Spatola v. O'Malley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

KATHY SPATOLA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:23-CV-576-JSD

)

MARTIN O’MALLEY, )

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )

)

Defendant.1 )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the Commissioner of

Social Security’s final decision denying the application of Kathy Spatola (“Spatola”) for

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§

401, et seq. For the reasons stated herein, the Court affirms the Social Security Administration’s

denial of Spatola’s claim for DIB.

I. Background

On November 4, 2020, Spatola applied for DIB, alleging a disability beginning October

25, 2020, due to colitis. (Tr. 17, 134-35, 150-54) The agency initially denied her claims, and on

reconsideration she appealed to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 74-102). On

February 3, 2022, Spatola received a telephone hearing before an ALJ. (Tr. 31-60)

On March 25, 2022, the ALJ entered a decision adverse to Spatola, finding she was not

entitled to DIB. (Tr. 14-30) The ALJ found Spatola had the medically determinable impairments

of lymphocytic colitis, anxiety, and insomnia. (Tr. 20) At the second step of the sequential

1 Martin O’Malley is now the Commissioner of Social Security. He is automatically substituted

as the defendant in this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

evaluation process, the ALJ found that Spatola did not have a severe impairment or combination

of impairments that significantly limits her ability to perform basic work activities under 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, et seq. (Tr. 20-24) Likewise, the ALJ found that Spatola had not been under

a disability, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), from October 25, 2020, through the date of

the decision. (Tr. 25-26)

On February 15, 2023, the Appeals Council denied Spatola’s request for a review. (Tr. 1-

6) The decision of the ALJ thus stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. See Sims v.

Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000).

Spatola filed this appeal on May 2, 2023. (ECF No. 1) On June 12, 2023, Spatola filed a

Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Complaint. (ECF No. 17) The Commissioner filed a Brief in

Support of the Commissioner’s Decision on January 22, 2024. (ECF No. 18)

As to Spatola’s testimony, work history, and medical records, the Court accepts the facts

as provided by the parties.

II. Legal Standard

The Social Security Act defines as disabled a person who is unable “to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The

impairment must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but

cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work

exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him,

or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A);

1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) uses a five-step analysis to determine

whether a claimant seeking disability benefits is in fact disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1).

First, the claimant must not be engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, the claimant must establish that he or she has an impairment or

combination of impairments that significantly limits his or her ability to perform basic work

activities and meets the durational requirements of the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Third,

the claimant must establish that his or her impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in the

appendix of the applicable regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant's

impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment, the SSA determines the claimant's RFC to

perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

Fourth, the claimant must establish that the impairment prevents him or her from doing

past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant meets this burden, the

analysis proceeds to step five. At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish the

claimant maintains the RFC to perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy.

Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 2000). If the claimant satisfied all of the criteria under

the five-step evaluation, the ALJ will find the claimant to be disabled. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(v).

III. Discussion

In the opinion, the ALJ found that Spatola did not engage in substantial gainful activity

after her alleged onset date of October 25, 2020. The ALJ determined that Spatola had the

medically determinable impairments of lymphocytic colitis, anxiety, and insomnia. The ALJ

completed only two steps of the five-step analysis, finding that Spatola did not have a severe

physical or mental impairment and, therefore, was not disabled. (Tr. 19-26)

Spatola’s arguments in support of remand is three-fold. First, she argues that the ALJ’s

RFC finding was not supported by substantial evidence, even though the ALJ never made an

RFC determination since the case was decided at the second step. Next, Spatola contends that the

ALJ did not properly consider “opinion evidence.” Finally, Spatola claims that the ALJ failed to

make a proper pain evaluation. As discussed herein, these arguments fail upon review and the

Court affirms the ALJ’s decision as supported by substantial evidence.

A. ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence

Spatola argues that the ALJ’s decision did not “adequately explain how the evidence

supports the fact that plaintiff’s colitis does not cause more than a minimal effect on her ability

to work.” (ECF No. 17 at 4) Spatola claims that the ALJ’s opinion presents “random citation[s]

of evidence without explaining how it impacted the conclusion.” Id.

The Court finds that the ALJ’s opinion that Spatola’s colitis has only a minimal effect on

her ability to work is supported by substantial evidence. “The key issue is whether the

Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Cox v.

Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Sultan v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 862 (8th

Cir. 2004)). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable

mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion.” Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d

913, 915 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2007)). In

determining whether evidence is substantial, this Court considers “evidence that detracts from

the Commissioner's decision as well as evidence that supports it.” Travis, 477 F.3d at 1040

(citing Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 2000)). “If substantial evidence supports the

Commissioner's conclusions, this court does not reverse even if it would reach a different

conclusion, or merely because substantial evidence also supports the contrary outcome.” Id.

Under the regulations, the agency “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight,

including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical

finding(s), including those from your medical sources.”20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Rather, when

evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings,

ALJs look at the supportability and consistency of those findings. Id. “An ALJ may ‘discount or

even disregard the opinion of a treating physician where other medical assessments are supported

by better or more thorough medical evidence, or where a treating physician renders inconsistent

opinions that undermine the credibility of such opinions.’” Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790

(8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2000)). “The

Commissioner may also assign ‘little weight’ to a treating physician's opinion when it is either

internally inconsistent or conclusory.” Thomas v. Berryhill, 881 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2018)

(citing Chesser v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (8th Cir. 2017)).

Contrary to Spatola’s argument, the evidence before the Court demonstrates that the ALJ

considered, evaluated, and incorporated her testimonial and medical evidence when evaluating

the effect of Spatola’s colitis on her ability to work. “After considering the evidence of record,”

the ALJ found that Spatola’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected

to produce the alleged symptoms; however[,] [Spatola’s] statements concerning the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent for the reasons

explained in the decision.”

Upon evaluation, the ALJ discerned that hearing testimony and Spatola’s claims of

disability did not reflect the magnitude of her symptoms presented to her medical care providers.

Indeed, the ALJ went through a careful and thorough analysis of Spatola’s medical records in

determining that her colitis was not disabling.

Specifically, at her primary care physician appointment on November 5, 2019, Spatola

complained of diarrhea, but her labs were within “reasonable limits.” At her primary care

examination on December 5, 2019, she reported her diarrhea had improved since being placed on

a steroid treatment and her exam was normal. (Tr. 21-22) Her BMI had increased to 21.36. At

her February 5, 2020 gastroenterology follow up appointment, Spatola reported an improvement

in her diarrhea, and she denied abdominal pain, back pain, blood in her stool, fever, or weight

loss. (Tr. 22) Her doctor decreased her Budesonide prescription and recommended Questran. At

her April 7, 2020 gastroenterology appointment, Spatola reported diarrhea, with bowel

movements four times per day, and her frustration at being dependent upon Budesonide. (Tr. 22)

At her primary care appointment on June 10, 2020, Spatola reported her colitis was better on

medication, increased bruising, and her anxiety was stable on her medication. (Tr. 22) Spatola’s

BMI was 21.5 and the remainder of her exam was normal. (Tr. 22) At her September 15, 2020

appointment, her colitis was marginally controlled with diet and medication, her BMI was 20.37

and the remainder of her examination was normal. (Tr. 22) Her anxiety was stable on

medication. On October 20, 2020, Spatola saw her gastroenterologist, reported that her colitis

was improved on daily Imodium, no longer used Budesonide, and she had gained weight. (Tr.

22) A November 9, 2020 CT scan of Spatola’s abdomen showed air-fluid levels consistent with

diarrhea. (Tr. 22) On December 16, 2020, Spatola had a colonoscopy, which showed mild and

subtle colitis changes. (Tr. 22) She also had an endoscopy, which was normal. (Tr. 22) A

December 30, 2020 Grayscale and Color Doppler Ultrasound of Spatola’s right upper quadrant

was normal, and a CT scan of her abdomen again showed air-fluid levels consistent with

diarrhea. (Tr. 22) On March 15, 2021, Spatola reported anxiety during her a visit with her

primary physician. (Tr. 23) The visit notes showed that Spatola’s anxiety was stable on

medications, she was in good spirits. She reported that she was refurbishing furniture, and her

colitis was improved on Mesalamine. (Tr. 23) Her examination was normal, and her medications

were continued without change. (Tr. 23) On April 23, 2021, Spatola had a physical consultative

examination with nurse practitioner Rachel Dibooglu. (Tr. 23) The nurse practitioner diagnosed

Spatola with colitis but did not provide any work-related functional limitations. (Tr. 23) On

September 22, 2021, Spatola was seen by her primary care physician, who noted her anxiety,

insomnia, and colitis were stable on medication. (Tr. 24) No medication changes were made. (Tr.

24)

Thus, as noted throughout Spatola’s examinations, her physical findings at every primary

care appointment were normal. Further, the records indicate that Spatola was prescribed and took

medications for her physical and mental impairments, and those treatments have been relatively

successful in controlling her symptoms. As noted the by ALJ, Spatola reported that her colitis

was much improved on medication, taking Imodium just once daily, and discontinuing any

steroid use. See Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 965 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Brown v.

Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2004)(“‘If an impairment can be controlled by treatment

or medication, it cannot be considered disabling.’”).

The Court finds that the ALJ properly assessed Spatola’s medical records and determined

that her symptoms from colitis did not significantly limit her ability to perform work. See Kirby

v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir.2007) (“An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a

slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to

do basic work activities.”); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(a); Berry v. Colvin, 74 F.

Supp. 3d 994, 997 (N.D. Iowa 2015). Indeed, Spatola had limited medical treatment by her

primary physician and her gastroenterologist. Although her medications were changed a few

times, her colitis seemed to be well-controlled by Imodium by the end of her treatment. Her most

recent visit to Nurse Practitioner Dibooglu did not list any work-related restrictions. Thus, the

Court finds that there was substantial support for the ALJ’s determination that Spatola’s physical

impairments, particularly her colitis, did not impact her daily activities and was not disabling.

The ALJ also considered Spatola’s documented, but adequately controlled mental status.

(Tr. 25) The ALJ discerned that her medically determinable mental impairment causes no more

than “mild” limitation in any of the functional areas and the evidence did not otherwise indicate

that there was more than a minimal limitation in Spatola’s ability to do basic work activities,

such that her impairments were deemed nonsevere. (Tr. 25). The Court holds that the record

supports a finding that Spatola was not disabled due to her mental impairments, given the

evidence of effective treatments and lack of disabling symptoms. The Court holds that the ALJ’s

determination is supported “by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Buford v. Colvin,

824 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Partee v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2011);

Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 2004)).

In sum, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding. “If, after

review, we find it possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those

positions represents the Commissioner's findings, we must affirm the denial of benefits.” Wiese

v. Astrue, 552 F.3d 728, 730 (8th Cir.2009); McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 611 (8th Cir. 2011).

Here, there was sufficient evidence documenting Spatola’s symptoms and impairments, which

supported the ALJ's decision that Spatola’s conditions were adequately controlled by medication,

and she was not disabled. The ALJ’s determination fell within the zone of choice, which this

Court will not disturb. See Winship v. Saul, No. 4:20-CV-00039-MDH, 2021 WL 1055196, at

*2 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 19, 2021) (citing Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010); Casey v.

Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 691 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Courts ‘defer heavily to the findings and conclusions

of the Social Security Administration’ and will disturb the Commissioner's decision only if it

falls outside the ‘zone of choice.’”).

B. Opinion Evidence

The ALJ relied upon the opinions issued by state agency reviewing physicians regarding

Spatola’s mental and physical limitations at the initial and reconsideration stages of her

application. The state agency review physicians were Barbara Markway, Ph.D. (Tr. 65), Charles

Watson, Psy.D (Tr. 72), Donna McCall, D.O., and Renu Debory, M.D. (Tr. 64). The ALJ found

these state medical and psychological consultant opinions to be persuasive because they are

“consistent with the other evidence in the record, including the successful use of treatment to

manage her symptoms, her own reports of daily activities that were not significantly limited as

well as the normal objective findings.” (Tr. 25)

Spatola complains that the ALJ relied on these state agency reviewing physicians and

addressed the consistency of the opinions but did not discuss the supportability of the opinion or

how plaintiff’s daily activities are consistent with the state agency opinions and the ALJ’s

conclusions. (ECF No. 17 at 5-6) Spatola claims that the records from Dr. Erik Thyssen at

Specialists in Gastroenterology and Dr. Howard Kohn at BJC Medical Group including multiple

biopsies, colonoscopies, CTs, and an ultrasound provide objective evidence in support of

Spatola’s subjective complaints of pain. (ECF No. 17 at 6-8) Spatola asserts that the exams show

that she suffers from colitis, as confirmed by her ongoing diarrhea and her weight loss resulting

from a steroid treatment (Budesonide). Spatola further acknowledges notations in the record that

her symptoms were improved with medications. (ECF No. 17 at 8) However, Spatola argues that

these records do not support the ALJ’s conclusions that Spatola’s “pain was under control or that

she was no longer having diarrhea.” (ECF No. 17 at 8-9) Spatola claims that, although her

episodes of diarrhea decreased from 10 to 4 accidents per day in 2020, her symptoms were not

under control. Spatola also contends that changes to her medications indicate that her symptoms

were in flux. (ECF No. 17 at 9) Further, Spatola proposes that her daily activities relied on by the

ALJ failed to take note that she has “good days and bad days” and her inability to function on

bad days should have been considered (ECF No. 17 at 9-10) Thus, Spatola asserts that “[t]he

ALJ failed to adequately explain how the supportability and consistency factors were

considered.” (ECF No. 17 at 10)

An ALJ may “discount or even disregard the opinion of a treating physician where other

medical assessments are supported by better or more thorough medical evidence, or where a

treating physician renders inconsistent opinions that undermine the credibility of such opinions.”

Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir.2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Considering the record as a whole, the Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the

ALJ's decision to rely on state agency reviewing physicians’ assessments that Spatola retained

the ability to perform work. See Gonzales v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890, 896 (8th Cir. 2006).

The Court has already discussed Spatola’s medical records from her primary care

physician and gastroenterologist, which did not support a finding of disability because the

treatments were effective in controlling her symptoms. Thus, the Court concludes that these

records support the opinions of the reviewing state physicians.

Likewise, the records regarding Spatola’s daily activities were also not indicative of

disabling mental or physical impairments. The ALJ noted that Spatola could manage her own

personal care; remember to take medication; prepare daily meals; perform household chores; run

errands (post office, grocery shopping) a few times per week; drive; go out alone; shop in stores

and by phone for groceries, clothes, and gifts. (Tr. 21, 168-75) She shopped for groceries every

10 days for 1-2 hours, leaving the remaining shopping by phone and computer. (Tr. 21) She

could manage her finances, watch television, read, occasionally go to estate sales. (Tr. 21) She

did not require any assistance filling out her disability forms. (Tr. 21)

Thus, in addition to the objective medical evidence, the ALJ found that the whole record,

particularly Spatola’s daily activities were not indicative of disabling impairments. Indeed,

Spatola appeared to lead a relatively normal and independent life full of travel, hobbies and

grandchildren. Although her conditions needed to be controlled by medication, the record did not

demonstrate that symptoms were uncontrolled or interfered with her ability to perform work.

The Court finds the ALJ’s opinion is adequately supported and consistent with the record and

should be affirmed.

C. Subjective Symptoms (Pain)

The ALJ concluded that the objective evidence did not substantiate Spatola’s subjective

pain complaints. (Tr. 24) Indeed, Spatola admitted that “her exams have been relatively normal

throughout the period in question.” (ECF No. 17 at 11) The ALJ also concluded that Spatola’s

medications have been effective in controlling her symptoms. (Tr. 24) Finally, the ALJ discerned

that Spatola’s daily activities were not limited to the extent one would expect from a person with

disabling symptoms and limitations. (Tr. 24)

Spatola disagrees and argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate her subjective pain

complaints. Spatola references its prior position that her improvements from medication do not

demonstrate that she was able to maintain employment. (ECF No. 17 at 11) Spatola claims that

the ALJ’s discussion of claimant’s daily activities failed to present and discuss the Polaski2

factors when making any credibility determinations. (ECF No. 17 at 12) Spatola further argues

the daily activities relied upon by the ALJ “did not consume a substantial part of a plaintiff’s

day.” (ECF No. 17 at 12) Although the ALJ stated that she analyzed Spatola’s subjective pain

complaints pursuant to the requirements of SSR 16-3p and 20 C.F.R. §404.1529, Spatola claims

that the ALJ gave weight to only one of the Polaski factors—objective medical evidence. Spatola

claims that her “subjective complaints may not be disregarded solely because they are not

supported by the objective medical evidence” but only “if they are inconsistent with the evidence

as a whole.” (ECF No. 17 at 14 (emphasis in original)) Spatola claims that her pain complaints

were supported by objective evidence including: biopsies, medications, CT scan, colonoscopies

and ultrasound. (ECF No. 17 at 15) Spatola stated that the ALJ conducted “no evaluation of the

other factors including work history; duration, frequency, and intensity of pain; precipitating and

aggravating factors; or functional restrictions.” (ECF No. 17 at 15)

The Eighth Circuit has addressed the requirements for dealing with subjective pain

complaints:

A disability claimant's subjective complaints of pain may be discounted if

inconsistencies in the record as a whole bring those complaints into question. See

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.1984). In assessing the

credibility of a claimant's subjective pain complaints, an ALJ is to consider

factors including the claimant's prior work record; the claimant's daily activities;

observations of the claimant by third parties and treating and examining

physicians; the duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant's pain;

precipitating and aggravating factors; the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of

the claimant's medication; treatment, other than medication, for relief of the

2 Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984).

claimant's pain; and functional restrictions on the claimant's activities. See id.

Although “an ALJ may not disregard [a claimant's] subjective pain allegations

solely because they are not fully supported by objective medical evidence, an ALJ

is entitled to make a factual determination that a[c]laimant's subjective pain

complaints are not credible in light of objective medical evidence to the contrary.”

Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir.2002) (internal citation omitted);

see also Goodale v. Halter, 257 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir.2001) (noting that an ALJ

may discount subjective complaints if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as

a whole), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 908, 122 S.Ct. 1212, 152 L.Ed.2d 149 (2002).

Gonzales v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890, 895 (8th Cir. 2006)

In this case, the ALJ discredited Spatola’s subjective complaints of pain after considering

all the evidence in the record. Applying the Polaski factors described above, the ALJ specifically

described the evidence supporting the adverse credibility determination. Gonzales, 465 F.3d at

895. As previously discussed, the ALJ detailed the limited objective medical testing, Spatola’s

notable daily activities, and the improvement of her conditions with treatment and medication.

Although the absence of objective medical evidence is not dispositive of whether a claimant

suffers from subjective complaints, the ALJ can consider the absence of objective medical

evidence supporting the claimed impairments. (Tr. 21-25) See 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(c)(2)

(“Objective medical evidence of this type is a useful indicator to assist us in making reasonable

conclusions about the intensity and persistence of your symptoms and the effect those symptoms,

such as pain, may have on your ability to work. We must always attempt to obtain objective

medical evidence and, when it is obtained, we will consider it in reaching a conclusion as to

whether you are disabled. However, we will not reject your statements about the intensity and

persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your

ability to work solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate

your statements.”); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir.2002) (internal citation

omitted) (Although “an ALJ may not disregard [a claimant's] subjective pain allegations solely

because they are not fully supported by objective medical evidence, an ALJ is entitled to make a

factual determination that a [c]laimant's subjective pain complaints are not credible in light of

objective medical evidence to the contrary.”).

In addition, the ALJ emphasized that Spatola’s reported daily activities were inconsistent

with her complaints of disabling limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (ALJ considers daily

activities when evaluating symptoms). As previously discussed, Spatola lived with her retired

husband but performed various housework, traveled, managed her finances, shopped, read, and

watched television.

Further, the record showed the medications, lately over-the-counter Imodium, were

largely successful in managing Spatola’s symptoms of colitis. Similarly, Spatola reported that

her anxiety was controlled by medication, with no indication that it was disabling. (Tr. 24, 238,

240-41, 244, 247, 292)

Finally, the ALJ noted Spatola’s inconsistent statements. Spatola reported limitations

with lifting, squatting standing, kneeling, and stair climbing, and that her wrists were weak. (Tr.

24, 173) However, the ALJ noted that Spatola’s physical findings were normal at every primary

care visit and, at her consultative examination, she had no tenderness in the back and her straight

leg raising was negative. (Tr. 24, 238-66, 292-94)

Thus, although Spatola accuses the ALJ of only discussing the objective medical

evidence in dismissing her subjective pain complaints, the record clearly shows that the ALJ

considered Spatola’s daily activities, improvement with treatment, and her inconsistent

statements.

The Court ‘will not disturb the decision of an ALJ who considers, but for good cause

expressly discredits, a claimant's complaints of disabling pain.’” Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785,

792 (8th Cir. 2005)(quoting Gowell v. Apfel, 242 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir.2001)); see also

Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1218 (8th Cir.2001) (‘The credibility of a claimant's

subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to decide, not the courts.”). In this case, the ALJ

considered Spatola’s subjective complaints of pain but found independent reasons, each

supported by substantial evidence, to discredit those complaints. Accordingly, we conclude that

the ALJ properly discredited Spatola’s subjective complaints of pain. (Tr. 21-25; ECF No. 17 at

14-15.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision was based on substantial

evidence in the record as a whole and should be affirmed.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is AFFIRMED. A separate Judgment will

accompany this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall reflect on the docket that Martin

O’Malley, Commissioner of Social Security, 1s the proper defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

25(d).

ot S. □□□

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated this 29th day of August, 2024.

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