Hickman v. Blair Logistics LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

BLAKE HICKMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:24-CV-00085-SNLJ

)

BLAIR LOGISTICS, LLC, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case comes before the Court on a Motion to Remand to the Circuit Court of

Scott County, Missouri [Doc. 30], filed by plaintiff.

I. Background

Plaintiff Blake Hickman filed a petition for damages on March 28, 2024 in the

Circuit Court of Scott County, Missouri against defendants Blair Logistics, LLC

(“Blair”), Gregory Williams, and Midwest Truck Sales and Service, Inc. (“Midwest”).

Plaintiff alleges the following: on September 14, 2023, defendant Midwest sent a

technician to respond to a service request on a freightliner owned by defendant Blair that

had been having mechanical problems. While the Midwest technician was on site to

service the freightliner, defendant Williams, on behalf of Blair, began driving the

freightliner southbound on Interstate 55. Thereafter, Williams collided the freightliner

with plaintiff’s Jeep Wrangler on Interstate 55 in Scott County, Missouri, causing

plaintiff damages. Plaintiff alleges that all three defendants are liable for plaintiff’s

damages due to their negligence. [Doc. 1-1.]

On May 2, 2024, defendant Blair filed a notice of removal with this Court, arguing

that the Eastern District of Missouri has subject matter jurisdiction over this case based

on diversity of citizenship. [Doc. 1.] In order for such jurisdiction to exist, there must be

“complete diversity” between the parties, meaning that no plaintiff is a citizen of the

same state as any of the defendants. M & B Oil, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 66 F.4th

1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). In the present case, the parties’

states of citizenship are not in dispute. Plaintiff Hickman is a citizen of Missouri,

defendant Blair is a citizen of Alabama and Nevada, defendant Williams is a citizen of

Mississippi, and defendant Midwest is a citizen of Missouri. [Doc. 1 at 2]; [Doc. 1-1 at

1–2.] At first glance, it appears clear that diversity of citizenship is not satisfied, because

plaintiff Hickman and defendant Midwest are both citizens of Missouri. However,

defendant Blair in its notice of removal argues that defendant Midwest was fraudulently

joined to this claim and Midwest’s citizenship should accordingly be disregarded. [Doc.

1 at 2–5.] If Midwest’s citizenship is disregarded, complete diversity exists between the

parties. Plaintiff filed the present motion to remand arguing Midwest’s citizenship

should not be disregarded, that complete diversity does not exist in this case, and that

accordingly this Court has no jurisdiction to hear this claim.

II. Analysis

“Joinder is fraudulent and removal is proper when there exists no reasonable basis

in fact and law supporting a claim against the resident defendants.” Wiles v. Capitol

Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 724

F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1983)). “Joinder is not fraudulent if state law might impose liability

on the resident defendant under the facts alleged.” Halsey v. Townsend Corp., 20 F.4th

1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir.

2003)). “The removing party alleging fraudulent joinder bears the burden of proving the

alleged fraud.” Seoul Taco Holdings v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 4:20-cv-1249-RLW,

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 236461, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2020) (citing Manning v. Wal-

Mart Stores East, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148 (E.D. Mo. 2004)); cf. Altimore v.

Mount Mercy College, 420 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the party

removing to federal court “bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a

preponderance of the evidence”).

As the present question is jurisdictional, it is not the job of this Court currently to

evaluate the merits of plaintiff’s claim. This Court’s task at this time “is limited to

determining whether there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the state law

might impose liability based upon the facts involved. In making such a prediction, the

district court should resolve all facts and ambiguities in the current controlling

substantive law in the plaintiff’s favor.” Filla, 336 F.3d at 811.

“To prove a claim of negligence under Missouri law, ‘a plaintiff must establish

that the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, the defendant failed to

perform that duty, and the defendant’s failure proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.’”

Brown v. Davis, 813 F.3d 1130, 1136 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lesch v. United States, 612

F.3d 975, 981 (8th Cir. 2010)). In his complaint, plaintiff explicitly alleges that

defendant Midwest owed him a duty of care, Midwest breached that duty of care, and

plaintiff suffered injury because of that breach. [Doc. 1-1 at 4–5.]

Defendants offer a number of unconvincing arguments to support their claim of

fraudulent joinder. First, defendant Blair claims that Midwest owed plaintiff no duty of

care because:

the Petition does not state that Defendant Blair made a service request to

Defendant Midwest. It does not state that Midwest sent a technician to

repair a Blair truck, nor does it state that Midwest’s technician examined

the Blair truck and/or knew or could have known of its dangerous

condition.

[Doc. 33 at 2.] This assertion is flatly contradicted by the record. Plaintiff’s complaint

specifically states that “[i]n response to a service request, Midwest sent a technician out

to work on the [Blair] vehicle,” and “Midwest’s field technician had advised Williams

that the vehicle should not be driven on the roadway until he had performed additional

work.” [Doc. 1-1 at 2–3.] (emphasis added). Blair’s argument in this regard fails.

Next, both defendants contend that Midwest owed plaintiff no duty of care

because it was not foreseeable that Midwest’s conduct would lead to plaintiff’s injuries.

[Doc. 33 at 4]; [Doc. 34 at 5–6.] Defendants are correct that foreseeability is a

requirement in that Missouri law holds that “[a] duty arises when ‘there is a foreseeable

likelihood that particular acts or omissions will cause harm or injury.’” Lafarge N. Am.,

Inc. v. Discovery Group L.L.C., 574 F.3d 973, 984 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Smith v.

Dewitt & Assocs., 279 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)); see Madden v. C & K

Barbecue Carryout, 758 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Mo. banc 1988) (“The touchstone for the

creation of a duty is foreseeability. A duty of care arises out of circumstances in which

there is a foreseeable likelihood that particular acts or omissions will cause harm or

injury.”).

However, defendants have not demonstrated that plaintiff’s injuries were not the

foreseeable consequence of Midwest’s alleged conduct. According to plaintiff, “Midwest

sent a technician out to work on [Blair’s] vehicle,” and the technician “failed to bring

adequate tools so as to promptly repair the vehicle” and “failed to tow the vehicle from

the scene to prevent a disabled vehicle from becoming a hazard to the traveling public.”

[Doc. 1-1 at 4–5.] The complaint also contains the two incompatible assertions that the

technician “had advised Williams that the vehicle should not be driven” and “in the

alternative, Midwest’s technician failed to advise Williams that he should not operate the

vehicle…” Id. at 3–4. The latter assertion, if proven, is conceivably evidence of

foreseeability—that the failure to warn against driving the vehicle could lead to an

accident. Whether or not the warning was given is a factual matter outside the scope of

this analysis. It is enough for the present matter to note that there is a possibility that the

fact finder could find that Midwest’s technician failed to warn Williams that the truck

was disabled.

From this, there is “arguably a reasonable basis,” Filla, 336 F.3d at 811, to

conclude that Midwest’s technician had “‘knowledge of a dangerous condition, which

imperil[ed] the plaintiff’”—namely the presence of a disabled vehicle on Interstate 55—

and the technician’s alleged failures created a “foreseeable likelihood that [such failures

would] cause harm or injury” to a third party, Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 311 (quoting Reed,

693 S.W.2d at 282). For this reason, defendants’ foreseeability argument fails as well.

Additionally, both Blair and Midwest variously claim that Midwest owed plaintiff

no duty of care because there existed no agreement between Midwest and Blair to repair

Blair’s truck, and even if an agreement did exist, plaintiff was not a party to it. [Doc. 33

at 1–2]; [Doc. 34 at 3–4.] This argument fails on its face because it rests on the faulty

assumption that privity between parties is necessary for a duty of care to arise. “In such

cases [where there is a foreseeable likelihood that particular acts or omissions will cause

harm or injury], duty does not arise out of any ‘special relationship’ between the parties,

but rather arises ‘out of the defendant’s knowledge of a dangerous condition, which

imperils the plaintiff…’” Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)

(emphasis added) (quoting Reed v. Hercules Constr. Co., 693 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Mo. Ct.

App. 1985)). That duty of care can extend to third parties: “[w]hen a defendant

undertakes an activity that the defendant knows can affect the safety of third persons, the

defendant has a duty of care to those third persons ‘to act in such a way that they will not

be injured.’” A.O.A. v. Rennert, 350 F. Supp. 818, 844 (E.D. Mo. 2018) (quoting

Wolfmeyer v. Otis Elevator Co., 262 S.W.2d 18, 22 (Mo. 1953)). As noted, there is

“arguably a reasonable basis” to conclude that plaintiff’s injuries were the foreseeable

consequence of Midwest’s conduct. Filla, 336 F.3d at 811. Defendants’ argument

accordingly fails.

Defendants finally claim that joinder was fraudulent because Midwest’s conduct

was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. [Doc. 33 at 5]; [Doc. 34 at 6–7.]

Under Missouri law, “[t]o establish proximate cause…[i]t is enough that [defendant’s]

negligence was a ‘substantial factor’ in producing [plaintiff’s] injuries, and [plaintiff’s]

negligence need not be the sole proximate cause.” Morrow v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 541

F.2d 713, 718 (8th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting

Ricketts v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 484 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Mo. banc 1972)). Once

again, the task of this Court “is limited to determining whether there is arguably a

reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability based upon the

facts involved,” Filla, 336 F.3d at 811 (emphases added), and it is the removing party’s

burden to prove otherwise, Seoul Taco Holdings, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 236461, at *3.

Defendants have not met that burden. It is at least arguable from the facts alleged that

Midwest’s technician’s actions were a “‘substantial factor’ in producing [plaintiffs]

injuries.” Morrow, 541 F.2d at 718 (quoting Ricketts, 484 S.W.2d at 222).

iI. Conclusion

Having found that there is arguably a reasonable basis upon which a Missouri

court might find that defendant Midwest owed a duty of care to plaintiff, breached that

duty, and proximately caused plaintiffs injuries, this Court concludes that Midwest was

not fraudulently joined to this action as a party defendant.

Accordingly, there is not complete diversity between plaintiff and defendants, and

this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Remand, [Doc. 30], is

GRANTED, and this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Scott County,

Missouri.

Dated this 8th day of August, 2024.

/ hot ca oh

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE