive ‘bail’, and

the second time only due to the good fortune of having her habeas corpus application heard

before another judge while Judge Reilly was on vacation) certainly violates all contemporary

standards of decency.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 159. The Amended Complaint further alleges that the

Nassau County Sheriff and New York City Sheriff “were deliberately indifferent regarding the

conduct of their deputies and others under their supervision, and the treatment to which Mrs.

Cassini was subjected.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 160.

The Amended Complaint’s Fifth Cause of Action alleges conspiracy to violate civil rights

12 The Amended Complaint further alleges that Judge Reilly stated in open court, “I want to

keep that woman in jail;” that “[i]t is perhaps a historical first for a widow to be incarcerated

on two separate occasions for eight months over a will;” and that “[t]his was a truly

unnecessary, brutal, sadistic physical assault on Mrs. Cassini’s person, which has caused her

severe mental anguish.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 154.

in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, against all Defendants. See Am. Compl. at 33. The

Amended Complaint alleges that “Defendants conspired together in the manner described [in the

Amended Complaint] to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, and none of them

intervened to prevent the violation or deprivation of those rights despite their power to do so.”

See Am. Compl. ¶ 162.

The Amended Complaint’s Sixth Cause of Action alleges abuse of process in violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and New York State Law, against the RICO

Defendants, the County of Nassau, and the Public Administrator. See Am. Compl. at 34. The

Amended Complaint alleges, inter alia, that the RICO Defendants “employed otherwise legal

process to do harm to Plaintiffs in the manner described [in the Amended Complaint]” and that

“[t]hey defrauded and stole from Plaintiffs, unjustly enriched themselves and their friends and

associates, and utilized the power of the Surrogate’s Court under the guise of legal process to do

so.” See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 164-65.

The Amended Complaint’s Seventh Cause of Action alleges conversion against the RICO

Defendants and Doyle Galleries. See Am. Compl. at 34. The Amended Complaint alleges that

the RICO Defendants and Doyle Galleries “converted Plaintiffs’ property described [in the

Amended Complaint] by intentionally and without lawful authority assuming and exercising

control over said property, interfering with Plaintiffs’ rightful possession” and that the RICO

Defendants “continue to interfere with Plaintiffs’ lawful possession and ownership of their

respective property to the extent that said property was not already disposed of for said

Defendants’ financial gain.” See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 167-68.

The Amended Complaint’s Eighth Cause of Action alleges breach of fiduciary duty

against Defendants Baiamonte, DeLuca, and the Public Administrator. See Am. Compl. at 35.

The Amended Complaint alleges, inter alia, that Mrs. Cassini was to inherit the majority of the

estate, which Defendants Baiamonte and the Public Administrator have substantially dissipated

and wasted; that “Ms. Baiamonte, in her role as Receiver, has knowingly taken over corporations

rightfully owned by Mrs. Cassini and has failed to exercise due care in managing the companies’

holdings and profit-making endeavors, thereby irreparably damaging the corporations and Mrs.

Cassini;” and that “[w]ith the blessing and at the direction of Judge Reilly, property that Mr. &

Mrs. Cassini cherished since they began living in their Nassau County home in 1978 was sold by

the Receiver callously and for a fraction of its value.” See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 170-72.

The Amended Complaint’s Ninth Cause of Action alleges constructive trust against

Defendants Baiamonte, the Public Administrator, and Doyle Galleries. See Am. Compl. at 36.

The Amended Complaint alleges, inter alia, that Defendants Baiamonte and Doyle Galleries

“unlawfully acquired property rightfully belonging to Plaintiffs;” that “Ms. Baiamonte has stated

that some or all of the property was ‘owned’ by the Public Administrator;” and that “[t]he

property remaining in any of their possession, and the funds acquired as a result of the sale of

Plaintiffs’ property previously acquired by said Defendants, should be regarded as placed in a

constructive trust and returned to Plaintiffs lest said Defendants be further unjustly enriched.”

See Am. Compl. ¶ 176.

The Amended Complaint’s Tenth Cause of Action alleges intentional infliction of

emotional distress against all Defendants. See Am. Compl. at 37. The Amended Complaint

alleges, inter alia, that “Defendants’ conduct detailed [in the Amended Complaint] was so

outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency;” that “Defendants’ conduct continues to be extreme and outrageous, intended to – or at

best with a disregard of – a substantial probability of causing severe emotional distress to Mrs.

Cassini;” and that “Defendants’ conduct has resulted in [Mrs. Cassini] experiencing extreme and

lasting stress, anxiety, and agoraphobia” and Mrs. Cassini “has been and continues to be fearful

for her life.” See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 178-80.

The Amended Complaint’s Eleventh Cause of Action alleges trespass against all

Defendants excluding the New York City Sheriff. See Am. Compl. at 37. The Amended

Complaint alleges that “Defendants and their agents intentionally or recklessly entered and

remained upon Plaintiffs’ property without Plaintiffs’ permission and without justification.” See

Am. Compl. ¶ 182.

The Amended Complaint’s Twelfth Cause of Action alleges unjust enrichment against

the RICO Defendants and Doyle Galleries. See Am. Compl. at 37. The Amended Complaint

alleges that the RICO Defendants “and their co-conspirators, associates, and friends were

enriched by hundreds of millions of dollars at Plaintiffs’ expense” and that “[i]t is against equity

and good conscience to permit any of the Defendants to retain any of the monies they gained

through their participation in the criminal enterprise and fraudulent, corrupt conduct described

[in the Amended Complaint].” See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 184-85.13

II. Procedural Background

On March 27, 2022, Mrs. Cassini, OCI, CPL, and Gemeaux commenced this action. See

ECF No. 1. Thereafter, various pre-motion conference letters in anticipation of motions to

dismiss were filed, asserting that the Complaint suffered from various deficiencies; Plaintiffs, in

13 In briefing, Plaintiffs state, inter alia: “Plaintiffs intended to withdraw the state law tort claims

against the municipal defendants by the Amended Complaint, but inadvertently failed to do

so. Plaintiffs’ Sixth (insofar as it arises under state law), Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh causes

of action are hereby withdrawn (without prejudice) as to Defendants County of Nassau,

Curran, Dzurenda, and Fucito.” See Pls.’ Br. at 19 n.3. Accordingly, those Causes of Action

are deemed withdrawn, as specified.

response, expressed the view that the claims were sufficiently pled or, to the extent that there

were pleading deficiencies, such deficiencies could be cured by amendment; and Plaintiffs

requested leave to amend. See ECF Nos. 11-13, 17, 20-23. By Order dated July 5, 2022, the

Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend. See July 5, 2022 Order.

On August 5, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 25.

Thereafter, Defendants filed various pre-motion conference letters in anticipation of

motions to dismiss, asserting that the Amended Complaint suffered from various deficiencies,

and Plaintiffs responded. See ECF Nos. 26-27, 29-32, 34-35, 37-40. On October 12, 2022, the

Court held a pre-motion conference. See October 12, 2022 Minute Entry.

On March 31, 2023, Defendants filed their joint Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

which Plaintiffs oppose. See ECF Nos. 64-66. On April 19, 2023, Defendants Baiamonte and

Miller filed their Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which Plaintiffs oppose. See ECF Nos. 69-71.14

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)

when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v.

United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)). “A plaintiff

14 By letter dated September 19, 2023, Defendant Baiamonte informed the Court that the

Honorable Teresa K. Corrigan, Acting Surrogate of the Surrogate’s Court, had issued a

decision on September 8, 2023 which, inter alia, approved the Receiver’s interim accounting

for the period of July 1, 2016 through April 30, 2021. See ECF No. 72 at 1; see also generally

ECF No. 72 at 3-8 (Decision & Order). By letter dated September 27, 2023, Plaintiffs

responded to the September 19, 2023 letter, arguing that Judge Corrigan’s September 8, 2023

Decision & Order “has no bearing on the pending motions nor the merits of the claims set

forth in the Complaint” and was being appealed. See ECF No. 73 at 1-2; see also ECF No.

73-2.

asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that it exists.” Id.; see Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638

(2d Cir. 2005); Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The party invoking

federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists.” (quotation omitted)).

“In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a

district court . . . may refer to evidence outside the pleadings.” Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113. “If

the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss

the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

When a court is faced with a motion to dismiss pursuant to both Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court “must decide the jurisdictional

question first because a disposition of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is a decision on the merits and,

therefore, an exercise of jurisdiction.” Pressley v. City of N.Y., No. 11-CV-03234, 2013 WL

145747, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2013) (quotation omitted); see also United States ex rel.

Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1155-56 (2d Cir. 1993).

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint

must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir.

2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court must “accept all ‘well-

pleaded factual allegations’ in the complaint as true” and “‘construe all reasonable inferences

that can be drawn from the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Lynch v. City

of N.Y., 952 F.3d 67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2020) (first quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; then quoting

Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 2009)). However, “labels and conclusions” or

“formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action will not do,” and dismissal is proper

where “the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to

relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 558. A court is not “bound to accept conclusory allegations

or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.” See Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,

648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that

a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)); Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55,

59 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that “factual allegations must be sufficient to support necessary legal

conclusions” and “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief”). “In considering a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, ‘[a] district court is normally required to look only to the

allegations on the face of the complaint,’” though “[it] may consider documents that ‘are

attached to the complaint,’ ‘incorporated in it by reference,’ ‘integral’ to the complaint, or the

proper subject of judicial notice.” United States v. Strock, 982 F.3d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 2020)

(quoting Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007)). State court decisions are “public

records, and thus appropriate for judicial notice.” See Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 816 F.

App’x 532, 534 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Simmons v. Trans Express Inc., 16 F.4th 357, 360-61

(2d Cir. 2021) (noting that “[t]he district court properly took judicial notice of documents

indicating the claims [plaintiff] brought in small claims court, the remedies she sought, and the

judgment she was awarded”).15

15 Plaintiffs acknowledge that “it is within this Court’s discretion to consider public records in

deciding a motion to dismiss.” See ECF No. 73 at 1; see also Pls.’ Br. at 11 (acknowledging

that federal courts may take judicial notice of state court decisions).

DISCUSSION

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted, the Amended

Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, and the Motion for Sanctions is denied.

I. Mrs. Cassini’s Claims are Dismissed

As set forth below, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine appears to bar all of Mrs. Cassini’s

claims except to the extent she seeks to bring any excessive force claim(s). Accordingly, all of

Mrs. Cassini’s claims, except to the extent she seeks to bring any excessive force claim(s), must

be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Further, any excessive force claim(s) must

be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

A. Rooker-Feldman Bars Mrs. Cassini’s Claims, Except Any Excessive Force

Claim(s)

1. Applicable Law

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983) “established the clear principle that federal district courts lack jurisdiction

over suits that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments.” See Hoblock v. Albany

Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62,

67 (2d Cir. 2023). Rooker-Feldman “bars a party losing in state court from seeking what in

substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court.” See

Hunter, 75 F.4th at 67 (ellipsis and quotation omitted).

The Second Circuit has “articulated a four-part test according to which Rooker-Feldman

applies if ‘(1) the federal-court plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries

caused by a state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites review and rejection of that judgment;

and (4) the state judgment was rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’” See

id. at 68 (quoting Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir.

2014)).

The Second Circuit has stated that “the core requirement from which the other Rooker-

Feldman requirements derive” is that a “plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state court

judgment.” See id. at 71 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). In determining whether a

plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment, “the following formula guides [a

court’s] inquiry: a federal suit complains of injury from a state-court judgment, even if it appears

to complain only of a third party’s actions, when the third party’s actions are produced by a

state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it.” See id.

(alteration accepted) (quoting Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88); see also Charles v. Levitt, No. 15-CV-

09334, 2016 WL 3982514, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016) (noting that Rooker-Feldman does not

bar a claim “where a plaintiff alleges damages directly caused by defendants’ misconduct – not

by the state court judgment which the misconduct allegedly produced” but determining that

Rooker-Feldman barred plaintiff’s claims where the only damages plaintiff clearly pled were the

direct result of a judgment and an order appointing receiver and plaintiff “[sought] to redress

injuries that [were] a direct result of the state-court judgment and subsequent attempts to enforce

it”), aff’d and remanded on other grounds, 716 F. App’x 18 (2d Cir. 2017).

“Rooker-Feldman deprives a federal court of jurisdiction only if the federal suit is filed

‘after the state proceedings ended.’” See Hunter, 75 F.4th at 70 (quoting Exxon Mobil v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)). For Rooker-Feldman to apply, “[t]he state-court

proceedings must either have reached finality or yielded an order that satisfies ‘the exceptions to

the finality requirement that were set out in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469

(1975),’ so as to trigger the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.” Id. (quoting

ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 612 (1989)). In Hoblock, the Second Circuit observed

that although Rooker-Feldman’s “timing requirement will usually be straightforward,” “federal

suits challenging interlocutory state judgments may present difficult questions as to whether ‘the

state proceedings have “ended” within the meaning of Rooker-Feldman on the federal questions

at issue.’” See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 89 (quoting Federacion de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de

Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005)). “In making this observation,

the Second Circuit cited to Federacion, a First Circuit case that examined at length how Rooker-

Feldman applied to interlocutory state court judgments” and that “concluded that Rooker-

Feldman did indeed bar a federal suit that would have required the federal district court to review

and reject an interlocutory determination of a Puerto Rican court that federal law did not preempt

the state court proceedings.” Phillips ex rel. Green v. City of New York, 453 F. Supp. 2d 690,

714 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). “Although Federacion’s analysis of this issue concerning when a state

court proceeding has ‘ended’ has not been formally adopted by the Second Circuit,” courts in

this Circuit have been “persuaded by Federacion’s reasoning.” Id.; see also Robinson v. Cusack,

No. 05-CV-05318, 2007 WL 2028112, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2007).

The Federacion court explored what it means for state proceedings to have “ended” and

concluded that for purposes of Rooker-Feldman, generally speaking, state proceedings will have

“ended” in three situations: first, “when the highest state court in which review is available has

affirmed the judgment below and nothing is left to be resolved;” second, “if the state action has

reached a point where neither party seeks further action” – for example, “if a lower state court

issues a judgment and the losing party allows the time for appeal to expire;” and third, “if the

state court proceedings have finally resolved all the federal questions in the litigation, but state

law or purely factual questions (whether great or small) remain to be litigated.” See Federacion,

410 F.3d at 24-25; see also Phillips, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (discussing Federacion and noting

that these three situations are not limited to situations of a final judgment under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257). In other words, “Rooker-Feldman applies where the state proceeding has ended with

respect to the issues that the federal plaintiff seeks to have reviewed in federal court, even if

other matters remain to be litigated.” See Phillips, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (quoting

Federacion, 410 F.3d at 26). “Simply stated, proceedings end for Rooker-Feldman purposes

when the state courts finally resolve the issue that the federal court plaintiff seeks to relitigate in

a federal forum.” Hunter, 75 F.4th at 70 (alteration accepted) (quotation omitted).

2. Rooker-Feldman Applies to Mrs. Cassini’s Claims, Except Any Excessive

Force Claim(s)

Defendants argue that “it is obvious from the face of the Amended Complaint that

Plaintiffs are trying to challenge final court orders and decisions of the Surrogate’s Court that

were entered before this federal action was filed, primarily, Mrs. Cassini’s contempt, her court-

ordered arrest, the court-ordered sale of [the McCouns Lane Property], and the court-ordered sale

of the Doyle Auctioned Property,” and that “[e]ach of the issues and claims raised in the

Amended Complaint falls squarely within Rooker-Feldman.” See Defs.’ Br. at 15. Defendants

argue that Mrs. Cassini’s claims arising out of her court-ordered arrest easily meet all four

factors of the Rooker-Feldman test and that there can be no serious dispute that (1) Mrs. Cassini

“lost” in state court after Judge Reilly found her to be in contempt of court for refusing to turn

over OCI’s and CPL’s books and records to the Receiver; (2) Mrs. Cassini is complaining of

injuries stemming from Judge Reilly’s order holding her in contempt of court and issuing a

warrant for her arrest; (3) Mrs. Cassini is asking this Court to review and reject those orders; and

(4) each of these orders was entered long before this federal action was commenced. See Defs.’

Br. at 15. Defendants argue that the same analysis applies to the sale of OCI’s McCouns Lane

Property, which Mrs. Cassini claims was wrongfully taken from her and sold; that any claim

regarding the court-ordered sale of the McCouns Lane Property could have or should have been

pursued – and in fact, was pursued – before the Surrogate’s Court, the Appellate Division, and

the Nassau County District Court; and that Plaintiffs “may not seek to challenge those rulings by

dressing up their state court losses as a federal claim.” See Defs.’ Br. at 16-17. Further,

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ attempt to claim that “their” property was sold has been

repeatedly rejected and that Plaintiffs are asking this Court to unwind the outcome of the state

court proceedings and the ensuing auction and litigate the issue of ownership of the property that

was sold by Doyle Galleries, which is a “classic example of federal claims that are barred by

Rooker-Feldman, because the only way those claims can succeed is if this Court were to revisit

state court determinations and, indeed, to declare them wrongly decided.” See Defs.’ Br. at 17-

18 (quotation omitted).

Plaintiffs argue that “the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not serve as a basis for this

Court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction over this matter,” asserting that “[t]he state court

proceeding pending in the Nassau County Surrogate’s Court regarding the Estate of Oleg Cassini

has not yet concluded” and “[t]hus, no judgment has been entered and [Mrs. Cassini] cannot be

deemed to have lost while the matter is still ongoing.” See Pls.’ Br. at 12. Plaintiffs also argue

that Gemeaux “is not even a party to that action, so Rooker-Feldman is clearly inapplicable to

this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over that Plaintiff’s claims.” See Pls.’ Br. at 12. Plaintiffs

acknowledge that “Plaintiffs do complain of injuries caused by things that have occurred in state

court,” but emphasize that “there is no state court ‘judgment’ as of yet so Plaintiffs cannot

possibly complain of it.” See Pls.’ Br. at 12. Further, Plaintiffs assert that they “do not ask this

Court to review or change determinations made by [the Surrogate’s Court],” arguing that Mrs.

Cassini availed herself of the state appellate process and prevailed as to the issue of the

appointment of a receiver and other related issues. See Pls.’ Br. at 13.

Here, except as to any excessive force claim(s), Rooker-Feldman applies to each of Mrs.

Cassini’s Causes of Action because (1) Mrs. Cassini lost in state court, (2) Mrs. Cassini

complains of injuries caused by one or more state court orders, (3) Mrs. Cassini appears to invite

review and rejection of one or more of those state court orders, and (4) the state court orders

were rendered before this action was commenced. As to each of the orders Mrs. Cassini

complains of, the order was affirmed on appeal, the appeal of the order was dismissed, or no

appeal of the order was filed before the time to appeal had expired. The Court is persuaded by

Federacion and concludes that prior to the commencement of the instant action, the state

proceedings had “ended” with respect to the relevant issues for the purposes of Rooker-Feldman.

Mrs. Cassini’s First (civil RICO), Sixth (abuse of process), Seventh (conversion), Eighth

(breach of fiduciary duty), Ninth (constructive trust), Eleventh (trespass), and Twelfth (unjust

enrichment) Causes of Action, as well as Mrs. Cassini’s Second (due process), Third (Fourth

Amendment), Fifth (conspiracy to violate civil rights), and Tenth (intentional infliction of

emotional distress) Causes of Action to the extent that they relate to the alleged deprivation of

property, stem from allegations that Defendants improperly deprived Mrs. Cassini of her

property. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120-37, 140, 161-85. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ assertions to the

contrary, each of those Causes of Action appears to invite review and rejection of at least one of

the following state court orders: the Nassau County District Court Order awarding OCI a

judgment of possession of the McCouns Lane Property and a warrant of eviction as to Mrs.

Cassini, see Baiamonte Exs. U, V, W, X; the Surrogate’s Court Order approving the Purchase

Option Agreement and Residential Contract of Sale with respect to the sale of the McCouns

Lane Property and authorizing the Receiver to proceed with the sale, see Baiamonte Exs. BB,

CC; and the Surrogate’s Court Orders authorizing the Receiver to sell items belonging to OCI

and CPL or the estate, see Baiamonte Exs. EE, FF. Mrs. Cassini lost in state court with respect

to these Orders; the injury that Mrs. Cassini complains of – namely, loss of property – was

caused by one or more of the Orders, which authorized the Receiver and others to take

possession of and to sell the property at issue; and the Orders were final prior to the

commencement of this action.

Similarly, Mrs. Cassini’s Fourth Cause of Action (Eighth Amendment), as well as Mrs.

Cassini’s First (civil RICO), Second (due process), Third (Fourth Amendment), Fifth (conspiracy

to violate civil rights), and Tenth (intentional infliction of emotional distress) Causes of Action

to the extent they relate to allegations of deprivation of liberty, stem from Mrs. Cassini’s arrest

and confinement and appear to invite review and rejection of the Surrogate’s Court Orders

holding Mrs. Cassini in civil contempt and issuing an arrest warrant. See Baiamonte Exs. P, Q,

L. Mrs. Cassini lost in state court with respect to these Orders; the injury that Mrs. Cassini

complains of was caused by the Orders, which authorized Mrs. Cassini’s arrest and confinement;

and the Orders were final prior to the commencement of this action.

Plaintiffs’ argument that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable because the state court

proceedings are ongoing is unavailing. Even though the state court proceedings relating to Oleg

Cassini’s estate were ongoing when this action was commenced, the state proceedings ended

with respect to the issues that Mrs. Cassini seeks to have reviewed in federal court, even if other

matters remained to be litigated. See Phillips, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 713-14. With respect to each

of the state court orders relating to the sale of the McCouns Lane Property, the sale of OCI’s and

CPL’s property by Doyle Galleries, and Mrs. Cassini’s arrest and confinement, by the time this

action was commenced, Mrs. Cassini had appealed and lost, or failed to appeal before the time

for doing so had expired. See Baiamonte Exs. L, CC; Pls.’ Ex. 1; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5513.

However, to the extent that Mrs. Cassini seeks to bring any excessive force claim, such

claim would not be barred by Rooker-Feldman. Mrs. Cassini appears to seek to bring an

excessive force claim – or claims – as part of the Third Cause of Action and/or the Fourth Cause

of Action. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 147 (alleging that “[e]xcessive force was used to effectuate

the arrest”), 157 (alleging that “[e]xcessive force, maltreatment and denial of medical care claims

brought by prisoners – including those subject to civil confinement – are actionable under the

Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (via 42 U.S.C. § 1983)”); see also Pls.’ Br. at 23-24,

40. Although Mrs. Cassini was arrested and confined pursuant to the Surrogate’s Court Orders,

neither the arrest warrant nor the contempt order caused the use of any alleged excessive force.

Moreover, any allegations relating to excessive force do not invite review or rejection of the

validity of any state court order. Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman does not deprive the Court of

jurisdiction over any excessive force claim(s).

Mrs. Cassini’s claims, except as to any excessive force claim(s), are dismissed, without

prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. Any Excessive Force Claims are Dismissed

Defendants argue that “[a]lthough Plaintiffs did not plead an excessive force claim as no

such claim is separately delineated in the Amended Complaint, should the Court construe the

Amended Complaint to allege an excessive force claim, such claim is . . . time barred.” See

Defs.’ Br. at 48 n.12; see also Defs.’ Br. at 48 (noting that the statute of limitations for a Section

1983 civil rights action in New York is three years). Defendants also argue that “[t]he County of

Nassau was not involved in [Mrs. Cassini’s] arrest and, even so, Plaintiffs have done nothing to

establish Monell liability relative to the arrest.” See Defs.’ Br. at 29.

Plaintiffs argue that they have “sufficiently pled a violation of the Fourth Amendment to

the United States Constitution” and that “[t]he allegations contained in the Amended Complaint

include unlawful search and seizure of person and property, use of excessive force in carrying

out the arrest, and a policy or custom that gave rise to all of these things.” See Pls.’ Br. at 22-24.

Plaintiffs also argue that “[t]he statute of limitations had not expired prior to the commencement

of this action” because “[t]he cause of action arising from the false arrest and excessive force in

effectuating the arrest began to accrue only once [Mrs. Cassini] was incarcerated pursuant to

legal process” and Mrs. Cassini “was never held pursuant to legal process.” See Pls.’ Br. at 40-

41. Plaintiffs further argue that “Monell claims only accrue upon discovery of the policy or

custom that resulted in the constitutional violation” and “[t]hus, this is an issue properly decided

on summary judgment rather than in the context of a motion to dismiss as it requires a factual

inquiry.” See Pls.’ Br. at 41-42.

1. Mrs. Cassini Fails to State a Claim Under Section 1983 Against the

County of Nassau, the Nassau County Sheriff in His Official Capacity,

and the New York City Sheriff in His Official Capacity

Section 1983 “provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred,’

including under the Constitution.” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).16

16 In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to

the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any

action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

To hold a municipality liable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege “(1) an official

policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional

right.” Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted); see also

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978). “To establish the existence of a

municipal policy or custom, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a formal policy which

is officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken or decisions made by municipal

policymaking officials, i.e., officials with final decision making authority, that caused the alleged

violation of plaintiff’s civil rights; (3) a practice so persistent and widespread as to practically

have the force of law, or that was so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior

policy-making officials; or (4) that a policymaking official exhibited deliberate indifference to

constitutional deprivations caused by subordinates.” Wilson v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 15-CV-

05436, 2016 WL 1465361, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016) (alteration accepted) (citations and

quotations omitted).

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defendants persuasively argue that any

excessive force claim would be time-barred. See Defs.’ Br. at 48.

Even assuming, arguendo, that any excessive force claim is not time-barred, Mrs. Cassini

has not, inter alia, plausibly alleged an official policy or custom and therefore fails to state a

claim for excessive force under Section 1983 against the County of Nassau or the City of New

York.17 The Amended Complaint contains only conclusory allegations relating to any policy or

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

17 Because the Nassau County Sheriff and the New York City Sheriff are sued only in their

official capacities, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14; see also Pls.’ Br. at 41-42, any excessive force

claim against the Nassau County Sheriff and the New York City Sheriff is in effect a claim

against the County of Nassau and the City of New York, respectively. See Lore v. City of

custom. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 143 (“The Nassau County Sheriff and New York City Sheriff

were deliberately indifferent regarding the conduct of their deputies and others under their

supervision, and the treatment to which Mrs. Cassini was subjected.”), 152 (“The treatment of

Mrs. Cassini by said Defendants, who were at all relevant times acting under color of state law

and pursuant to official policy or custom, was not only excessive because it was wholly

unnecessary, but also physically and morally demeaning, and extremely painful in every way.”),

158 (“The treatment of Mrs. Cassini by the Nassau County Sheriff’s Office, perpetrated under

color of state law and pursuant to official policy or custom, was excessively harsh, cruel, entirely

unwarranted, and certainly unusual.”). The Court need not – and does not – accept such

conclusory allegations as true. See Faber, 648 F.3d at 104; Ruston, 610 F.3d at 59.

To the extent Mrs. Cassini seeks to bring any excessive force claim against the County of

Nassau, the Nassau County Sheriff in his official capacity, and/or the New York City Sheriff in

his official capacity, such claim is dismissed.

2. Any Excessive Force Claim Against Judge Reilly is Barred by Judicial

Immunity

“It is well settled that judges generally have absolute immunity from suits for money

damages for their judicial actions.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009).

“Generally, ‘acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered

judicial in nature.’” Wilkins v. Willner, No. 22-CV-02215, 2022 WL 1004191, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

Apr. 4, 2022) (quoting Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210). A judge’s “judicial immunity is not overcome

Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that “[a] claim asserted against an

individual in his official capacity . . . is in effect a claim against the governmental entity itself,

rather than a suit against the individual personally, for ‘official-capacity suits generally

represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an

agent’” (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 n.55)).

by allegations of bad faith or malice,” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991), and a judge “will

not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error . . . or was in excess of his

authority,” id. at 13 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978)). Immunity may

only be overcome where (1) the challenged actions were “not taken in the judge’s judicial

capacity” or (2) the actions, “though judicial in nature, [were] taken in the complete absence of

all jurisdiction.” See id. at 11-12; see also Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting

that judicial immunity “may be overcome if the judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction

or if he is not acting in his judicial capacity”).

As an initial matter, the Court again notes that Defendants persuasively argue that any

excessive force claim would be time-barred. See Defs.’ Br. at 48.

Even assuming, arguendo, that any excessive force claim is not time-barred, such a claim

against Judge Reilly is barred by judicial immunity. Mrs. Cassini’s allegations against Judge

Reilly appear to relate to actions taken in Judge Reilly’s judicial capacity – i.e., in presiding over

the proceedings in the Surrogate’s Court.18 Moreover, Judge Reilly, as Nassau County

Surrogate, had jurisdiction to issue, in connection with the proceedings over which she presided,

the arrest warrant and contempt order that led to Mrs. Cassini’s arrest and confinement. Judge

Reilly has judicial immunity here, and any excessive force claim against her cannot stand.19

18 Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs only allege actions taken [by Judge Reilly] in her official

capacity as Surrogate presiding over the Estate proceedings.” See Defs.’ Br. at 39. Plaintiffs

assert that Defendant Reilly “is sued herein in her individual, not official, capacity.” See Pls.’

Br. at 31. The Amended Complaint reflects that certain other Defendants are sued in their

official capacities but does not indicate that Judge Reilly is sued in her official capacity. See

Am. Compl. at 1, ¶¶ 9, 13-14.

19 To the extent that Plaintiffs seek injunctive and/or declaratory relief in connection with any

excessive force claim against Judge Reilly, such relief would not be available here. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983; see also Treistman v. McGinty, 804 F. App’x 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting

that “judicial immunity bars any claim for retrospective declaratory relief”).

To the extent Mrs. Cassini seeks to bring any claim for excessive force against Judge

Reilly, such claim is dismissed.

II. Gemeaux’s Claims are Dismissed

As set forth below, although Rooker-Feldman does not bar Gemeaux’s claims,

Gemeaux’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel and must be dismissed.

A. Rooker-Feldman Does Not Bar Gemeaux’s Claims

In contrast to Mrs. Cassini’s claims, Gemeaux’s claims are not barred by Rooker-

Feldman. Because Gemeaux was not a party to the estate proceedings in the Surrogate’s Court,

Gemeaux cannot be said to have “lost in state court.” See Hunter, 75 F.4th at 68; see also Lance

v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (stating that “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar

actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of

preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment”).

Moreover, although Gemeaux was a party to the 2021 Conversion Action, Gemeaux’s

claims – as discussed further below – appear to be based on allegations that “[t]he RICO

defendants disregarded Plaintiffs’ proof of ownership and proceeded, with the assistance and

cooperation of Doyle Galleries, to catalogue and sell Plaintiffs’ property at auction” in June

2019. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91-93. Because these claims are based on alleged misconduct

that preceded the 2021 Conversion Action and therefore were not caused by the state court

judgment in the 2021 Conversion Action, these claims are not barred by Rooker-Feldman. See

Hunter, 75 F.4th at 68.

B. Gemeaux’s Claims are Barred by Collateral Estoppel

1. Applicable Law

“The fundamental notion of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that

an issue of law or fact actually litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in a

prior action may not be relitigated in a subsequent suit between the parties or their privies.”

Constantine v. Tchrs. Coll., 448 F. App’x 92, 93 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ali v. Mukasey, 529

F.3d 478, 489 (2d Cir. 2008)). “Federal courts must give a New York state court judgment the

same preclusive effect that New York courts would, and if New York law would bar [a plaintiff]

from relitigating the claim in a subsequent state-court suit, he may not relitigate those factual

issues in a federal forum.” El-Shabazz v. N.Y. Comm. on Character & Fitness for the Second

Jud. Dep’t, 428 F. App’x 95, 96 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984) and Genova v. Town of Southampton, 776 F.2d 1560, 1561 (2d

Cir. 1985)). “Under New York law, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue when (1) the

identical issue necessarily was decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action,

and (2) the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate the issue in the prior action.” Phoenix Light SF Ltd. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 66 F.4th

365, 371 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Plymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P. v. GTR Source, LLC, 988

F.3d 634, 642 (2d Cir. 2021)); see also El-Shabazz, 428 F. App’x at 96-97 (noting that “[u]nder

New York law, collateral estoppel precludes a plaintiff from contesting in a subsequent action

issues clearly raised in a prior proceeding and decided against that party, irrespective of whether

the tribunals or causes of action are the same; New York courts apply collateral estoppel ‘if the

issue in the second action is identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and

material in the first action, and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in

the earlier action’” (quoting LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 271 (2d Cir. 2002))).

Under New York law, in the context of collateral estoppel, “privity is an amorphous

concept not easy of application and includes those who are successors to a property interest,

those who control an action although not formal parties to it, those whose interests are

represented by a party to the action, and those who are coparties to a prior action.” See Buechel

v. Bain, 97 N.Y.2d 295, 304 (2001) (alterations accepted) (quotations omitted); see also Crown

v. Danby Fire Dist., 676 F. App’x 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2017). “In addressing privity, courts must

carefully analyze whether the party sought to be bound and the party against whom the litigated

issue was decided have a relationship that would justify preclusion, and whether preclusion, with

its severe consequences, would be fair under the particular circumstances.” Buechel, 97 N.Y.2d

at 304-05. “Doubts should be resolved against imposing preclusion to ensure that the party to be

bound can be considered to have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.” Id. at 305; see also

Crown, 676 F. App’x at 90.

2. Collateral Estoppel Bars Gemeaux from Relitigating the Issue of

Ownership of the Property Doyle Galleries Sold at Auction

Defendants argue that “insofar as Plaintiffs’ claims are based upon their purported

property interest in McCouns Lane or the Doyle Auctioned Property, Plaintiffs are precluded

from relitigating the issue based upon collateral estoppel” but “[t]he crux of this action . . . is

based upon Plaintiffs’ false allegations that they own this property and it was ‘stolen’ from

them.” See Defs.’ Br. at 20. Defendants further argue that “[n]umerous court orders and

decisions have already determined this property belonged to the Estate, not Plaintiffs.” See

Defs.’ Br. at 33 (citing Baiamonte Exs. BB, CC, EE, FF, II, JJ); see also Defs.’ Br. at 39

(asserting that “all of the property at issue in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint was determined to

belong to the Estate, not Plaintiffs”).

Plaintiffs argue that “[a]ny decision(s) previously issued by the Surrogate[’]s Court

regarding the ownership of the companies and/or the property sold at auction were preliminary in

nature as the previous ‘trial’ (an inquest, at best) was vacated by the Appellate Division and a

new trial ordered.” See Pls.’ Br. at 27-28 (citing Pls.’ Ex. 2). Plaintiffs argue that “the matter is

undecided” and “even if [the matter is] regarded as decided, it is irrefutable that Plaintiffs were

not given a full and fair opportunity to be heard,” asserting that Mrs. Cassini “was not permitted

to present evidence and was not even present at the proceeding.” See Pls.’ Br. at 28. Plaintiffs

argue that collateral estoppel does not apply under these circumstances. See Pls.’ Br. at 28.

Here, collateral estoppel bars Gemeaux from relitigating the issue of ownership of the

property sold at auction by Doyle Galleries in 2019. The 185-paragraph Amended Complaint

appears to reference Gemeaux in only a few paragraphs, which appear to allege, in sum and in

substance, that Doyle Galleries sold property that was stolen from Gemeaux. See Am. Compl.

¶¶ 84 (alleging that “Mrs. Cassini contacted representatives of Doyle Galleries to make them

aware that property they had and/or were looking to abscond with belonged to her, her sister,

Peggy, and/or Gemeaux Ltd.”), 89 (alleging that “Mrs. Cassini, with the assistance of counsel,

did her best to prepare an inventory of all seized items and an explanation of ownership for those

belonging to her or Gemeaux Ltd., and therefore not rightfully in the custody and control of Ms.

Baiamonte, Doyle Galleries, or any of the RICO defendants”), 91-95 (alleging, inter alia, that

the RICO Defendants “disregarded Plaintiffs’ proof of ownership and proceeded, with the

assistance and cooperation of Doyle Galleries, to catalogue and sell Plaintiffs’ property at

auction;” that “[a]n Order to Show Cause was filed in the Surrogate’s Court on behalf of Mrs.

Cassini in advance of the auction sale, which set forth a catalogue of the items to be sold at

auction;” and that “[t]he list included purchases by Gemeaux Ltd., Ms. Nestor, and Mrs. Cassini

from various auction houses, and art galleries”), 96 (alleging that “Doyle Galleries knowingly

possessed then sold stolen property”), 134 (alleging that “the RICO defendants will next try to

find a way to sever Mrs. Cassini’s interest in the third [company], Gemeaux Ltd., and sell that

off, too, just as they did to Gemeaux’s property”); see also, e.g., Am. Comp. ¶ 168 (alleging that

“[t]he RICO defendants continue to interfere with Plaintiffs’ lawful possession and ownership of

their respective property to the extent that said property was not already disposed of for said

Defendants’ financial gain”).20

In order for the Amended Complaint to plausibly allege that Doyle Galleries sold stolen

property, the Amended Complaint would have to plausibly allege that Gemeaux owned that

property, which it cannot do in light of the state court proceedings. The issue of ownership of

the property necessarily was decided by the Surrogate’s Court in the underlying estate litigation.

See Baiamonte Exs. BB, CC, EE, FF, II, JJ. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ arguments to the

contrary, the Appellate Division vacated only the decisions, orders, and judgments entered in all

proceedings between March 14, 2016 and July 25, 2016 and did not vacate or declare void the

orders issued by the Surrogate’s Court regarding ownership of the property sold at auction,

which were issued outside of that timeframe. See Pls.’ Ex. 1 at 39 (granting Petitioner’s motion

to vacate and declare void all decisions, orders, and judgments entered after March 14, 2016 to

the extent that all decisions, orders, and judgments entered in all proceedings between March 14,

2016 and July 25, 2016 are vacated and noting that “the motion is otherwise denied”).

Moreover, it is fair to preclude Gemeaux from relitigating the issue because Gemeaux is

in privity with Mrs. Cassini, who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in state court.

Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, pursuant to the procedures set forth in

20 Gemeaux does not appear to join in Mrs. Cassini’s claims relating to Mrs. Cassini’s person or

property. See generally Am. Compl. In any event, Gemeaux would lack standing to bring

any such claim(s), as Gemeaux has not alleged that it has suffered any injury in connection

with Mrs. Cassini’s claims relating to Mrs. Cassini’s person or property. See TransUnion

LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021); Maddox v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 19

F.4th 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2021).

Judge Reilly’s May 30, 2018 Order and in the November 1, 2018 Stipulation and Order signed

by Mrs. Cassini’s counsel and So-Ordered by Judge Reilly, Mrs. Cassini had a full and fair

opportunity to dispute the Receiver’s determination of whether the property belonged to OCI and

CPL. See Baiamonte Exs. EE, FF. Given that Mrs. Cassini owns 50% of Gemeaux, Mrs.

Cassini and Gemeaux have a relationship that justifies preclusion here.

Notably, Gemeaux, along with Mrs. Cassini and Peggy Nestor, set forth similar

allegations in the 2021 Conversion Action. See Gemeaux Ltd., 2021 WL 6249530, at *1; see

also Baiamonte Ex. II at 4. However, as recognized by the Appellate Division, First Judicial

Department, the same issues of fact had already been litigated in the Surrogate’s Court prior to

the 2021 Conversion Action. See Gemeaux Ltd., 210 A.D.3d at 409 (affirming dismissal of the

complaint in the 2021 Conversion Action; stating that “Defendant established its entitlement to

dismissal of the complaint because it presented documents, including a Surrogate Court order

and so-ordered stipulation, definitively disproving the claim;” and noting that “Defendant’s

documents further establish that this action seeks to relitigate issues of fact previously decided in

the Surrogate’s Court’s action, which plaintiffs failed to appeal”); see also Baiamonte Ex. JJ at 4.

The Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, applying New York law, barred Plaintiffs

from relitigating their property-related claims in a subsequent state-court suit. Plaintiffs may not

relitigate the same factual issues in a federal forum.

Gemeaux’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel and are dismissed.

* * *

In sum, dismissal of the Amended Complaint in its entirety is warranted.21

21 Although the Court need not consider certain of Defendants’ arguments in light of the above,

the Court notes that Defendants raise a variety of persuasive arguments as to why Plaintiffs’

claims should otherwise be dismissed. See Defs.’ Br. at 18-47 (arguing, inter alia, that

III. The Motion for Sanctions is Denied

For the reasons set forth below, the Court declines to impose sanctions here.

A. Applicable Law

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires an attorney to certify that (1) a

pleading ‘is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary

delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation,’ (2) ‘the claims, defenses, and other legal

contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,

modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law,’ and (3) ‘the factual

contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary

support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.’” See Now-Casting

Econ., Ltd. v. Econ. Alchemy LLC, 628 F. Supp. 3d 501, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11(b)), reconsid. denied, No. 18-CV-02442, 2023 WL 3724155 (S.D.N.Y. May 30,

2023), aff’d, No. 23-947, 2024 WL 2720235 (2d Cir. May 28, 2024).

Rule 11 further provides, in relevant part:

A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion and must

describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b). The motion must

be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the

challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or

appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the court

sets. If warranted, the court may award to the prevailing party the reasonable

expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred for the motion.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).

Plaintiffs’ claims are insufficiently pleaded and fail to state a claim; that Plaintiffs’ claims

against certain Defendants are barred by the doctrines of sovereign immunity, judicial

immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, and/or the Barton doctrine; that Plaintiffs’ claims against

Defendant Doyle Galleries are barred by res judicata; and that the Court should decline to

adjudicate any disputes that are subject to further state court proceedings under the Colorado

River doctrine of abstention).

“A pleading violates Rule 11 if it is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or factually without

foundation, even though not signed in subjective bad faith.” Now-Casting, 628 F. Supp. 3d at

521 (quotation omitted). “To constitute a frivolous legal position for purposes of Rule 11

sanction, it must be clear under existing precedents that there is no chance of success and no

reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands.” Id. (alteration accepted)

(quoting Simon DeBartolo Grp. L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Grp., Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir.

1999)). “Given concern for encouraging zealous advocacy, courts maintain a high bar for

establishing a Rule 11 violation.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Among other things, a court must

‘resolve all doubts in favor of the signer’ of the pleading, and may impose sanctions only where

an attorney’s conduct was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Galin v. Hamada, 283 F. Supp. 3d 189,

201 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (alterations accepted) (first quoting Rodick v. City of Schenectady, 1 F.3d

1341, 1350 (2d Cir. 1993); then quoting Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 387 (2d

Cir. 2003)), aff’d, 753 F. App’x 3 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Omega SA v. 375 Canal, LLC, 324

F.R.D. 47, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting that “[b]ecause Rule 11 sanctions represent a drastic,

extraordinary remedy, courts seldom issue them and then only as a (very) last resort” (quotation

omitted)). “Sanctions are appropriate under Rule 11 only where it is patently clear that a claim

has absolutely no chance of success.” Now-Casting, 628 F. Supp. 3d at 521 (quotation omitted).

“And even if the Court finds that a party has met this high bar, ‘the decision whether or not to

impose sanctions is a matter for the court’s discretion.’” Id. (quoting Perez v. Posse Comitatus,

373 F.3d 321, 325 (2d Cir. 2004)); see also Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F.

Supp. 3d 410, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that “[c]ourts should be cautious in granting Rule 11

sanctions”).22

22 The 1993 Advisory Committee note to Rule 11 lays out various possible considerations for

B. The Court Declines to Impose Sanctions

Defendants Baiamonte and Miller argue, inter alia, that “[f]rom the face of the Amended

Complaint, it is obvious that Plaintiffs are trying to challenge final court orders and decisions of

the Surrogate’s Court that were entered before this federal action was filed, primarily, Ms.

Cassini’s contempt, her court-ordered arrest, the court-ordered sale of McCouns Lane, and the

court-ordered sale of the Doyle Auctioned Property;” that the Amended Complaint “is plainly

barred by the state court proceedings, warranting the imposition of severe sanctions;” and that

sanctions are warranted “for a litany of other reasons.” See generally Sanctions Br.; see also

generally Sanctions Reply.

Plaintiffs argue, inter alia, that this action was not brought for an improper purpose; that

Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel “are aware that some difficult hurdles have to be overcome in

order to maintain suit against a judge, court-appointed attorneys and other public officials where

conduct was sanctioned by court order, but to not proceed would be to allow the wrongs alleged

in the Complaint to go without recourse;” that there has been no final judgment in the

Surrogate’s Court matter; that even if the Court is not swayed by Plaintiffs’ arguments, they are

advanced in good faith, are grounded in the law, and are not frivolous; and that Plaintiffs’

allegations in this action have evidentiary support. See generally Sanctions Opp. Plaintiffs point

to the Heuser Declaration and accompanying exhibits to address the factual contentions raised by

deciding whether to impose sanctions and what sanctions would be appropriate: “[w]hether

the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it was part of a pattern of activity, or

an isolated event; whether it infected the entire pleading, or only one particular count or

defense; whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation; whether it was

intended to injure; what effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense; whether the

responsible person is trained in the law; what amount, given the financial resources of the

responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case; what

amount is needed to deter similar activity by other litigants.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory

committee’s note to 1993 amendment; see also Now-Casting, 628 F. Supp. 3d at 521.

Defendants in the Motion for Sanctions and argue that such motion “is not the proper vehicle for

raising such factual disputes.” See Sanctions Opp. at 13-14.

Although, as set forth above, the Court has concluded that all of Plaintiffs’ claims must

be dismissed and although Plaintiffs’ allegations and arguments are troublingly inconsistent with

the state court record in some respects, ultimately the Court declines to impose the extraordinary

remedy of sanctions on the record here.

The Motion for Sanctions is denied.23

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 64, is GRANTED; the

Amended Complaint, ECF No. 25, is DISMISSED in its entirety; and the Motion for Sanctions,

ECF No. 69, is DENIED. Dismissal of Mrs. Cassini’s claims, other than any excessive force

claim(s) against Judge Reilly, the County of Nassau, the Nassau County Sheriff, and the New

York City Sheriff, is without prejudice.

Dismissal of the Amended Complaint is without leave to further amend.24 Plaintiffs were

apprised of the pleading defects in the original Complaint by way of the initial requests for a pre-

motion conference; Plaintiffs were afforded – and availed themselves of – the opportunity to

amend; Plaintiffs were apprised of the pleading defects in the Amended Complaint by way of the

requests for a pre-motion conference with respect to the Amended Complaint; and Plaintiffs did

not seek leave to further amend at that time. On the record before the Court, there is no

23 Plaintiffs’ request “that the Court award counsel fees to Plaintiffs to offset the expense

incurred as a result of having to defend against [the] motion,” see Sanctions Opp. at 14, also is

denied. Such relief is not warranted here.

24 Plaintiffs appear to request leave to amend – rather cursorily – in various places in their

briefing. See, e.g., Pls.’ Br. at 19, 24, 26, 40 n.5.

indication that Plaintiffs could provide additional allegations that might cure the defects set forth

above and lead to a different result. Under these circumstances, leave to amend is not warranted.

See Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369-70 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Nat’l Credit Union Admin.

Bd. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 898 F.3d 243, 257-58 (2d Cir. 2018).

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Diane Gujarati _

DIANE GUJARATI

United States District Judge

Dated: August 12, 2024

Brooklyn, New York