The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ALTERIK HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
aintiti, Civil Action No. 23-1870 (KMW) (MIS)
v OPINION
JAMES RICARDO, et al.,
Defendants.
WILLIAMS, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the Court’s sua sponte screening of Plaintiff's
complaint (ECF No. 1) and the Court’s review of Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF No, 1-1.) Having reviewed the application, this Court finds that leave to proceed
in forma pauperis is warranted in this matter, and Plaintiffs application will be granted. Because
Plaintiff will be granted in forma pauperis status in this matter, this Court is required to screen his
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss any claim which is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
. Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently housed in South Woods State Prison on a parole
violation. (ECF No. | at 2-3.) In his current complaint, he seeks to bring claims against two parole
officers, Defendants Ricardo and Tischio, for arresting him on a parole violation which Plaintiff
asserts is a mere “technicality,” and for unduly delaying his revocation hearmg. (d. at 5-6.)
Plaintiff also seeks to bring charges against three parole board members, Defendants Taylor,
Marenco, and Mutphy, who oversaw his revocation hearing and issued an “excessive sentence” of
180 days imprisonment for the parole violation and allegedly denied Plaintiff Due Process by
“ignoring” material evidence, (/d. at 6.) Although the exact nature of the violation in question is
somewhat unclear, it appears that Plaintiffs parole violation arose out of his use of drugs while on
parole, and the material evidence Plaintiff claims was ignored was an after the fact drug test which
was “unconfirmed” for Fentanyl, Ud. at 6, 8.) Although Plaintiff complains that his hearing was
delayed by eighty days, he states that he did ultimately receive a hearing, and the Parole Board did
ultimately issue a decision on March 10, 2023, resulting in the allegedly “excessive” sentence
about which he now complains. (/d. at 8.)
IL. LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff will be granted in forma pauperis status, this Court is required to screen
his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, this Court must sua
sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Jc, “The
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C, §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court is
required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences
from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 US. 265, 286 (1986). A complaint need not contain “detailed
factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must contain “more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft vy. Igbal, 556 U.S, 662, 678 (2009). A
complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it provides only “’naked assertion{s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Jd (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Jd. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides facts
“merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Jd. (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at
557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in conducting such an analysis, pro se
litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v, Crown
Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 Gd Cir, 2013).
Il. DISCUSSION .
In this matter, Plaintiff seeks to raise civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
two parole officers and three parole board officials for charging him with a parole violation and
allegedly denying him Due Process in punishing him for that violation, Turning first to the two
parole officer Defendants, Plaintiff asserts that they allegedly violated his rights by charging him
with a parole violation, resulting in his being subjected to detention and, ultimately, a violation of
his parole. In making that claim, Plaintiff admits that there was at least a technical violation of the
terms of his parole. This claim is thus a species of malicious prosecution claim — i.¢., that the
officers initiated charges against Plaintiff without sufficient cause, To succeed on such a claim,
however, Plaintiff would have to show that the parole violations in question resulted in a favorable
termination for Plaintiff. See, e.g. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296-97 (3d Cir, 2014). As
Plaintiff indicates that his parole violation hearing resulted in his being returned to prison for an
“excessive” sentence, he has failed to plead favorable termination, and his malicious prosecution
claim against the two parole officers must be dismissed without prejudice,!
As to the three parole board officials, Plaintiff contends they denied him Due Process
insomuch as they denied him a timely, fair, and impartial parole violation hearing, and that they
issued an excessive sentence against him, A civil rights action such as this one, however, may not
be used to collaterally attack a parole violation decision unless and until the violation is overturned
through state court proceedings or a habeas petition. See, e.g., Butler v. Pa, Bd. Of Probation &
Parole, 613 F. App’x 119, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 US. 74, 81-
82 (2005) (“a state prisonet’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) — no matter the
relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct
leading to a [parole violation] or internal prison proceedings) — if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration”). To the extent there is merit
to Plaintiffs claim that the parole board officials denied him Due Process by unlawfully delaying
his hearing, refusing to consider proper evidence at that hearing, and in issuing an improper
| Although this Court construes Plaintiff's claim as one for malicious prosecution as it seems to
relate more to the charging and pursuit of a parole violation than merely his arrest, Plaintiff may
also have intended to plead a claim for false arrest against the officers. If Plaintiff did intend to
raise that claim, however, it would also need to be dismissed as such a claim would only have
merit if Plaintiff were arrested without sufficient cause — as Plaintiff himself appears to admit a
technical violation of his parole, he has failed to plead a lack of sufficient cause for his arrest. See,
e.g., James v, City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir, 2012). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff
also sought to raise a false arrest claim, that claim is dismissed without prejudice.
sentence, Plaintiffs Due Process claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of the outcome of
his parole violation and in turn his current period of imprisonment. Bufler, 613 F. App’x at 123-
24, Plaintiff's claims against the parole board officials must therefore be dismissed without
prejudice as they are barred until such time as Plaintiff successfully overturns his parole violation
decision. As all of Plaintiffs claims must be dismissed without prejudice, his complaint shall be
dismissed without prejudice in its entirety.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF
No. 1-1) shall be GRANTED, and Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) shall be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
United States District Judge