PRICE v. THE COUNTY OF SALEM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

ANTHONY PRICE, et al., :

:

Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No. 22-6042 (MAS)(JTQ)

:

v. : MEMORANDUM OPINION

: AND ORDER

THE COUNTY OF SALEM, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to compel certain discovery from

Defendants, the County of Salem and John S. Cuzzupe (“Defendants”). For the

reasons set forth below, the information Plaintiffs seek is neither relevant to

Plaintiffs’ individualized claims nor proportional to the needs of the case.

Consequently, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed this Motion seeking an Order compelling Defendants to produce

a “statistical sample” of protected health information (“PHI”) from nonparty Salem

County Correctional Facility (“SCCF”) inmates to determine their suicidal “at-risk”

status. Plaintiffs supposedly seek this information to support their allegations that

Defendants arbitrarily over-classify SCCF inmates as “at-risk,” resulting in what

Plaintiffs claim to be improper strip searches, stigmatization, and excessive

surveillance, among other practices. ECF No. 75-1 (“Moving Br.”) at 4.

Based upon Defendants’ representations (as Plaintiffs have not attached the

document requests to the Motion), the requests that are the subject of this Motion

seek the following information:

• Request No. 16: “All corresponding evaluations by a medical professional

either releasing these individuals from ‘at-risk’ or maintaining their ‘at-risk’

status;”

• Request No. 55: “All documents reflecting transfers to mental health facilities

for detainees who must be released but are on the ‘at-risk’ unit and have not

yet been seen by a mental health professional;” and

• Request No. 56: “All documents reflecting individuals who were released from

the jail while on ‘at[-]risk’ status.”

ECF No. 80 (“Opp”) at 3-4.

Plaintiffs’ Motion follows two Orders entered by the Honorable Elizabeth A.

Pascal, U.S.M.J. The first Order, dated November 21, 2023, permitted Plaintiffs to

amend Document Request Numbers 16, 55, and 56 “to request a statistical sample of

the relevant documents.” ECF No. 57. Defendants submit that Plaintiffs did not

comply with the November 21, 2023 Order’s deadline of November 30, 2023; instead,

Plaintiffs requested to review 700 inmates’ files on December 15, 2023. Opp. at 4.

Thereafter, on January 11, 2024, Magistrate Judge Pascal granted Plaintiffs leave to

file a motion to compel discovery. ECF No. 72. And on February 9, 2024, Plaintiffs

filed this Motion, requesting inter alia suicide questionnaires, psychological

evaluations, documents related to inmates’ referrals to a mental health facility from

435 non-party SCCF inmates. Moving Br. Three days later, on February 12, 2024,

Plaintiffs filed an amended proposed order reducing their request to a random sample

of 150 inmates. ECF No. 76.

Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to this information and the request is

“proportional” because it will shed light on Defendants’ arbitrary suicide

classification system. Moving Br. at 9-10. Plaintiffs contend that “HIPAA expressly

permits third party PHI when a court determines under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 that such

discovery should be permitted” and that a qualified protective order from the Court

will protect the 150 inmates’ privacy interests. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiffs’ amended

proposed order filed in connection with this Motion suggests that the Parties may

take notes and create a spreadsheet on the statistical information gleaned from the

inmate files, excluding any identifying information. ECF No. 76-1.

Defendants object to the disclosure of this sensitive information, as well as the

random sampling Plaintiffs suggest. According to Defendants, this litigation involves

four individuals (not a putative class) who claim their own rights have been violated

and thus seek relief on their own behalf. Opp. at 9-10. To that end, Defendants posit

Plaintiffs are not entitled to the privileged medical information of 150 nonparties. Id.

Defendants emphasize that because Plaintiffs elected to opt out of a prior class

action,1 the statistical sample requested here will have no bearing on the

individualized claims Plaintiffs are pursuing. Id. at 9. Defendants also assert that

SCCF’s current policies are not indicative of the way things were done during the

1 Stevenson, et al. v. Salem, et al., SLM-L-92-17.

period of alleged violative conduct—2015 to 2020, id. at 9-10, and that responding to

the request would be unduly burdensome. Id. at 11-12.2

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The scope and limits of discovery are defined by Rule 26(b)(1), which provides:

[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that

is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs

of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the

action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant

information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in

resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed

discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

“Rule 26 is liberally construed to favor disclosure, as relevance is a broader inquiry

at the discovery stage than at the trial stage.” Kaye v. Nussey, 2022 WL 3227578, at

*2 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2022). “[A] court may order the discovery of any matter relevant

to a party's claims, defenses, or the subject matter involved in the litigation upon a

finding of good cause.” Campbell v. Sedgwick Detert, Moran & Arnold, 2013 WL

1314429, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2013). However, “[a]lthough the scope of discovery

under the Federal Rules is broad, this right is not unlimited and may be

circumscribed.” Hayes v. Bergus, 2015 WL 5666128, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2015). The

“the sole purpose of discovery is to add flesh for trial on the parties' respective claims

and defenses,” not to serve as a “fishing expedition for potential claims or defenses.”

Robinson v. Horizon Blue Cross-Blue Shield of New Jersey, 2013 WL 6858956, at *2

2 Defendants also raise an evidentiary objection that Plaintiffs’ proposed spreadsheet

will constitute inadmissible hearsay. Opp. at 13.

(D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2013), aff'd, 2014 WL 3573339 (D.N.J. July 21, 2014), and aff'd, 674

F. App'x 174 (3d Cir. 2017).

Furthermore, Rule 37 provides that, “[a] party seeking discovery may move for

an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 37(a)(3)(B). A party moving to compel discovery “bears the initial burden of proving

the relevance of the requested information.” Ford v. City of Pittsburgh, 2015 WL

12777652, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2015). Once that initial burden is met, “[t]he party

objecting to discovery must show that the requested materials do not fall within the

broad scope of relevance ... or else are of such marginal relevance that the potential

harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of

broad disclosure....” Clemens v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 300 F.R.D. 225,

227 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Rulings regarding the

proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which discovery may be compelled, are

matters consigned to the Court's discretion and judgment.” Ford, 2015 WL 12777652,

at *1.

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Requested Information is Irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ Claims

What Plaintiffs overlook in arguing that the production of the requested

information should be compelled is that before the Court is able to address whether

the discovery sought is “proportional to the needs of the case,” it must determine

whether the discovery is “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 26(b)(1). Plaintiffs instead urge the Court to simply find that the requested

information is “proportional to the context of what is at issue in the litigation,”

seemingly hoping to bypass a relevance determination. Moving Br. at 3. Conducting

such an analysis to “enjoin Defendants’ practices” as “a matter of public interest”

absent any consideration for whether the requested documents are relevant to the

claims before the Court would be to disregard not only the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, but decades of legal precedent. See id.

It is beyond settled that “[t]he test for determining whether material is

discoverable is relevancy.” Cont'l Access Control Sys., Inc. v. Racal-Vikonics, Inc., 101

F.R.D. 418, 418 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also Forrest v. United States, 1996 WL 171539,

at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 1996) (finding “the test of discoverability is the relevance

standard of FRCP 26(b)(1)”). And it is Plaintiffs’ burden—as “the party seeking

discovery”—to “demonstrate the relevancy of the requested information.” AdvanSix

Inc. v. Allianz Glob. Risks US Ins. Co., 2023 WL 179963, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2023);

Ford, 2015 WL 12777652, at *1. Plaintiffs have not sustained their burden here.

Indeed, even under a liberal standard, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate

how the privileged medical files of 150 non-party inmates are relevant to any of

Plaintiffs’ claims. As Defendants correctly point out, Plaintiffs are four individuals

who opted out of a class action lawsuit and now seek a statistical sample of inmate

files from 2015 to 2020. See Opp. at 9, 10. Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, make any

argument that the private medical files of 150 SCCF inmates support a claim that

Defendants violated their individual rights. Plaintiffs’ broad assertion that “[t]he

right of citizens to be free of arbitrary government punishment is a cornerstone to

democracy” does nothing to the analysis. Nor does it convince the Court that

Defendants’ “at-risk” classification of a random sample of current SCCF inmates is

relevant to whether the rights of four Plaintiffs were violated over four years ago. See

Moving Br. at 10.

B. Even if the Requested Documents were Relevant, Plaintiffs

Have Made No Effort to Properly Request the Inmates’

Protected Information.

Even if Plaintiffs could demonstrate how other current SCCF inmates’ medical

files are relevant to their claims, the Court would still shield this sensitive and highly-

personal information from disclosure because the inmates have a fundamental

privacy interest in their personal medical records.

Importantly, “[d]iscovery is only available as to nonprivileged documents.”

Miller v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 700142, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). And “[t]here can be no question that . . . medical

records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the

ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection.” Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 315 (3d

Cir. 2001) (holding inmates have a privacy interest in medical information). “It has

been recognized in various contexts that medical records and information stand on a

different plane than other relevant material.” E.E.O.C. v. Princeton Healthcare Sys.,

2012 WL 1623870, at *20 (D.N.J. May 9, 2012). To be sure, “when comparing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 35 with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), it is clear that the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure impose a higher burden for discovery of reports of the physical and mental

condition of a party or other person than for discovery generally.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, “[a]ny release of [protected] health information must conform with

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (‘HIPAA’).” Arvidson

v. Buchar, 2018 WL 10613032, at *7 (V.I. Super. June 6, 2018). HIPAA “establishes

that health care providers may not use or disclose HIPAA protected health

information without written authorization from the individual or providing the

individual with an opportunity to agree or object in instances where a judicial or

administrative proceeding requires disclosure.” Id. However, PHI may be disclosed

in the course of a judicial or administrative proceeding in several circumstances.

Specifically, disclosures may be made, “[i]n response to an order of a court or

administrative tribunal, provided that the covered entity discloses only the protected

health information expressly authorized by such order.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(i).

And where there is no court order, PHI may nonetheless be disclosed “[i]n response

to a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process” if one of the following

conditions is met:

(A) The covered entity receives satisfactory assurance, as described in

paragraph (e)(1)(iii) of this section, from the party seeking the

information that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to

ensure that the individual who is the subject of the protected health

information that has been requested has been given notice of the

request; or

(B) The covered entity receives satisfactory assurance, as described in

paragraph (e)(1)(iv) of this section, from the party seeking the

information that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to

secure a qualified protective order that meets the requirements of

paragraph (e)(1)(v) of this section.

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii).

Contrary to what Plaintiffs assert, the Court has not entered a “Protective

Order which provides for the designation of Protected Health Information as

ATTORNEY EYES / EXPERT EYES ONLY.” Moving Br. at 3. Rather, the Parties’

Discovery Confidentiality Order (“DCO”), entered on June 5, 2023, protects “highly

sensitive business or personal information.” Id.; ECF No. 36 ¶2. The DCO does not

appear to protect information that is also protected by HIPAA and its additional

disclosure protections and releases. And Plaintiffs have not identified any specific

section of the DCO to suggest otherwise. Cf. Open MRI & Imaging of RP Vestibular

Diagnostics, P.A. v. Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co., 2023 WL 5979835, at *2 (D.N.J.

Aug. 28, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5985187 (D.N.J. Sept.

14, 2023) (noting that the Court entered the parties’ stipulated discovery

confidentiality order, which expressly covered ‘protected health information’”). As

such, Plaintiffs’ position that the Attorneys’ Eyes Only designation is sufficient to

protect the 150 inmates’ privacy interests appears to be based on their

misunderstanding of the protections afforded by the DCO.

Not only is the requested medical information not afforded the protection of a

court order, but Plaintiffs have never even requested that such an order be entered.

Accordingly, to facilitate the exchange of the requested discovery, Plaintiffs are

looking for the Court to grant relief they never asked for. Without making any effort

to obtain a protective order or notify the inmates of the requested PHI, Plaintiffs

cannot demonstrate that the disclosure of the SCCF inmates’ files should be

permitted. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1).

Furthermore, Plaintiffs cannot argue that they have now provided a sufficient

basis for the Court to enter a protective order with the filing of this Motion. Rule 26(c)

permits the Court, “for good cause” to “issue an order to protect a party or person from

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(c)(1). “‘Good cause’ is established when it is specifically demonstrated that

disclosure will cause a clearly defined and serious injury.” Glenmede Tr. Co. v.

Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). “Broad allegations of harm,

unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not support a good

cause showing.” Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994).

Here, Plaintiffs have provided nothing other than “broad allegations of harm,”

and not even harm to them individually. They make unsupported assertions such as,

“[t]he context of this case should persuade the Court to allow an evaluation of

[SCCF’s] suicide classification system.” Moving Br. at 10. Such conclusory statements

provide an insufficient basis for the Court to infringe upon a privacy right that has

been so well-protected that it stands “on a different plane than other relevant

material.” See Princeton Healthcare Sys., 2012 WL 1623870, at *20.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the

information requested is relevant to their claims or proportional to the needs of the

case. Further, the documents requested contain privileged medical information, to

which Plaintiffs have established no entitlement.3

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above,

IT IS on this 23rd day of July 2024,

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery (ECF No. 75) is

DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to terminate ECF No. 75.

s/ Hon. Justin T. Quinn

JUSTIN T. QUINN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

3 The Court need not address Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs’ document

requests are unduly burdensome and would lead to the production of inadmissible

hearsay. Opp. at 11-13. However, for the reasons set forth above, an undue burden

would be imposed by the time it would take to obtain the necessary HIPAA

authorizations from each of the 150 inmates to permit disclosure of their medical files.