Brown v. I.R.S.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

JACK BROWN,

Plaintiff, 8:24CV319

vs.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I.R.S.,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Jack Brown (“Plaintiff”), a non-prisoner, filed his Complaint on August 8,

2024 (the “Complaint”), Filing No. 1, which this Court construes as arising under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Plaintiff has been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Filing No. 5.

The Court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint to

determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and

finds that it is. For the reasons that follow Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be dismissed without

prejudice.

I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff brings suit against the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) as the sole

defendant. Filing No. 1 at 2. As a claim Plaintiff asserts the following single violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the Fourteenth Amendment:

[Plaintiff] got sued for $640 in a debt collection case and [he has] waited 10

months for nothing to be done.

Id. at 3–4 . As relief, Plaintiff seeks $26 billion in damages “for allowing taxes to bankrupt

the City of Omaha,”1 and to abolish Nebraska’s unicameral system.2 Id. at 4.

II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

This Court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether

summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). A complaint or any portion

of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief, must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim,

and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase

Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d

968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). While “[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and

pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties,” Topchian, 760

F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), pro se plaintiffs must set forth

enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible,” or their complaint shall be dismissed. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has

1 The Court notes that although Plaintiff does not list the City of Omaha as a plaintiff, he is without standing

to sue on the city’s behalf because, amongst other reasons, an individual plaintiff cannot sue for the alleged

deprivation of the civil rights of others. Tyler v. Ryan, 419 F. Supp. 905, 906 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (citing Elk

Grove Firefighters Local No. 2340 v. Willis, 391 F.Supp. 487 (N.D. Ill. 1975)).

2 Nebraska’s unicameral system is a governmental structure, created by state law, under which the

Nebraska legislative body operates and over which this Court has no authority to abolish as the creation of

this governmental system involves a question only of state law. See, e.g., Herzog v. Scanlan, No.

8:09CV149, 2009 WL 1649246, at *2 (D. Neb. June 9, 2009) (the revocation of a medical license is outside

the scope of a federal court’s authority as the issuance and revocation of a medical license involves a

question of state law as governed by state statute).

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).

III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, and although complaints filed by pro

se litigants are held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers, as set forth above, even pro se litigants must comply with the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal

statute, and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a

person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (emphasis

added); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).

However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that every complaint contain

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and

that “each allegation ... be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). A

complaint must state enough to “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to meet this minimal pleading standard. For

example, Plaintiff names the IRS as a defendant but the Court is unable to ascertain any

connection between the IRS and Plaintiff’s claim relating to a debt collection case, nor

can it be determined how or when any alleged violative incident took place, or any detail

of the resulting harm to Plaintiff as a result. To reiterate, the Court is unable to determine

how the IRS is involved in the debt collection case Plaintiff references, when the case

took place, or the nature of the constitutional claim alleged, because Plaintiff does not

allege any specific violations, connect the alleged violations to the IRS, or connect the

specific relief sought with the IRS.

However, even if Plaintiff were to amend his complaint to address these

deficiencies, it is well established that, absent an express waiver, the doctrine of

sovereign immunity bars a plaintiff's claim for money damages against the United States,

its agencies, and its officers in their official capacities. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S.

471, 475 (1994); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). “Sovereign

immunity is jurisdictional in nature.” FD/C v. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475 (citing United States

v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (‘It is axiomatic that the United States may not be

sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for

jurisdiction’”)). As the IRS is a federal agency, Plaintiff's suit is barred and must be

dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: The Complaint, Filing No. 1, is dismissed without

prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. separate judgment

will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 22nd day of October, 2024.

BY THE COURT:

C4 F Shit

Joseph F. Bataillon

Senior United States District Judge