Hill v. MHM Support Services

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION .

REGINA M. HILL, )

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:24-CV-00971 JAR

MERCY HOSPITAL, □□

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Regina M. Hill for leave to

commence this civil action without payment of the required filing fee. [ECF No. 2]. Having

reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court finds it should

be granted. Additionally, for the ‘Teasons discussed below, the Court will issue process on

plaintiffs claim for retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However,

plaintiff's remaining claims in this lawsuit will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To

state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere

possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 678. Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as

true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8" Cir.

2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8" Cir. 2016) (stating

that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true but is not required to “accept as true

any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’”’).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit

of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction”

means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the

plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal

framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8" Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints

are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v.

Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8" Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8"

Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just

because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition,

affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural

rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed

without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint and Charge of Discrimination

Plaintiff Regina Hill is a self-represented litigant who brings this employment

discrimination complaint against defendant Mercy Hospital. The complaint is on a Court-provided

form, as required. In her complaint, plaintiff checked the boxes indicating she is bringing this

lawsuit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VID), as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e, et seg., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12101, ef seq. In the complaint, plaintiff also placed check marks indicating she believes she

was discriminated against because of her race, national origin, color, disability, and retaliation.

Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against in the terms and conditions of her employment,

retaliated against, subjected to harassment, unlawfully terminated and “called racist slurs, made

fun of [on account of her] race. . . and [defendant] thought it was funny when [she] complained

about it, and they made up lies on [her].” The Court interprets plaintiff's factual assertions to allege

a hostile work environment/harassment claim under Title VII.

In the body of her complaint, plaintiff alleges that she was hired as a nurse’s assistant,

which she refers ‘to as a PCA, on December 28, 2022.' She asserts that during her training for the

job at Mercy Hospital, her trainer, Ashley McCasland, treated “students of color” differently than

white students. Although plaintiff fails to give specific examples of the “different” treatment by

trainer Ashley in her complaint, she states in a conclusory manner in her Charge of Discrimination

that Ashley McCasland gave “less training time to people of other races and colors.” Plaintiff,

however, does not identify her racial identity or her color in the complaint or her Charge of

Discrimination.”

‘Because plaintiff's factual statement in her complaint is somewhat difficult to discern, the Court has

supplemented the facts with those taken from her Charge of Discrimination which is attached to her

complaint. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) (“A statement in a pleading may be adopted by

reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion. A copy of a written

instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”).

*Plaintiff appears to suggest that she is Puerto Rican and suffers from the purported disability of

Fibromyalgia. However, she does not come out and state this for a fact. Rather, she states in her complaint

that she called other employees at Mercy Hospital Puerto Rican names. Moreover, she claims, “They fired

Plaintiff additionally alleges that “[d]Juring MLK [day] the safety teacher was very rude &

racist.” Plaintiff fails to indicate if the unidentified safety teacher was rude to her, or simply rude

to everyone at the workplace. Additionally, although plaintiff asserts that the teacher was “racist,”

she fails to indicate what the safety teacher did that was allegedly racist.

Plaintiff states that when she “told her supervisor Tiffany,” she was “demoted.” Although

plaintiff has failed to articulate in the body of her complaint what she allegedly told her supervisor,

Tiffany Kunz, in her Charge of Discrimination she states that she complained about

“discrimination.” Specifically, she states that she complained of trainer Ashley McCasland’s

purported racially discriminatory behavior in only speaking to, and training, Caucasians during the

nurse’s assistant training. □

me when I told them Racel a white employee had fibermyalgia [sic] & they didn’t hire me & we had the

same thing.” The Court cannot, however, assume facts that are not alleged. Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15.

3Plaintiff alleges in her Charge of Discrimination:

1.1 was hired by the above-mentioned employer on or about December 28, 2022, as a

PCA (Nurse’s Assistant), making approximately $15.00 per hour. My employment ended

in approximately mid-May 2023.

2.During my training period with the employer, the trainer Ashley McCasland only spoke

to Caucasians. She gave less training time to the people of other races and colors and

didn’t train me on some topics at all. When I complained about the discrimination to my

Supervisors Tiffany Kunz, Elizabeth Slais, Human Resources, and the Chief Executive

Operator’s Secretary, I was suspended without pay starting on or about January 27, 2023.

The Respondent also failed to reasonably accommodate my disability. I was told by

Human Resources that I needed to find a new job within the company by May 15, 2023,

or I would be terminated.

3.1 believe I was denied a reasonable accommodation for my disability in violation of

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1994, as amended. I believe I was

subject to different terms and conditions of employment than those similarly situated than

I, suspended, laid off, denied a reasonable accommodation, and terminated in retaliation

for opposing discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; as

amended.

Plaintiff complains that after reporting Ashley McCasland’s purported discriminatory

conduct to Tiffany Kunz, as well as Human Resources Assistant Elizabeth Slais, she was demoted

and placed on leave without pay, as of January 27, 2023. Plaintiff claims that she was told that she

could interview for other jobs at Mercy Hospital, up through May 15, 2023; however, no one at

Mercy would hire her when she applied for other jobs. Plaintiff does not indicate what “other jobs”

at Mercy Hospital she applied for and why she was allegedly not hired for those jobs.

Plaintiff claims that she was later told by someone employed by Mercy Hospital that the

reason she was discharged was because she cussed oh the job. As noted in footnote 2, plaintiff

admits that she called other employees at Mercy Hospital Puerto Rican names during her

approximate one-month employment between December 22, 2022, and January 27, 2023.

Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) on September 25, 2023. Plaintiff indicated on the Charge that she was

discriminated against based on an alleged disability, and she claimed she was retaliated against.

As noted in footnote 3 above, plaintiff claimed that she was also denied a reasonable

accommodation by Mercy Hospital for her alleged disability and “subject to different terms and

conditions of employment.” However, plaintiff fails to indicate her disability in the complaint or

within her Charge of Discrimination. Moreover, plaintiff has also failed to articulate how she was

discriminated against in the terms and conditions of her employment.

Plaintiff asserted in her Charge of Discrimination that the discriminatory conduct occurred

between December 28, 2022, and May 15, 2023, on the date of the alleged termination from Mercy

Hospital. The EEOC sent plaintiff a Right to Sue Letter on June 26, 2024, giving her ninety (90)

days in which to file a lawsuit. Thus, plaintiffs lawsuit appears to be timely filed.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in this action.

Discussion

Upon initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds that plaintiff's complaint

sufficiently states a claim under Title VII for retaliatory discharge against defendant Mercy

Hospital but does not sufficiently state claims under the ADA for disability discrimination or

failure to accommodate plaintiff’s alleged disability. Additionally, plaintiff fails to properly allege

claims under Title VII for race and color discrimination, discrimination in the terms and conditions

of her employment and/or harassment/hostile work environment. As such, these claims are subject

to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A. ADA Claims

“The ADA bars private employers from discriminating against a qualified individual on

the basis of disability.” Faidley v. United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc., 889 F.3d 933, 940 (8" Cir.

2018). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, “an employee must show

that she (1) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) is a qualified individual under the

ADA, and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.” Hill v. Walker,

737 F.3d 1209, 1216 (8" Cir. 2013). See also Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 684

(8 Cir. 2003). To establish a disability, an ADA claimant must show a physical or mental

impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, a record of such impairment, and that the

claimant is regarded as having such impairment. Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481,

490-91 (8" Cir. 2002). Under the ADA, prohibited discrimination includes intentional

discrimination against a qualified individual because of her disability, which can be shown by

evidence of disparate treatment or other proof based on the specific facts of the case. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(a)-(b)(1); Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 152 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8 Cir. 1998).

Although plaintiff's Charge of Discrimination and complaint indicate she is suing under

the ADA, the only place in the complaint or Charge where plaintiff indicates she believes she has

a disability is the statement in her complaint where she states: “They fired me when I told them

Racel a white employee had fibermyalgia [sic] & they didn’t hire me & we had the same thing.”

Plaintiff's complaint lacks any other mention of a disability or allegation that she faced an

adverse employment action because defendants knew of her alleged disability or because she was

perceived as disabled. See Heisler v. Metropolitan Council, 339 F.3d 622, 626-27 (8" Cir. 2003)

(to state a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show, among other

things, that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA).

Plaintiff's complaint fails to provide supporting facts, such as whether her alleged

Fibromyalgia substantially impairs a major life activity, how it allegedly affected her work, who

at work allegedly knew of her disability, or who at work perceived her as disabled. As noted above,

this Court cannot assume facts that are not alleged. Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15. Furthermore,

plaintiff's pleading must do more than simply provide labels or recite the elements of a cause of

action. See Johnson y. Precythe, 901 F.3d 973, 977 (8" Cir. 2018) (stating that a “pleading must

offer more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

to state a plausible claim for relief”).

Even liberally construing the complaint, the Court finds that plaintiffs allegation of

disability discrimination and failure to accommodate her disability do not survive review under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As plaintiff has not stated an ADA claim for disability discrimination or

failure to accommodate her disability, all claims under the ADA will be dismissed. See Martin,

623 F.2d at 1286 (pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for

relief as a matter of law).

B. Title VII Claims

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate

against an individual because of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2. To state a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show either direct evidence of discrimination,

or evidence that is sufficient to create an inference of discrimination under the McDonnell

Douglas‘ burden shifting framework. Onyiah v. St. Cloud State University, 684 F.3d 711, 716 (8"

Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

To allege a race discrimination claim under Title VII, plaintiff must allege that she is a

member of the protected class, she was meeting the employer’s legitimate job expectations, she

suffered an adverse employment action and was treated differently than similarly situated

employees who were not members of her protected class. Jackman v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Dep’t. of

Corr. Servs., 728 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2013). Thus, not only must plaintiff articulate in her

complaint what her race and color is, how she was racially discriminated against, and how she

believes she was meeting the employer’s legitimate job expectations, but she should also articulate

how she believes she was treated differently than those who were not of her same race (or color)

but were not terminated or disciplined for acting similarly. Jd.

Plaintiff has failed to articulate her race or color, or that she was a member of the protected

class, thus, she cannot state a Title VII claim on this basis. As noted above, plaintiff indicates that

“ McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 □□

she called individuals in her workplace Puerto Rican names, but plaintiff has not alleged that she

was part of a protected racial group or that she suffered discrimination due to her color.

Moreover, plaintiff has failed to indicate in her Charge of Discrimination that she is

asserting race and color discrimination claims under Title VII. Thus, she cannot pursue those

claims in federal court. See Duncan v. Delta Consolidated Indus., Inc., 371 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th

Cir. 2004) (a plaintiff may only pursue claims in her complaint that are “like or reasonably related

to” claims in the Charge of Discrimination).° Similarly, plaintiff did not bring claims for hostile

work environment/harassment or discrimination in the terms or conditions of her employment in

her Charge of Discrimination.® Thus, she may also not pursue those claims in the present lawsuit.

Accordingly, plaintiff's claims for discrimination based on her race and color, as well as those

alleging discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment and/or harassment/hostile

work environment, are subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

“(T]he sweep of any subsequent judicial complaint may be as broad as the scope of the EEOC

‘investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’ ” Cobb v.

Stringer, 850 F.2d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 1988) quoting Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir.

1985). “Allegations outside the scope of the EEOC charge...circumscribe the EEOC’s investigatory and

conciliatory role, and for that reason are not allowed.” Kells v. Sinclair Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d

827, 836 (8th Cir. 2000).

Even if plaintiff had properly alleged a harassment/hostile work environment claim in the Charge of

Discrimination, she has failed to properly allege such a claim in her complaint. A hostile work

environment claim is a type of discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Mahler v. First

Dakota Title Ltd. P’ship, 931 F.3d 799, 806 (8th Cir. 2019). To state a prima facie claim, a plaintiff must

show that: “(1) she is a member of the class of people protected by the statute, (2) she was subject to

unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment resulted from her membership in the protected class, and (4)

the harassment was severe enough to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment.” Jd.

(quoting Blake v. MJ Optical, Inc., 870 F.3d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 2017)). Although plaintiff alleges that the

trainer failed to properly train those who were not Caucasian, she has not alleged that the trainer created a

hostile work environment for plaintiff. Moreover, although plaintiff complains that the “safety teacher”

was “rude & racist,” she does not indicate how this affected the terms and conditions of her employment

at Mercy Hospital during her one month on the job.

The Court will, however, issue process on plaintiff's claim for retaliatory discharge under

Title VII. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee

“because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this

subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in

an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she

engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a

causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 530 (8th Cir. 2007). In this case plaintiff asserts that she

complained to her supervisor Tiffany Kunz, as well as Human Resource Assistant Elizabeth Slais,

that trainer Ashley McCasland acted in a racially discriminatory manner during the nurse’s

assistant training. After her complaints she was demoted and placed on leave without pay. For the

purposes of initial review, the Court will issue process on plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim

under Title VII.

Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel. [ECF No. 3]. In civil cases, a pro se litigant

does not have a constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel. Ward v. Smith, 721 F.3d 940,

942 (8th Cir. 2013). See also Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that

“Ta] pro se litigant has no statutory or constitutional right to have counsel appointed in a civil

case”). Rather, a district court may appoint counsel in a civil case if the court is “convinced that

an indigent plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous claim . . . and where the nature of the litigation is

such that plaintiff as well as the court will benefit from the assistance of counsel.” Patterson v.

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Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2018). When determining whether to appoint counsel for an

indigent litigant, a court considers relevant factors such as the complexity of the case, the ability

of the self-represented litigant to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting testimony, and

the ability of the self-represented litigant to present his or her claim. Phillips v. Jasper Cty. Jail,

437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006).

After reviewing these factors, the Court finds that the appointment of counsel is not

warranted at this time. Plaintiff has demonstrated, at this point, that she can adequately present her

claims to the Court. Additionally, neither the factual nor the legal issues in this case appear □□□□

unduly complex.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

[ECF No. 2]. is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF

No. 3] is DENIED at this time.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs claims for race and color discrimination, as

well as discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment, brought pursuant to Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are DISMISSED without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs claims for harassment/hostile work

environment, brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are DISMISSED

without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's disability discrimination and failure to

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accommodate claims brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act are DISMISSED

without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to issue process or cause

process to issue on plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964. Defendant shall be served with summons by the U.S. Marshals Service at:

Mercy Hospital St. Louis, 615 S. New Ballas Road, St. Louis, Mo. 63141.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this Memorandum and Order would

not be taken in good faith.

An Order of Partial Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 18" day of July, 2024.

vl heet

ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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