Peeler v. SRG Global Coatings, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

MICHELLE PEELER, on behalf of )

herself and all others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:23-CV-23-SNLJ

)

SRG GLOBAL COATINGS, LLC, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

)

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

Plaintiff initially filed this putative class action against defendant SRG Global

Coatings, LLC (“SRG”) in February 2023. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint

[Doc. 47] in April 2024 that added several defendants, including E.I. du Pont de Nemours

and Company, The Chemours Company, The Chemours Company FC, LLC, Corteva,

Inc., and DuPont de Nemours, Inc. (collectively, “DuPont”). This matter is before the

Court on the DuPont defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 76].

I. Background

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges injuries and damages resulting from the “migration of

hazardous carcinogenic chemicals” and “metals” from its manufacturing facilities in

Portageville, Missouri, including hexavalent chromium, chromium, arsenic, PFAS, and

nickel, as well as other hazardous chemicals and metals. [Doc. 47 at ¶¶ 1-2, 32, et seq.]

Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that “Defendant SRG failed to adequately prevent

migration of the contaminated groundwater plume from the SRG site into the aquifer

under Portageville, Missouri, that caused dangerous pollutants to enter the drinking water

of Portageville residents.” [Id. at ¶ 107(d).]

Plaintiffs allege that DuPont and other recently-added defendants “designed,

manufactured, formulated, promoted, marketed and sold (directly and indirectly) PFAS

products that were used in SRG’s electroplating manufacturing processes.” [Id. at ¶ 33.]

Plaintiffs bring claims for strict liability design defect (Count III) and negligence (Count

IV) against DuPont and others.

DuPont has moved to dismiss. Because this Court will grant the motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction, this Court need not address DuPont’s other arguments

for dismissal.

II. Discussion

In a diversity action such as this one, the Court “may assume jurisdiction over the

nonresident defendants only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum

state and by the Due Process Clause.” Romak USA, Inc. v. Rich, 384 F.3d 979, 984 (8th

Cir. 2004).

To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the non-moving

party need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction; that is, the “plaintiff must state

sufficient facts in the complaint to support a reasonable inference that defendants may be

subjected to jurisdiction in the forum state.” Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 585 (8th

Cir. 2008).

Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.

v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017)

(“BMS”). The exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation may take place where

“the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)). “A court with general jurisdiction

may hear any claim against that defendant, even if all the incidents underlying the claim

occurred in a different State.” Id. Here, the DuPont group is comprised of Delaware

corporations with their principal place of business in Delaware. Nothing in the complaint

provides any basis for claiming that DuPont’s contacts are “so continuous and systematic

as to render [them] essentially at home” in Missouri. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139; see also

Lizama v. Venus Laboratories, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 3d 848, 856 (E.D. Mo. 2023) Thus, this

Court does not have general jurisdiction over DuPont.

“Specific jurisdiction is very different. In order for a state court to exercise

specific jurisdiction, ‘the suit’ must ‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts

with the forum.’” Id. (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746,754 (2014)).

“Specific personal jurisdiction can be exercised by a federal court in a diversity suit only

if authorized by the forum state’s long-arm statute and permitted by the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen

GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2011). The Missouri Long-Arm Statute

provides that jurisdiction extends to “any cause of action arising from” the “transaction of

business within” or the “commission of a tortious act” within Missouri. § 506.500.1(1),

(3) RSMo. The Missouri legislature’s objective in enacting the statute “was to extend the

jurisdiction of the courts of this state over nonresident defendants to that extent

permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

Constitution of the United States.” State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889,

892 (Mo. banc 1970). Thus, critical to the “analysis is whether the exercise of personal

jurisdiction in this case comports with due process.” Clune v. Alimak AB, 233 F.3d 538,

541 (8th Cir. 2000). The Constitution’s Due Process Clause requires that there be

“minimum contacts” between the nonresident defendant and the forum state “such that

the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945) (internal quotations

omitted).

“[T]here must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying

controversy, principally, [an] activity or occurrence that takes place in the forum State.’”

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). In other words, “specific

jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the

very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Id. Moreover, specific jurisdiction “must

arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum.” Walden v. Fiore,

571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014); see also Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs. Corp., 760 F.3d 816,

821 (8th Cir. 2014) (for specific jurisdiction to exist, “the relationship must arise out of

contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum State”).

Here, the complaint alleges no facts demonstrating any connection between

plaintiffs’ claims and the activities of DuPont in Missouri such that this Court’s exercise

of personal jurisdiction comports with due process. Simply alleging plaintiffs suffered an

injury in Missouri is not enough to permit the exercise of specific jurisdiction, as the

Supreme Court has made clear that “mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient

connection to the forum.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 290. Plaintiffs do not even allege that

defendants sold any PFAS or products containing PFAS to SRG for SRG’s use in

Missouri; plaintiffs allege only that the DuPont defendants sold PFAS to other

companies, which then allegedly sold products using PFAS to SRG in Missouri. [Doc.

47 at ¶ 63.] Indeed, DuPont submitted affidavits that defendants have not identified any

direct sales to SRG, its predecessor, or other defendants/distributors who may have sold

products to SRG or other relevant defendants in Missouri. Where, as here, a defendant

raises through affidavits or other means a meritorious challenge to personal jurisdiction,

“the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction by affidavits, testimony, or

documents.” Dever v. Hentzgen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiffs offer no evidence of DuPont’s intent to specifically target Missouri consumers

or the exercise of control over the relevant distributors.

Instead, plaintiffs rely on the theory that DuPont has “consented” to jurisdiction in

Missouri. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that “by registering to do business and

maintaining an agent for service of process in Missouri,” defendants have “consented to

the jurisdiction of Missouri courts for any cause of action[.]” [Doc. 88 at 2 (citing

Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990)).] Knowlton,

however, was decided under Minnesota law, which provides that a “foreign corporation

shall be subject to service of process . . . [b]y service on its registered agent” without

limitation to “claims arising out of in-state activities . . . .” Id. (citing Minn. Stat. §

303.13). Missouri has no such law. The “plain language of Missouri’s registration

statutes does not mention consent to personal jurisdiction for unrelated claims, nor does it

purport to provide an independent basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporations that

register in Missouri.” State ex re. Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Dolan, 512

S.W.3d 41, 52 (Mo. banc 2017). The Missouri Supreme Court has thus rejected

arguments like plaintiffs’ here, and this Court has, as well.

In Sahm v. Avow Corp., the plaintiffs argued—as plaintiffs do here—that the

nonresident foreign corporation defendant had consented to personal jurisdiction because

it had registered with the Missouri Secretary of State as a prerequisite to doing business

within the state under R.S.Mo. §§ 351.582 and 351.571. No. 4:23-CV-00200-AGF, 2023

WL 8433158, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 5, 2023). The Sahm plaintiffs relied on the United

State Supreme Court’s analysis in Mallory, which held that a foreign corporation was

subject to personal jurisdiction under the Pennsylvania registration statute requiring out-

of-state corporations to consent to general personal jurisdiction as a condition of

registering to do business in Pennsylvania. Id. (citing Mallory v. Norfolk S. R.R. Co., 600

U.S. 122 (2023)). This Court rejected the Sahm plaintiffs’ argument, finding that “the

statutory scheme in Missouri is not explicit that a foreign corporation registered to do

business in Missouri submits to general jurisdiction in its courts. 2023 WL 8433158 at

*4 1 This Court declines to hold that DuPont has consented to personal jurisdiction in

Missouri.

Because this Court lacks both general and specific jurisdiction over DuPont, this

Court need not reach DuPont’s arguments for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants E.I. du Pont de Nemours and

Company, The Chemours Company, The Chemours Company FC, LLC, Corteva, Inc.,

and DuPont de Nemours, Inc’s motion to dismiss [Doc. 75] is GRANTED for lack of

personal jurisdiction.

Dated this 30th day of August, 2024.

f ee _ qy

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR. ~

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

' Plaintiffs also cite a different case from this Court, Mitchell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 159 F. Supp. 3d

967, 977 (E.D. Mo. 2016), but that case appears to be an outlier.