TAYLOR v. SHEET METAL WORKERS' NATIONAL PENSION FUND

[ECF No. 23]

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

STULTZ G. TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 24-4321 (CPO/EAP)

v.

SHEET METAL WORKERS’

NATIONAL PENSION FUND et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion of Plaintiff Stultz G. Taylor seeking

discovery outside of the administrative record in this action brought under the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. (“ERISA”), ECF No. 23 (“Pl.’s Br.”). Defendants

Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund (the “Fund”) and the Board of Trustees of the Sheet

Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund, as Administrator of the Pension Plan of the Sheet Metal

Workers’ National Pension Fund (the “Board of Trustees”) (collectively, “Defendants”) opposed the

Motion, ECF No. 24 (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), and Plaintiff filed a Reply, ECF No. 26 (“Pl.’s Reply”). The

Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions and held oral argument on September 5, 2024. For the

reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s request for discovery is DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Plaintiff alleges that he began working as a sheet metal worker with Local Union Number

43 immediately after high school. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 11. From 1979 through December

2018, Plaintiff was employed as a union sheet metal worker, and from 1979 to 2012, he worked for

Bernal Mechanical Contractors (“Bernal Mechanical”). Id. ¶¶ 12, 14. While employed at Bernal

Mechanical, Plaintiff obtained his New Jersey HVACR Master Certification and License. Id. ¶¶ 12-

13.

In April 2013, Plaintiff and his wife Sandra Taylor founded STS Sheet Metal, Inc. (“STS”),

located in Vineland, New Jersey, with each owning fifty percent of the business. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17.

Plaintiff was and remains the corporate president of STS. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff asserts that, because

New Jersey State regulations require that an HVAC contractor employ an executive officer with an

HVACR Master License, he acts as that bona fide representative for STS. Id. ¶¶ 19-20, 22-24.

In December 2018, Plaintiff claims that he applied to the Fund for an early retirement

pension to be effective January 1, 2019, at which time he would be fifty-nine years old. Id. ¶ 25.

Aware that he may be ineligible to receive pension benefits until reaching age sixty-two, Plaintiff

alleges that in his application, he advised the Fund that he was retiring from sheet metal work and

requested confirmation that he could continue to perform office work with STS without affecting

his pension eligibility. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. The Fund allegedly responded that Plaintiff had thirty-nine

years and three months of Future Service Credit and that his pension benefit at age sixty-five would

be $4,663 per month, subject to reduction if he took his pension before age sixty-five. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.

Plaintiff also alleges that he confirmed with the Fund that when he decided to take his earned pension

benefit, he would only need to submit a reactivation form and not another application. Id. ¶ 31.

Plaintiff performed office work at STS for three more years, and in December 2021, he

submitted a reactivation form for his pension benefits to be effective January 1, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 32-33.

At that time, he would be sixty-two years old, and he believed he would be eligible for his early

retirement pension. Id. According to the Complaint, the Fund advised that Plaintiff would be

notified of his qualification by the end of March 2022. Id. ¶ 34.

Plaintiff alleges that while the Fund investigated Plaintiff’s qualification for pension

benefits, it required Plaintiff to be paid as a sheet metal worker and that STS make contributions to

the Fund based upon the hours that he worked. Id. ¶¶ 27, 39-41. According to Plaintiff, the Fund

investigated various issues, including STS’s lack of pension contributions for Plaintiff from 2019

through 2021, continuing contributions to the Fund from STS, Plaintiff’s ownership of STS, his

part-time work at STS, and the withdrawal of a separate and distinct entity, Bernal Mechanical, from

the Fund. Id. ¶ 42.

In January 2022, the Fund expressed concern regarding the stoppage of contributions for

Plaintiff in 2019 through 2021 and the possibility of an Owner-Member (“OM”) requirement, even

though Plaintiff was not working as a sheet metal worker. Id. ¶ 43. The Complaint avers that internal

fund correspondence also reflected a concern that granting Plaintiff’s pension request was “too

risky” because the Fund was concerned that Plaintiff would “close” STS and continue his business

under Bernal Mechanical. Id. ¶ 44. According to Plaintiff, he advised the Fund that STS and Bernal

Mechanical were separate entities; that Bernal Mechanical was a one-man plumbing contractor; and

that he had no intention of closing STS. Id. ¶ 45.

In May 2022, the Fund again raised the issue of Plaintiff’s employment from December 2018

through December 2021, stating its concern that Plaintiff was engaged in Covered Employment. Id.

¶¶ 48-49. According to Plaintiff, he reassured the Fund that he had only been engaged in office

work. Id. ¶ 50. On May 2, 2022, the Fund allegedly advised Plaintiff that he could work up to forty

hours per month and remain eligible to collect his pension because he continued to be an owner of

STS. The Fund then requested information on Plaintiff’s work from 2019 through 2021; who would

be performing his former duties; and the details of his continued work for STS. Id. ¶ 53.

When Plaintiff did not receive a decision on his qualification for pension benefits within six

months, Plaintiff alleges that he emailed the Fund on May 23, 2022. He claims that, in response,

the Fund “arbitrarily reversed” its prior position that Plaintiff was eligible for an early retirement

pension and determined that he did not qualify because he continued to own and perform clerical

work for STS, which constituted disqualifying employment. Id. ¶¶ 59-60.

On July 8, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote a letter to the Fund advising it of Plaintiff’s

intention to appeal and providing the reasons that the Fund’s decision was erroneous, including: (1)

Plaintiff was not an “Owner-Member” because he was not included in a unit of employees covered

by the collective bargaining agreement and did not perform work covered by the collective

bargaining agreement; (2) Plaintiff then-worked part-time for STS in an office position for no more

than forty hours per month; (3) at the Fund’s direction, STS had been making pension contributions

on Plaintiff’s behalf; and (4) Plaintiff accrued his pension benefits by working in Covered

Employment with employers who made contributions to the Fund for him for more than thirty-nine

years. Id. ¶ 61. On that same day, the Fund acknowledged Plaintiff’s appeal to the Board of

Trustees. Id. ¶ 62.

On November 4, 2022 and December 8, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote additional letters to

the Board of Trustees regarding Plaintiff’s appeal. Id. ¶¶ 63-64. Plaintiff alleges that the Board of

Trustees denied his appeal—without allowing Plaintiff or his counsel to be present—because

Plaintiff’s employment with STS was disqualifying employment. Id. ¶¶ 65-71.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court setting forth the following

causes of action: (1) failure to provide ERISA benefits (Count I), ¶¶ 73-78; (2) breach of fiduciary

duty (Count II), id. ¶¶ 79-93; (3) estoppel (Count III), id. ¶¶ 94-108; and (4) failure to provide a full

and fair review (Count IV), id. ¶¶ 109-117.

On June 17, 2024, the Court held an initial scheduling conference. See ECF No. 20. At that

time, the parties raised a dispute about the propriety of discovery in this administrative record review

case. The Court ordered the parties to provide briefing on the issue and set a briefing schedule. See

id. ¶ 2. In accordance with that Order, on July 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a letter in support of his

request for discovery outside of the administrative record. See ECF No. 23. Defendants filed a

responsive letter on July 30, 2024. See ECF No. 24. On August 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. See

ECF No. 25. On September 5, 2024, the Court converted the present dispute to a motion to compel

and heard oral argument on the motion. See ECF No. 23. This matter is now ripe for disposition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An entity administering an ERISA plan must “provide a ‘full and fair review’ of claim

denials.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §

1133(2)). A participant or beneficiary who disagrees with an administrator’s decision may bring an

action in federal court “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his

rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the

plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).

In Firestone Tire and Rubber Company v. Bruch, the United States Supreme Court explained

that, in the context of an action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), courts reviewing an administrator’s

benefits decision should apply a de novo standard of review “unless the benefit plan gives the

administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe

the terms of the plan.” 489 U.S. at 115. Under those circumstances, “a deferential standard of

review” is appropriate because “‘[w]here discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the

exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court except to prevent an abuse by

the trustee of his discretion.’” Id. at 111 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187 (1959)).

Under this abuse-of-discretion standard,1 a court should overturn an administrator’s decision

only if it is “without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.”

Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993) (cleaned up), abrogated in part

on other grounds by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 112 (2008). Further, “the court is

not free to substitute its own judgment for that of the [administrator] in determining eligibility for

plan benefits.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,

214 F.3d 377, 387 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). A deferential review

“promotes efficiency by encouraging resolution of benefits disputes through internal administrative

proceedings rather than costly litigation.” Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010).

Nevertheless, “[w]hile review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is extremely deferential,

it is not without ‘some teeth’ and does not mean ‘no review.’” Clauss v. Plan, 196 F. Supp. 3d 463,

474 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (quotation omitted).

As “the proper standard of review of a trustee’s decision depends on the language of the

instrument creating the trust,” the court must look to the terms of the Fund’s Plan Document and

Trust Document to determine whether the plan administrator2 is granted discretionary authority and

thus, whether an abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies. Conkright, 559 U.S. at 512; Luby

v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1991). No

“magic words” must be used to grant discretion to the plan administrator. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1180

1 “In the ERISA context, an ‘abuse-of-discretion’ standard of review is used interchangeably

with an ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard of review.” Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.2d

407, 413 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 793 n.6 (3d Cir.

2010)).

2 Here, the Fund is administered by the Board of Trustees, which has the “sole discretionary

power” to determine the application and interpretation of the Plan Document, the entitlement to any

benefit, and has delegated to an Appeals Committee the authority to make final and binding

determinations on all appeals. See Defs.’ Answer, ECF No. 10, ¶ 5; see also Plan Document, Section

8.04, available at https://perma.cc/VN8T-TVR2 (last visited Oct. 11, 2024).

(quotation omitted). If the policy language is ambiguous, the Court must construe it in favor of the

insured. Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011).

The Plan Document here clearly grants discretionary authority to Defendants. Section 8.03

of the Plan Document states that “[t]he Trustees shall have the sole and absolute power, authority

and discretion to determine . . . entitlement to or amount of a pension.” https://perma.cc/VN8T-

TVR2 (last visited Oct. 11, 2024). This provision triggers an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.

See, e.g., Nally v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 299 F. App’x 125, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that

abuse of discretion applied where the summary plan description stated that the benefits review

committee “shall have the discretionary authority to determine eligibility for plan benefits and to

construe the terms of the plan, including the making of factual determinations.”); White v.

Unumprovident, No. 03-5845, 2005 WL 1683735, at *11 (D.N.J. July 18, 2005) (finding that the

plan expressly conferred discretion to insurer where the Plan terms stated, “[i]n making any benefits

determination under this policy, the Company shall have the discretionary authority both to

determine an employee’s eligibility for benefits and to construe the terms of this policy”).

DISCUSSION

The question before the Court is whether Plaintiff, in challenging Defendants’ decision on

his early retirement pension benefit under an abuse-of-discretion standard, may pursue discovery

outside the administrative record.

“By enacting ERISA, Congress manifested its intent to ‘provide a method for workers and

beneficiaries to resolve disputes over benefits inexpensively and expeditiously.’” Sivalingam v.

Unum Provident Corp., 735 F. Supp. 2d 189, 194 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting Perry v. Simplicity

Eng’g, a Div. of Lukens Gen. Indus., Inc., 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1990)). Thus, when a plaintiff

alleges that a plan administrator abused its discretion in making a benefits decision, the court must

generally limit its review to the administrative record; that is, to the “evidence that was before the

administrator when [it] made the decision being reviewed.” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak

Co., 113 F.3d 433, 440 (3d Cir. 1997)). This restricted review achieves congressional intent by

encouraging parties to resolve benefit claims internally, thereby avoiding the costs of litigation.

Dandridge v. Raytheon, No. 08-4793, 2010 WL 376598, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2010) (citing

Grossmuller v. Int’l Union, 715 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1983)). In addition, ERISA requires

claimants to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit, resulting in a full and complete

administrative record that eliminates the need for discovery. See Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co. of

Am., 279 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 2002); Dandridge, 2010 WL 376598, at *3.

Nonetheless, “[e]vidence beyond the administrative record may in certain circumstances be

relevant and admissible as to issues that were not before the plan administrator—such as trustee

conflict of interest, bias, or a pattern of inconsistent benefits decisions.” Otto v. W. Pa. Teamsters

& Emps. Pension Fund, 127 F. App’x 17, 21 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005). In cases where a plaintiff plausibly

alleges a conflict of interest, a court may allow limited discovery beyond the administrative record.

Hart v. Bd. of Trustees, United Food & Comm. Workers Union Local 152 Retail Meat Pension, No.

17-12320, 2019 WL 13258890, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2019).

In this regard, the Third Circuit has identified two types of conflicts that may warrant

discovery beyond the administrative record: structural conflicts and procedural conflicts. See Noga

v. Fulton Fin. Corp. Emp. Benefit Plan, 19 F.4th 264, 276 (3d Cir. 2021).

A structural conflict analysis focuses on the role of financial incentives in the plan’s

administration, such as where the same entity administers and pays the benefits due under the plan.

Id. Here, Plaintiff does not, and cannot allege, any structural conflict. In this case, benefits decisions

are made by this multi-employer benefit plan, where a committee of one employer and one union

trustee makes the benefits decisions, and such benefits are paid from a trust funded by contributions

and investment income. Defs.’ Br. at 2. This arrangement simply does not implicate a structural

conflict.

A procedural conflict analysis “examines the presence or absence of irregularities in the

handling of benefit claims,” or the way in which the administrator arrives at its decision, such as an

unexplained reversal of position, bias, “self-serving selectivity” in the use and interpretation of

expert reports, or a pattern of inconsistent benefit decisions. Id.; see also Dowman v. Chubb Corp.,

No. 16-8129, 2018 WL 2973381, at *4 (D.N.J. June 11, 2018); Sivalingam, 735 F. Supp. 2d at 196.

“‘[T]o establish that additional discovery is warranted, a plaintiff must—at the very least—make ‘a

good-faith allegation of a procedural irregularity . . . in the review process.’” Hart, 2019 WL

13258890, at *8 (quoting Neal v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 16-1146, 2017 WL 321497, at *3

(W.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2017) (citation omitted)); see also Muccino v. Long Term Disability Income Plan

for Choices Eligible Emps. of Johnson & Johnson, No 11-3641, 2012 WL 2119152, at *11 (D.N.J.

June 11, 2012) (“[D]iscovery should be allowed when a plaintiff presents a good faith basis for

alleging some bias or that a conflict infected the administrator’s determination.”); Dandridge, 2010

WL 376598, at *6 ( “[S]ome discovery into alleged procedural irregularities is permitted in ERISA

cases, but only when the party seeking discovery has made at least some minimal showing of bias

or irregularity that could have impacted the administration of the claim.”). Mere “evanescent

allegations” or “bald allegation[s] of wrongdoing or alleged bias” are insufficient to obtain discovery

into procedural conflicts. Dandridge, 2010 WL 376598, at *5; see also Muccino, 2012 WL

2119152, at *11 (rejecting plaintiff’s examples of procedural irregularities because plaintiff did not

provide any factual basis for the assertions); Killian v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 07-4902, 2009 WL

537666, at *4 (requiring a “good-faith allegation of a procedural irregularity or bias that could have

been found within the administrative record to warrant the additional discovery-related work”).

Moreover, “to the extent Plaintiff seeks discovery into the merits of the [Committee’s] claim

determination, it is clear that such discovery is prohibited. Dandridge, 2010 WL 376598, at *3

(emphasis in original). Finally, any such discovery “must be circumscribed so as to preserve

ERISA’s goal of providing an inexpensive and expeditious means of resolving benefit disputes.”

Sivalingam, 735 F. Supp. 2d at 196.

To justify his request for discovery beyond the administrative record, Plaintiff posits four

alleged “procedural conflicts,” none of which the Court finds convincing.3 First, Plaintiff contends

that discovery is appropriate here because he has alleged facts outside of the record in support of his

ERISA claim that Defendants have disputed. See Pl.’s Br. at 2-3; Pl.’s Reply 3-5. For example,

Plaintiff argues that the Fund considered matters outside of the administrative record, including

STS’s lack of pension contributions for Plaintiff from 2019 through 2021, STS’s continuing

contributions to the Fund, Plaintiff’s ownership of STS, his part-time work at STS, the withdrawal

of Bernal Mechanical from the Fund, the stoppage of contributions for Plaintiff from 2019 through

2021, and an Owner-Member requirement despite that Plaintiff was not working as a sheet metal

worker. See Pl.’s Reply at 3. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that the Fund gave him advice that

materially misrepresented his eligibility for early retirement pension benefits. Pl.’s Br. at 3. Plaintiff

claims that because these allegations involve evidence outside the administrative record and clearly

show that Defendants “actions were arbitrary and capricious,” discovery is warranted. Pl.’s Br. at

2-3; Pl.’s Reply at 3.

3 Notably, Plaintiff’s opening brief raised only the first argument, with the remaining three

arguments being raised in his reply brief. A reply brief is not the appropriate time to raise a new

argument. See Laborer’s Int’l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir.

1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief . . . “); In re BlackRock Mut.

Funds Advisory Fee Litig., 327 F. Supp. 3d 690, 736 n.42 (D.N.J. 2018) (explaining that “courts

ordinarily decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief . . .”), aff’d, 816 F.

App’x 637 (3d Cir. 2020). Nonetheless, for the sake of comprehensiveness, the Court will address

all of Plaintiff’s arguments.

As set forth in the Complaint, however, these identical allegations were before the Fund and

made part of the administrative record. See Compl. ¶ 42 (listing these facts as matters that the Fund

considered in reaching its decision). The identified facts all involve the underlying basis for the

benefits determination and do not implicate any procedural irregularity outside the administrative

record. While Plaintiff alleges that “discovery is necessary to aid the Court in determining the

reasonableness of the Fund’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s pension,” Pl.’s Br. at 5, this inquiry into

the merits of the actual claim determination is precisely the type of inquiry that ERISA shields from

expansive discovery.

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff failed to produce all relevant information to the Fund or the

Board of Trustees regarding these matters during the administrative review process, he may not now

use the discovery process to develop the record. When a plaintiff alleges that a plan administrator

failed to provide ERISA benefits, the court generally limits its review to the administrative record,

meaning the ”evidence that was before the administrator when [it] made the decision being

reviewed.” Mitchell, 113 F.3d at 440. Otherwise, a Plaintiff could simply withhold evidence

relevant to his claims to create a basis for appealing an ERISA decision—a tactic which runs

contrary to Congress’s stated desire to encourage parties to resolve benefit claims internally. See

Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Materials that the parties failed to

put before the administrator are not usually relevant to the inquiry of whether the administrator

abused its discretion. Thus, under most circumstances, ‘the record for arbitrary-and-capricious

review of ERISA benefits denial is the record made before the plan administrator, and cannot be

supplemented during litigation.’” (quotation omitted)).

Second, Plaintiff contends that a potential conflict of interest/bias exists due to Defendants’

denial of Plaintiff’s pension based, in part, on Plaintiff’s work for Bernal Mechanical from 1979 to

2012, Bernal’s withdrawal from the Fund, and the Fund’s concern that Plaintiff would close STS

and continue his business under Bernal Mechanical. Compl. ¶¶ 42-45. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he

conflict of interest/bias comes into focus when one learns that Defendants have sued Bernal

Mechanical for withdrawal liability, seeking in excess of $1.6 million,” that Defendants contend

that Bernal Mechanical withdrew from the Fund in 2013, when Plaintiff left Bernal Mechanical and

started STS. Pl.’s Reply at 2.

Plaintiff, however, fails to explain how these facts—even taken as true—reflect any bias or

other procedural irregularity. In considering procedural factors, the focus is whether in the particular

case at issue, “the administrator has given the court reason to doubt its fiduciary neutrality.” Verme-

Gibboney v. Hartford Ins. Co., No. 11-3796, 2013 WL 6633084, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2013).

“[B]ald allegation[s] of wrongdoing or alleged bias” are insufficient to obtain discovery into

procedural conflicts. Dandridge, 2010 WL 376598, at *5; see also Muccino, 2012 WL 2119152, at

*11 (D.N.J. June 11, 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s examples of procedural irregularities because

plaintiff did not provide a good faith factual basis for alleging bias). Nothing in Plaintiff’s argument

gives the Court any reasonable basis to doubt Defendants’ fiduciary neutrality or to believe that

Defendants engaged in some misconduct when rendering Plaintiff’s benefits decision.

Third, Plaintiff contends that he has raised a reasonable suspicion of misconduct because on

May 23, 2023, Plaintiff emailed the Fund requesting a release of his pension benefits that “the Fund

had determined that Plaintiff was eligible for,” and later that same day, it “arbitrarily reversed its

position” and “determined that Plaintiff did not qualify for an Early Retirement Pension.”4 Pl.’s

4 The Third Circuit has clarified that a “reversal of decision” situation that potentially creates

a procedural conflict occurs where an administrator awards disability benefits and then reverses that

decision without receiving any new medical information to support this change in position. Miller

v. Am. Airlines, 632 F.3d 837, 848 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Connor v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs.,

Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d 568, 586 (D.N.J. 2011) (noting that any decision to terminate benefits must be

based on additional medical evidence not originally reviewed). The present case involves retirement

benefits, not disability benefits, and thus does not implicate the same concerns.

Reply at 2-3. Nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, suggests that the Fund had ever made a

final determination that Plaintiff was eligible for the requested pension benefits, which it then

reversed on May 23, 2023. Indeed, according to the Complaint, Plaintiff reactivated his application

for pension benefits in December 2021. Compl. ¶ 33. “From January through April of 2022, the

Fund investigated the qualification of [Plaintiff] to receive his pension benefits,” during which time

the Fund repeatedly expressed various concerns with Plaintiff’s application. Id. ¶¶ 39-53. The

Complaint then alleges that, “[h]aving provided all of the information requested by the Fund, and

the passage of nearly six months without a decision on his qualification for pension benefits, on

May 23, 2022, [Plaintiff] emailed the Fund, advised the Fund that he had complied with all of the

Fund’s requests and directions, and requested the release of his pension benefits.” Id. ¶ 58 (emphasis

added). That same day, the Fund sent a letter stating that upon completion of its investigation, it

determined that Plaintiff did not qualify for an early retirement pension. Id. ¶ 60. Plaintiff’s

purported evidence that the Fund had at some point prior to that date internally approved Plaintiff’s

application, simply reflects the decision-making process and does not raise “a reasonable suspicion

of misconduct” sufficient to warrant discovery.

Finally, Plaintiff contends that Counts II through IV of his Complaint allege non-ERISA

claims of breach of fiduciary duty, estoppel, and the failure to provide full and fair hearing. He

asserts that he is entitled to discovery to establish the merits of this claims. Plaintiff is incorrect.

The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that ERISA preemption is “clearly expansive.”

Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997). ERISA

Section 514(a) provides that the statute “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may

now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” covered by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The

“relate to” standard is broadly construed. Way v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 346 F. Supp. 2d 711, 718

(D.N.J. 2004). “In areas where ERISA specifically legislates, including benefit claims and fiduciary

provisions with respect to the administration of benefit plans, state law is pre-empted.”

Brainbuilders, LLC v. Ocean Healthcare Mgmt. Grp. Ben. Plan, No. 20-2495, 2021 WL 949321, at

*8 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2021). A plaintiff “cannot merely relabel their ERISA benefit claims as state

law claims.” Id. In turn, a plaintiff cannot seek discovery outside the administrative record in an

effort to litigate such preempted claims. Id.

Here, Plaintiff’s claims set forth in Counts II through IV are nothing more than a reiteration

of his ERISA claims. Because these claims are likely preempted by ERISA, Plaintiff cannot premise

a request for discovery on them.5

CONCLUSION

The Plan at issue here gives Defendants discretion to interpret its terms; as such, the Court’s

review is limited to an arbitrary and capricious standard based on the administrative record. While

Plaintiff seeks discovery outside that record, he has not identified any structural or procedural

conflicts that would permit consideration of facts beyond the administrative record. Plaintiff’s

challenges to Defendants’ exercise of discretion are cabined by the administrative review record,

5 Plaintiff’s cited cases in support of his request for discovery are all factually

distinguishable. In Baker v. Lukens Steel Co., 793 F.2d 509, 512 (3d Cir. 1986), the court considered

affidavits on the issue of whether the plaintiffs had provided proof of injury resulting from the

company’s amendment of its pension plan to eliminate a special retirement provision—not on the

reasonableness of the plan’s decision to deny retirement benefits. In Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec.

Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1993), the court found that the issue of whether a misrepresentation

by a pension benefits plan is material—a question not at issue here—is a mixed question of law and

fact that warranted discovery. In Novembre v. Local 584 Pension Trust Fund & Welfare Trust Fund,

1981 WL 138042 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 1981), the court did not discuss the availability of discovery

regarding the plaintiffs’ ability to carry over their respective pension credits from one Local to

another. Id. at *6. In Schlear v. Carpenters Pension & Annuity Fund of Philadelphia, No. 22-1843,

2023 WL 3569971, at *8 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2023), the court allowed discovery on plaintiff’s

allegation that the defendant inconsistently applied the plan terms in different benefits decisions

involving similar circumstances, which is one of the identified “procedural irregularities” that gives

rise to a right to limited discovery—an allegation not at issue here. Finally, in Luby v. Teamsters

Health, Welfare, and Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1991), the plan terms did

not grant the administrator discretion to interpret ambiguous plan terms; consequently, the de novo

standard applied and the court’s review was not limited to the administrative record.

which may not be supplemented on appeal. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for

discovery.

An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Elizabeth A. Pascal

ELIZABETH A. PASCAL

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Christine P. O’Hearn, U.S.D.J.