WHEELERWEAVER v. C.O. TARGGART

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

____________________________________

KHALIL WHEELERWEAVER, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civ. No. 23-22617 (GC) (JTQ)

:

v. :

:

C.O. TARGGART, et al., :

: OPINION

:

:

Defendants. :

______________________________:

CASTNER, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Khalil Wheelweaver’s submission of an

amended civil rights complaint (“Amended Complaint”) and the filing fee. At this time, the Court

screens the Amended Complaint for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons explained

below, the Court dismisses the federal claims for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant to its

screening authority under § 1915A, provides leave to submit a second amended complaint within

45 days, and declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims at this time.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the caption of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff lists as Defendants C.O. Targgart, C.O.

Morton, Anissa Jett, Kathy Johnson, Kyle Yaindi, Tiffany Fairweather, Dr. Haggag, Nurse Sharon,

Susan Springler, Amy Emrich, Garyn Nathan, Cyrus Manahan, Uchenna Nwodili, Ford Motor

Vehicle Co., and New Jersey Department of Corrections. (See ECF No. 3, Amended Complaint

at 1.)

On May 15, 2023, C.O. Targgart and C.O. Morton transported Plaintiff from Essex County

Courthouse to New Jersey State Prison (“NJSP”). (Amended Complaint at 6.) When Plaintiff

boarded the van, “neither officer took the time to secure [Plaintiff] with a seatbelt,” and Plaintiff

was unable to secure his own seatbelt because he was handcuffed to a waist chain and shackled at

the ankles. (Id.)

As the van traveled on the New Jersey Turnpike, the officer driving the van allegedly drove

aggressively in an unsafe manner. (Id.) The officer slammed on his brakes, which caused Plaintiff

to fly out of his seat and slam headfirst into the van’s metal partition. (Id.) Plaintiff hit his head,

neck, and back and injured all three. (Id.) Because he was shackled, Plaintiff could not brace for

the impact, and his right ankle shackle was blown off due to the impact. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that

C.O. Targgart and C.O. Morton were “negligent for recklessly operating the D.O.C. vehicle” and

for failing to secure Plaintiff in the vehicle. (Id.)

Plaintiff also alleges that Ford Motor Vehicle Co. and the New Jersey Department of

Corrections (“NJDOC”) were “deliberately indifferent for constructing and outfitting the D.O.C.

model vans in a manner that makes it unsafe for inmates to travel or be transported in.” (Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff further alleges that “All medical personnel listed as defendants were more than

negligent for failing to continue with medical follow ups after physical therapy to ensure

that my injuries were properly treated; specifically an ‘M.R.I.’ as I requested.” Id.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief to prevent

him from traveling in Department of Corrections vehicles. Id.

Plaintiff has also provided five grievances that he submitted in connection with the incident

and his medical care. Plaintiff’s Exhibit One is a grievance dated May 16, 2023. (ECF No. 1-1 at

2.) In the grievance, Plaintiff states the following:

I would like to make a complaint. I was transported back to

[T]renton from Essex court and along the way the CTU officer

slammed on the brakes causing me to fly and slam into the back wall

extremely violently. I would like the video from the van as soon as

possible please and thank you. In addition to this, [I] would like any

report connected with this incident including the Rahway report

from when the van made an “emergency” detour to [R]ahway’s

medical. [A]s well as any reports filed by the officers involved.

[T]hank you.

Defendant Kyle Yaindi responded on May 18, 2023, as follows: “Grievance has been referred to

Administration for review and appropriate action.” Id. Plaintiff appealed that response, stating

that he received conflicting information about whether the camera in the van was recording. See

id. Plaintiff also complained that “the jail here is attempting to down play [sic] my injuries[,]”

which included head, neck, and back pains, and throbbing headaches, and occasional numbness in

his left arm and leg. (See id.) Defendant Tiffany Fairweather responded to Plaintiff that he would

“receive a response directly from Administration regarding this matter.” (Id.)

Exhibit Two is a grievance dated May 18, 2023. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3.) In that grievance,

Plaintiff states that he was seen by Dr. Haggag and complained about “constant throbbing head

aches, head pain, neck pain, back pain, and occasional numbness in his arm and leg.” Dr. Haggag

allegedly “did a VISUAL inspection and says it seems fine.” (Id. (Emphasis in original).) Plaintiff

allegedly told Dr. Haggag “multiple times that [he is] NOT fine” and needs to be taken to the

hospital and for a CT and/or an MRI. (Id. (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff also states that he has

serious neck pain and “went down on an emergency pass multiple time since the incident to report

and be seen for neck, head, and back pain to no avail.” (Id.) Defendant Susan Springler responded

to the grievance with the following statement: “duplicate – referred to see provider for test results.”

(Id.)

Exhibit Three is a grievance dated May 19, 2023. (Id. at 3.) In that grievance, Plaintiff

reiterates that he was injured during transport and states the following about his medical care:

I went to Rahway prison and the medical staff said that CTU should

have brought me to the hospital and not there. When I came back I

have consist[e]ntly told the medical staff including DR. HAGGAG

about head pain, neck pain, back pain, dizziness, and seeing star[s].

I was told “you[’]ll be okay in a week[.]” [I] [sic] requested to go

to the hospital due to me possibly having a subdural hematoma and

it was not taken seriously.

(Id. (Emphasis in original).) Defendant Kathy Johnson responded that Plaintiff should “review

Jpay Ref# NJSP32021175 from Medical Department.”1 Id. Johnson also instructed Plaintiff to

file an appeal or submit his concerns to the Medical Ombudsman if he disagreed with the response.

(See id.)

Exhibit Four is a grievance dated May 20, 2023. (Id. at 4.) In that grievance, Plaintiff

reiterates that he has head, neck, and back pain, along with occasional numbness in his left arm

and leg and dizziness, and sees stars when he lies down. (Id.) Plaintiff also repeats his allegation

that corrections officers took him to the Rahway prison medical department, and “the medical staff

said that the officer should have brought us to the hospital.” (Id.) Plaintiff further complains that

The medical staff here is NOT taking my injuries serious [I] have

throbbing head pains, muscles spasms, and cramps. I am in pain.

Can someone please assist me. I could have a subdural hematoma

and it[’]s not being treated because the medical staff here couldn[’]t

see it.

(Id. (Emphasis in original).) Defendant Johnson closed this grievance as a duplicative request.

(See id.)

Exhibit Five is a grievance dated June 6, 2023. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff writes the following:

I am in constant pain. I can barely sleep due to me being in pain.

All I am ASKING for is PROPER MEDICAL ATTENTION. Same

as anyone else. I asked to speak with the Director of medical and

also was denied. I am running out of options. What do you as

ADMINISTRATION suggest I do?

1 Plaintiff did not provide the Medical Department’s response as an exhibit to his Complaint or

Amended Complaint.

(Id. (Emphasis in original).) Defendant Garyn Nathan responded on June 15, 2023, and stated the

following: “I sent your previous [J]pay to the dept. head of Medical[.]” Defendant Amy Emrich

also viewed the grievance on June 9, 2023, and she changed the status to pending. (See id.)

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on November 22, 2023 (ECF No. 1), and did not

submit the filing fee or an application to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. He filed an

Amended Complaint and the filing fee on or about February 13, 2024. (ECF No. 3.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff paid the filing fee for this case; however, the Court has the authority to screen his

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because he is a prisoner and has sued government

agencies and officials. See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing

that the district courts have the authority to screen a prisoner complaint pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1)

even if the prisoner is not proceeding in forma pauperis). Section 1915A(a) requires the court to

screen prisoner complaints seeking redress from governmental entities, officers, or employees and

to dismiss those complaints falling under the categories listed in § 1915A (b)(1). “[T]he screening

process of § 1915A targets claims that are ‘frivolous, malicious, or fail[ ] to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted; or . . . seek[ ] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief.’” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109–10 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 1915A); see also Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2023).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim at screening is governed by the same standard

applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher

v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, at the screening stage, “[t]he

Court must accept all facts in the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the prisoner’s

favor, and ask only whether the complaint contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.”

Durham, 82 4th at 223; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because Plaintiff is

proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185

(3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

“This means [courts] remain flexible, especially ‘when dealing with imprisoned pro se

litigants[.]’” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 244). The Court will “apply the relevant legal

principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However, “‘pro se litigants still must

allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.’” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245).

III. DISCUSSION

For the reasons explained below, the Court dismisses the federal claims pursuant to its

screening authority under § 1915A, provides Plaintiff with leave to amend if he can cure the

deficiencies in his federal claims, and declines supplemental jurisdiction at this time.

a. The Federal Claims Brought Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff brings his civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute provides,

in relevant part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ...[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 1) a violation of

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and 2) that the alleged deprivation

was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (3d Cir. 1994). In Will v.

Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), the Supreme Court held that

“[n]either a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”

The Court dismisses the § 1983 claims against the New Jersey Department of Corrections because

it is not a proper defendant under the statute.2 See Will, 491 U.S. at 68–70 (holding that

governmental entitles considered “arms of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes are not

“persons” within the meaning of § 1983); Crabow v. Southern State Correctional Facility, 726 F.

Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J.1989) (stating that New Jersey Department of Corrections and state

prison facilities not “persons” under § 1983).

“[A] state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, [is] a

person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as

actions against the State.’” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

167, n.14 (1985); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–160 (1908). Here, however, the Court

dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff’s request not to ride in Department of Correction vehicles for

lack of standing because he has not pleaded any facts suggesting that is likely to suffer a future

injury of the same type. See e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (explaining

that “Lyons’ standing to seek the injunction requested depended on whether he was likely to suffer

future injury from the use of the chokeholds by police officers”).

The Court next addresses whether Plaintiff states a claim under § 1983 against C.O.

Targgart and C.O. Morton for allegedly failing to secure him in the van, driving aggressively, and

slamming on the brakes of the vehicle, causing Plaintiff to crash into the metal partition. Although

2 The Court does not construe Plaintiff to bring § 1983 claims for damages against any of the

individual Defendants in their official capacities. Nor does the Court construe Plaintiff to allege

any § 1983 claims against Ford Motor Vehicle Co., which is a private entity. In certain

circumstances, a private entity qualifies as a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983, see Kach v. Hose,

589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009), but Plaintiff has not pleaded facts to suggest Ford Motor

Company acted under color of state law in designing or manufacturing the vans used by the New

Jersey Department of Corrections. The Court addresses the potential state law claims against Ford

Motor Vehicle Co. below.

Plaintiff appears to frame this conduct as negligence, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff to

allege that the officers also violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. A convicted prisoner

can assert an Eighth Amendment violation under § 1983 as a deliberate indifference or excessive

force claim. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1986). Federal courts have recognized

prisoner transportation claims under both standards. See McKinney v. Lanigan, No. 18-8618, 2022

WL 10075302, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2022); Pagliaroli v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., No. 18-12412, 2023

WL 1419700, at *3, 6 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2023) (collecting cases applying either a deliberate

indifference or excessive force standard to a “rough ride” Eighth Amendment claim).

The deliberate indifference standard is a two-pronged test: (1) the prisoner must be exposed

to “a substantial risk of serious harm,” and (2) the prison official must know of and disregard that

substantial risk to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837–38

(1994). Deliberate indifference requires “more than mere negligence” but does not require acting

“for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. at 835. The

Supreme Court has stated that “acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial

risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.” Id. at 836.

In excessive force cases, courts generally determine “whether force was applied in a good-faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992).

The Third Circuit has not issued a precedential opinion involving prisoner transportation,

but other circuit and district court decisions provide guidance in this area. In Jabbar v. Fischer,

683 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit held that the “absence of seatbelts on inmate

bus transport,” without more, does not constitute deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth

or Fourteenth Amendment. Courts in this circuit and elsewhere have held that liability in prisoner

transportation cases may arise “when a defendant refuses to stop driving recklessly, refuses to

secure a prisoner, or refuses to intervene, despite a prisoner’s complaints.” Williams v. Whitaker,

No. 16-6379, 2020 WL 1164788, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2020); see also Brown v. Fortner, 518

F.3d 552, 560 (8th Cir. 2008) (refusing to provide seatbelt to shackled prisoner, driving recklessly,

and ignoring prisoner’s warnings to slow down was evidence that Defendant knew of and

disregarded a substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 878 F.3d 89,

94-109 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding that the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to defeat summary

judgment on excessive force and deliberate indifference claims where the defendants refused to

fasten shackled prisoner’s seatbelt, drove at high speeds, laughed at the plaintiff’s requests to be

more careful, and taunted him about his filing of grievances).

Here, Plaintiff alleges only that C.O. Targgart and C.O. Morton failed to “take the time” to

secure his seatbelt, and one of the officers drove in an unsafe or aggressive manner and slammed

on the brakes, which caused Plaintiff to hit the metal partition headfirst. Although these allegations

could support a negligence claim, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts to suggest that either

C.O. Targgart or C.O. Morton consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm or acted

maliciously or sadistically with the purpose of causing harm. Indeed, Plaintiff does not plead facts

to suggest that C.O. Targgart or C.O. Morton intentionally or recklessly failed to secure Plaintiff’s

seatbelt, refused to secure his seatbelt upon Plaintiff’s request, or even realized that they failed to

secure Plaintiff’s seatbelt. Although one of the officers allegedly drove the vehicle in an unsafe

manner and slammed on the brakes, there is no indication that either officer realized that Plaintiff

was unsecured and could be seriously injured. For these reasons, the Court dismisses the Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference and excessive force claims against C.O. Targgart and C.O.

Morton arising from this incident and provides Plaintiff with leave to amend if he can provide

additional facts suggesting that these Defendants violated his constitutional rights.

Plaintiff also alleges that medical staff at NJSP provided him with inadequate medical care

for his injuries.3 “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment requires

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to inmates.” Perotti v. United States, 664 F.

App’x. 141, 144 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)); see also Duran

v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702, 719 (D.N.J. 2013) (explaining that the Constitution mandates that

prison officials satisfy inmates’ “basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care,

and reasonable safety”) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). To plead deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs, a convicted prisoner must allege that “(1) he had a serious

medical need, (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that need; and (3) the deliberate

indifference caused harm to the plaintiff.” Durham, 82 F.4th at 229 (citing Atkinson v. Taylor,

316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003)).

The Court assumes for purposes of screening only that Plaintiff's injuries were a serious

medical need.4 At issue is whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that any of the Defendants

3 The Court does not construe Plaintiff to allege that C.O. Targgart and/or C.O. Morton acted with

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by taking him to Rahway prison medical

department rather than to the hospital, but Plaintiff is free to clarify his claims in a second amended

complaint.

4 At minimum, the “seriousness” prong requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the need is “one that

has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional

Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Pearson v. Prison Health Servs.,

850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that a medical need is serious where it has been diagnosed

by a physician as requiring treatment). At the other end of the spectrum, “where denial or delay

causes an inmate to suffer a life-long handicap or permanent loss, the medical need is considered

serious.” Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347.

acted with deliberate indifference to his injuries. In cases where an inmate challenges the adequacy

of his medical care, “mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment does not support a

claim of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Pearson, 850 F. 3d at 535 (internal quotation and

citation omitted). In such cases, courts presume that the medical care provided to the plaintiff was

adequate, and the plaintiff must show that the medical provider did not exercise professional

judgment. See id. at 536; see also White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 1990) (mere

medical malpractice or disagreement with the proper treatment of an illness cannot give rise to a

violation of the Eighth Amendment). As long as a physician exercises professional judgment, his

or her behavior does not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights. See Moore v. Luffey, 767 F.

App’x. 335, 340 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d

Cir. 1990). A prison official also acts with deliberate indifference if he or she intentionally denies

or delays access to medical care or interferes with the treatment once prescribed. See id. at 534

(quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05); see also Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d

575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the court has “found deliberate indifference in situations

where necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons”) (cleaned up).

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends very generally that “[a]ll medical personnel

listed as defendants were more than negligent for failing to continue with medical follow ups after

physical therapy to ensure that my injuries were properly treated; specifically an ‘M.R.I.’ as I

requested.” Notably, Plaintiff acknowledges that medical staff prescribed physical therapy for his

injuries but alleges that he should have received an MRI in addition to physical therapy. Plaintiff

also includes grievances he filed about the adequacy of his medical care covering a three-week

period from May 16, 2023 through June 6, 2023. The Court credits Plaintiff’s allegations in his

grievances that he was in “constant pain” for three weeks after the incident and that he repeatedly

told medical staff, including Dr. Haggag, that he was experiencing pain, dizziness, numbness, and

saw stars. Plaintiff also states in his grievances that he needed to go to the hospital and get an MRI

to determine whether he had a “subdural hematoma,” but he has not provided any facts in his

Amended Complaint to support this potential diagnosis.

Moreover, it is unclear which of the Defendants listed in the caption were involved in his

medical care. Based on the grievances, the only Defendant that appears to have treated Plaintiff is

Dr. Haggag, who is mentioned in two grievances over a three-week period. Based on these

grievances, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Haggag provided inadequate medical care because he visually

inspected Plaintiff’s injuries, told Plaintiff he would be okay within a week, and did not order an

MRI and/or a CT scan, as Plaintiff requested. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs against Dr. Haggag because his sparse allegations do not

suggest that Dr. Haggag failed to exercise professional judgment in treating him, but rather amount

to a disagreement over the type of treatment provided. See Innis v. Wilson, 334 F. App’x. 454,

456-57 (3d Cir. 2009) (disagreement with treatment received does not state a viable claim for

relief). Nor does Plaintiff provide any well-pleaded facts suggesting that Dr. Haggag or another

medical provider delayed or denied Plaintiff an MRI for nonmedical reasons. See Pearson, 850

F.3d at 537. The Court dismisses the inadequate medical care claim as to Dr. Haggag and provides

Plaintiff with leave to submit a second amended complaint as to this Defendant and the other

medical providers involved in his care.

Plaintiff has also sued the prison officials who viewed and responded to his grievances;

however, a non-physician defendant is not deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical

needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment if she fails to respond to an inmate’s administrative

complaint regarding medical treatment while the inmate is already receiving treatment by the

prison doctor. Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993). “Once a prison grievance

examiner becomes aware of possible mistreatment, the Eighth Amendment does not require him

or her to do more than ‘review[ ] ... [the prisoner’s] complaints and verif[y] with the medical

officials that [the prisoner] was receiving treatment.’” Glenn v. Barua, 252 F. App’x. 493, 498 (3d

Cir. 2007) (quoting Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2005)). In addition, after-

the-fact review of a grievance is insufficient to demonstrate the actual knowledge necessary to

establish personal involvement.5 See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1998)

see also Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x. 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, Plaintiff fails to state a

claim for inadequate medical treatment against Dr. Haggag or any of the medical providers.

Moreover, the exhibits show that Kathy Johnson, Kyle Yaindi, Tiffany Fairweather, Susan

Springler, Amy Emrich, and Garyn Nathan responded to Plaintiff’s grievances and referred his

complaints to prison administration and the medical director for review. The medical department

also responded to Plaintiff’s grievances, but Plaintiff has not provided that response as an exhibit.

The Court dismisses without prejudice the deliberate indifference claims as to these Defendants

for failure to state a claim for relief and permits Plaintiff to submit a second amended complaint if

he can show that any of the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs.

The Court also dismisses without prejudice the § 1983 claims against the remaining

individual Defendants for lack of personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. Liability in a 42

5 In addition, prisoners do not have a constitutionally protected right to prison grievance

procedures. Speight v. Sims, 283 F. App’x 880 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d

641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty

interest on a prisoner.”). Thus, a prison official’s inadequate response to grievances (or failure to

respond to grievances altogether) does not state a claim for relief. Washington v. Crum, No. 19-

14602022 WL 798372, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2022) (explaining that a plaintiff “cannot recover

from the named defendants [under § 1983] for failing to respond to his grievances”).

U.S.C. § 1983 action is personal in nature and defendants are “liable only for their own

unconstitutional conduct.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med, Inc., 166 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d

on other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015). Respondeat superior cannot

form the basis of liability. See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005); see also

Alexander v. Forr, 297 F. App’x 102, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2008) (constitutional deprivation cannot be

premised merely on the fact that defendant was a prison supervisor when incidents set forth in the

complaint occurred). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against

the remaining individual Defendants—Anissa Jett, Nurse Sharon, Cyrus Manahan, and Uchenna

Nwodili—for failure to state a claim for relief. To the extent any of these Defendants were

personally involved in the alleged denial of adequate medical care, Plaintiff may submit a second

amended complaint.

b. The State Law Claims

In addition to his federal claims, Plaintiff also alleges that C.O. Targgart and C.O. Morton

were negligent for failing to secure his seatbelt and driving aggressively. Plaintiff may be

attempting to assert a medical negligence claim against the Department of Corrections and a

defective product claim against Ford Motor Vehicle Co. These claims arise under state law.

Where a federal court has original jurisdiction over certain claims, it also has supplemental

jurisdiction over all other related claims that form part of the “same case or controversy” under

Article III of the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also United Mine Workers

of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (same). Section 1367 (c)(3) provides that district courts

“may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” As relevant here, “where the claim over which the

district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to

decide the pendent state law claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and

fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.” Hedges v. Musco, 204

F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). “Additionally, the federal court should be

guided by the goal of avoiding needless decisions of state law ... both as a matter of comity and to

promote justice between the parties.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Here, the Court has dismissed the

federal claims at an early stage and declines supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law

claims at this time.°

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained in this Opinion, the Court dismisses the federal claims pursuant

to its screening authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The § 1983 claims against the New Jersey

Department of Corrections are dismissed with prejudice. The remaining claims under § 1983 are

dismissed without prejudice for the reasons stated in this Opinion. The Court declines

supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law claims at this time. Plaintiff may submit a

second amended complaint within 45 days if he can cure the deficiencies in his federal claims and

may also reassert his state law claims. An appropriate Order follows.

DATED: July 11, 2024 Gragte Cletnen

GEORGETTE CASTNER

United States District Judge

© If Plaintiff submits a second amended complaint, he is free to reassert his state law claims. If

Plaintiff states one or more federal claims, the Court will address the state law claims at that time.

Alternately, Plaintiff is free to file his claims in state court.

15