KAETZ v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

WILLIAM F. KAETZ,

Plaintiff,

Civ. No. 22-1003 (KM-MAH)

vs.

OPINION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et

al.,

Defendants.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:

Plaintiff William F. Kaetz pled guilty to a federal offense in the U.S.

District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and was sentenced to

16 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. One

of the additional terms of his supervised release was an initial period of home

detention for 180 days. (See Judgment of Conviction (copy at DE 1 p. 35).) In

this action, Mr. Kaetz attacks that term of home detention as being illegal and

in violation of his plea agreement.

Mr. Kaetz brings this civil action against the United States and various of

its agencies and personnel, including the U.S. Marshals Service, the Probation

Office, the Bureau of Prisons, and the Designation and Sentence Computation

Center; the Judge and Magistrate Judge who presided over his criminal case

and subsequent related proceedings; the Assistant U.S. Attorney who

prosecuted the criminal case; the appointed defense attorney who represented

him; the Allegheny County Jail and its warden; the Northeast Ohio Correction

Center (NEOCC) and its warden; and BI Incorporated, the vendor that supplied

a monitoring ankle bracelet. All, he alleges, “had a hand” in the violation of civil

rights represented by his 180 days of home detention while on supervised

release.

The causes of action consist of “Count #1 Breach of Contract”; “Count #2

The Bivens Remedy for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights Violations by Federal

Actors”; and “Count #3 The Bivens Remedy for 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Civil Rights

Violations by Federal Actors.” The complaint seeks money damages and also

injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702. (See

Cplt. pp. 23–27.)

The following motions are now before the Court:

1. Motion of defendants Allegheny County Jail and its Warden, Orlando

Harper (together, “Allegheny”) to dismiss the complaint for lack of

personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim,

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (3), and (6) (DE 13).

2. Motion of defendant Douglas Sughrue (Kaetz’s appointed counsel) to

dismiss the complaint based on issue preclusion and failure to state a

claim, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6) (DE 14).

3. Motion of plaintiff Kaetz for default judgment against Northeast Ohio

Corrections Center (“NEOCC”) and its Warden, David Bobby (together,

“CoreCivic”), under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (DE 33);

4. Motion of CoreCivic to dismiss the complaint based on issue

preclusion, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim,

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), and (6) (DE 52).

5. Motion of defendants Designation And Sentence Computation Center,

Patricia L. Dodge, Buffeyanne Esquivel, Federal Bureau Of Prisons,

Afonso Fernandes, Tonya Sulia Goodman, Javier Marrero, Emily Race,

J. Nicholas Ranjan, The United States Of America, United States

Department Of Justice, United States Marshals Service, United States

Probation Office (the “Federal defendants”) to dismiss the complaint

based on collateral estoppel, immunity of the individual defendants,

failure to state a legally sufficient Bivens claim, failure to plead

sufficient facts, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction over any APA

claim. (DE 53)1

BACKGROUND

As background, I can do no better than to quote in full a decision of the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. That decision, Kaetz v. United

States, 2022 WL 1486775 (3d Cir. May 11, 2022) (“3d Cir. Op.”), affirms the

district court’s dismissal of Mr. Kaetz’s habeas petition, in terms that are

relevant to the current case.

OPINION *

PER CURIAM

[*1] William Kaetz appeals from an order dismissing a habeas petition that he filed

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We will affirm.

I.

Kaetz was charged with crimes relating to his threats to kill a federal judge. He

ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of publicizing restricted information (i.e., the

judge's home address) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 119(a)(1) and (a)(2).

In Kaetz's plea agreement, the parties stipulated to a sentence of (1) 16 months of

imprisonment, and (2) three years of supervised release, the first six months of which

would be served in home detention. (W.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2-21-cr-00211-NR-1, ECF No.

111-1 at 3-4.) 1 During Kaetz's plea colloquy and sentencing, the court also explained

that Kaetz's six-month period of home detention was part of his supervised release and

was in addition to 16 months of imprisonment. (ECF No. 118 at 22, 49-50.) Consistent

with these terms, the court entered a judgment of sentence providing for separate

terms of (1) 16 months of imprisonment, and (2) three years of supervised release,

including 180 days of home detention. (ECF No. 116 at 2-3, 5.)

Kaetz later filed a § 2241 habeas petition challenging the execution of this sentence.

When he first submitted his petition, he was still in prison and sought immediate

release. He claimed that (1) his six-month period of home detention constituted part of

1 Kaetz’s responses to DE 52 and DE 53 are also designated as cross-motions to

strike. (See DE 56, 57.) As to these cross motions, he was granted leave to file a reply.

(DE 61, 62)

his 16-month prison sentence, thus leaving him with only a 10-month prison sentence,

and (2) he already had been imprisoned for 10 months. But on December 6, 2021, Kaetz

was released from prison after serving his 16-month prison term and began to serve the

six-month period of home detention as part of his supervised release. After that, he

amended his claim to seek release from his period of home detention on the ground

that he already had served it as part of his 16 months in prison.

A Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing Kaetz's petition on the grounds that it was

moot to the extent that he sought release from prison and that it was otherwise not

cognizable under § 2241. The District Court adopted that recommendation and added

that Kaetz's challenge lacked merit. Kaetz appeals.2

II.

We will affirm. Kaetz's initial claim for release from prison became moot when he was

released, but his amended claim for release from home detention is not moot because

he is still serving that part of his sentence. See Burkey, 556 F.3d at 147-48. Kaetz claims

that his home detention is unlawful for several reasons, including that it violates various

provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. For these claims to be cognizable under § 2241

as challenges to the execution of his sentence, Kaetz would have to claim that his home

detention is “somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the

sentencing judgment.” Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2012). As

explained above, however, Kaetz's period of home detention was expressly imposed by

his sentencing judgment. Thus, Kaetz's claims would appear to be addressed to the

validity of that judgment, not its execution. To that extent, his claims can be raised only

under § 2255 as the Magistrate Judge explained. See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

432 F.3d 235, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2005).

[*2] Nevertheless, Kaetz's claim based on the Guidelines could be construed as a claim

that his home detention violates his sentence as that sentence is properly understood.

To that extent, this claim could be characterized as a challenge to the execution of his

sentence under § 2241.3 To the same extent, however, this claim lacks merit and that

issue does not present a substantial question.

Kaetz claims that home detention constitutes imprisonment and that his continued

detention is unlawful because he already has served the 16 months in prison ordered by

the District Court. He relies on statements in the Guidelines that “[h]ome detention may

be imposed as a condition of supervised release, but only as a substitute for

imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(e)(2) (emphasis added); see also U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2

(same). From those statements, Kaetz concludes that his six-month period of home

detention is a “substitute” for six of the 16 months of imprisonment imposed by the

District Court. That conclusion does not follow. Kaetz assumes that these provisions

make home detention a substitute for imprisonment that the court imposed. The

opposite is true. Home detention is a substitute, not for imprisonment that the court

imposed, but for imprisonment that the court could have imposed but did not.

Kaetz's reliance on these provisions is otherwise misplaced. These provisions advise

courts on how to impose a sentence. 4 They do not tell the Bureau of Prisons or other

authorities how to execute a sentence once imposed. Thus, these provisions do not

support Kaetz's claim of error in the execution of his sentence. These provisions aside,

Kaetz cannot claim any error in the execution of that sentence according to its express

terms. If Kaetz wants relief from his term of supervised release, he can file an

appropriate motion in his criminal case as the Magistrate Judge advised. See 18 U.S.C. §

3583(e). We express no opinion on whether such relief might be warranted.

III.

[*3] For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Footnotes

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not

constitute binding precedent.

1 All citations to ECF herein are to Kaetz's criminal proceeding.

2 Kaetz does not require a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of his § 2241

petition, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Burkey v. Marberry, 556

F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009).

3 We need not address whether Kaetz's petition satisfies other requirements for § 2241

relief, including filing in the proper venue and naming the proper custodian.

4 Thus, some courts have relied on these provisions in holding that courts may not

impose a combined term of imprisonment and home detention that exceeds the

statutory maximum sentence, see, e.g., United States v. Blinn, 490 F.3d 586, 587-88 (7th

Cir. 2007) (collecting cases), or a sentencing cap in a plea agreement, see United States

v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2003). No such circumstance is present here.

Kaetz's combined term of 22 months in prison and home detention is within both the

five-year maximum sentence for the crime to which he pleaded guilty, see 18 U.S.C. §

119(a), and the Guidelines range of 21-27 months to which the parties stipulated at

sentencing (ECF No. 118 at 36). The plea agreement also expressly provides for that

combined 22-month term. Kaetz argues that he understood otherwise because his

counsel gave him bad advice. This argument goes to the validity of Kaetz's sentence and

must be asserted under § 2255. But given the impending completion of Kaetz's home

detention, we note that this argument lacks merit. Kaetz testified at his plea colloquy

that no one had made any sentencing guarantee or promise “[o]ther than what is in the

plea agreement[.]” (Id. at 17.) And Kaetz's plea agreement expressly provides for

separate terms of 16 months in prison and six months of home detention, as both the

parties and the court made clear at the plea colloquy and sentencing. (ECF No. 118 at

16, 22, 39.) Thus, “any possible error in plea counsel's advice ... was cured by the plea

agreement and at the plea colloquy.” United States v. Fazio, 795 F.3d 421, 428 (3d Cir.

2015).

(3d Cir. Op.)

That Third Circuit decision affirmed Kaetz v. United States, No. 2:21-CV-

1614-NR-PLD, 2022 WL 357214 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2022) (Ranjan, U.S.D.J.)

(“Dist. Ct. Op.”), which had affirmed and adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report

& Recommendation, No. CV 2:21-1614, 2021 WL 6693765 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 28,

2021) (Dodge, U.S.M.J.) (“R&R”)).

II. DISCUSSION

For the reasons stated herein, I analyze the motions to dismiss under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which affords a plaintiff certain

advantages. Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or

in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The

defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of showing that no claim has

been stated. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462,

469 n.9 (3d Cir. 2011). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the facts

alleged in the complaint are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are

drawn in favor of the plaintiff. New Jersey Carpenters & the Trs. Thereof v.

Tishman Constr. Corp. of New Jersey, 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014).

I have considered the exhibits attached to Mr. Kaetz’s Complaint, as well

as other pleadings in the related criminal proceedings against Mr. Kaetz. That is

permissible on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Products Liability

Litigation (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 134 n.7 (3d Cir. 2016); Schmidt v. Skolas, 770

F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014); S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong

Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426-27 (3d Cir. 1999).

A. Kaetz motion for default judgment against CoreCivic

Mr. Kaetz moves for entry of default and for a default judgment against

CoreCivic. That motion will be denied.

“[T]he entry of a default judgment is left primarily to the discretion of the

district court.” Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing

Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 244 (3d Cir. 1951)).

Because the entry of a default judgment prevents the resolution of claims on

the merits, “this court does not favor entry of defaults and default judgments.”

United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1984).

Thus, before entering default judgment, the Court must determine whether the

“unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action” so that default

judgment would be permissible. DirecTV, Inc. v. Asher, 2006 WL 680533, at *1

(D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2006) (citing Wright, Miller, Kane, 10A Fed. Prac. & P. Civil 3d

§ 2688, at 58–59, 63).

A prerequisite to a default judgment is entry of default by the clerk. The

clerk will enter a default against a party that “has failed to plead or otherwise

defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The plaintiff must have properly served the

summons and complaint, and the defendant must have failed to file an answer

or otherwise respond to the complaint within the time provided by the Federal

Rules, which is twenty-one days. See Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc.,

756 F.2d 14, 18–19 (3d Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a).

It is not contested that CoreCivic was duly served on March 21, 2022.

(DE 9) CoreCivic did not timely answer or move in response to the complaint,

or move for an extension of time to do so, before the 21-day deadline expired on

April 11, 2022. Mr. Kaetz filed the current motion for entry of default and a

default judgment on June 6, 2022.

By letter filed June 16, 2022, CoreCivic sought additional time to

respond, citing the need to obtain local counsel and move for admission pro

hac vice. (DE 40) After one procedurally defective attempt, counsel was granted

leave to appear for CoreCivic pro hac vice on June 29, 2022 (DE 49).

On July 5, 2022, CoreCivic file its brief in opposition to the default

motion. (DE 51) Simultaneously, CoreCivic filed its motion to dismiss the

complaint based on issue preclusion, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure

to state a claim, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), and (6) (DE 52), which is

discussed infra.

Entry of default by the clerk would be a fruitless exercise at this point.

CoreCivic responded tardily to the summons and complaint, but respond it did.

I have routinely granted applications to accept such a late response, absent

egregious behavior, which is not present here.

More to the point, however, the Court would not enter a default judgment

on these facts, even if the clerk had previously entered default. A court

considering entry of a default judgment must exercise its discretion in light of

three factors: “(1) whether the party subject to default has a meritorious

defense, (2) the prejudice suffered by the party seeking default, and (3) the

culpability of the party subject to default.” Doug Brady, Inc. v. N.J. Bldg.

Laborers Statewide Funds, 250 F.R.D. 171, 177 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Emcasco

Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 74 (3d Cir. 1987)). I consider those factors in

turn:

(1) Here, for the reasons discussed below, CoreCivic does have a

meritorious defense on the merits. Indeed, that defense, shared by

codefendants, forms the basis of the Court’s dismissal of this action.

See Section II.B, infra.

(2) There is no particular prejudice to Mr. Kaetz as a result of excusing

CoreCivic’s default. The case is in the early stages. The codefendants’

motions to dismiss are pending. CoreCivic’s motion to dismiss, on

largely similar grounds, will be decided simultaneously with those of

its codefendants, later in this Opinion. In short, if CoreCivic has

lagged behind, it will very shortly catch up.

(3) It is true that CoreCivic alone is responsible for its tardy response,

and this factor weighs against it. The period of delay is substantial, if

not dramatic—a matter of about three months—and it seemingly took

a motion for default to spur CoreCivic to action. There is no

indication, however, that CoreCivic had some ulterior, culpable

motive, or had anything to gain from defaulting.

Weighing these factors, and in light of the strong preference that claims

be resolved on the merits, I will deny Mr. Kaetz’s motion for entry of default and

a default judgment against CoreCivic.

B. Claims of error in connection with sentence

Mr. Kaetz asserts a number of issues against a number of parties who,

he alleges, “had a hand” in the imposition or execution of the sentence. All of

his contentions depend, however, on his arguments that a sentence including

180 days of home confinement was improper, for two reasons: (a) home

confinement was illegal, because it followed the service of his 16-month

sentence of imprisonment, rather than serving as a substitute for part of that

16-month sentence; (b) home confinement violated the parties’ plea agreement.

Both arguments are plainly incorrect. 2

2 The Federal defendants, CoreCivic, and Sughrue moved to dismiss the

complaint based on issue preclusion, citing the prior decisions of Judge Ranjan and

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The application of that doctrine

requires the presence of four factors:

(1) the issue decided in the prior action must be identical to the one presented

in the later action;

(2) the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits;

(3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the

prior action, and

(4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.

Iseley v. Talaber, 232 F. App'x 120, 123 (3d Cir. 2007). (citing Witkowski v. Welch, 173

F.3d 192, 199 (3d Cir.1999); line breaks added).

The core of the district court’s ruling, affirmed by the Third Circuit, was that

Mr. Kaetz’s particular claims were not cognizable in a habeas action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241. Both courts took the trouble to briefly analyze the merits, however, and

found them to be lacking. Rather than consider the implications for factors 1, 2, and

4, I have adopted for the direct approach. While citing and considering those courts’

analyses, I have also performed my own independent analysis.

Mr. Kaetz’s first argument is based on two Sentencing Guidelines,

U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(e)(2) and § 5F1.2. Both state that “Home detention may be

imposed as a condition of [. . .] supervised release, but only as a substitute for

imprisonment.” From this language, he draws the incorrect implication that the

16 month term of imprisonment and the 6 month term of home detention (as a

condition of supervised release), although imposed separately, cannot legally

coexist; the second must be vacated or subtracted from the first. This is a

misreading. The Guidelines language does not mean that a term of home

detention must be subtracted from a separate term of imprisonment that was

actually imposed; it means that home detention may be ordered in lieu of

additional imprisonment that could permissibly have been imposed.

Other courts, in a variety of contexts, have recognized the principle that

a supervised release condition of home detention does not count against an

independent term of imprisonment. See, e.g., United States v. McKenzie, 996

F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Any inference that time spent in community

confinement as a condition of supervised release must be credited toward

prison time is undermined by the specificity of section 5F1.2.”); United States v.

Iversen, 90 F.3d 1340, 1343 (8th Cir. 1996) (“the fact that home detention may

be imposed ‘only as a substitute for imprisonment[,]’ . . . does not mean home

detention is a form of imprisonment”); United States v. Millbrook, 840 F. App'x

25, 27 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Home detention is a substitute for imprisonment, not a

type of reduction, see U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2 . . . .) United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d

1147, 1165 (6th Cir. 1997) (Section 5F1.2 “makes clear that home detention is

not equivalent to imprisonment for the purposes of initial incarceration.” )

(quoting United States v. Harris, Nos. 91–2421 to 91–2423, 1992 WL 393582, at

* 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 31, 1992)).

The parties, in giving prominence to collateral estoppel, may have been

influenced by the argument of Mr. Sughrue, echoed by CoreCivic, that issue

preclusion implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The case he cites, Coulter

v. Paulisick, 778 F. App’x 180, 182 (3d Cir. 2019), does not hold that issue preclusion,

as such, is an issue of jurisdictional stature. Thus my analysis has proceeded under

Rule 12(b)(6), not 12(b)(1).

I am emboldened in that conclusion by the Third Circuit’s explicit

endorsement of this reasoning in its opinion upholding the denial of habeas

relief in Mr. Kaetz’s case:

Kaetz claims that home detention constitutes imprisonment and that his

continued detention is unlawful because he already has served the 16 months in

prison ordered by the District Court. He relies on statements in the Guidelines

that “[h]ome detention may be imposed as a condition of supervised release,

but only as a substitute for imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(e)(2) (emphasis

added); see also U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2 (same). From those statements, Kaetz

concludes that his six-month period of home detention is a “substitute” for six of

the 16 months of imprisonment imposed by the District Court. That conclusion

does not follow. Kaetz assumes that these provisions make home detention a

substitute for imprisonment that the court imposed. The opposite is true. Home

detention is a substitute, not for imprisonment that the court imposed, but for

imprisonment that the court could have imposed but did not.

3d Cir. Op., 2022 WL 1486775 at *2 (emphasis added). Thus the Court of

Appeals stated that Mr. Kaetz had simply misinterpreted the Sentencing

Guidelines; the sentence was not illegal. A fortiori, the prison authorities did

not commit “any error in the execution of that sentence according to its express

terms.” Id.

In an abundance of caution that the Court of Appeals’ analysis could be

considered dictum, I have analyzed the matter independently. See supra. I

agree that there is no legal error here. Accordingly, all of Mr. Kaetz’s claims, to

the extent they are based on this first claim of error, must be dismissed.

Mr. Kaetz asserts a second claim of error, i.e., that the sentence violated

the plea agreement. This claim is refuted by the plea itself.

Here is the relevant paragraph of the plea agreement:

2. Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(l)(C), the parties stipulate and agree that

the appropriate sentence in this case is a term of imprisonment of

16 months; a fine, if any, in an amount to be determined by the

Court; a term of supervised release of three years, with the

condition that the first six months of supervised release be served

in home detention; and a special assessment of $100.

(Plea agreement (attached to complaint as Ex. 1), DE 1 at 32) That plea

agreement nowhere suggests that the supervised release term, or any part of it,

is subsumed by the term of imprisonment. On the contrary, it is quite clear

that the supervised release term, which includes an initial six months of home

detention as a condition, shall follow the term of imprisonment. Indeed, it is

inherent in the nature of supervised release that it occurs “after

imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583. And home detention itself, which is a

permissible condition of supervised release, does not constitute imprisonment,

for the reasons stated above.

At the guilty plea hearing, District Judge Ranjan explained the stipulated

sentence, including the term of imprisonment followed by the term of

supervised release, and Mr. Kaetz acknowledged that he understood:

THE COURT: Let's talk for a moment about sentencing. My

understanding of your plea agreement is that it contains a

stipulated sentence of a term of imprisonment of 16 months, a fine

to be determined by the Court, a term of supervised release of

three years with certain specific agreed-to conditions that you

must abide by during those three years.

It's also my understanding you want the Court to accept your plea

agreement and sentence you in accordance with this stipulated

sentence. Is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That's correct, Your Honor. . . .

….

As I just mentioned, Mr. Kaetz, in sentencing you, I may impose a

term of supervised release to follow any term of incarceration.

Supervised release is basically a period of probation after you get

out of prison. While on supervised release, you must check in with

the probation office and there are a lot of conditions you must

follow. Do you understand what supervised release is?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do.

Plea Hearing Tr. pp. 16, 18 (W.D. Pa. Crim No. 21-00211-1, DE 118 (emphasis

added))

Later in the hearing, the attorney for the government, at the court’s

request, orally recited the terms of the plea agreement, and Mr. Kaetz and his

counsel confirmed their understanding of those terms:

[AUSA] . . . The parties agree to the maximum penalties that may

be imposed as the Court just reviewed here today, and the parties

agree that pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, the appropriate sentence in this case is a term

of imprisonment of 16 months; a fine, if any, in an amount to be

determined by the Court; a term of supervised release of three

years with the following specific conditions: No. 1, the first six

months of the supervised release will be served in home detention

with electronic monitoring if that's required by the probation office.

. . . .

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Sughrue, do you agree with the government's summary?

MR. SUGHRUE: Yes, Your Honor.

. . . .

THE COURT: . . . Mr. Kaetz, have you a plea agreement in front of

you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do.

THE COURT: You recognize that as the plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Have you reviewed it completely with Mr. Sughrue?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I have.

THE COURT: Do you understand all of the contents of that

agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any remaining questions about the plea

agreement that you wish to ask Mr. Sughrue before we proceed?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

(Id. pp. 22–25)

Mr. Kaetz’s counsel, in his sentencing argument, confirmed his

understanding that the parties had agreed to 16 months’ imprisonment, and

an “additional” six months of house arrest under supervision:

I think the 16 months with a potential for six months of additional

house arrest or home detention as determined by the probation

office is a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary

to achieve all the goals of sentencing.

(Id. pp. 39–40 (emphasis added)) He argued that 16 months of actual

incarceration was sufficient, in part because of the harshness of prison

conditions during the COVID pandemic.

District Judge Ranjan, in imposing sentence, picked up on the

“hard time” theme, while making it very clear that the six month stretch

of home detention was separate from, and would follow, the 16 months of

incarceration:

Specifically, I believe here that even though the stipulated

sentence is below the guidelines, I do think it adequately reflects

an appropriate sentence in this case, 16 months, including some

hard time during this time is sufficient but not greater than

necessary. Adding on to that six months of home detention really

places you on largely within the guidelines. So I do think it's a

sufficient sentence in this case.

(Id. pp. 48–49 (emphasis added))

The Judgment of Conviction tracks the sentence agreed to by the parties:

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the

Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:

SIXTEEN (16) MONTHS, with credit for time served on any federal

detainer:

. . . .

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release

for a term of: THREE (3) YEARS.

. . . .

ADDITIONAL SUPERVISED RELEASE TERMS

Mr. Kaetz shall be placed on home detention for a period of 180

days, to commence as soon as arrangements can be made by the

Probation Office. . . .

(Judgment (attached to complaint as Ex. 2), DE 1 at 36–39)

In sum, the plea agreement provided for a sentence of 16 months’

imprisonment. Supervised release, by its very nature, follows any term of

imprisonment. The 6 month term of home detention was imposed, not as a

component of the sentence of incarceration, but as a condition of the follow-on

term of supervised release. The sentence as promulgated and implemented was

in complete accord with the plea agreement. Nothing in that agreement, the

plea colloquy, the representations of the government, or the sentence as

ultimately imposed, is to the contrary.

My analysis, once again, is consistent with that of the two other courts

who have considered Mr. Ranjan’s contentions.

In his decision, Judge Ranjan affirmed the conclusion of the R&R that

the claims were not properly cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He made

“additional observations,” however, that the merits were lacking. Specifically,

Judge Ranjan wrote that the 16 month term of imprisonment followed by a

separate supervised release condition of 6 months’ home detention was a

sentence in accord with the parties’ plea agreement:

Contrary to Mr. Kaetz's arguments and objections, his plea agreement clearly

and unequivocally stated that, in addition to serving 16 months imprisonment,

he would serve three years of supervised release, of which “the first six months

of supervised release be served in home detention.” See United States v. Kaetz,

2:21-cr-211, Dkt. No. 111-1, pp. 3-4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2021). This was pursuant to

a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) stipulated sentence, which the Court accepted. Id.

Dist. Ct. Op., 2022 WL 357214 at *1 n.1. Indeed, as he observed, this was a

binding agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C); the sentencing court’s

imposition of any other sentence would have been tantamount to rejection of

the plea itself.

The Third Circuit, affirming Judge Ranjan’s decision, likewise did not

confine itself to the technicalities of habeas law. Rather, it reached out for

possible claims of substantive error, including violation of the plea agreement,

but found them inapplicable:

Thus, some courts have relied on these provisions in holding that courts may not

impose a combined term of imprisonment and home detention that exceeds the

statutory maximum sentence, see, e.g., United States v. Blinn, 490 F.3d 586, 587-88

(7th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases), or a sentencing cap in a plea agreement, see United

States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2003). No such circumstance is

present here. Kaetz's combined term of 22 months in prison and home detention is

within both the five-year maximum sentence for the crime to which he pleaded

guilty, see 18 U.S.C. § 119(a), and the Guidelines range of 21-27 months to which the

parties stipulated at sentencing (ECF No. 118 at 36). The plea agreement also

expressly provides for that combined 22-month term. Kaetz argues that he

understood otherwise because his counsel gave him bad advice. This argument goes

to the validity of Kaetz's sentence and must be asserted under § 2255. But given the

impending completion of Kaetz's home detention, we note that this argument lacks

merit. Kaetz testified at his plea colloquy that no one had made any sentencing

guarantee or promise “[o]ther than what is in the plea agreement[.]” (Id. at 17.) And

Kaetz's plea agreement expressly provides for separate terms of 16 months in prison

and six months of home detention, as both the parties and the court made clear at

the plea colloquy and sentencing. (ECF No. 118 at 16, 22, 39.) Thus, “any possible

error in plea counsel's advice ... was cured by the plea agreement and at the plea

colloquy.” United States v. Fazio, 795 F.3d 421, 428 (3d Cir. 2015).

3d Cir. Op., 2022 WL 1486775 at *2 n.4.

I have analyzed the matter independently and, for the reasons stated

above, I agree with those courts’ analyses. Both of the essential claims of error

asserted by Mr. Kaetz are rejected. All of his various claims against the

defendants depend on the viability of those two claims that his sentence was

improper, or was improperly calculated. Accordingly, all claims are dismissed.

C. Other issues

Because the core contentions on which all of Mr. Kaetz’s claims depend

have been rejected, I do not consider the many other grounds for dismissal

cited by the defendants. These grounds include judicial, prosecutorial, and

qualified immunity; the unavailability of a Bivens cause of action; failure to

state a claim, or insufficient pleading under the standards of Rule 8 and

Twombly/Iqbal; lack of personal jurisdiction; and others.

Also pending are two cross-motions to strike (DE 56, 57), asserted by Mr.

Kaetz in opposition to the motions to dismiss of the Federal and CoreCivic

defendants.

As to CoreCivic, Mr. Kaetz asserts various grounds for disagreement with

their substantive contentions—for example, CoreCivic’s denial of being a

government actor. These objections are moot in light of my rulings supra. He

also accuses CoreCivic of an ethical violation because it cited the unpublished

decisions of Judge Ranjan and the Third Circuit. Those, however, are prior

decisions in related proceedings involving Mr. Kaetz himself, and are therefore

properly cited. The motion to strike is denied as to CoreCivic

As to the Federal defendants, Mr. Kaetz again simply disputes their

substantive contentions, and argues that they should therefore be struck. He

denies committing a crime, objects to the government’s unflattering

characterizations of him, and attributes his “selective” prosecution to political

bias. The Federal defendants’ motion to dismiss, he argues, is frivolous and

constitutes a fraud on the court. In light of my grant of that motion to dismiss,

see supra, this motion to strike must be denied as to the Federal defendants.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted in accordance with the

foregoing opinion. The plaintiff’s cross-motions to strike are denied. The

complaint is dismissed in its entirety.

An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.

Dated: October 25, 2022

/s/ Kevin McNulty

_____________________________

KEVIN MCNULTY

United States District Judge