Whitfield v. The Federal Government

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

JAQUAN WHITFIELD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) No. 4:24-CV-00115 SEP

)

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Jaquan Whitfield’s motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis in this civil action. Doc. [2]. The Court finds that the motion should be granted and

assesses an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In addition, for the

reasons set forth below, the Court will require Plaintiff to amend his Complaint on a Court-

provided form within 21 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis

is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his

prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an

initial partial filing fee of 20% of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s

account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month

period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly

payments of 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to his account. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly

payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10, until the filing

fee is fully paid. Id.

Plaintiff has not submitted a certified prison account statement. As a result, the Court

will require Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris, 129

F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified

copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount “that is reasonable,

based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances”). If Plaintiff is

unable to pay the initial partial filing fee, he must submit a certified copy of his prison account

statement in support of his claim.

LEGAL STANDARD ON INITIAL REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim

for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal

conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v.

Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court is not required to “accept

as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court

should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered

within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004)). But even pro se complaints are

required to “allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon,

623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not

required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would

have formed a stronger complaint”). And “procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not

be “interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” See McNeil v.

United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee housed at the St. Louis County Justice Center in Clayton,

Missouri, filed the Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against: the Federal Government;

Chad Nixson (Jail Administrator, Pemiscot County Jail in Caruthersville, Missouri); Scott

Spurlock (Director, Pulaski County Jail in Ulin, Illinois); Jason Woosley (Director, Grayson

County Jail in Litchfield, Kentucky); Tommy Greenwell (Sheriff, Pemiscot County Jail in

Caruthersville, Missouri); and Robert Helman (Chairman, Pulaski County Jail in Ulin, Illinois).

Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual capacities only.

Plaintiff asserts that his due process rights were violated when he was held “illegally” by

the federal government for two years before his case was “finally dismiss[ed].” Doc. [1] at 5.

More specifically, he claims that he was illegally held in Pemiscot County Jail by Defendants

Nixson and Greenwell from June through December of 2021, during which time he was not

adequately treated for Crohn’s Disease. Id. Plaintiff does not elaborate on these allegations or

indicate how Nixson and Greenwell were responsible for the alleged illegality of his detention or

for any purported deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

Plaintiff further alleges that he was illegally detained by Defendants Spurlock and

Helman at the Pulaski County Jail in Ulin, Illinois, from December of 2021 through December of

2022. Id. While incarcerated at that location, he claims, his “medical needs weren’t properly

cared for.” Id. He does not indicate how Spurlock or Helman personally violated his rights,

however.1 And because the alleged events in Pulaski County, Illinois, occurred within the

jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Plaintiff’s

claims relating to those events must be brought in that Court.2

Plaintiff next asserts that from December of 2022 through June of 2023, he was illegally

held at Grayson County Jail in Litchfield, Kentucky, by Jail Director Jason Woosley. Id. at 6.

For the same reason that this Court cannot hear Plaintiff’s claims relating to Pulaski County Jail

1 Liability under § 1983 is personal. See Frederick v. Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 2017).

“Government officials are personally liable only for their own misconduct.” S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d

335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, § 1983 liability “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility

for, the deprivation of rights.” Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)). Thus, Plaintiff must allege facts connecting

each Defendant to a challenged action. See Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2019).

2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), an action of this type may be brought only in: “(1) a judicial district in

which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2)

a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,

or a substantial part of property that is subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in

which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any

defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.”

in Illinois, it cannot hear Plaintiff’s claims relating to conduct at Grayson County Jail in

Kentucky. The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky has jurisdiction

over those claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

DISCUSSION

The Complaint suffers from several defects, which the Court will allow Plaintiff to

address by amending his complaint.

First, Plaintiff brings multiple unrelated claims against different Defendants in this

action, which is impermissible. A plaintiff may join in one action as many claims as he has

against a single defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) (emphasis added). When multiple defendants

are named, the Court must consider whether the defendants are properly joined under Rule

20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Intercon Research Assocs., Ltd. v. Dresser

Indus., Inc., 696 F.2d 53, 57 (7th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). Under Rule 20(a)(2), a plaintiff

may join multiple defendants in one action only if his claims against them arise out of the same

transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences and present common questions

of law or fact. Unrelated claims against different defendants must be brought in different suits.

As the Court already indicated, Plaintiff’s claims related to his incarceration in Kentucky

and Illinois must be brought elsewhere. Plaintiff’s two claims arising from his time at Pemiscot

County Jail in Missouri—i.e., his “illegal” incarceration claim and his deliberate indifference to

serious medical need claim—also belong in separate suits. Although both claims relate to

Plaintiff’s time in the Pemiscot County Jail, they involve neither the same defendants nor the

same (or similar) issues of law and fact. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue both claims, he will have to

pursue them in separate lawsuits.

Although misjoinder of parties is not grounds for dismissing an action, a Court may, on

its own, drop parties or sever any claim against a party to remedy the misjoinder. Fed. R. Civ. P.

21. Rather than sever claims on its own, the Court will give Plaintiff the opportunity to file an

amended complaint so that Plaintiff can decide what to pursue in this lawsuit.

With respect to his illegal incarceration claim, Plaintiff should note that the federal

government, including its departments, cannot be sued under § 1983 without its consent. Iverson

v. United States, 973 F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir. 2020); see also Hinsley v. Standing Rock Child

Protective Services, 516 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 2008) (“It is well settled that the United States

may not be sued without its consent.”). Nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff indicate that the

federal government has consented to his lawsuit.

With respect to his claim related to medical care at Pemiscot County Jail, Plaintiff’s

Complaint does not sufficiently allege deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

Under the Eighth Amendment, the government has an obligation to provide medical care to those

it has incarcerated. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). To demonstrate constitutionally

inadequate medical care, the inmate must show that a prison official’s conduct amounted to

deliberate indifference. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237-38 (8th Cir. 1997). To

establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must prove that he suffered from an objectively

serious medical need, and that prison officials actually knew of and disregarded that need.

Roberts v. Kopel, 917 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 2019). A “serious medical need is one that has

been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a

layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Coleman v. Rahija, 114

F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997). To show that an official has been deliberately indifferent to—

rather than just negligent of—such a need, an inmate “must show grossly incompetent or

inadequate care ‘so inappropriate as to evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to provide

essential care.’” Redmond v. Kosinski, 999 F.3d 1116, 1120 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Dulany,

132 F.3d at 1242).

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges only that his medical needs were “unmet” while he was

housed at Pemiscot County Jail. He does not even indicate that he sought treatment for his

Crohn’s disease from a specific person and was denied treatment, or that he suffered as a

result—much less that the care he received from a specific individual was “so inappropriate as to

evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to provide essential care.” Id.

The Court will allow Plaintiff 21 days to attempt to successfully state a claim relating to

his time in Pemiscot County Jail. He must follow the instructions set forth below when

amending his Complaint on the Court-provided form.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AMENDING THE COMPLAINT

An amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint. See In re Wireless

Telephone Federal Cost Recovery Fees Litigation, 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005) (“It is well-

established that an amended complaint supersedes an original complaint and renders the original

complaint without legal effect”). Plaintiff must type or neatly print the amended complaint on

the Court’s prisoner civil rights complaint form, which will be provided to him. See E.D. Mo.

L.R. 2.06(A) (“All actions brought by self-represented plaintiffs or petitioners should be filed on

Court-provided forms where applicable.”).

In the “Caption” section of the complaint form, Plaintiff should write the name of the

defendant(s) he intends to sue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff must avoid naming a person

as a defendant unless that person is directly related to his claim. Plaintiff must specify the

capacity in which he sues the defendant.

In the “Statement of Claim” section, Plaintiff should begin by writing the defendant’s

name. In separate, numbered paragraphs under that name, Plaintiff should set forth a short and

plain statement of the facts that support his claim or claims against that defendant. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s allegations must be simple, concise, and direct. See id. Each numbered

paragraph should be “limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff should avoid including unnecessary detail in the amended complaint.

If Plaintiff names only one defendant, he may set forth as many claims as he has against

that defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). If he names more than one defendant, he may include

only claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence—that is, claims that are related

to each other. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Plaintiff may file a separate civil action to assert any

unrelated claim or claims.

It is important that Plaintiff allege facts explaining how each defendant was personally

involved in or directly responsible for harming him. See Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203,

1208 (8th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff must explain the role of the defendant well enough that the

defendant will have notice of what he or she is accused of doing or failing to do. See Topchian v.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to commence this

action without prepaying fees or costs, Doc. [2], is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 21 days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff

must pay an initial filing fee of $1.00. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to

“Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison

registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an

original proceeding.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall mail to Plaintiff copy of the Court’s

form Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 21 days of the date of this order, Plaintiff

must file an amended complaint in accordance with the instructions herein.

Plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this

case, without prejudice and without further notice.

Dated this 13 day of September, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE