Miller v. O'Malley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

KANDIE ANN MILLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:24 CV 420 RWS

)

MARTIN O’MALLEY, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Kandie Ann Miller brings this action seeking judicial review of the

Commissioner’s decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits

under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401. Section 205(g) of the

Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), provides for judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner. Because the Commissioner’s final decision is supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole, I will affirm the decision of the

Commissioner.

Procedural History

Plaintiff was born in 1969 and protectively filed her application on June 29,

2021. (Tr. 17.) She alleges she became disabled beginning December 18, 2020,

because of lupus, seizures, chronic fatigue, atrial fibrillation, fibromyalgia, and

chronic pain. (Tr. 211.)

Plaintiff’s application was initially denied on September 29, 2021, and upon

reconsideration on December 20, 2021. (Tr. 88, 103.) After a telephonic hearing

before an ALJ on January 11, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits on

April 5, 2023. (Tr. 37-64, 17-31.) On January 22, 2024, the Appeals Council

denied plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr. 1-6.) The ALJ’s decision is now the

final decision of the Commissioner.

In this action for judicial review, plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly

considered her non-severe mental impairments when determining that she could

perform her past relevant work as a sleep technician and medical assistant. She

asks that I reverse the Commissioner’s final decision and remand the matter for

further evaluation. For the reasons that follow, I will affirm the Commissioner’s

decision.

Medical Records and Other Evidence Before the ALJ

With respect to the medical records and other evidence of record, I adopt

plaintiff’s recitation of facts (ECF #8-1) only to the extent they are admitted by the

Commissioner (ECF #9-1). I find the Commissioner’s clarifications of plaintiff’s

statement of facts to be supported by the record, so I adopt his version of those

facts (ECF #9-1). Additional specific facts will be discussed as needed to address

the parties’ arguments.

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Discussion

A. Legal Standard

To be eligible for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act,

plaintiff must prove that she is disabled. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211,

1217 (8th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 552,

555 (8th Cir. 1992). The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An individual will be declared disabled “only

if [his] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that

[she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her]

age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner engages in a

five-step evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482

U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). At Step 1 of the process, the Commissioner begins by

deciding whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. If the

claimant is working, disability benefits are denied. Next, at Step 2 the

Commissioner decides whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or

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combination of impairments, meaning that which significantly limits her ability to

do basic work activities. If the claimant’s impairment(s) is not severe, then she is

not disabled. At Step 3, the Commissioner then determines whether claimant’s

impairment(s) meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1. If claimant’s impairment(s) is equivalent to one of the

listed impairments, she is conclusively disabled. At Step 4 of the process, the ALJ

must assess the claimant’s RFC – that is, the most the claimant is able to do despite

her physical and mental limitations, Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 923 (8th Cir.

2011) – and determine whether the claimant is able to perform her past relevant

work. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (RFC assessment

occurs at fourth step of process). If the claimant is unable to perform her past

work, the Commissioner continues to Step 5 and determines whether the claimant

can perform other work as it exists in significant numbers in the national economy.

If so, the claimant is found not disabled, and disability benefits are denied.

The claimant bears the burden through Step 4 of the analysis. If she meets

this burden and shows that she is unable to perform her past relevant work, the

burden shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5 to produce evidence demonstrating

that the claimant has the RFC to perform other jobs in the national economy that

exist in significant numbers and are consistent with her impairments and vocational

factors such as age, education, and work experience. Phillips v. Astrue, 671 F.3d

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699, 702 (8th Cir. 2012). If the claimant has non-exertional limitations, the

Commissioner may satisfy his burden at Step 5 through the testimony of a

vocational expert. King v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 2009).

I must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial

evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002).

Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but enough that a reasonable

person would find it adequate to support the conclusion. Johnson v. Apfel, 240

F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). “[Substantial evidence] means – and means only

– such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Determining whether there is substantial

evidence requires scrutinizing analysis. Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th

Cir. 2007).

I must consider evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision as well

as any evidence that fairly detracts from the decision. McNamara v. Astrue, 590

F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010). If, after reviewing the entire record, it is possible to

draw two inconsistent positions and the Commissioner has adopted one of those

positions, I must affirm the Commissioner’s decision. Anderson v. Astrue, 696

F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 2012). I may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision

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merely because substantial evidence could also support a contrary outcome.

McNamara, 590 F.3d at 610.

When evaluating evidence of pain or other subjective complaints, the ALJ is

never free to ignore the subjective testimony of the claimant, even if it is

uncorroborated by objective medical evidence. Basinger v. Heckler, 725 F.2d

1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1984). The ALJ may, however, disbelieve a claimant’s

subjective complaints when they are inconsistent with the record as a whole. See

e.g., Battles v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 1990). In considering the

subjective complaints, the ALJ is required to consider whether a claimant’s

subjective complaints are consistent with the medical evidence. See Polaski v.

Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) (listing factors such as the claimant’s daily

activities, the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain, precipitating and

aggravating factors, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication, and

functional restrictions).1 When an ALJ gives good reasons for the findings, the

court will usually defer to the ALJ’s finding. Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 696

1 This was once referred to as a credibility determination, but the agency has now eliminated use

of the term “credibility” to clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of

an individual’s character. However, the analysis remains largely the same, so the Court’s use of

the term credibility refers to the ALJ’s evaluation of whether a claimant’s “statements about the

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are consistent with the objective medical

evidence and other evidence of record.” See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8 (S.S.A. Oct.

25, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3); Lawrence v. Saul, 970 F.3d 989, 995

n.6 (8th Cir. 2020) (noting that SSR 16-3p “largely changes terminology rather than the

substantive analysis to be applied” when evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints).

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(8th Cir. 2007). However, the ALJ retains the responsibility of developing a full

and fair record in the non-adversarial administrative proceeding. Hildebrand v.

Barnhart, 302 F.3d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 2002).

B. ALJ’s Decision

In her written decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since December 18, 2020. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ found

that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: lupus, epilepsy, migraines,

fibromyalgia, and history of atrial fibrillation. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ found that

plaintiff had the following non-severe impairments: bursitis of the left shoulder,

hypertension, anemia, substance abuse (alcohol), depressive disorder, and anxiety

disorder. (Tr. 20.) In finding plaintiff’s mental impairments to be non-severe, the

ALJ concluded that plaintiff had “mild” limitations in the four areas of mental

functioning: understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting

with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or

managing oneself. (Tr. 20-21.) The ALJ determined that plaintiff’s impairments

or combination of impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment

in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 22-24.) The ALJ found

plaintiff to have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work with

the following limitations:

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[T]he claimant can occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but she should avoid

climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance.

She can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant should

avoid extreme cold, extreme heat, vibrations, and hazards, such as

unprotected heights and handling hazardous machinery. She should avoid

concentrated fumes, odors, gases, dusts, and poor ventilation and should

avoid work that requires operating motor vehicles. The claimant can

frequently handle and finger with the bilateral upper extremities.

(Tr. at 25).

The ALJ relied upon vocational expert testimony to support a conclusion that that

plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a sleep technician

(DOT#078.362-042, medium, performed light, semi-skilled, SVP-4), as she

performed it and past relevant work as a medical assistant (DOT#079.362-010,

light, skilled, SVP-6). (Tr. 30.) The ALJ concluded that “this work does not

require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s

residual functional capacity.” (Tr. 30.) The ALJ therefore found plaintiff not to be

disabled. (Tr. 31.)

C. Evaluation of Non-Severe Mental Impairments When Determining RFC

Plaintiff makes one argument in support of remand: that the ALJ committed

legal error because, although she found her medically determinable mental

impairments not severe at Step 2, the ALJ determined plaintiff had mild

impairments in each of the four broad mental function areas, and yet, assessed no

mental limitations in her RFC. Notably, plaintiff does not argue that finding her

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mental impairments to be non-severe at Step 2 was error; rather, she contends that

the ALJ erred because she failed to consider the impact of her non-severe mental

impairments on her ability to perform her past work as a sleep technician and

medical assistant. Therefore, plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to appropriately

evaluate her mental limitations before finding she could perform her past relevant

work.

At Step 2, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s anxiety and depression did not

cause more than a minimal limitation in plaintiff’s ability to perform basic mental

work activities and therefore were non-severe impairments. (Tr. 20-21.)

When evaluating the severity of a claimant’s mental impairments, an ALJ must

first “evaluate [the claimant’s] pertinent symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings

to determine whether [the claimant has] a medically determinable mental

impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(b)(1). The ALJ “then rate[s] the degree of

functional limitation resulting from the impairment(s)” in four broad functional

areas known as the “Paragraph B” criteria. See § 404.1520a(b)(2). As correctly

noted by the ALJ, the criteria are as follows: (1) understand, remember, or apply

information; (2) interact with others; (3) concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and

(4) adapt or manage oneself. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). The ALJ rates the

criteria using a five-point scale of none, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)(4). If the ALJ rates the claimant’s mental impairments as

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“none” or “mild,” then the ALJ will generally conclude that the mental

impairments are non-severe, unless the evidence indicates there is more than a

minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1). This evaluation, known as the psychiatric review

technique (PRT), is used when evaluating the severity of mental impairments at

Step 2 and in determining whether the impairments are listed at Step 3. Cuthrell v.

Astrue, 702 F.3d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 2013).

If a claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal one of the listed

impairments, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant retains the RFC to

perform her past relevant work. Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir.

2012) (cleaned up). RFC is defined as the most a claimant can do despite her

physical and mental limitations. Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir.

2016). An ALJ must consider all of plaintiff’s impairments (including those that

are non-severe) in the RFC formulation. Igo v. Colvin, 839 F.3d 724, 730 (8th Cir.

2016).

The PRT for the assessment of mental impairments must be consistent with

the ALJ’s RFC determination. See Chismarich v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 978, 980 (8th

Cir. 2018). (“As a general proposition, this assertion is unobjectionable and

correct.”). “As a practical matter, however, the different steps serve distinct

purposes, the degrees of precision required at each step differ, and our deferential

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standard of review precludes us from labeling findings as inconsistent if they can

be harmonized.” Id. (cleaned up).

Here, at Step 2, the ALJ found plaintiff had a mild limitation in each of the

four paragraph B criteria. (Tr. 20-21.) In her analysis, the ALJ noted that

plaintiff’s daily activities, numerous normal mental status examinations,

consultative examination, and her ability to get along with others indicated no

more than “mild” limitations, and as the evidence did not otherwise indicate more

than a minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities,

resulted in a finding of non-severe mental impairments. (Tr. 21.)

The ALJ went on to fashion an RFC which did not contain any mental

limitations. (Tr. 25.) Plaintiff argues that finding her mental impairments non-

severe does not speak to her capacity for the heightened mental abilities necessary

for her past relevant work.

Here, because the ALJ found plaintiff’s depression and anxiety cause mild

limitations in her ability to perform basic mental work activities, she was required

to consider these non-severe impairments when determining plaintiff’s RFC.

Mabry v. Colvin, 815 F.3d 386, 390 8th Cir. 2016). The ALJ did so. She

expressly considered plaintiff’s mental impairments in determining the RFC. (Tr.

25-30.) At the outset, the ALJ acknowledged her duty to consider all medically

determinable physical and mental impairments in assessing the RFC. (Tr. 25.)

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The ALJ noted the impairments plaintiff alleged with her application, which did

not include any mental impairments. (Tr. 25, 211.) See Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241

F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The fact that [plaintiff] did not allege depression

in her application for disability benefits is significant, even if the evidence of

depression was later developed.”) During her consultative examination with

Thomas Spencer, Psy.D., on August 19, 2021, plaintiff repeatedly stated that she

did not want to see a behavioral health professional, she denied ever seeing a

behavioral health professional, and she refused to say she was depressed. She

attributed her anxiety to her seizures and loss of interest to her pain, and stated that

she was “worked up” because she had to see a psychologist and “not very happy to

be there.” (Tr. 508-10.)

The ALJ also discussed plaintiff’s Function Report and her testimony that

she had trouble focusing and concentrating primarily because of pain, not mental

impairments. (Tr. 20-21, 25-26, 42-55, 226-33, 509.) The ALJ also considered the

objective findings of plaintiff’s providers, which noted consistently normal mental

status examinations with only occasional depression and anxiety.2

2 On October 2, 2020, physical examination by Michael D. Synder, M.D., revealed that plaintiff

was alert and oriented x3, with normal attention and concentration, fluent speech, intact

comprehension, and normal recent and remote memory. (Tr. 330.) During her next office visit

with Dr. Synder on November 5, 2020, plaintiff was observed to be “alert and oriented x3” with

fluent speech. (Tr. 325.)

During her visit with Siri Kolli, M.D., on October 23, 2020 (prior to her onset date), plaintiff

reported being stressed because of work and headaches which caused a lack of focus. She

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reported intermittent depression. (Tr. 460.) Examination yielded normal results, including

normal memory, judgment, and insight, appropriate mood and affect, and full orientation to time,

place, person, and situation. (Tr. 463.) At her December 11, 2020, telehealth appointment,

plaintiff reported increased anxiety because her seizures made her afraid to do things. (Tr. 457.)

Dr. Kolli reassured her about her condition being treated with medication and told her that she

was ok to drive, and plaintiff reported “feeling ok about it now.” (Tr. 457.) Mental status

examination was normal. (Tr. 458).

Plaintiff appeared anxious at her next appointment with Dr. Kolli’s Nurse Practitioner on March

4, 2021. (Tr. 455.) Her recurrent major depressive disorder was noted to be “in full remission.”

(Tr. 452.) Plaintiff was on duloxetine but stated she did not feel like it was helping and reported

being stressed and a “nervous wreck.” (Tr. 452.) Mental status exam was normal. (Tr. 455.)

The Nurse Practitioner added mirtazapine to treat anxiety and advised plaintiff to come back in

four weeks. (Tr. 450.) At her April 1, 2021, follow-up appointment with Dr. Kolli’s Nurse

Practitioner, plaintiff reported feeling depressed about being overweight. (Tr. 443.) She was

observed to be anxious with inappropriate mood and depressed affect, feelings of hopelessness,

and poor insight. (Tr. 448.) Her medication was changed from mirtazapine to Trintellix and she

was counselled about weight management. (Tr. 442.) Plaintiff came back two weeks later and

stated that she wanted labs because she “is bitchy,” gaining weight, and “drinking 176 cups of

chamomile tea daily” because she is “dying of thirst all the time.” (Tr. 438.) Plaintiff did not fill

her prescription for Trintellix because of cost. (Tr. 438.) Labs were ordered and she was

advised to start counselling for her depression. (Tr. 436.) Her mental status examination

yielded normal results. (Tr. 441.)

On May 14, 2021, plaintiff saw Siri Kolli, M.D., to “discuss anxiety,” but her only complaint

was that she irritable due to pain. (Tr. 431.) Her physical examination yielded normal results,

including normal memory, full orientation to time, place, person, and situation, appropriate mood

and affect, and normal insight and judgment. (Tr. 434-35.) On June 10, 2021, Dr, Kolli

observed plaintiff to have normal memory, and she was oriented to time, place, person, and

situation, with appropriate mood and affect, normal insight, and normal judgment. (Tr. 429.) By

her September, 2021, follow up with Dr. Kolli, plaintiff no longer reported anxiety or depression

and her mental status examination was normal. (Tr. 615.) However, at her October 20, 2021,

visit with Dr. Kolli, plaintiff reported little interest in activities, some depression and feelings of

hopelessness, and sleeplessness. (Tr. 618.) She was prescribed trazedone. (Tr. 616.) Plaintiff’s

mental status examination was within normal limits. (Tr. 621.) Plaintiff returned to Dr. Kolli’s

office five days letter stating her lawyer “wants her to get a letter from [Dr. Kolli] stating that she

is unable to work due to her medical issues.” (Tr. 622.) Her mental status examination was

again normal. (Tr. 625.) At plaintiff’s December 8, 2021, appointment, Dr. Kolli noted a 20

pound weight loss. (Tr. 627.) Plaintiff reported pain, fatigue, and staring off into space. (Tr.

627.) Dr. Kolli noted that plaintiff’s seizure disorder could be due to alcohol withdrawal. (Tr.

628.) Plaintiff’s mental status examination was again within normal limits. (Tr. 630.)

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In fashioning plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ also discussed and relied upon the

opinion of consultative psychological examiner Dr. Spencer. During examination,

plaintiff had fair eye contact, her speech was within normal limits, she was

cooperative, and her insight and judgment were intact. (Tr. 510.) Plaintiff’s affect

was neutral, she was alert and oriented to time, place, person, and event, she had

intact concentration and average intelligence, but she was unable to recall three

objects after five minutes of distraction. (Tr. 510.) Based on his examination, Dr.

Spencer opined that plaintiff had mild impairment in her ability to learn, recall, and

use information, and to consistently stay on task, as well as a mild impairment in

her ability to relate to and work with others on a consistent basis. (Tr. 510.) The

ALJ found Dr. Spencer’s opinion persuasive as consistent with his examination

results and the opinions of the state disability reviewing psychologists. (Tr. 29.)

The ALL also expressly considered and found persuasive the prior

administrative medical findings of Mark Altomari, Ph.D., and Barbara Markway,

Ph.D., both of whom concluded that plaintiff had non-severe mental impairments

which did not significantly impede her ability to function on a sustained basis. (Tr.

69, 80.)

After consideration of all this evidence, the ALJ determined that the record

evidence did not warrant the inclusion of mental limitations in the RFC. In doing

so, she did not substantially err. The fact that the ALJ concluded for purposes of

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Step 2 that plaintiff’s mental impairments were “mild” does not mean that the RFC

must include mental functioning limitations. Kelly T. v. Kijakazi, Case No.

20CV1915 WMW/DTS, 2022 WL 507609, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2022), report

and recommendation adopted, Case No. 20CV1915 WMW/DTS, 2022 WL 507390

(D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2022). Rather, it simply requires the ALJ to assess these non-

severe mental impairments in the context of determining an appropriate RFC.

Here, the ALJ’s findings in Step 2 can be harmonized with the ALJ’s analysis in

Step 4 as the ALJ found mild limitations in Step 2 and went on to consider those

limitations in Step 4, ultimately concluding that plaintiff retained the ability to

perform work within the parameters of the RFC. See Chismarich, 888 F.3d at 980.

Because the ALJ considered plaintiff’s mild limitations in determining the

RFC and the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff’s non-

severe mental impairments did not prevent her from performing light work tailored

to her credible limitations, the ALJ did not err in omitting non-exertional

limitations from the RFC. “Mild limitations identified at Step Two using the PRT

do not require corresponding RFC limitations.” Wymer v. Saul, Case No.

4:19CV2616 MTS, 2021 WL 1889870, at *9 (E.D. Mo. May 11, 2021) (cleaned

up); see also Taylor v. Berryhill, Case No. 4:17CV1050 DGK/SSA, 2018 WL

5410977, at *2-3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 29, 2018) (rejecting the argument that the “ALJ

erred by failing to incorporate the mild limitations in the [psychiatric review

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technique] analysis from Steps Two and Three into mental limitations on his RFC

at Step Four” and explaining the differences between the use of the PRT at Steps 2

and 3 and the function of the RFC assessment at Step 4); Johnson v. Berryhill,

Case No. 4:17CV416 DGK/SSA, 2018 WL 2336297, at *2 (W.D. Mo. May 23,

2018); Browning v. Colvin, Case No. 13CV266 REL, 2014 WL 4829534, at *37

(W.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2014) (“While it is true that the ALJ did not include his

finding of plaintiff's mild difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace in the

assessment, there was no requirement that he do so. Mild limitations in any of the

four domains of mental functioning are non-severe and therefore by definition

cause no work-related limitations of function.”) (cleaned up); Crissey v. Saul, Case

No. 4:20CV476 WJE, 2021 WL 2624514, at *3-4 (W.D. Mo. June 25, 2021).

The absence of mental health limitations in the RFC does not demonstrate

that the ALJ failed to evaluate those limitations, but instead indicates that she

concluded that those mild limitations did not ultimately impact plaintiff’s RFC

determination.

Although plaintiff argues that she could not perform her past relevant work

as a sleep technician and medical assistant because these jobs require mental

abilities exceeding her RFC, she presented no evidence in support of this

contention despite the fact that she bears the burden to show that she cannot

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perform past relevant work at Step 4. See Sloan v. Saul, 933 F.3d 946, 950 (8th

Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

At Step 4, the ALJ must find the claimant “not disabled” if she can perform

any of her past relevant work either as performed or as generally performed in the

national economy. To determine whether a claimant can perform her past relevant

work, the ALJ must compare the claimant’s RFC with the demands of her prior

work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the ALJ determines the claimant can perform

her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. See id. In making this

determination, an “ALJ has a duty to fully investigate and make explicit findings

as to the physical and mental demands of a claimant’s past relevant work and to

compare that with what the claimant herself is capable of doing before the ALJ

determines that she is able to perform her past relevant work.” Nimick v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 887 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1989) (cleaned up).

Here, the ALJ fulfilled this duty, and substantial evidence on the record as a

whole supports the ALJ’s decision that plaintiff could perform past relevant work.

In determining whether plaintiff could return to her past relevant work as generally

or actually performed, the ALJ questioned plaintiff about her past relevant work

and then considered the testimony of a VE, consistent with the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (“DOT”). (Tr. 30-31, 58-64.) The VE testified that plaintiff’s

past relevant work was as a sleep technician (DOT code 078.362-042), classified

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as semi-skilled, medium work (SVP-4) and performed at the light work category,

and medical assistant (DOT code 079.362-010), classified as skilled light work

(SVP 6) under the DOT.3 (Tr. 58.) The VE further testified that a hypothetical

person with plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC could perform

both jobs as actually performed, and the medical assistant job as generally

performed. (Tr. 60.) The VE’s testimony provides substantial evidence supporting

the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff could perform her past relevant work. See

Schwandt v. Berryhill, 926 F.3d 1004, 1013 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that a VE’s

answer to a properly phrased hypothetical supplies substantial evidence supporting

a determination that a claimant can perform past relevant work).

3 Jobs with an SVP are semi-skilled, while jobs with an SVP of 6 are skilled. SSR 00-4P, 2000

WL 1898704, at *3 (S.S.A. Dec. 4, 2000).

“Semi-skilled work is work which needs some skills but does not require doing the more

complex work duties. Semi-skilled jobs may require alertness and close attention to watching

machine processes; or inspecting, testing or otherwise looking for irregularities; or tending or

guarding equipment, property, materials, or persons against loss, damage or injury; or other types

of activities which are similarly less complex than skilled work, but more complex than unskilled

work. A job may be classified as semi-skilled where coordination and dexterity are necessary, as

when hands or feet must be moved quickly to do repetitive tasks.” 20 C.F.R § 404.1568(b).

“Skilled work requires qualifications in which a person uses judgment to determine the machine

and manual operations to be performed in order to obtain the proper form, quality, or quantity of

material to be produced. Skilled work may require laying out work, estimating quality,

determining the suitability and needed quantities of materials, making precise measurements,

reading blueprints or other specifications, or making necessary computations or mechanical

adjustments to control or regulate the work. Other skilled jobs may require dealing with people,

facts, or figures or abstract ideas at a high level of complexity.” 20 C.F.R § 404.1568(c).

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The ALJ specifically identified the DOT job titles as testified to by the VE,

along with the exertional levels of the jobs as actually and generally performed, the

skill levels, and the SVPs, and them compared them with the DOT to “determine

that the VE’s testimony is consistent with the information in the DOT.” (Tr. 30.)

(cleaned up). She then expressly “compared the claimant’s residual functional

capacity with the physical and mental demands of this (past) work” and concluded

that plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work. (Tr. 31.) (cleaned up).

Here, the ALJ expressly and adequately considered the mental and physical

demands of plaintiff’s past relevant work when determining, with the assistance of

VE testimony, that plaintiff could still perform her jobs of medical assistant as

actually and generally performed and sleep technician as actually performed. See

Biggers v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 6066590, at *7 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 18, 2023) (ALJ

adequately discharged duty at Step 4 in concluding plaintiff could perform past

relevant work by questioning plaintiff about demands of the job, questioning a VE

who identified the DOT job descriptions, comparing the VE’s testimony with the

DOT, and then comparing the demands of the work with what plaintiff is capable

of doing). In so doing, the ALJ sufficiently discharged her duty at Step 4 and did

not commit legal error requiring remand. See Young v. Astrue, 702 F.3d 489, 491

(8th Cir. 2013) (“We reject plaintiff’s contention to the extent she alleges the ALJ

failed to make explicit findings regarding the mental and physical demands of the

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plaintiff’s past relevant work as a factory packer and assembler. The ALJ may

discharge this duty by referring to the specific job descriptions in the DOT that are

associated with the claimant’s past work.”) (cleaned up).

Conclusion

The question for the Court is whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by

“substantial evidence on the record as a whole and not based on any legal error.”

See Sloan v. Saul, 933 F.3d 946, 949 (8th Cir. 2019). “Substantial evidence is less

than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind would accept it as

adequate to support the ALJ’s conclusion.” Id. (cleaned up). “Legal error may be

an error of procedure, the use of erroneous legal standards, or an incorrect

application of the law.” See Lucus v. Saul, 960 F.3d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 2020)

(cleaned up).

For the reasons set out above, the ALJ did not commit legal error in

determining that plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work, and a

reasonable mind can find the evidence of record sufficient to support the ALJ’s

determination that plaintiff was not disabled.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that that the decision of the Commissioner is

affirmed, and Kandie Ann Miller’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

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A separate Judgment is entered herewith.

Ww

RODNIEY W. SIP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 4th day of October, 2024.

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