LYLES v. BRANTLEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

_________________________________________

RONNIE LYLES, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civ. No. 23-1034 (KM) (JBC)

:

v. :

: OPINION

REV. MALACHIA BRANTLEY, :

:

Defendant. :

_________________________________________ :

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiff Ronnie Lyles, an inmate at Northern State Prison (“NSP”), seeks to commence a

lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Malachia Brantley, Supervisor of Religious

Services at NSP, for purportedly violating his free exercise rights under the First Amendment.

Lyles also brings claims for purported violations of his religious rights and freedoms under the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq.

In a previous order (DE 3), I granted Lyles leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and noted that the

complaint would be screened in due course pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Upon having

screened the complaint, for the reasons discussed below, the complaint may proceed in part.

A. Background

The complaint contains the following factual allegations, which, for screening purposes, I

accept as true.

Lyles is a Native American. DE 1 at 1. Brantley, as the Supervisor of Religious Services

at NSP, “is responsible for providing for [Lyles’s] religious needs.” DE 1 at 2. Brantley has

prevented Lyles from engaging in Native American “ceremonial religious practices” by not

allowing him to: (1) wear a religious head covering (“a white bandanna and religious

medallion”); (2) “smudge . . . on a weekly basis”; (3) “use kinnikinnick on a weekly basis”; (4)

“use his medicine bag”; (5) “prayer pipe on a weekly basis”; (6) “dance on a weekly basis during

Native American services”; and (7) “attend the Sweat Lodge on a monthly regular basis.” DE 1

at 3–6 (quotations omitted).

On October 12, 2022, Lyles filed a grievance to “[NSP] Religious Services” “expressing

his discontent in the ongoing denial of being allowed to practice his Native American ceremonial

religious practices.” DE 1 at 2. Lyles also “[grieved] the fact that his religious items that were

sent to the prison via the mailroom are either missing or stolen.” DE 1 at 2. Brantley replied that

“your rights are not being denied, 10/4 weather was not permitting, 10/11 [s]taffing concerns.”

DE 1 at 2 (quotations omitted).1

Based on the above allegations, Lyles seeks to hold Brantley liable for violations of (1)

Lyles’s right to freely express his religion under the First Amendment (DE 1 at 3); (2) the

protections granted him by RLUIPA (DE 1 at 2–5); and (3) his right to be free from religious

discrimination under “Federal Statutes of the Civil Right[s] Act” (DE 1 at 5–6). Lyles sues

Brantley in his individual and official capacities. DE 1 at 6. As relief, he requests a declaration

that Brantley violated his rights, compensatory and punitive damages, and any other relief the

Court deems proper. DE 1 at 6.

B. Screening Standard

District courts must review complaints in civil actions filed by prisoners, see 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(a), and dismiss any case that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) & 1915(e)(2)(B). “The legal standard for dismissing a

1 Lyles’s complaint cites “Exhibit PA-1” in support of these allegations, but there are no exhibits attached

to the complaint.

complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that

for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v.

Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d

Cir. 2000)). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To survive the court’s screening for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially

plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to

support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation

omitted).

C. Discussion

Construing the complaint liberally, I perceive that Lyles is asserting official and

individual capacity claims against Brantley for violations of Lyles’s (1) religious rights under the

Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, made actionable under § 1983, and (2) religious

rights and freedoms, made actionable under RLUIPA. For the reasons below, (1) Lyles’s § 1983

claim must be dismissed to the extent it seeks non-injunctive relief against Brantley in his

official capacity because it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) Lyles’s RLUIPA claim

against Brantley in his individual capacity must be dismissed because RLUIPA does not apply to

state employees acting in their individual capacities; (3) Lyles’s RLUIPA claim against Brantley

in his official capacity must be dismissed to the extent it seeks monetary damages because

monetary damages are not available under RLUIPA; and (4) Lyles’s claim for compensatory

damages must be dismissed because he has not alleged a physical injury. Lyles may proceed with

(1) his § 1983 claim against Brantley in his official capacity for injunctive relief, and in his

individual capacity for non-compensatory, monetary damages (e.g., nominal or punitive

damages); and (2) his RLUIPA claim against Brantley in his official capacity for declaratory

and/or injunctive relief.

1. Immunity and Damages

Before discussing the causes of action individually, I consider certain threshold bars to

relief.

The Eleventh Amendment imposes a jurisdictional bar against individuals bringing suit

against a state or its agencies in federal court. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,

54 (1996). That bar extends to claims against a state official in his or her official capacity. See

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in

his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s

office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”). Eleventh Amendment

immunity, however, is not absolute. A state may consent to suit in federal courts, or Congress

may abrogate Eleventh Amendment protections. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Freeney,

495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990). Further, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit for prospective

injunctive relief against a state official who violates federal law, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.

123, 158–59 (1908), or a suit against officials in their individual capacities, even if the actions

that are the subject of the suit were part of the officials’ governmental duties. See Hafer v. Melo,

502 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1991). Here, Brantley, in his official capacity as the Supervisor of Religious

Services at NSP, is a state official. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars Lyles’s § 1983

claim seeking monetary relief against Brantley in his official capacity. See, e.g., Lassoff v. New

Jersey, 414 F. Supp. 2d 483, 488 (D.N.J. 2006). Lyles’s § 1983 claim will therefore be dismissed

with prejudice to the extent it seeks monetary relief from Brantley in his official capacity.

RLUIPA, however, does permit a private plaintiff, such as Lyles, to “obtain appropriate

relief against a government.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 153 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc-2). The statute defines “government” to include state entities, their agencies,

and any other person acting under color of state law. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)).

Thus, RLUIPA applies to state employees acting in their official capacities, but not their

individual capacities. See id.; Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 303 (3d Cir. 2016)

(“[S]tate officials . . . cannot be held individually liable under RLUIPA”); Spada v. Klemm, No.

1:22-CV-00478, 2023 WL 2290258, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2023) (“RLUIPA does not permit

an action against state officials in their individual capacities.”). Moreover, a plaintiff may not sue

a state or state official for monetary damages under RLUIPA. See Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S.

277, 288, 293 (2011) (holding that states, by accepting federal funds, do not waive their

sovereign immunity to suits for money damages under RLUIPA). Accordingly, Lyles’s RLUIPA

claim against Brantley in his individual capacity will be dismissed with prejudice, and Lyles’s

RLUIPA claim against Brantley in his official capacity will be dismissed with prejudice, to the

extent it seeks monetary damages.

Lyles seeks compensatory damages. DE 1 at 6. However, the Prison Litigation Reform

Act prohibits compensatory damages for “mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody”

absent “a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Allah v. Al–Hafeez, 226 F.3d

247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000). More than a de minimis physical injury must be alleged. See Mitchell v.

Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 536 (3d Cir. 2003). Lyles does not allege that he suffered a physical injury;

thus, as pled, the complaint does not support a claim for compensatory damages. Accordingly,

for this additional reason, all claims for compensatory damages are dismissed.

2. Section 1983

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of

constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in

any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation

of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged

deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v.

Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. I. The

Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth

Amendment. Cantwell v. State of Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). “Inmates clearly retain

protections afforded by the First Amendment . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit

the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citation

omitted). Sincerely held beliefs, religious in nature, are entitled to constitutional protection, but

“the fact of incarceration and the valid penological objectives of deterrence of crime,

rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security justify limitations on the exercise of

constitutional rights by inmates.” DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50–51 (3d Cir. 2000). A prison

regulation alleged to impinge upon an inmate’s First Amendment rights “is valid if it is

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89. Thus, to

establish a free exercise violation, Lyles must show that Brantley burdened the practice of his

religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith without a

justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Id.

At this early stage of litigation, Lyles has plausibly alleged a violation of his right to the

free exercise of religion sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. Specifically, he has

alleged his beliefs are sincerely held (DE 1 at 2) and religious in nature (id. at 3–6), and that he

has been prevented from engaging in Native American ceremonial practices, “as required for

[his] religious practice” (id.).

Of course, many factual issues, not suitable for consideration at this stage, may remain.

The Court expresses no view as to whether legitimate penological interests may justify some or

all of the limitations on Lyles’s exercise of his religion while incarcerated. For now, however,

Lyles will be permitted to proceed past this initial screening stage with his § 1983 claim against

Brantley in Brantley’s official capacity for injunctive relief, and in his individual capacity for

non-compensatory monetary damages.

3. RLUIPA

RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing a “substantial burden” on a prisoner’s

religious exercise unless that burden furthers a compelling interest and is the least restrictive

means of furthering that interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2). A substantial burden exists

where (1) “a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and

forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the

precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit”; or (2) “the government puts substantial

pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”

Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007). Therefore, to establish a prima facie case

of a RLUIPA violation, a prisoner must initially demonstrate that a substantial burden has been

placed on his or her exercise of religious beliefs. See Robinson v. Sup’t Houtzdale SCI, 693 F.

App’x 111, 115 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“The threshold question in any . . . RLUIPA case is

whether the prison’s challenged policy or practice has substantially burdened the practice of the

inmate-plaintiff’s religion.”) (citing Washington, 497 F.3d at 277–78).

Lyle has alleged that Brantley has prevented him from engaging in seven activities that

are necessary to his “Native American ceremonial religious practices.” DE 1 at 2; id. at 3–6

(alleging deprivation of the right to: wear a religious head covering, “smudge,” use

“kinnikinnick,” use a “medicine bag,” prayer pipe, dance during services, and attend the “Sweat

Lodge”). At this early stage of the litigation, Lyles has met his minimal burden to plausibly

allege that these deprivations have substantially burdened his religious exercise. Accordingly,

Lyles will be permitted to proceed past this initial screening stage with his RLUIPA claim

against Brantley in Brantley’s official capacity for declaratory and/or injunctive relief with

respect to these religious practices.

D. Conclusion

For the reasons above, Lyle’s complaint will be permitted to proceed to the following

extent:

The § 1983 claim may proceed against Brantley in his official capacity for injunctive

relief, and in his individual capacity for non-compensatory, monetary damages (e.g., nominal or

punitive damages). The claim will be dismissed with prejudice to the extent it seeks non-

injunctive relief against Brantley in his official capacity.

The RLUIPA claim may proceed against Brantley in his official capacity for declaratory

and/or injunctive relief. The RLUIPA claim against Brantley in his individual capacity will be

dismissed with prejudice, and the RLUIPA claim against Brantley in his official capacity to the

extent it seeks monetary damages will be dismissed with prejudice.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: March 20, 2023

/s/ Kevin McNulty

KEVIN MCNULTY

United States District Judge