The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JADA DAVIS-BEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) Case No. 4:23-cv-1049-SEP
)
MARGIE REYNOLDS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff Jada Davis-Bey’s Complaint, Doc. [1], and Motion to
Amend Complaint and Reply to Court Order, Doc. [10]. For the reasons set forth below, the
case is dismissed.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Plaintiff in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case alleges violations of her civil rights while
incarcerated at the St. Louis City Justice Center by the Justice Center and Correctional Officer
(CO) Margie Reynolds. CO Reynolds is sued in both her individual and official capacities.
The Complaint consists of several handwritten pages attached to the Court’s § 1983
complaint form, and it is difficult to discern the nature of Plaintiff’s claims. See Doc. [1].
Plaintiff first alleges that the sink and toilet in her cell became clogged on June 25, 2023, and the
Justice Center staff ignored her maintenance requests until July 3rd. Id. at 12. The Complaint
does not allege to whom Plaintiff complained. Plaintiff also states that she would “remove the
clear water to keep the sink from filling up,” so it is not clear if Plaintiff’s sink was completely
clogged during this time or if it was simply draining slowly. Id. When the maintenance man
came to fix the sink and toilet, Plaintiff alleges that she watched the “clear toilet water turn
brown” and her sink water began to smell like toilet water. Id. Plaintiff was moved to a new cell
on or about July 13, 2023. Id.
Plaintiff claims that during some portion of the time between June 25th and July 13th, she
had to drink sewer water because of the plumbing issues. Although Plaintiff alleges that the
water coming from the faucet in her cell smelled like sewer water during that period, she does
not allege that the sink was actually clogged and unable to provide drinking water the whole
time. Plaintiff’s claim appears to be that the water in the Justice Center was not potable because
it smelled. She speculates that even after moving to a new cell, she might have been drinking
non-potable water as late as July 31, 2023. Id. at 13. And Plaintiff claims to have suffered
abdominal pain, shaking, lightheadedness, gastrointestinal distress, nightmares, and muscle
spasms as a result of drinking the allegedly contaminated water. Id. at 12-13.
Plaintiff claims that the Justice Center failed to supervise their employees and “maintain
a proper and clean water supply and water system.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff claims Defendant
Reynolds intentionally inflicted emotional distress by refusing to “smell [Plaintiff’s] cup of
sewer water” and failing to call maintenance to fix her sink. Id. at 14. During the relevant time,
Reynolds worked in Plaintiff’s pod “for about five days straight,” and Plaintiff claims Reynolds
denied her recreation time during that period. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that she was written up by Defendant Reynolds for kicking her cell door,
trying to incite a riot, and calling Reynolds a “b***h.” Id. at 7. She alleges that Reynolds
denied her the ability to get water from the fountain near her cell on July 4th and 5th. Id. at 13.
And Plaintiff blames Reynolds for failing to call maintenance to fix her sink promptly and
provide her with bottled water, but she does not indicate what dates Reynolds was working when
her water supply was clogged. Id.
On November 9, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show that she had properly
exhausted her administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit. Doc. [9]. Plaintiff indicated in
the Complaint that she had not filed an Informal Resolution Request (IRR) form or grievance
relating to her allegations in the Complaint, stating that staff did not provide her with a form
despite being aware of the conditions of the water in her cell. Doc. [1] at 6, 7. Plaintiff
responded on November 29, 2023, with a filing titled, “Motion to Amend Complaint and Reply
to Court Order and Motion for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Against the
State Court Proceedings, On the Ground that Missouri Laws Are Being Unconstitutionally
Applied by the State Court So As To Cause Plaintiff Great and Irreparable and Immediate
Injury.” Doc. [10] (hereinafter, “Response”). Plaintiff also filed supplemental documents on
December 7th and 11th. Docs. [11], [12]. The second supplemental document contains a copy of
an IRR dated November 20, 2023, relating to issues raised in this case, along with a response
indicating that the IRR was “not actionable” because it was untimely. Doc. [12] at 1, 2.
In Plaintiff’s Response, she argues the case should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust
her administrative remedies because: (1) she “suffered irreparable injury” and “is still in
immediate harm,” (2) she informed various staff members that her ailments resulting from
ingesting alleged sewer water, (3) staff members were aware of the “dirty water,” refused to
drink it themselves, and failed to act to remedy the situation, and (4) she was not made aware of
possible next steps to remedy the situation by facility staff. Doc. [10].
LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. An action “is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The court must assume the veracity of
well-pled facts but need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Courts must liberally construe complaints filed by pro se litigants, Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976), which means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible,” a court
should “construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered
within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even self-represented
“complaint[s] must allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v.
Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts are not required to “assume facts
that are not alleged,” Stone, 364 F.3d at 915, nor are they required to interpret procedural rules to
“excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S.
106, 113 (1993).
DISCUSSION
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), “[n]o action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is required “even
though relief of the sort that the plaintiff is seeking is not available through the administrative
procedures that are available.” Lyon v. Vande Krol, 305 F.3d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737-41 (2001)). Although “inmates are not required to
specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints,” a court may dismiss a complaint
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies if it is plain on the face of the complaint that a
grievance procedure has not been exhausted. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215-16 (2007); see
also ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 728 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2013). “[A]n
inmate must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court.” Johnson v.
Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003). “If exhaustion was not completed at the time of filing,
dismissal is mandatory.” Id.
Plaintiff had not exhausted her administrative remedies at the time of filing. In the
Complaint, Plaintiff checked a box indicating that she did not file a grievance “concerning the
facts relating to this complaint.” Doc. [1] at 6. On the next page, she stated, “No I did not file a
grievance.” Id. at 7. And in response to the Court’s order to show cause, she attached an IRR
she filed on November 20, 2023—long after this lawsuit was filed. Doc. [10-1]. She later filed a
copy of the IRR response, dated November 27, 2023, explaining that the IRR was not
“actionable” because it was not “filed 10 days from the day of the alleged incident.” Doc. [12].
There is no indication that Plaintiff filed a grievance or grievance appeal of the denial of her
IRR. Plaintiff’s belated attempt to satisfy the requirement after filing her Complaint is
insufficient. See Johnson, 340 F.3d at 627.
There is also no basis for excusing Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the administrative
remedies. “A prisoner need not exhaust remedies if they are not ‘available.’” Ross v. Blake, 578
U.S. 632, 636 (2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). A remedy is unavailable “(1) when the
procedure ‘operates as a simple dead end’; (2) when the administrative scheme is ‘so opaque that
it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use’; and (3) when prison administrators
deliberately thwart prisoner attempts to use the process.” Smith v. Andrews, 75 F.4th 805, 808
(8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at 643-44). “An inmate’s subjective belief that the
procedures were not applicable to medical grievances ‘does not matter’ and is not
determinative.” Gibson v. Weber, 431 F.3d 339, 341 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lyon, 305 F.3d at
809).
Plaintiff has not alleged any nonconclusory facts suggesting that administrative remedies
were not available. In the Complaint, Plaintiff states that she did not file a grievance because
“caseworker Jones did not provide [her] with an I.R.R. form”; that Defendant Reynolds “told Lt.
Hughes to leave the Pod when [she] tried to talk to her the next day to ask for a I.R.R. form”; and
that Lieutenants Hughes, Waate, and Williams did not bring her an IRR form. Doc. [1] at 7. In
the next paragraph, however, she admits that she talked to Caseworker Jones, Lt. Waate, and Mr.
Steve Brock about the problems she was having with the water and plumbing. Id. Similarly, on
the late IRR form, Plaintiff states, “No caseworker or correctional officer informed Ms. Davis-
Bey that she could file a I.R.R. about the sewer water, stopped up sink or toilet.” Doc. [12] at 2.
She also clarifies that Defendant Reynolds “shooed Lt. Erica Hughes out of the 3-D Pod on 7-4-
2023 which prevented [Plaintiff] from telling Lt. Hughes about the sewer smelling water.” Id.
Plaintiff does not claim that she requested an IRR form and was denied, or that Justice Center
administrators “thwart[ed] [her] from taking advantage of a grievance process through
machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 644.
Plaintiff’s responses to the Court’s order to show cause also fail show that administrative
remedies were unavailable. She argues that she is “still in immediate harm.” Doc. [10] at 1. If
Plaintiff still has a problem with the water in her cell, she is free to use the Justice Center’s
administrative process to address that current issue. But she cannot now file IRRs or grievances
to satisfy the exhaustion requirement for issues already presented in this case. Second, she
argues that she did inform Justice Center employees about the problems and many of them
already knew that the water and plumbing in the Justice Center were deficient. Id. at 1-2. That
does not excuse her failure to use the administrative procedures or render those procedures
unavailable; “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 84 (2006). Third, and most compellingly, Plaintiff argues claims that “no other steps
were held out.” Id. at 2. Liberally construed, Plaintiff could be understood as arguing that she
was never informed of the grievance procedure and did not know that it existed. But that claim
is undermined later in her Response when she claims to have filed at least two other IRRs around
July 5, 2023, related to a different incident. /d. at 3. Plaintiff has not shown that administrative
procedures were unavailable to her, and her “subjective beliefs, logical or otherwise, are
irrelevant in determining whether administrative procedures are available.” Baker v. Boyle, 327
F. App’x 680 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000)).
Based on the facts alleged in the Complaint and Plaintiff's supplemental filings, she has
not shown that she asked staff members for an IRR form and was denied or that she was
thwarted from using the grievance system at the St. Lous City Justice Center. Plaintiff's
admission that she filed IRRs in July of 2023 and again in November of 2023 shows that she was
aware of the prison’s administrative remedies and was able to use them. Because she did not use
those procedures to address the issues raised in the Complaint before filing this action, her
lawsuit has to be dismissed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing
this suit.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint, Doc.
[10], is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Doc. [13],
is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that an appeal of this action would not be taken in good
faith.
A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 19th day of July, 2024.
High.
SARAH E. PITLYK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE