<font color="red">DO NOT FILE IN THIS CASE</font> TRANSFERRED TO CAMDEN NEW CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-cv-14424

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BARBARA McLAREN, on behalf of herself

and other similarly situated,

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 21-14424 (MAS) (DEA)

v. MEMORANDUM OPINION

THE UPS STORE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Barbara McLaren’s (“Plaintiff”) motion

to remand pursuant to the local controversy exception to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A) (“CAFA”), following limited jurisdictional discovery. (ECF No. 64.)

Defendants The UPS Store, Inc., Turquoise Terrapin LLC formerly d/b/a UPS Store #4122, RK &

SP Services, Inc., formerly d/b/a UPS Store #4122, and Hamilton Pack N Ship LLC, d/b/a UPS

Store #4122 (collectively “Defendants’”) opposed the motion to remand (ECF No. 68), and Plaintiff

replied (ECF No. 70). Separately, Defendants cross moved to strike Plaintiff's reply in support of

the motion to remand (ECF No. 73), and Plaintiff opposed (ECF No. 75). For the reasons set forth

below, Plaintiff's motion to remand and Defendants’ motion to strike are both DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's renewed motion to remand comes after the Third Circuit’s April 25, 2022,

Opinion vacating the Court’s January 31, 2022, Order! (ECF No. 17) and instructing the Court to

consider the applicability of the local controversy exception to federal jurisdiction under CAFA.

See McLaren v. UPS Store Inc., 32 F.4th 232 (3d Cir. 2022). Because the facts giving rise to this

putative class action suit are well known to the parties and are set forth in both the January 31,

2022 Order and the Third Circuit’s Opinion, a detailed recounting here is unwarranted.

In sum, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants charged consumers, herself included, for notary

services in excess of $2.50, the maximum amount permitted under New Jersey law, N.J.S.A.

§ 22A:4-14. (See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) §§ 20-70, ECF No. 1, Ex. A.) Specifically, Plaintiff

claims that she visited UPS Store #4122, located in Hamilton Square, New Jersey to notarize two

documents and was unlawfully charged $5.00 in notary fees per document. (See id. J{ 62-66.)

The FAC includes class allegations for all persons who paid notary service fees in excess of the

statutory maximum at the approximately 161 The UPS Store franchisee locations in New Jersey.

(See id. {J 71-82.) Plaintiff further names the franchisees as a defendant class (“Franchisee

Class”), defined as “[al]ll persons and business entities of every kind who owned and/or operated

a UPS Store in the State of New Jersey that provides and provided notary services to the public at

such facility.” Ud. § 74.)

Following a period of discovery and an interlocutory appeal in state court, Defendants

removed the lawsuit from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, to this

Court pursuant to CAFA on July 30, 2021. (See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.) In response,

' This matter was originally assigned to Hon. Freda L. Wolfson (ret.), U.S.D.J., who issued the

January 31, 2022 Order. The case was reassigned on January 31, 2023. (See ECF No. 83.)

Plaintiff filed the first motion to remand (see ECF No. 3) asserting Defendants’ removal was

untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, which the Court granted. (See ECF No. 17.) Defendants

appealed that decision to the Third Circuit, which reversed but also ordered that the Court consider

whether the local controversy exception to CAFA jurisdiction applies such that remand is

appropriate.? See McLaren, 32 F.4th at 241-42. The Court then allowed for a 30-day period of

jurisdictional discovery. (See ECF No. 38.) Plaintiff noticed the 30(b)(6) depositions of

Defendants The UPS Store, Inc. and Hamilton Pack N Ship LLC.’

At the close of jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiff again moved to remand. (See Pl.’s

Moving Br., ECF No. 64-1.) Defendants opposed (see Defs.’ Opp’n Br., ECF No. 68), and

Plaintiff replied (see Pl.’s Reply Br., ECF No. 70). Defendants then moved to strike the evidence

submitted in conjunction with Plaintiff's reply brief (see Defs.’ Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 73-1), and

Plaintiff opposed (see Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 75).

IL. LEGAL STANDARD

The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, states that unless “otherwise expressly

provided by . .. Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of

the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . to the district court of the United

States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C.

* Solely for purposes of the first remand motion and the subsequent appeal, this matter was

consolidated with a related case: Tripicchio v. The UPS Store, Inc., No. 21-14512 (D.N.J.) (the

“Tripicchio Action’). The Tripicchio Action similarly involves class action claims, originally filed

in state court, for excessive notary services fees against The UPS Store and its New Jersey

franchisees. In contrast to Plaintiff here, however, the Tripicchio plaintiff declined to further

contest federal jurisdiction under CAFA at the close of jurisdictional discovery. (See Tripicchio

Action, ECF No. 57.)

>In the Tripicchio Action, the plaintiff noticed the 30(b)(6) deposition of JB&A Enterprises, a

named defendant in that case.

§ 1441(a). A plaintiffcan move to remand a case removed to a federal court where the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction or removal was otherwise improper. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

“CAFA provides federal courts with jurisdiction over civil class actions if the ‘matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000,’ the aggregate number of proposed class

members is 100 or more, and any class member is a citizen of a state different from any defendant.”

Vodenichar v. Halcon Energy Props., Inc., 733 F.3d 497, 503 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(2)(A), (d)(5)(B)). The party seeking removal pursuant to CAFA is required “to

demonstrate federal jurisdiction.” Kaufman y. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 151 (Gd Cir.

2009) (citing Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007)). However, where the

threshold jurisdictional requirements under CAF A are satisfied, the burden is on the party seeking

remand to show the applicability of any exception to CAFA, including the local controversy

exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A). See id. at 153-54.

I. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that remand is warranted pursuant to the local controversy exception to

CAFA because jurisdictional discovery has revealed that two-thirds of the members of the putative

plaintiff class are New Jersey citizens and that at least one defendant, whose alleged conduct forms

a significant basis for the class claims and from whom significant relief is sought, is a citizen of

New Jersey. (See generally Pl.’s Moving Br.) Other prerequisites for the exception are not in

dispute. According to Plaintiff, this case is the “epitome of a ‘local controversy’” as “[i]t centers

overwhelmingly on business conduct within the state of New Jersey that is exclusively covered by

New Jersey state law, and conduct which allegedly victimizes a population of overwhelmingly

New Jersey consumers through injuries inflicted solely in New Jersey.” (d. at 2.)

In opposition, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has neither sufficiently demonstrated that

two-thirds of the putative class members are New Jersey citizens nor that the alleged conduct of,

and relief sought from, the named local defendant in this action, Hamilton Pack N Ship LLC

(“HPNS”), is “significant” under the CAFA exception. (See generally Defs.’ Opp’n Br.)

Additionally, Defendants move to strike the evidence Plaintiff submitted on reply, asserting that

the evidence is “irrelevant” and that “it is improper to submit lengthy evidence with a reply brief.”

(See Defs.’ Mot. to Strike at 1.)

A. The Motion to Strike

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Defendants’ motion to strike lacks sufficient legal

support and is, therefore, denied. Notably, Defendants’ motion does not identify any authority

pursuant to which they seek relief. Rather, Defendants merely contend that Plaintiff's submission

on reply is “improper” and “irrelevant” because certain of Plaintiffs exhibits include information

about non-party The UPS Store franchisees. (See Defs.’ Mot. to Strike at 1.)

Absent any indication from Defendants as to the legal authority governing their motion,

the Court construes the motion to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).4 Rule 12(f)

states that a “court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “The decision is discretionary,” and

a general matter, motions to strike under Rule 12(f) are highly disfavored.” S.J. by Jones v.

Avanti Prods. LLC, No. 18-15003, 2019 WL 943521, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2019) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). “[E]ven where the challenged material is redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous, a motion to strike should not be granted unless the presence of the

surplusage will prejudice the adverse party.” F.7.C. v. Hope Now Modifications, LLC, No.

‘ Hereinafter, all references to Rule and Rules refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

09-1204, 2011 WL 883202, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2011) (quoting Symbol Techs., Inc. vy. Aruba

Networks, Inc., 609 F, Supp. 2d 353, 359 (D. Del. 2009)).

Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiffs reply exhibits are not pleadings, Defendants fail to

establish any prejudice suffered by Plaintiff's submission. Even if the exhibits are irrelevant, as

Defendants argue, the Court need not strike them, particularly where Defendants do not set forth

the legal basis for their motion. As discussed further below, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving

the applicability of the local controversy exception to CAFA. To the extent Plaintiff's submission

supports her arguments in favor of remand, the Court will consider it. Regardless, there is no

detriment to Defendants’ position from the mere presence of Plaintiff's exhibits in the record.

Defendants’ motion to strike is, therefore, denied.

B. The Motion to Remand — “Local Controversy” Exception to CAFA

“Even if a federal court has jurisdiction under CAFA, it must decline to exercise that

jurisdiction if the class action involves a local controversy.” McLaren, 32 F 4th at 241; see 28

§ 1332(d)(4)(A). “[T]he party seeking remand has the burden of showing that the local

controversy exception applies.” Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 154. To invoke this exception, the moving

party must show:

(1) greater than two-thirds of the putative class are citizens of the state in

which the action was originally filed; (2) at least one defendant is a citizen

of the state in which the action was originally filed (the “local defendant”);

(3) the local defendant’s conduct forms a significant basis for the claims

asserted; (4) plaintiffs are seeking significant relief from the local

defendant; (5) the principal injuries occurred in the state in which the action

was originally filed; and (6) no other class action asserting the same or

similar allegations against any of the defendants had been filed in the

preceding three years.

> The Court previously found the jurisdictional requirements of CAFA were met in this case. (See

ECF No. 17 at 10.) Plaintiff does not dispute the prerequisites of CAFA jurisdiction in the motion

to remand, nor does Plaintiff invoke any CAFA exceptions other than the local controversy

exception.

Vodenichar, 733 F.3d at 506-07. Here, the only contested elements are whether (1) greater than

two-thirds of the putative class are New Jersey citizens, (2) HPNS’s conduct forms a significant

basis for the claims asserted, and (3) significant relief is sought from HPNS. (See Defs. Opp’n at

16-33.)

1. Citizenship of the Putative Class

“For the local controversy exception to apply . . . Plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘greater

than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the

State in which the action was originally filed.’” Dicuio v. Brother Int’l Corp., No. 11-1447, 2011

WL 5557528, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)G)\(D). The Third

Circuit has not addressed what constitutes sufficient evidence to meet this burden.

Plaintiff argues that the inquiry “necessitates a reasonable, common-sense assessment” of

the citizenship of the members of the putative class, essentially endorsing a pragmatic approach,

rather than one based on statistical certainty. (See Pl.’s Moving Br. at 8.) At least one other district

court in this Circuit has adopted this standard. See Ellis v. Montgomery County, 267 F. Supp. 3d

510, 516 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“In weighing and considering the evidence submitted by a party seeking

to invoke a CAFA exception, a court should engage in a ‘practical and reasonable’ inquiry that

considers the evidence in light of the context of the case.”). Under the pragmatic approach, “a

court need not use a precise mathematical formula or exact data.” Id. (quoting Doe v. Georgetown

Synagogue-Kesher Israel Congregation, 118 F. Supp. 3d 88, 95 (D.D.C. 2015)). That said,

“Tt]here must ordinarily be at least some facts in evidence from which the district court may make

findings regarding class members’ citizenship for purposes of CAFA’s local controversy

exception.” Jd. (quoting Mondragon vy. Capital One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 884 (9th Cir. 2013)).

As such, “[t]he party seeking to invoke an exception must provide evidence (not merely assertions)

that makes it more likely than not that more than two-thirds of the proposed class consists of

citizens of the relevant state.” Jd. (emphasis in original). In support of her evidentiary burden,

Plaintiff has produced logbook entries of notary services transactions from The UPS Store #4122

in Hamilton, New Jersey, during the period of September 2019 to May 2022. (See Decl. of Kent

Bronson (“Bronson Decl.”) Ex. B, ECF No. 64-4.) The entries include information regarding the

notary services rendered at that location, including transaction date, customer name, customer

address, type of identification used by the customer, and, in some entries, the amount paid. (See

id.) Plaintiff contends that review of these entries indicates that 85% to 90% of notary service

customers at The UPS Store #4122 during that period had both New Jersey home addresses and

New Jersey drivers’ licenses. (See Pl.’s Moving Br. at 12; Bronson Decl. § 6-8.)

Defendants contend Plaintiff's burden is more onerous, and one that Plaintiff fails to

satisfy. (See Defs.’ Opp’n Br. at 17.) Specifically, Defendants point to the approach of the Seventh

and Eighth Circuits, which hold there are “two ways plaintiffs can meet their burden: (1) affidavit

evidence or statistically significant surveys showing two-thirds of the class members are local

citizens[;] or (2) redefine the class as only local citizens.” Hood v. Gilster-Mary Lee Corp., 785

F.3d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Jn re Sprint Nextel Corp., 593 F.3d 669, 675-76 (7th Cir.

2010)). First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not produced a “statistically significant survey”

demonstrating the two-thirds threshold. (See Defs.’ Opp’n Br. at 18-19.) Second, Defendants

assert that the proposed plaintiff class is not limited to New Jersey citizens. (See Defs.’? Opp’n Br.

at 17.) Instead, the class is defined as “All natural persons who paid fees to [The UPS Store] in

excess of the statutory minimum set forth in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 22A:4-14 for notary services in New

Jersey.” (FAC 4 72.)

Under Defendants’ proposed standard, Plaintiff plainly fails to meet her evidentiary

burden. As Defendants’ expert, Dr. Victoria Stodden, highlights, and as Plaintiff admits, the

notary logbook entries from The UPS Store #4122 are merely a “sample of convenience,” without

statistical significance. (See Decl. of Victoria Stodden Ph.D. (“Stodden Decl.”) {9 23-28, ECF

No. 68-8.) Dr. Stodden explains in detail that “[w]hile Plaintiff claims that the data ‘can be

generally extrapolated to the overall number and percentages of notary services of [The UPS Store]

Stores in New Jersey during the Class Period,’ this statement is unsupported and inconsistent with

standard accepted sampling theory.” Ud. 7 24.) According to Dr. Stodden, there are various

sources of potential selection bias that prevent reliable extrapolation, including “[The UPS Store]

#4122 is geographically distinct from many other UPS stores in New Jersey” and “|s]tores with

differing geographic locations may attract different customers”; “patterns of store ownership (e.g.

franchisee or nonfranchisee) may differ across stores and could imply different business practices,

and so the customers served may be systematically different as well”; and “population

characteristics can change over time” and “the Class Period in this matter stretches as far back as

2014.” Ud. 25.) Simply put, “[t]he record does not include any sample, sampling methodology,

or other indication of a disciplined approach.” Hood, 785 F.3d at 266; see Myrick v. WellPoint,

Inc., 764 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2014) (Plaintiffs may “take a random sample of [potential class

members], ascertain the citizenship of each .. . on the date the case was removed, and extrapolate

to the class as a whole.”). Absent a representative sample of the putative class, extrapolation from

the notary logbook entries of a single The UPS Store location during a period of time that does not

align with Plaintiffs class definition amounts to “guesswork, based on a sense of how the world

works, but guesswork nonetheless.” Jn re Sprint, 593 F.3d at 674.

Even under Plaintiff's proposed standard, the notary logbook entries from The UPS Store

#4122 are insufficient to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that more than two-thirds of

the proposed class consists of New Jersey citizens. In advocating for a commonsense approach to

the burden of proof, Plaintiff asks the Court to assume too much. By Plaintiff's own admission,

most entries in the logbook reflect information about notary services customers who do not qualify

for the putative class. (See Pl.’s Reply Br. at 5.) According to Plaintiff, out of the 2,280 notary

transactions provided “there are at least several hundred putative Class members reflected in

HPNS’s logbooks, and as many as 800, who were overcharged for notary services.” (/d.) For this

reason, the evidence produced by Plaintiffis only partially useful in ascertaining the characteristics

of the putative class members. Moreover, the logbook entries contain no precise information as to

the putative class members’ “residency as of the date on which this case was filed, which is the

date on which citizenship is determined for CAFA purposes.” E/is, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 519 (citing

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7)). Because Plaintiff does not limit the class definition to New Jersey

citizens, it is reasonable to conclude that a number of class members no longer reside in New

Jersey. Further, these flaws in Plaintiffs evidence are ultimately underscored by the glaring fact

that Plaintiff has only provided the Court with notary customer information as to a single The UPS

Store location.® Although the notary logbook entries from The UPS Store #4122 admittedly

indicate a high percentage of New Jersey citizens seeking notary services at that location, the Court

cannot make the inference, based on that information alone, that greater than two-thirds of the

Plaintiff provided information regarding The UPS Store #4122 because the store “has, if

anything, among the higher percentages of non-New Jersey residents’ customers because of its

particularly close proximity to the New Jersey-Pennsylvania state border.” (P1.’s Moving Br. at

12.) Thus, according to Plaintiff, the fact that nearly 90% of that store’s notary services customers

are New Jersey citizens is indicative of the New Jersey citizenship of notary service customers at

The UPS Store locations throughout the state. (See id.)

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proposed class consists of New Jersey citizens. As Defendants argue, there are far too many

variables with respect to notary services customers state-wide to make that logical leap, even if

such a conclusion appears to be commonsense.

As the party seeking remand, Plaintiff“has the burden of showing that the local controversy

exception applies.” Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 154. Although the precise contours of that burden with

respect to the two-thirds threshold are not clearly defined in this Circuit, Plaintiff's limited

evidentiary showing here is insufficient. With information as to the customer base of only one

New Jersey The UPS Store and even less information as to the putative class members who

transacted business at that store, the Court is left with little confidence that any reasonable

assumption can be made about the citizenship of the putative class. Thus, Plaintiffs motion for

remand pursuant to the local controversy exception fails on this basis.

2. Significant Local Defendant Test

Still, even if Plaintiff could demonstrate that greater than two-thirds of the putative class

are New Jersey citizens, Plaintiff's motion suffers an additional defect with respect to whether the

alleged conduct of the local defendant, HPNS, amounts to a “significant basis” for the class claims.

The significant basis provision “requires that the class action include at least one local defendant

‘whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff

class.”” Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 154 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(@)UD(bb)). Thus, “[t]he

local defendant’s alleged conduct must be an important ground for the asserted claims in view of

the alleged conduct of all the Defendants.” Jd. at 157 (emphasis in original). “Whether this

condition is met requires a substantive analysis comparing the local defendant’s alleged conduct

to the alleged conduct of all the Defendants.” /d. at 156.

Here, the alleged conduct of The UPS Store overwhelms that of HPNS. Plaintiff alleges,

among other things, that “|The UPS Store] controls and has the right to control the conduct of its

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franchisees, including but not limited to setting the prices for notary services charged at The UPS

Store locations, including at UPS Store #4122 as well as those currently or formerly owned and

operated by Franchisee Defendants”; “Due to the control asserted by [The UPS Store],

Representative Defendants acted and/or act as agents and servants for [The UPS Store]”; “[The

UPS Store] mandates that each location in New Jersey charge notary fees of $5 instead of $2.50

for each notarial act performed”; and “[The UPS Store] at all times material was and is aware that

it systematically flouts state laws on notary fees, including that of New Jersey.” (FAC 36, 39,

49, 52.) As to HPNS, Plaintiff merely alleges that “Plaintiff purchased, was charged, and paid

$5.00 in notary fees per document” when she “visited UPS Store #4122, owned at the time by RK

& SP Services LLC, currently owned by [HPNS].” (FAC □ 66, 62.) And that, as the owner of

UPS Store #4122, HPNS engaged in “unlawful charges for notary services” and “derived

substantial revenue from notary services within New Jersey” in conjunction with the other

Defendants. U/d. | 46.) In this way, the clear theme of Plaintiff's allegations is that The UPS Store

directed the overcharges for notary services and that franchisees, like HPNS, were essentially

along for the ride.

Plaintiff contends that HPNS’s alleged conduct does form a significant basis for the class

claims, pointing to the fact that HPNS “‘is also not only mentioned, but is directly and equally

implicated, in every one of the five counts setting forth the five causes of action . . . including the

claim for Civil Conspiracy.” (PI.’s Moving Br. at 18.) But “[t]he significance of the local

defendant’s alleged conduct must always be assessed in comparison to the alleged conduct of all

the Defendants.” Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 157; see Vodenichar, 733 F.3d at 507 n.8 (“The focus is

on the conduct in which the local defendant allegedly engaged and the alleged number of people

impacted by it.”). While HPNS may have engaged in notary service overcharges to a limited

12?

number of customers, such conduct is hardly significant in light of the allegations against The UPS

Store, which allegedly directed the overcharges state-wide. Perhaps recognizing this, Plaintiff

emphasizes that HPNS is designated as a representative defendant and that Plaintiff has also sued

a class of The UPS Store New Jersey franchisees whose conduct forms a significant basis for the

class claims. (See Pl.’s Moving Br. at 19; P1.’s Reply Br. at 10.) However, this putative defendant

class is not currently a party to the action, and the Third Circuit has squarely held that “the local

controversy exception requires consideration of the defendants presently in the action.” Kaufman,

561 F.3d at 153. Consideration of the conduct of the putative defendant class is, thus,

unwarranted.’

As explained above, Plaintiff's motion to remand fails on the basis that Plaintiff has not

sufficiently demonstrated that greater than two-thirds of the putative class are New Jersey citizens.

But even if Plaintiff had satisfied that evidentiary burden, the Court has doubts that Plaintiff can

demonstrate that HPNS’s alleged conduct is significant when compared to the alleged conduct of

The UPS Store. As courts in this Circuit have recognized, “[t]he local controversy exception is

narrow, and the legislative history of CAFA reveals a strong preference that interstate class actions

should be heard in a federal court if properly removed.” Durnell vy. Foti, No. 19-2972, 2019 WL

4573247, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2019) (quoting Sabrina Roppo v. Travelers Commercial Ins.

Co., 869 F.3d 568, 584 (7th Cir. 2017)); see also Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1163

(11th Cir. 2006) (“Congress intended the local controversy exception to be a narrow one, with all

doubts resolved ‘in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.’”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 109-14,

at 42)). Although Plaintiff's putative class action undoubtedly has strong ties to New Jersey,

7 Although the parties also address whether significant relief is sought from the local defendant,

because Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden on other elements of the local controversy

exception, the Court need not address that issue here.

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Plaintiff “bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the [local

controversy] exception applies,” and did not do so here. Vodenichar, 733 F.3d at 503. Without

any additional arguments to the contrary, the Court finds that this class action suit was properly

removed pursuant to CAFA.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs motion to remand is denied, and Defendants’

motion to strike is also denied.

s/ Michael A. Shipp

MICHAEL A. SHIPP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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