FALLAS v. DIGERONIMO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DARYL FALLAS,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 23-04100 (GC) (JBD)

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUSTINE DIGERONIMO, ESQ., et al.,

Defendants.

CASTNER, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Justine Digeronimo, Esq., and South

Jersey Legal Services Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Daryl Fallas’s Complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (ECF Nos.

1, 8.) Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.) The Court has carefully

reviewed the parties’ submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Rule

78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, and other good cause shown,

Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

This is a legal malpractice action stemming from a probate case in the Superior Court of

New Jersey, Monmouth County, Docket No. MON-P-214-17. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.1) Plaintiff’s

1 Page numbers for record cites (i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the

Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.

bases for subject-matter jurisdiction are his “right to attorney/client privilege,” “due process,” and

“legal malpractice.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he hired Digeronimo, an attorney with South Jersey Legal Services,

Inc. (SJLS), “sometime in 2016 for work regarding financials, such as filing bankruptcy.” (Id. at

3; ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff then “put [Digeronimo] with [his] father to redo his will of 2004.” (ECF

No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff states that “the key part of the change [to the will] was giving me a life estate

so I couldn’t be forced out.” (Id.)

Plaintiff’s father died on January 18, 2017, and the will was filed with the probate court on

February 6, 2017. (Id.) Plaintiff appears to allege that in the state-court proceedings concerning

his father’s will, a dispute with an opposing party led to an unfavorable disposition of the estate

for Plaintiff, particularly as to the sale of property. (See id.) Plaintiff alleges that “they . . .

convince[d] the Court I had und[ue] influence over my father,” using “[Digeronimo] with her

transcribed phone conversations with me []as their star witness.” (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff was

evicted from his home of 50 years, causing him “embarrassment and shame” as his personal

property was forcibly removed. (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff thus seeks “the minimum [he] would have been due [from] the estate upon my

determining sale price and date: . . . $775,168.21.” (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks $18 million to ensure

“a worry-free environment . . . for the next 30 years,” and punitive damages of an additional $18

million for “being ripped out of my home and away from family and friends.” (Id.)

B. Procedural History

On August 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) Shortly after, this Court

sua sponte ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff responded that he has “evidence of violations

of [his] 14th Amendment right of due process” and “evidence of corruption, collusion, conspiracy

to commit fraud and obstruct Justice,” which he believes “may warrant action under the Federal

RICO Act.” (ECF No. 7 at 1.) Plaintiff added that prosecution of his case “will require Discovery

and Subpoena power.” (Id.)

On August 25, Defendants moved to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to raise a federal

question establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 8.)

Plaintiff submitted two opposition filings with additional details to establish subject-matter

jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.) In the first, Plaintiff contends that because he is homeless, living

in hotels, and maintaining a permanent address at “a federal building called the United States Postal

Service” to “keep [his] driver’s license and . . . receive important letters and such,” he has “no

home jurisdiction; unless considering the post office my home address, in which case we can say

I live on Federal property and therefore this Court has Federal jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 9 at 1.)

Plaintiff also elaborates on his show-cause filing, describing his case as one of “corruption,

collusion and conspiracy to commit fraud and obstruct justice” arising from “two different cases

and two different judges” — one case concerning his bankruptcy and the other case concerning

his father’s will. (Id. at 1-2.) Given the implications of his claims, he says, Plaintiff “ha[s] every

reason to doubt that [he] could ever get Justice in the New Jersey Court System.” (Id. at 1.) In his

second filing, Plaintiff describes several of his negative experiences in state court,2 asking the

2 Specifically, Plaintiff describes an incident in 2007, when a state-court judge who

mistakenly answered Plaintiff’s call to chambers would not speak with Plaintiff about his case and

later ruled against Plaintiff; an incident in 2009, when a small-claims debt-collection suit against

Plaintiff ended in settlement, which Plaintiff believes evinces the fraudulent nature of the suit; an

incident in 2010, when a different state-court judge threatened Plaintiff with sanctions if he

continued filing motions in the trial court instead of proceeding to the appellate court; a state-court

case where the Presiding Judge of the Chancery Division ruled against Plaintiff and awarded

Plaintiff’s sister the proceeds of their late father’s life insurance policy; the decision of the judge

in the probate case denying Plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue from Monmouth County to

Court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction because “it would be unreasonable for [Plaintiff] to

expect fair treatment in New Jersey courts after what [he has] been through.” (ECF No. 10 at 4.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may bring a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). There are two types of subject-matter challenges under

Rule 12(b)(1): “either a facial or a factual attack.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d

Cir. 2016). On a facial attack, the court “accept[s] the complaint’s well pled allegations as true,

and review[s] ‘the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached

thereto[] in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Manivannan v. United States Dep’t of Energy,

42 F.4th 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176

(3d Cir. 2000)). On a factual attack, “the court ‘is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as

to the existence of its power to hear the case.’” Davis, 824 F.3d at 346 (quoting Mortensen v. First

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)).

“Federal courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, have an obligation to establish subject

matter jurisdiction, raising it sua sponte if necessary.” United States v. Port Imperial Ferry Corp.,

Civ. No. 16-2388, 2023 WL 2535302, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 2023) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Ward Trucking Co., 48 F.3d 742, 750 (3d Cir. 1995)). If a court determines at any time that it

lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action because subject matter jurisdiction

“call[s] into question the very legitimacy of a court’s adjudicatory authority.” Council Tree

Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 503 F.3d 284, 292 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d

193, 200 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[The court is] required to consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction,

Middlesex County, where Plaintiff lived, and refusing to replace the latest will with Plaintiff’s

newly found “handwritten will by [his] father dated many months prior to the will in question.”

(See ECF No. 10.)

even though neither party contends that it is lacking.” (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch.

Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986))). “Where a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, its

disposition of such a case will be without prejudice.” Siravo v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 256 F.

App’x 577, 580 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing In re Orthopedic “Bone Screw” Prod. Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d

152, 155 (3d Cir. 1997)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not raised a federal question, as Plaintiff has “pled a

claim for legal malpractice relating to state-law wills and estate administration.” (ECF No. 8-1 at

9.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s bases for subject-matter jurisdiction are that (1) Defendants’

divulging privileged communications in the probate proceedings violated of his Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights (ECF No. 1 at 1); (2) Plaintiff’s homelessness and use of the U.S.

Postal Service as a permanent address either establishes diversity jurisdiction or otherwise confers

subject-matter jurisdiction on this Court (ECF No. 9 at 1); and (3) given his proffered evidence of

corruption in the state-court system, Plaintiff cannot get a fair hearing in state court (ECF No. 10

at 4). Based on the Court’s review of the record, Plaintiff has not pled an adequate basis for federal

subject-matter jurisdiction.

A. Federal Question Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded

complaint rule, which provides that such jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,

482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “[T]o satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, ‘[a] right or immunity

created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one,

of the plaintiff’s cause of action.’” Highview Terrace Apartments v. Abulkhair, Civ. No. 20-2383,

2021 WL 825472, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2021) (quoting United Jersey Banks v. Parell, 783 F.2d

360, 365 (3d Cir. 1986)).

When the plaintiff is pro se, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally. Courts “tend

to be flexible when applying procedural rules to pro se litigants, especially when interpreting their

pleadings.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Higgs v.

Atty. Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011)); see also Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938

F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining courts’ obligation as to pro se complaints). Still, “there are

limits to our procedural flexibility”; “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their

complaints to support a claim.” Mala, 704 F.3d at 244.

In Plaintiff’s form complaint, Plaintiff selected “Federal Questions” as the basis for federal

court jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) As to the “federal Constitutional, statutory or treaty right” at

issue, Plaintiff wrote “right to attorney/client privilege,” “due process,” and “legal malpractice.”

(Id.) Plaintiff has not, however, pled the essential element necessary to raise a federal question.

Plaintiff’s recourse for a breach of the attorney-client privilege is a legal malpractice claim,

and a legal malpractice claim does not give rise to a federal question. See Westcor Land Title Ins.

Co. v. Alicea, Civ. No. 19-8474, 2019 WL 6724311, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2019) (listing the

existence and breach of an attorney-client relationship as elements for a legal malpractice claim

under New Jersey law); see also Tidwell v. Bembry, 133 F. App’x 26, 28 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The

District Court correctly concluded that subject matter jurisdiction could not be premised on 28

U.S.C. § 1331 because [plaintiff’s] claims of legal malpractice did not give rise to a federal

question.”). Because Plaintiff has not identified a basis other than the divulgence of privileged

communications as support for his assertion of a due process violation, he has not asserted a

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that could raise a

federal question. See James v. Superior Ct. of New Jersey, Civ. No. 21-16769, 2023 WL 4669484,

at *3 (D.N.J. July 20, 2023) (discussing requirements for asserting due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment).

Nor can Plaintiff establish subject-matter jurisdiction with his passing mention of “the

Federal RICO Act,” or the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1962. (ECF No. 7 at 1.) Indeed, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not plead or otherwise describe a

federal civil RICO claim.3 (See generally ECF No. 1.) Though courts reviewing a pro se pleading

must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name,”

Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002), the sum of Plaintiff’s filings indicates that he

does not assert a federal civil RICO claim against Defendants. The only time that Plaintiff

mentions “RICO” is in his show-cause filing, where he notes that he believes that “[his] evidence

may warrant action under the Federal RICO Act,” and that “before continuing with this case as a

Civil matter, [Plaintiff is] willing to share everything [he has] and know[s] about this with a federal

prosecutor.” (ECF No. 7 at 1.) Later, in his opposition papers, Plaintiff discusses the prospect of

“becom[ing] a witness for the prosecution” for a potentially forthcoming “case of corruption,

collusion and conspiracy to commit fraud and obstruct justice,” in which case he “won’t be able

to be the pro se litigant should that take place.” (ECF No. 9 at 1.)

The Court construes Plaintiff’s submission as his support for his assertion that he wishes

to proceed in federal court because he has been denied “fair treatment in New Jersey courts.” (ECF

No. 10 at 4.) Courts in this Circuit have rejected similar assertions as bases for subject-matter

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Turner v. Children’s Hosp. of Philadelphia, 378 F. App’x 124, 126 (3d Cir.

3 If Plaintiff wishes to state a federal civil RICO claim, he must allege “(1) the conducting

of, (2) an enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity.” Gunter v. Ridgewood

Energy Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 166, 173 (D.N.J. 1998).

2010) (holding that a pro se plaintiff’s claim that her state-court proceedings were unfair was

inextricably intertwined with state court’s judgment and thus barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine); Topfer v. Topfer, Civ. No. 18-01181, 2018 WL 8997509, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2018),

report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3778709 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2019) (rejecting a

plaintiff’s claim of injury “arising from any ‘unfair’ and final State Court orders entered against

him during the divorce proceedings” as barred under by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).4

To be sure, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction in

a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the plaintiff’s loss in a state-court action resulted from a

conspiracy between the defendants and certain members of the state judiciary. Great W. Mining

& Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 172 (3d Cir. 2010).5 Indeed, the Third Circuit

Court of Appeals has recognized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar a plaintiff’s

federal action arising from injuries suffered not from a state-court judgment, but from the

defendant’s wrongful conduct in a state-court proceeding. Id. at 167-68, 171-72 (discussing

McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2006); then Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003

(7th Cir. 1995), overruled by Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson, 62 F.4th 394 (7th Cir. 2023); then Brokaw

v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Vuyanich v. Smithton Borough, 5 F.4th 379,

386 (3d Cir. 2021) (“When . . . a federal plaintiff asserts injury caused by the defendant’s actions

and not by the state-court judgment, Rooker-Feldman is not a bar to federal jurisdiction.” (quoting

4 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars any such attempt to use a federal trial court as a court

of appeals from state-court judgments. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).

5 “[P]rivate parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with [an official

judicial act] are . . . acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.” Great W.

Mining, 615 F.3d at 176 (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980)) (alterations added in

Great W. Mining).

Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 167)). In that event, the plaintiff’s claim for damages must be “based

on an alleged independent violation of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights” — “the right to an

impartial forum.” Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 172 (citation omitted).

But here, Plaintiff has not shown that he wishes to plead such a claim. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants’ divulgence of privileged communications in the probate case violated his Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights. (See ECF No. 7.) If Plaintiff attributes that violation to collusion

among state-court judges and Defendants to conspire against him, Plaintiff must say so. Indeed,

Plaintiff’s submissions include no facts or assertions from which the Court could infer that Plaintiff

intends to assert a claim against Defendants like the § 1983 claim asserted in Great Western Mining

& Mineral Company v. Fox Rothschild LLP, et al., discussed above. For instance, Plaintiff

provides no factual allegations of a conspiracy in the probate case that the Court could liberally

construe for Plaintiff. Nor does Plaintiff even mention § 1983. Rather, Plaintiff expresses his

desire to be in federal court based only on his general distrust of the Superior Court after years of

unpleasant experiences in the state-court system. That general distrust is not enough to establish

a federal question.

To be clear, the Court does not dismiss Plaintiff’s suit under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of

jurisdiction due to merits-related defects. Although “[a] suit may sometimes be dismissed for want

of jurisdiction where the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to

be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is

wholly insubstantial and frivolous, [d]ismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not appropriate merely

because the legal theory alleged is probably false, but only because the right claimed is so

insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely

devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Davis, 824 F.3d at 350 (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen a case raises a disputed factual issue that goes both to the

merits and jurisdiction, district courts must demand less in the way of jurisdictional proof than

would be appropriate at a trial stage.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).6

Here, the defect is not that Plaintiff’s claim is unsubstantiated, but that Plaintiff has not

made clear that he even wishes to assert a claim that might raise a federal question, like the one in

Great Western Mining. The Court does not read such a claim into Plaintiff’s suit.

Plaintiff also seeks damages of $775,168.21 as “the minimum [he] would have been due

[from] the estate upon [his] determining sale price and date.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) An award of those

damages, from what the Court can gather, would not require overturning the state court’s

disposition of estate property. See Vuyanich, 5 F.4th at 387 (“And importantly, the [plaintiffs] did

not ask the District Court to overturn the June 18, 2019 state-court order,” which the plaintiffs

asserted was “invalid,” “but rather sought damages for the actions Defendants took under the guise

of implementing that order.”); Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 173 (“[W]hile [plaintiff]’s claim for

damages may require review of state-court judgments and even a conclusion that they were

erroneous, those judgments would not have to be rejected or overruled for [plaintiff] to prevail.”).

But to recover more than nominal damages for a due process violation, Plaintiff “would have to

show that the adverse state-court decisions were entered erroneously.” Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d

at 173. Plaintiff alleges nothing to that effect.

In sum, Plaintiff’s complaint raises no federal question under § 1331.

6 Indeed, Defendants launch a facial attack — that Plaintiff does not allege subject-matter

jurisdiction — requiring the Court to “treat the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P. v. Cook, 866 F.3d

534, 538 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333,

341 (3d Cir. 2001)).

B. Other Basis for Jurisdiction

Plaintiff also states that he has “no home jurisdiction; unless considering the post office

my home address, in which case we can say I live on Federal property and therefore this Court has

Federal jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 9 at 1.) To the extent that Plaintiff believes that provides grounds

for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Court disagrees. Even if he does not have a

permanent address, Plaintiff has represented to the Court that he resides in New Jersey. (/d.; see

generally ECF Docket Sheet.) Since the record indicates that Defendants are citizens of New

Jersey (see ECF Nos. 1, 8), the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over this case. See, e.g., Lincoln

Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 111 Gd Cir. 2015).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, and other good cause shown, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED without

prejudice. Plaintiff shall have 30 days to file an amended complaint to the extent that he can cure

the deficiencies identified in this Memorandum Opinion. An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: Marcel, 2024 (dike

ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11