The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
NICHOLAS M.,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-22121 (GC)
vy. OPINION
MARTIN O’MALLEY, COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
CASTNER, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Nicholas M.’s! appeal from the
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying an application
filed by Plaintiff for child’s insurance benefits and disability under Title II and/or Title XVI of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423, ef seg. The Court has jurisdiction to review this matter
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and reaches its decision without oral argument pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, and
other good cause shown, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED,
The Court identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial pursuant to D.NJ, Standing
Order 2021-10.
2 This matter was initially filed by Plaintiff’s father. Plaintiff has now reached the age of
majority and pursues this appeal on his own behalf. As an adult alleging disability since childhood,
a successful application would result in Social Security Disability Insurance Disabled Adult Child
(“DAC”) benefits to be paid out based on Plaintiff’s father’s Social Security earnings record.
I BACKGROUND
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 17, 2019, Plaintiff's father applied for child’s insurance benefits on Plaintiff's
behalf, alleging an onset date of September 1, 2004. (Administrative Record (“AR”) at 11, 86.°)
On September 13, 2019, the Commissioner denied Plaintiff's claim, (7d. at 95), and on December
24, 2019 it denied the claim again upon reconsideration, (fd. at 107). On August 2, 2022, the
Administrative Law Judge (‘ALJ’) held an Administrative Hearing. Ud. at 46-85.) In an August
26, 2022 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (/d at 11-23.) Plaintiff timely
requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision. (Ud. at 1-7.) On September 12,
2023 the Appeals Council found there was no basis for review of the ALJ’s decision. Ud. at 1-7.)
Plaintiff filed an application to proceed with his appeal in forma pauperis in front of this Court on
November 8, 2023, (ECF No. 1), which the Court granted on November 21 (ECF No. 2). The
same day, the Complaint was filed onto the docket and a summons was issued to the Commissioner
of Social Security.
Plaintiff filed his brief on June 6, 2024, (ECF No. 7), and Defendant filed his response on
July 8, GECF No. 8).
B. THE ALJ’S DECISION
in the ALJ’s decision denying Plaintiff's application, the ALJ set forth the five-step process
for determining whether an individual is disabled and entitled to disability benefits, and then
examined the evidence at each step. (Ud. at 12-23 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404,1520(a)).)
3 The Administrative Record certified on January 18, 2024 is available at ECF Nos, 5-1
through 5-7. This Opinion references page numbers in the Record only and not the corresponding
ECF numbers, Page numbers for all other cites (@.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers
stamped by the Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.
L Steps One through Three of the ALJ's Disability Deterntination
Under Section 202(d) of the Social Security Act, for a child to be entitled to insurance
benefits the plaintiff must have a disability that began before the age of 22. Ud. at 12.) At step
one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was still under the age of 22 as of the onset date of September 1,
2004. Ud. at 13.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any gainful activity since the
alleged disability onset date, (/d. at 14 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571).)!
At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following “severe”
impairments: attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”); learning disorder; borderline
intellectual functioning; depressive disorder; and obesity. Ud. (citing 20 CFR 404.1520(c)).) The
ALJ found that these medically determinable impairments “significantly limit the claimant’s
ability to perform basic work activities as required by [Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)] 85-28.”
Ud} The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had the following non-severe impairments: history of
rash/allergic dermatitis/impetigo; and eczema. Ud.) The ALJ determined that these “are non-
severe impairments because the medical evidence of record reflects that they have not caused more
than minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities for 12 consecutive
months relevant to this decision.” Ud.) The ALJ further found that references in the record to
Plaintiff's otitis media of the right ear, headache, allergic rhinitis, and status post-concussion did
not result in any medically determinable impairments because a medically determinable
impairment “may not be established solely on the basis of a claimant’s allegations regarding
symptoms; and... must be established by objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical
source.” Cd.)
4 The ALJ found that while “the claimant testified that he worked after the alleged disability
onset date... this work activity did not rise to the level of substantial gainful activity [SGA]? as
he earned less than $400.00 per month, which did not “rise to SGA levels.” (AR 14.)
At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did “not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
CFR. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Ud. at 14-15 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525,
404.1526).) The ALJ considered muitiple listed impairments and determined that none were
supported by the medical record. (/d. at 14-15.) Further, the ALJ found that “[t]he severity of the
claimant’s mental impairments, considered singly and in combination, do not meet or medically
equal the criteria of listings 12.04, 12.05 or 12.11.” Ud at 15.) In making this determination, the
ALJ cited psychological evaluations from Plaintiffs school, medical records from Dr, Lyudmila
Yuzefovich from 2019, and medical records from Rutgers University Behavioral Health Care. (7d.
at 15-17 (citing Exs. 1F, 6F, 7F, and 8F.)°)
In assessing the paragraph B criteria related to the disability regulations for evaluating
mental disorders, the ALJ found that based on the medical evidence of record Plaintiff had
moderate limitations in: understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with
others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting and managing oneself. (d. at
15.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had not shown that he met the paragraph C criteria for
evaluating mental disorders as “[t]he medical evidence does not show such marginal adjustment
that the claimant has minimal capacity to adapt to changes in the environment or some new
demands.” (id. at 16.) Further, the medical record in evidence “did not show that simple changes
or increased demands have led to a deterioration of the claimant’s functioning or inability to
function outside the home.” (/d.)
5 The Court refers to exhibits by the same exhibit numbers used in the Administrative
Record.
4d
2. Step Four
At the fourth step, the ALJ outlined his findings of Plaintiff's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), writing:
[C|laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c), with exceptions.
The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; but can never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can perform
frequent balancing; and can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl. The claimant can never work at exposed heights or work with
machinery involving exposed sharp or exposed moving mechanical
parts; and can never operate a motor vehicle or operate heavy
equipment. The claimant can understand and remember simple
instructions, and can perform simple, routine tasks; can use
jedgment in making work-related decisions commensurate with this
same type of work; and can adapt to occasional changes in routine
work settings. The claimant can have occasional interaction with
coworkers and supervisors, beyond any increased interactions
initially required to learn the job, but can never work in tandem with
coworkers to complete job tasks, such as with assembly-line work.
Lastly, the claimant can have occasional interaction with the public.®
at 17-18.}]
Step four requires that the ALJ follow a two-step process in which he must: (1) determine
whether there is an “underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) . . . that
can be shown by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques . . . that could
reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms,” and then (2) evaluate
the “intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent
to which they limit the claimant’s work related activities.” at 18.) In reaching his conclusion
6 The Social Security Administration “determine[s] the physical exertion requirements of
work in the national economy” by “classify[ing] jobs as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very
heavy.” 20 C.E.R. § 404.1567. Accordingly, medium work “involves lifting no more than 50
pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds.” (id. § (c).)
The regulations find that “[i]f someone can do medium work, .. . he or she can also do sedentary
and light work.” Ud.)
&
regarding Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ stated that he relied on “careful consideration of the entire
record” and “considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be
accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” (/d. (citing 20
CFR § 404,1529 and SSR 16-3p).) The ALJ also considered the Plaintiff's testimony, the medical
opinions provided, and prior administrative medical findings, Ud. (citing 20 CFR § 404.1520c).)
In determining Plaintiffs RFC, the ALJ weighed Plaintiffs past function reports,
educational history, and the testimony Plaintiff gave in the hearing regarding his impairments.
The ALJ found that after reviewing the evidence, “the claimant’s medically determinable
impairments reasonably could be expected to cause symptoms and limitations” but that “to the
extent that the claimant alleges that the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his conditions
result in disability, this is not consistent with the evidence in the record.” (d. at 19.) Further, the
ALJ found that “with respect to the claimant’s ADHD; learning disorder; borderline intellectual
functioning; depressive disorder; and obesity, the record reflects that these are severe impairments
and the claimant has some resulting limitations” which were reflected in the ALJ’s RFC finding.
To reach this conclusion, the ALJ reviewed, in relevant part: a psychological evaluation by
Lynna Cirillo, M.A.; Plaintiffs educational records; pharmacological progress notes from Rutgers
University Behavioral Health Care; progress notes from Dr. Sherie Novotny; and Plaintiffs
Disability Report. Gd. at 19-20 (citing Exs. 1F, 1E, 6F, 7F, 8F).)
The ALJ then considered the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings.
(id. at 20.) First, the ALJ examined the Disability Determination Service’s (“DDS”) initial
evaluation, which determined that Plaintiff “had severe ADHD; and a severe learning disorder.”
(citing Ex. 2A).) The initial evaluator opined that Plaintiff could understand, remember, and
execute simple tasks; could persist at work activities sustaining pace and attention during periods
fo
of two hours; could adjust to changes; and could interact with the public, coworkers, and
supervisors. (/d.) On reconsideration, the second DDS consultant found the claimant “had severe
ADHD; severe borderline intellectual functioning; and a severe depressive, bipolar, or related
disorder, (/d, (citing Ex. 4A).) The reconsideration evaluator opined that “the claimant had
moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information; mild limitation
interacting with others; moderate limitations in concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace;
and mild limitations in adapting and managing oneself.” (Ud. at 21 (citing Exs. 2A & 4A).) The
reconsideration evaluator opined that claimant could understand, retain, and carry out simple
instructions and complete simple tasks; could consistently and usefully perform routine tasks on a
sustained basis with normal supervision; could cooperate adequately with others, could adapt over
time to most changes and task demands; could make simple decisions; and could take appropriate
precautions for normal hazards. (/d.)
The ALJ found that “these medical opinions are persuasive . . . to the extent consistent with
limitations to simple instructions, to simple, routine tasks, to adapting to occasional changes in
routine work settings, and for the limitations on interactions incorporated into the above [RFC]
finding.” Ud.) The ALJ found that while “the DDS consultants did not have the benefit of
observing the claimant personally” and “did not incorporate the entirety of the claimant’s
limitations,” their findings were “consistent with the overall medical evidence.” Cd.)
Next, the ALJ reviewed the third-party function report submitted by Plaintiff's mother,
which stated that Plaintiffs conditions “adversely affect[ed] his abilities to remember, complete
tasks, concentrate, understand, follow instructions, and get along with others.” (/d. (citing Ex.
3E).) The ALJ categorized this report as a lay statement and observation regarding a claimant’s
functioning which must be considered, and he did so within the context of the overall record. Ud.
(citing 20 C.ELR. §§ 404. 1502(e), 416.902(e)).)
3. Step Five
At the fifth and final step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had no past relevant work
experience, that he was a young individual at the alleged disability onset date, and that Plaintiff
had a high school education. Gd. at 21-22.) The ALJ found that “{c]onsidering the claimant’s age,
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” (Ud. at 22 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1569, 404.1569a(a)).) These jobs, based upon the vocational expert’s testimony at the hearing,
include: hand packager; kitchen helper; and automobile detailer. Ud.) The ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from September 1,
2004 through the date of this decision.” Ud. at 23 (citing 20 CFR §§ 404.350(a)(5), 404. 1520(g)).)
I. LEGAL STANDARD
A. DISABILITY DETERMINATION
An individual is “disabled” and therefore eligible for disability insurance benefits if he is
unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 USC,
§ 423(d)(1)(A). The individual’s impairment must be severe to the point that the individual cannot
engage in his previous work or in “any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy,” i.e., work that exists in significant numbers either in the region where such
individual lives or in several regions of the country. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Plunmmer v. Apfel,
186 F.3d 422, 427-28 (3d Cir. 1999). A physical or mental impairment is one “that results from
Go
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)@).
The Commissioner employs a five-step sequential evaluation process for disability claims.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps of
the analysis, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner for the fifth step, Poulos v. Comm’r of
Soc, Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2007); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 Gd Cir. 2004).
First, a claimant must not have engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged
disability onset date. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)G), (b).
Second, the Commissioner considers “the medical severity of [the claimant’s]
impairment(s).” Jd. § 404.1520(a\(4)Gi). The claimant must have a “medically determinable
physical or mental impairment” or combination of impairments severe enough to limit the
claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities for a continuous period of at least twelve months.
Id.; see also id. at § 404.1509. The claimant bears the burden of establishing the first two
requirements, and failure to satisfy either of them automatically results in denial of benefits.
Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 n.5 (1987).
Third, if the claimant satisfies his burden at steps one and two, the Commissioner then
considers the “medical severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s).” Jd. § 404.1520(a)(4)Gii). The
impairment or impairments must meet or equal a listing in Appendix 1 of C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P. fd. § 404.1520(d). The impairment or impairments are “medically equivalent to a listed
impairment... if [they are] at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed
impairment.” Id. § 404.1526(a). If the claimant can make a sufficient showing at step three, he is
deemed disabled. fd. § 404.1520(a){iii).
Fourth, if the claimant fails to make a sufficient showing at the third step, the analysis
proceeds to an evaluation of the claimant’s RFC and past relevant work. Jd. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
RFC is the most the claimant can do in a work setting despite his limitations. fd. § 404.1545(a)(1).
The Commissioner “assess[es| [the claimant’s] residual functional capacity based on all the
relevant evidence in [his] case record,” and “consider[s] all of [the claimant’s] medically
determinable impairments,” including ones that are not “severe” pursuant to §§ 404.1520(c),
404.1521, and 404.1523. fd. § 404.1545(a)(1)-(3). The Commissioner also assesses RFC based
on “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” Jd. § 404.1545(a}(3). Past relevant work is
“work that [the claimant] ha[s] done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity,
and that lasted {ong enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it.” Jd § 404.1560(b)C1). “The
claimant bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to [his] past relevant work.”
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428 (citing Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994)),
Fifth, if the claimant is incapable of performing past relevant work, the analysis proceeds
to the fifth and final step. See id. § □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ Phimmer, 186 F.3d at 428. At this step,
the claimant must be unable to adjust to other work in light of his RFC, age, education, and work
experience to be considered disabled. See id. § 404,1520(a)(4)(v), (g). Before denying a claim at
step five, the Commissioner must show that the claimant is capable of other work existing “in
significant numbers in the national economy.” /d. § 404.1560(c)(2); see Poulos, 474 F.3d at 92.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
District courts may “affirm[], modify[], or revers[e] the decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In
reviewing the decision, the court determines whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence. [d.; see also Poulos, 474 F.3d at 91, Substantial evidence is “such relevant
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Reefer v.
Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971)). “It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a
preponderance of the evidence.” Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146, 1148 Gd Cir. 1971)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The district court is not “empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for
those of the fact-finder.” Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 Gd Cir, 1992). This limitation
applies “even if [the court] would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Hartranfi v. Apfel,
181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999), The court must “review the record as a whole to determine
whether substantial evidence supports a factual finding.” Zirnsak vy. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d
Cir, 2014) (citing Schaudeck vy. Comm ’r of Soc, Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 Gd Cir, 1999)), “Since it
is apparent that the ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason, an
explanation from the ALJ of the reason why probative evidence has been rejected is required so
that a reviewing court can determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper,”. Cotter y,
Harris, 642 ¥.2d 700, 706-07 (3d Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted).
Wi, DISCUSSION
On review of the ALJ’s decision, (see AR at 11-23), and the Administrative Record, (see
generally AR), the Court finds good cause to affirm the Commissioner’s decision. In reaching a
decision, an ALJ must evaluate the evidence and explain the reasons for accepting or rejecting
evidence, Coffer, 642 F.2d at 706. Here, the ALJ provided extensive and thorough reasoning for
his findings, and the Court therefore determines that the ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
11
In support of his appeal, Plaintiff advances three arguments: (1) at step three of the
sequential evaluation, the ALJ failed to properly combine Plaintiff's four severe mental
impairments; (2) the ALJ’s opinion did not devote serious consideration to Plaintiff's severe
obesity; and (3) the decisional RFC finding Plaintiff could perform medium work is not based on
substantial evidence and did not have a sufficiently articulated rationale. (ECF No. 7 at 7-49.)
The Court will address these arguments in turn.
A. THE ALJ’s ASSESSMENT OF PLAINTIFE’S MENTAL HEALTH AT STEP 3
Plaintiff first objects to the comprehensiveness of the ALJ’s analysis at step three regarding
the combination of Plaintiff's four severe mental impairments, Ud. at 6-7.) At step three, an ALJ
considers whether the combination of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments meets
or equals the severity of any one of the impairments in the Listing of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. §
404,1520(a)(4)Gii), An impairment meets a listed impairment if it satisfies “‘all of the specified
medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely,
does not qualify.’” Jones, 364 F.3d at 504 (quoting Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 990)).
“A claimant cannot qualify for benefits under the ‘equivalence’ step by showing that the overall
functional impact of his unlisted impairment or combination of impairments is as severe as that of
a listed impairment.” Zebley, 493 U.S. at 531. “[T]he medical criteria defining the listed
impairments [are set] at a higher level of severity than the statutory standard” because the “listings
define impairments that would prevent an adult, regardless of his age, education, or work
experience, from performing any gainful activity, not just ‘substantial gainful activity.’” Jd. at 532
(quoting 20 C.ER. § 416.925(a)).
Plaintiff argues that although the combination of all severe impairments and the
“comparison of that constellation of symptoms and diagnoses against listing-level severity” is
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mandatory under the regulations, here it is “absent.” (ECF No. 7 at 7 (citing Torres y. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 279 F, App’x 149 Gd Cir, 2008).) Plaintiff admits that this analysis does not require
“any particular format or magic words,” but argues the ALJ’s opinion does not provide the required
“analysis of the evidence and the requirements of the listing to satisfy the Court that proper
comparisons were made and the evidence which might lead to a medical equivalence conclusion
was sufficiently covered.” (Ud at 8-9 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).)
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that evidence on the record regarding his working memory
was not properly incorporated into the ALJ’s assessment that Plaintiff has only moderate, rather
than marked, limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying information as well as in
mental functioning, concentration, persistence, and pace. (Ud. at 13-14 (citing Ex. 1F).) Plaintiff
makes similar arguments regarding the ALJ’s incorporation of findings in the same psychiatric
evaluation regarding Plaintiff's “variable” concentration and attention span. Ud. at 15-16.) Finally,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff only had a moderate limitation in
adapting and managing himself because the facts show that: (1) Plaintiff has never lived outside
of his parents’ home; (2) Plaintiff was tested and has several learning disabilities and intellectual
deficits; (3) Plaintiff spent his educational career classified as a special education student; and (4)
Plaintiff was let go after 4-5 days from a job at UPS and has made less than $100 a week riding a
delivery bicycle for DoorDash, (/d. at 23-24.)
The Defendant argues the ALJ’s assessment that Plaintiff was not presumptively disabled
at step three was based on substantial evidence, and that Plaintiff did not “satisfy his burden to
prove that his conditions met or equaled these listings.” (ECF No. 8 at 13-14.) Specifically, the
ALJ sufficiently articulated his assessment of medical evidence and the opinion of state agency
psychologist Dr. Lewis as to the effect of Plaintiff's impairments on his limitations and
12
incorporated those limitations in his assessment. (/d. at 16.) Further, where an ALJ “believes that
the evidence already received in the record does not reasonably support a finding that the
individual’s impairment(s) medically equals a listed impairment, [the ALJ] is not required to
articulate specific evidence supporting his or her finding that the individual’s impairment(s) does
not medically equal a listed impairment .., a statement that the individual’s impairment(s) does
not medically equal a listed impairment constitutes sufficient articulation for this finding.” (ed. at
17 (citing SSR 17-2.).)
At step three, an ALJ must ensure “sufficient development of the record and explanation
of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505 (citing Burnett y Comm’r of Sac,
Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 120 Gd. Cir. 2000)); see also Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir.
2001). It is well-settled that this “requires more than just a conclusory statement that a claimant
does not meet the listings.” Burneft, 220 F.3d at 119. The ALJ did so here. He articulated his
assessment of the evidence based on the full medical record, and sufficiently compared Plaintiff's
limitations and the impact of his impairments to the levels required by the listings. Further, the
evidence in the record substantially supports the ALJ’s finding, particularly in light of the mental
_ health assessments and medical record notes showing that Plaintiff's condition remained stable
following his high school graduation and his struggle to find work. (AR at 20.)
The district court is not “empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for
those of the fact-finder.” Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182; see also Hartranfi, 181 F.3d at 360 (finding
the relevant question is not if the district court “would have decided the factual inquiry
differently”). The court must instead “review the record as a whole to determine whether
substantial evidence supports a factual finding.” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 610 (citing Schaudeck, 181
F.3d at 431). Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ should have found marked limitations in the four
1d
areas of functioning is unpersuasive, as it does not point to an error by the ALJ, but merely that
Plaintiff disagrees with his assessment of the evidence. As the ALJ supported his findings with
substantial evidence and an articulation of his assessment of the full medical record in evidence,
the Court affirms the ALJ’s decision. See Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003).
B, THe ALJ’s TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFE’S OBESITY
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not adequately consider Plaintiffs severe obesity at step
three and in his decisional RFC at step four. (ECF No. 7 at 31.) After finding at step two that
Plaintiff suffered from severe obesity, the ALJ’s opinion referred twice more to the obesity, and
found that “even when obesity is considered in combination with the claimant’s other impairments,
the claimant does not meet or equal any of the listings.” (ECF No. 7 at 30-31 (citing AR at 15).)
Plaintiff argues that this analysis did not meet the regulation standard for “serious consideration”
under the current standards for evaluation of obesity’s impact on disability claims. Ud.) As such,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in (1) not properly combining obesity with the mental
impairments considered at step three in analyzing whether Plaintiff was presumptively disabled
and (2) that the ALIJ’s analysis of Plaintiff's obesity and its impact on Plaintiff’s decisional RFC
was not sufficiently articulated so as to allow for judicial review. (Cd. at 30-35.) Defendant
contends that the ALJ “fully considered Plaintiff's obesity at step three and the RFC.” (ECF No.
8 at 19.)
“fAjn ALJ must meaningfully consider the effect of a claimant's obesity, individually and
in combination with [his] impairments, on [his] workplace function at step three and at every
subsequent step.” Diaz v. Comm ’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 3d Cir. 2009). There exists no
independent listing for obesity, and so a favorable finding at step three will either result from (1)
a finding “that an individual with obesity ‘meets’ the requirements of a listing if [he] has another
14
impairment that, by itself, meets the requirements of a listing”; or (2) if there exists “an impairment
that, in combination with obesity, meets the requirements of a listing.” SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL
34686281, at *5 (Sept. 12, 2002). “For example, obesity may increase the severity of coexisting
or related impairments to the extent that the combination of impairments meets the requirements
of a listing.” /d. This is especially true of musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular
impairments.” /d, The regulations direct that a finding of equivalence at step three is appropriate
“if an individual has multiple impairments, including obesity, no one of which meets or equals the
requirements of a listing, but the combination of impairments is equivalent in severity to a listed
impairment.” /d, The ALJ, however, “will not make assumptions about the severity or functional
effects of obesity combined with other impairments.” /d. at *6. “Obesity in combination with
another impairment may or may not increase the severity or functional limitations of the other
impairment.” Ld.
Here, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s impairments in combination and did not find he
satisfied a listing. (AR 15.) Plaintiff has not shown either in the record or in his briefing what
obesity-related impairment he has that would meet the medical equivalent of a listing, and he has
not sufficiently argued how he would have “prevailed at step three if the ALJ’s analysis had been
more thorough.” Holloman v. Comim’r Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 Gd Cir. 2016), Here, like
in Holloman, Plaintiff “offers no answer to that question and therefore no basis for us to remand
the case.” Jd. Plaintiff has not shown error on the ALJ’s part, or that he did not consider obesity
at all, merely that he disagrees with the ALJ’s assessment of how the obesity created limitations
on Plaintiff when combined with his mental health issues.
Further, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's obesity when assessing Plaintiff’s functional
capacity, and he incorporated corresponding postural and exertional limitations into the RFC. As
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noted above, the ALJ is required to consider the impact of Plaintiff's obesity singly and in
combination with other impairments at steps three, four, and five. Diaz, 577 F.3d at 504. Here, in
assessing Plaintiff’s exertional limitations and the ensuing impact on Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ
assessed Plaintiff’s athletic history, his job delivering DoorDash via bicycle, and the lack of
medical evidence in the record showing impairments due to Plaintiff’s obesity. (AR at 15, 21.)
The ALJ relied on the medical evidence in the record to assess the impact of Plaintiff’s obesity.
Moreover, Plaintiff did not originally claim disability due to his obesity and does not
sufficiently argue what limitations Plaintiff suffers from due to his obesity beyond what is
incorporated into the RFC. Alejandra D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 22-175, 2023 WL
2609134, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2023) (“Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence in the record
indicating that obesity impacted her impairments such that the medical equivalency analysis would
change or that she required additional RFC limitations due to her obesity.”); see also William J.-P
v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 20-18081, 2022 WL 909665, at *8 (Mar. 29, 2022) (finding “remand is not
appropriate as it would not change the outcome of the case, Plaintiff has not presented any
objective medical evidence to meet his burden of showing how his obesity actually impacted his
work, as opposed to merely showing that he has obesity and struggles to work.”).
The Court finds that the ALJ sufficiently considered Plaintiff’s severe obesity at both step
three and step four of his analysis.
C,. THe ALJ’s SUBSEQUENT RFC DETERMINATION
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ did not base the decisional RFC at step four on
substantial evidence and did not sufficiently articulate the type of work Plaintiff could sustain.
(ECF No. 7 at 35, 45.) Defendant disputes this characterization and argues that the “ALJ fully
17
articulated his rationale in finding Plaintiff capable of reduced range medium work with additional
postural, environmental, and mental limitations.” (ECF No. 8 at 23.)
Here, the Court finds that the ALJ’s assessment that Plaintiff can perform medium work
was based on substantial evidence in the record and should be affirmed. An ALJ is not required
“to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis. Rather, the
function . . . is to ensure that there is sufficient development of the record and explanation of
findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505; see alse Diciano v. Comm of Soc.
See., Civ. No, 18-17383, 2019 WL 6696523, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2019) (“The RFC is a function-
by-function assessment based on all of the relevant evidence of an individual’s ability to do work-
related activities, but an ALJ does not need to use particular language or adhere to a particular
format in conducting his RFC analysis.”),
In this case, the ALJ detailed the record evidence that he relied on in a narrative discussion,
cited specific medical evidence, medical opinion evidence, and other evidence including the
Plaintiff’s mother’s third-party function assessment, and formulated an RFC that reflected the
ALJ’s conclusions related to those limitations. The Court agrees with Defendant that the ALJ
considered Plaintiff’s mental health treatment records, which showed Plaintiff had “largely
unremarkable findings, he was able to complete school, he participated in sports, and he
maintained relationships,” and otherwise clearly had reviewed and referenced the record as a
whole. (ECF No. 8 at 24.) Further, as already addressed above, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's
obesity, and incorporated related limitations into his RFC analysis.
Based on a review of the record, the Court finds that the ALJ sufficiently examined the
evidence and provided sufficient reasoning regarding his RFC, and the Court will thus affirm. See
Wellington W. v. Kijakazi, Ctv. No. 22-05042, 2023 WL 5551030, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2023)
[T]he ALJ did not merely announce her RFC determination without providing any support or
explanation. She appropriately evaluated the objective medical record . .. and provided a clear
presentation of her reasoning ... .”); Jose S. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 19-19077, 2023 WL 5125533, at
*4 (D.N.J, Aug. 9, 2023) (“The ALJ’s detailed examination of the objective medical evidence...
indicates that his RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence and that it resulted from
his ‘careful consideration of the entire record.’”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and other good cause shown, the ALJ’s decision to deny
benefits is AFFIRMED. An appropriate order follows.
Dated: September? ly , 2024 | ty af the ( a st i
cron thd
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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