TRUIST BANK v. ELGEO CORP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

____________________________________

:

TRUIST BANK, : Civil Action No. 24-1533 (JKS)(MAH)

:

Plaintiff, : OPINION

:

v. :

:

ELGEO CORP, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

____________________________________:

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Truist Bank’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for leave

to serve by alternative means the Summons, Complaint, and related filings upon Defendants, Elgeo

Corp (“Elgeo”), David Alhalabi (“Alhalabi”), and Irakli Sharashenidze (“Sharashenidze”)

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(e) and 4(h). See generally Mot. for Alt. Serv., D.E.

10. Specifically, Plaintiff requests leave to effect service on Defendants by: (1) sending a copy of

the Summons, Complaint, and related filings by certified and ordinary mail to Defendants’ last

known addresses and Defense counsel’s email; (2) award for the expenses incurred in effectuating

service; and (3) an extension of time to serve Defendants by sixty additional days. See id.; Mot.

for Ext. of Time, D.E. 11. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part

and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

On March 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants, alleging breach of loan

violations. See generally Compl., D.E. 1. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff extended to Elgeo

two loans and “made available” two credit card facilities, all of which were “absolutely and

unconditionally guaranteed” by Alhalabi and Sharashenidze. See id. at ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiff alleges

Defendants have defaulted on the loans and credit card facilities secured for Elgeo, and it now

seeks to recover the money Defendants owe. See id. at ¶ 4. Despite multiple attempts, Plaintiff

has been unsuccessful in personally serving Defendants. See generally Mot. for Alt. Serv., D.E.

10.

On May 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed its first motion for alternative service. See First Mot. for

Alt. Serv., D.E. 8. On May 28, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice due to

Plaintiff’s failure to include a legal brief and a proposed form of alternative service. See Order,

May 28, 2024, D.E. 9. Plaintiff rectified these deficiencies and on June 6, 2024, filed the instant

motion. See Mot. for Alt. Serv., D.E. 10. Plaintiff also attached a supporting certification of its

counsel, Jeffrey M. Lichtstein (“Mr. Lichtstein”), and a supplementary exhibit containing recent

emails between Mr. Lichtstein and counsel for Defendants, Mr. Morris Fateha, Esq. (“Mr.

Fateha”).1 Id.

According to Mr. Lichtstein, Plaintiff has been unable to effectuate service on Defendants,

as detailed herein. See generally Ex. 1, Cert. of Jeffrey M. Lichtstein, D.E. 8-1. On March 6,

2024, the Court issued a summons for Defendants. Summons, D.E. 3. The following day, Mr.

Fateha emailed Mr. Lichtstein that he “represent[s] [Elgeo] in connection with the Truist Bank

matter.” See Ex. 2, First Email Exchange, D.E. 8-2 at 3. On March 8, 2024, Plaintiff retained De

Novo Attorney Services, Inc. (“De Novo”) to serve Defendants at their last known addresses. Ex.

1, Cert. of Jeffrey M. Lichtstein, D.E. 8-1, at ¶¶ 3-6. De Novo used Defendants’ addresses from

the Promissory Note and Guarantees (“Loan Documents”) associated with the loan subject to this

1 In the interest of adjudication of this motion on the merits, the Court notes that it references an

additional certification and exhibits submitted in the First Motion, as well as attached exhibits and

certifications submitted in the instant motion.

action. See Ex. A, Promissory Note, D.E. 1-1; Ex. E, Guaranty, D.E. 1-5. However, even with

Defendants’ last known addresses, De Novo could not effectuate service on Defendants. See Ex.

3, Returns of Non-Service, D.E. 8-3, at 2-4.

De Novo attempted to serve Sharashenidze, individually, and as resident agent for Elgeo,

on March 11, 2024, at his last known residence, 131 Dudley Street, Apt. 122, Jersey City, New

Jersey 07302.2 See id. When the process server attempted to serve Sharashenidze at this address,

the current tenant stated she did not know Sharashenidze. Id. Further, the front desk representative

said Sharashenidze’s lease expired on September 6, 2003. See id. Plaintiff then directed De Novo

to widen its search efforts. See Ex. 1, Cert. of Jeffrey M. Lichtstein, D.E. 8-1, at ¶ 7. De Novo

conducted an “expanded person search” (“Skip Trace”) to locate other addresses potentially

associated with Sharashenidze. See Ex. 4, Skip Trace, D.E. 8-4, at 2. As a result of the Skip Trace,

De Novo determined Sharashenidze likely resides at 71 Blanchard Road, South Orange, New

Jersey 07079. See id.

Accordingly, De Novo attempted service on Sharashenidze at 71 Blanchard Road, South

Orange, New Jersey 07079, four times: (1) March 19, 2024, at 7:16 p.m.; (2) March 23, 2024, at

10:29 a.m.; (3) March 26, 2024, at 9:04 p.m.; and (4) March 30, 2024, at 9:04 a.m. See Ex. 3,

Returns of Non-Service, D.E. 8-3, at 2-3. During the March 19, 2024, attempt, a nanny at the

residence stated to the process server that “[Sharashenidze] would return from work later in the

evening.” See id. at 2. On March 23, 2024, the same nanny told the process server,

2 Plaintiff deemed Sharashenidze to be the resident agent for New Jersey company Elgeo because

he lives in New Jersey, is president of Elgeo, and is a guarantor of the loan. See generally Mot.

for Alt. Serv., D.E. 10. The Court acknowledges the “determination whether an individual is ‘a

managing or general agent’ depends on a factual analysis of that person’s authority within the

organization[,]” and therefore accepts for this motion Plaintiff’s characterization of Sharashenidze

as resident agent. Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1971) (internal

citations omitted).

“[Sharashenidze] was not home and works every day.” See id. Subsequently, De Novo attempted

service after typical work hours, at approximately 9:00 p.m. on March 26, 2024, but no one

answered the door. See id. Similarly, at approximately 9:00 a.m. on March 30, 2024, De Novo

could not serve Sharashenidze. See id.

Additionally, De Novo attempted to serve Alhalabi at 2423 E. 1st Street, Brooklyn, New

York 11223 four times: (1) March 14, 2024, at 11:29 a.m.; (2) March 15, 2024, at 8:20 a.m.; (3)

March 18, 2024, at 9:07 p.m.; and (4) March 26, 2024, at 8:50 p.m. See Ex. 3, Returns of Non-

Service, D.E., 8-3 at 4. On March 14, 2024, March 15, 2024, and March 18, 2024, De Novo’s

process server could not serve Alhalabi because there was “[n]o answer at the door.” See id.

During the fourth service attempt on March 26, 2024, at 8:50 p.m., the process server saw “[l]ights

on; kids[’] stuff everywhere; [a] television on in [two] rooms; [and a] car in the garage[,]” but

could not effectuate service. See id.

Plaintiff also engaged in additional investigative efforts to locate Defendants. See Ex. 1,

Cert. of Jeffrey M. Lichtstein, D.E. 8-1, at ¶¶ 15-20. Mr. Lichtstein searched the internet, social

media, Department of Defense Manpower Data Center, and PACER. See id.; Ex. 9,

Servicemembers Search, D.E. 8-9; Ex. 10, Indiv. Defs. PACER Search, D.E. 8-10; Ex. 11, Elgeo

PACER Search, D.E. 8-11; Ex. 12, LinkedIn Search, D.E. 8-12. However, the investigation failed

to yield any new information to assist Plaintiff. See Ex. 1, Cert. of Jeffrey M. Lichtstein, D.E. 8-

1, at ¶¶ 15-20.

After these unsuccessful service attempts, Mr. Lichtstein directed an attorney at his firm

to request a waiver of service of process from Defendants. See Ex. 1, Cert. of Jeffrey M.

Lichtstein, D.E. 8-1, at ¶ 9. On April 8, 2024, Mr. Lichtstein emailed Mr. Fateha a Notice of a

Lawsuit (“Notice”) and a Request to Waive Service of a Summons (“Waiver”). See Ex. 2, First

Email Exchange, D.E. 8-2, at 2. Mr. Fateha responded to Mr. Lichtstein on April 16, 2024, that

he is “not authorized to waive service.” See Ex. 2, First Email Exchange, D.E. 8-2, at 1. On April

9, 2024, Plaintiff sent Defendants a Notice of Lawsuit, copy of the Complaint, two copies of the

Waiver, and prepaid means of returning the forms via first-class mail. See Ex. 6, Waivers of

Service, D.E. 8-6; Ex. 7, First Class Mail, D.E. 8-7; Ex. 8, Pre-Paid Postage, D.E. 8-8; Ex. 1, Cert.

of Jeffrey M. Lichtstein, D.E. 8-1, at ¶ 11. Plaintiff used each Defendant’s last known address

obtained from the Loan Documents. Ex. 1, Cert. of Jeffrey M. Lichtstein, D.E. 8-1, at ¶ 11. On

May 24, 2024, Mr. Lichtstein emailed Mr. Fateha a courtesy copy of Plaintiff’s Motion for

Substituted or Constructive Service. See Ex. 2, Second Email Exchange, D.E. 10-2, at 1. Mr.

Fateha responded that he does not represent Defendants “on this litigation” and can “only settle

this matter.” See id. As of May 24, 2024, neither Defendants nor Mr. Fateha have signed and

returned the Waivers. See Ex. 1, Cert. of Jeffrey M. Lichtstein, D.E. 8-1, at ¶ 14.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues the Court should allow it to serve Defendants by alternative means because

“all reasonable efforts of effectuating personal service or waiver of service have failed.” See Mot.

for Alt. Serv., D.E. 10, at 5. Plaintiff proposes service by registered or certified mail, ordinary

mail, and email to Mr. Fateha. See id. Plaintiff also requests Defendants pay for the expenses

Plaintiff incurred effecting service following Defendants’ failure to execute the Waivers. See id.

at 8.

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) governs service of process on individual defendants

and provides the framework for service on a corporation, as outlined in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(h). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) states:

Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual – other than a

minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been

filed – may be served in a judicial district of the United States by:

(1) following state law for serving summons in an action

brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where

the district court is located or where service is made; or

(2) doing any of the following:

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint

to the individual personally;

(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or

usual place of abode with someone of suitable age

and discretion who resides there; or

(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by

appointment or by law to receive service of process.

In New Jersey, personal service is the primary and preferred method for individuals and

corporate defendants within and outside the state. N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a); N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a)(1); N.J.

Ct. R. 4:4-4(a)(6). However, when personal service cannot be effectuated upon an individual or

corporation in accordance with N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a), New Jersey law allows for substitute service

so long as the proposed form of service is “provided by court order, consistent with due process

of law.” See N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(3).

Before seeking a court order pursuant to Rule 4:4-4(b)(3), an “affidavit of diligent inquiry

is required to disclose the efforts made to ascertain the defendant’s whereabouts.” Modan v.

Modan, 327 N.J. Super. 44, 47 (App. Div. 2000). The diligence exercised and the alternative

service requested must meet the constitutional requirements of due process provided that “notice

[be] reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford

them an opportunity to present their objections.” See O’Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 126-27

(1975) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)) (holding

that the proposed means of alternative service must comport with constitutional notions of due

process). “There is no objective formulaic standard for determining what is, or is not, due

diligence. Instead . . . due diligence is measured by the qualitative efforts of a specific plaintiff

seeking to locate and serve a specific defendant.” Modan, 327 N.J. Super. at 48 (internal citation

and quotations omitted); see also J.C. v. M.C., 438 N.J. Super. 325, 331 (Ch. Div. 2013) (holding

that to show due diligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate a good faith effort to locate a defendant).

Due diligence does not require a plaintiff to “take every conceivable action” to find a defendant’s

whereabouts. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Crystal Clear Indus., No. 11-3062, 2012 WL

1884003, at *5 (D.N.J. May 22, 2012). Since there is no “objective formulaic standard” for

determining due diligence, the court must instead assess diligence by performing a fact-sensitive

inquiry of “the qualitative efforts of a specific plaintiff seeking to locate and serve a specific

defendant.” See id. at 47-48; Janowski v. Williams, No. 12–3144, 2014 WL 1092611, *2 (D.N.J.

Mar. 18, 2014) (finding plaintiff must demonstrate a good faith effort to locate defendant to satisfy

due diligence). Once a plaintiff has exhibited that he exercised reasonable due diligence, “a court

may order an alternative means of service that is consistent with due process.” Guardian Life Ins.

Co. of Am. v. Estate of Matesic, No. 16-643, 2016 WL 3763340, at *2 (D.N.J. Jul. 14, 2016).

B. Analysis

i. Diligence

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated due diligence in attempting to serve

Defendants. Plaintiff’s process servers attempted to personally serve Defendants many times at

their last known addresses. See Ex. 3, Returns of Non-Service, D.E. 8-3, at 2-4. Plaintiff further

attempted to locate Defendants by searching the internet, social media, and PACER. See Ex. 1,

Cert. of Jeffrey M. Lichtstein, D.E. 8-1, at ¶¶ 15-20. After the futile service attempts, Plaintiff

mailed each Defendant a Notice of Lawsuit, copy of the Complaint, two copies of the Waivers,

and prepaid means of returning the forms to ensure Defendants had knowledge of the lawsuit.3

See Ex. 6, Waivers of Service, D.E. 8-6, Ex. 7, First Class Mail, D.E. 8-7, Ex. 8, Pre-Paid Postage,

D.E. 8-8. Mr. Lichtstein also emailed Mr. Fateha copies of the Notices, Waivers, and Plaintiff’s

May 24, 2024, Motion for Substituted or Constructive Service. See Ex. 2, Second Exchange 2,

D.E. 10-2, at 2.

The Court finds the record clearly demonstrates Plaintiff attempted to serve Sharashenidze,

individually, and as resident agent for Elgeo. Indeed, the process server attempted service five

times, though each attempt proved to be unsuccessful. Ex. 3, Returns of Non-Service, D.E. 8-3,

at 2-4, Ex. 4, Skip Trace, D.E. 8-4 at 2. Upon receiving information from the current tenant and

confirmation from the front desk representative at the 131 Dudley Street location that

Sharashenidze did not live there, Plaintiff endeavored to find Sharashenidze’s correct, current

address via Skip Trace. See Ex. 3, Returns of Non-Service, D.E. 8-3, at 2-3. When the Skip Trace

informed Plaintiff that Sharashenidze resided at the 71 Blanchard Road residence, Plaintiff focused

its efforts on serving Sharashenidze there. See Ex. 3, Returns of Non-Service, D.E. 8-3, at 2-4,

Ex. 4, Skip Trace, D.E. 8-4, at 2. Indeed, the process server attempted service at this location four

times. See Ex. 3, Returns of Non-Service, D.E. 8-3, at 2-4. Further, it is clear Plaintiff exercised

diligence in its attempts. This is evidenced by Plaintiff revising its service strategy when it had a

better understanding of Sharashenidze’s possible work schedule. Id.

3 The Court notes that Mr. Lichtstein sent Sharashenidze’s forms only to the 131 Dudley Street

address rather than the address identified by the Skip Trace, the 71 Blanchard Road address.

However, this does not change the Court’s finding because Plaintiff exercised due diligence in

attempting to personally serve and locate Sharashenidze multiple times at the Blanchard Road

address.

Plaintiff similarly exercised diligence in its attempts to serve Alhalabi. Indeed, the record

shows that Plaintiff attempted to serve Alhalabi four times at 2423 E. 1st Street, Brooklyn, New

York 11223. See id. at 4. The process server stated that “no [one] answer[ed] the door” when she

attempted service at the residence on March 14, 2024, at 11:29 a.m., March 15, 2024, at 8:20 a.m.,

and March 18, 2024, at 9:07 p.m. See id. The process server was unsuccessful even when

changing the time to attempt service. See id.

Though Plaintiff has not attempted to serve Defendants after further internet research, the

Court concludes any additional efforts would likely be futile because the search failed to uncover

verifiable information as to Defendants’ whereabouts. 4 See Ex. 9, Servicemembers Search, D.E.

8-9; Ex. 10, PACER Search for Indiv. Defs., D.E. 8-10; Ex. 11, Elgeo PACER Search, D.E. 8-11;

Ex. 12, LinkedIn Search, D.E. 8-12. For instance, Plaintiff performed general internet and social

media searches for Sharashenidze and Alhalabi, but Plaintiff could not correctly attribute the

search results to named Defendants. See Ex. 1, Cert. of Jeffrey M. Lichtstein, D.E. 8-1, at ¶¶ 18-

19. Further, a general internet search for Elgeo “revealed only that [Elgeo] maintained a LinkedIn

social media account, that its associated members primarily live in Tbilisi, Georgia[,] and New

Jersey, and that it formerly maintained a website –www.elegeo.com—which is currently defunct.”

See id at ¶ 20. Though a social media search can be another helpful way to locate someone,

Plaintiff is not required to “take every conceivable action” to find a defendant’s whereabouts. See

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2012 WL 1884003, at *5.

Following these unsuccessful service attempts, Plaintiff tried another route to notify

Defendants of the pending action. See Mot. for Alt. Serv., D.E. 10, at 5. Plaintiff mailed each

4 Plaintiff established that Defendants are not active-duty service members or parties in other open

federal cases. See Ex. 9, Servicemembers Search, D.E. 8-9; Ex. 10, Indiv. Defs. PACER Search,

D.E. 8-10; Ex. 11, Elgeo PACER Search, D.E. 8-11; Ex. 12, LinkedIn Search, D.E. 8-12.

Defendant a Notice of Lawsuit, copy of the Complaint, two copies of the Waivers, and prepaid

means of returning the forms to Mr. Lichtstein. See Ex. 1, Cert. of Jeffrey M. Lichtstein, D.E. 8-

1, at ¶ 11. Plaintiff also emailed Mr. Fateha copies of the Notices, Waivers, and Plaintiff’s May

24, 2024, Motion for Substituted or Constructive Service. See Ex. 2, First Email Exchange, D.E.

8-2; Ex. 2, Second Email Exchange, D.E. 10-2. Further, the record reflects additional “qualitative

efforts” Plaintiff has performed to effect service by transmitting physical and digital Notices and

Waivers to Defendants and Mr. Fateha. See Modan, 327 N.J. Super. at 47-48. Based on Plaintiff’s

varied and numerous attempts to locate and personally serve Defendants, the Court is satisfied that

Plaintiff has exercised “reasonable diligence” in its attempts to serve Defendants.

ii. Due Process

Although Plaintiff has demonstrated diligence in attempting to serve Defendants, the

Court’s inquiry does not end there because any form of substitute service must be “consistent with

due process of law.” N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(3); see also Marlabs Inc. v. Jakher, No. 07-4074, 2010

WL 1644041, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 22, 2010) (explaining that a proposed means of alternative service

must comport with constitutional notions of due process). The United States Supreme Court has

explained that the proposed method of service must provide “notice reasonably calculated, under

all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them

an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339

U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

Courts allow a “wide variety of alternative methods of service.” Marks L. Offs., LLC v.

Mireskandari, 704 F. App’x 171, 177 (3d Cir. 2017). Alternative service by certified mail has

been deemed to comport with due process requirements. See Rule 4:4-4(b)(1)(C); Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am. v. Estate of Matesic, No. 16-643, 2016 WL 3763340, at *2 (D.N.J. July 14, 2016)

(concluding simultaneous service by certified and ordinary mail satisfies due process).

Courts have also permitted alternative service by way of email. See Marks L. Offs., LLC,

704 App’x at 177. However, what qualifies as sufficient service depends on each case’s particular

facts and circumstances. See Prediction Co. LLC v. Rajgarhia, No. 09-7459, 2010 WL 1050307,

at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010). This Court has specifically allowed a plaintiff to serve a defendant

domestically by email where the plaintiff provided evidence that the email was “reasonably likely

to apprise Defendant of the pendency of this action.” See Menon v. Corbett, No. 21-8384, 2023

WL 4946972, at *3-5 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2023) (citing SEC v. Vuuzle Media Corp., No. 21-1226,

2021 WL 1731947, at *3 (D.N.J. May 3, 2021)) (finding plaintiff’s proper attribution of the address

to defendant and showing its recent use demonstrated that email service would sufficiently apprise

defendant of the action). Usually this evidence provides the Court with “facts indicating that the

person to be served would be likely to receive the summons and complaint at the given email

address.” Vuuzle Media Corp., 2021 WL 1731947, at *3; see also Hayward Indus. v. CompuPool

Prods., No. 22-7330, 2023 WL 3736216, at *10 (D.N.J. May 31, 2023) (denying service via email

where the plaintiff failed to show prior correspondence with addresses to indicate the accounts

were operative).

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s first proposed method of alternative service via

certified and ordinary mail is appropriate. Not only is this method articulated in New Jersey’s

Court Rules but it has also been accepted by this Court as complying with due process

requirements. See Rule 4:4-4(b)(1)(C), Estate of Matesic, 2016 WL 3763340, at *2.

The Court also finds that serving Defendants via morrisfateha@gmail.com would

sufficiently alert Defendants of the action. See Menon, 2023 WL 4946972, at *3-4 (citing Vuuzle

Media, 2021 WL 1731947, at *3) (concluding email service sufficient because plaintiff properly

attributed email address to defendant and provided communications showing its recent usage),

Vuuzle Media, 2021 WL 1731947, at *3 (citing SEC v. Dubovoy, No. 15-6076, 2016 WL 7217607,

at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2016)) (allowing “alternative service where defendants ‘are likely already

aware of the action against them’”). For example, Mr. Fateha, as a representative of Elgeo,

initiated emails with Mr. Lichtstein in March 2024 and has since engaged in continuous

correspondence with him. See Ex. 2, First Email Exchange, D.E. 8-2 at 3; Ex. 2, Second Email

Exchange, D.E. 10-2. As an officer of the court, Mr. Fateha is well-positioned to adequately give

Defendants notice of the action and afford them an opportunity to present a defense, even if he

only represents them for settlement purposes, as he currently claims. See Grange, 2022 WL

855694, at *4; Ex. 2, Second Email Exchange, D.E. 10-2, at 1. Further, the email exchanges

clearly show that Mr. Fateha used his email address recently and consistently throughout the

litigation and indicates to the Court that Mr. Fateha would likely receive service at

morrisfateha@gmail.com. See Hayward, 2023 WL 3736216, at *10. Plaintiff has sufficiently

shown that serving the Summons and Complaint upon Defendants via Mr. Fateha’s email address

would further put Defendants on actual notice of the action and allow them to present a defense.

See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.

At bottom, Plaintiff has demonstrated diligence in locating Defendants to effectuate

personal service and its proposed means of alternative service via certified mail, ordinary mail,

and email to Mr. Fateha comports with due process. Therefore, this Court will allow Plaintiff the

opportunity to serve Defendants by certified and ordinary mail. Plaintiff shall use all addresses

taken from the Loan Documents, as well as those addresses found via Skip Trace, when serving

Defendants. Plaintiff shall also resend the necessary service documents to Mr. Fateha at

morrisfateha@gmail.com.5

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for alternative service, D.E. 10, is granted in

part and denied in part. In addition, Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to serve

Defendants in accordance with this decision, D.E. 11, is granted. An appropriate Order

accompanies this Opinion.

/s Michael A. Hammer

Hon. Michael A. Hammer,

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: August 22, 2024

5 The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for expenses incurred in “making service following

Defendants’ deliberate failure to sign a return the April 9, 2024 Waivers.” See Mot. for Alt. Serv.,

D.E. 10, at 8. “[A]ttorney fees incurred in effectuating service, such as the time billed for an

attorney to arrange service, are not compensable under Rule 4(d).” Fink v. Bishop, No. 23-566,

2024 WL 3084409, at *3 (D.N.J. June 21, 2024) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff has not

adequately provided to the Court the amount of fees it seeks, or what this alleged costs were

incurred from. Accordingly, the Court cannot make a determination based on the submissions it

has before it. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request is denied without prejudice.