Wertz v. Mercy Health

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

THOMAS WERTZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:23-CV-00579-NCC

)

)

MERCY HEALTH and MHM SUPPORT )

SERVICES, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Mercy Health’s and MHM Support Services’

(collectively “Mercy” or “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19), Memorandum

in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21), and Defendants’ Statement

of Uncontroverted Material Facts (Doc. 20), to which Plaintiff filed a pro se Response1 (Doc. 27)

and Suggestions in Support of his Response (Doc. 28), and Defendants’ filed a Reply (Doc. 29).

Plaintiff also filed, without leave, a surreply2 (Doc. 30). The parties have consented to the

jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §

636(c) (Doc. 16). For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

19) will be GRANTED.

1 Plaintiff was initially represented by retained counsel who withdrew after Defendants filed their Motion for

Summary Judgment. See Doc. 23. After the expiration of time provided for Plaintiff to hire a new attorney,

Plaintiff elected to represent himself. See Docs. 24, 25, and 26.

2 Plaintiff filed a sur-reply without seeking leave of Court. See Doc. 30. According to Local Rule 4.01(C), after the

moving party files a reply to a memorandum in opposition to a motion, “[a]dditional memoranda may be filed by

either party only with leave of Court” (emphasis added). The Court reviewed the sur-reply but found it irrelevant

to the determination of the issues at hand.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 19, 2023, the Court held a Rule 16 conference and entered a Case Management

Order (Doc. 18) limiting this matter to the threshold issue of Defendants’ potential status as an

exempt religious organization. The Court determined it would then reach the merits if this issue

is not fully dispositive of the claims (id.).

The Court must first address which facts are before it for the purpose of summary

judgment. To support their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants filed a Statement of

Uncontroverted Material Facts making specific references to the exhibits attached to the

statement. See Doc. 20. Plaintiff fails, in his two responsive documents, to properly controvert

most of Defendants’ statements of fact. See Docs. 27 and 28.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1) demands that a party asserting that a fact is

genuinely disputed must support their assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). The moving party’s

Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts “are deemed admitted if the opposing party does not

controvert those facts with specific references to the record as required by Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1).” Ashley v. McKinney, No. 4:19-cv-00309-MTS, 2021 WL 1198066, at *1 (E.D. Mo.

Mar. 29, 2021). Local Rule 4.01(E), sets forth the same premise: a movant’s facts are deemed

admitted if not specifically controverted by the party opposing the motion. See L.R. 4.01(E).

While the Court construes Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, “[e]ven pro se litigants must

comply with court rules and directives.” Soliman v. Johanns, 412 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005);

see also Schooley v. Kennedy, 712 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“Although pro se

pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with

relevant rules of the procedural and substantive law.”).

Plaintiff’s responses articulate reasons he disagrees with Defendants’ assertions, but they

lack factual support or any specific references to the record. See Docs. 27, 28. In accordance

with the Federal and Local Rules, the facts contained in Defendants’ Statement of

Uncontroverted Facts (Doc. 20) are deemed admitted by Plaintiff for the purpose of ruling on

this motion. Despite this, summary judgment is not automatically granted in Defendants’ favor,

the undisputed “facts still must establish that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” in

order for the Court to grant Defendants’ motion. Davis v. Webb, No. 4:11-CV-1906-JAR, 2014

WL 1314938, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 2014).

Accordingly, the Court sets out the undisputed material facts below.

II. FACTS

A. Mercy’s Status as a Religious Organization

Mercy3 was founded by the Sisters of Mercy, a Roman Catholic religious order of nuns

(Doc. 20 ¶ 1). Mercy Health Ministries is a public juridic personality of the Roman Catholic

Church, organized under the Catholic Church’s Canon law (id. ¶ 2). Mercy Health Ministries is

3Defendants, throughout their Motion documents (Docs. 19, 20, 21) generally refer to both Mercy Health and MHM

Support Services collectively as “Mercy” or “Defendants,” although sometimes refer to each separately. In

Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff identifies Mercy Health as the owner and operator of Mercy Tech, where Plaintiff

worked (Doc. 1 at 3). Plaintiff identifies MHM Support Services as an “employer” who paid Plaintiff wages for the

work he performed at Mercy Tech (id. at 4). Plaintiff further alleges that as an employee of MHM Support Services,

he was required to follow the policies, procedures, and regulations established by Mercy Health while working at

Mercy Tech (id.). Plaintiff also alleges that discovery will show that “Defendants are a single employer or

integrated enterprise, or a joint employer regarding Plaintiff’s employment at Mercy Tech” (id.).

In Defendants’ Answer, they assert that Mercy Health was not Plaintiff’s employer, MHM Support

Services was, and that its use of the term “Defendant” or “Mercy” refers to MHM Support Services and any other

related entity found to have employed Plaintiff (Doc. 13 at 1 n.1). Additionally, Plaintiff named only “Mercy

Health” in his Charge of Discrimination and did not file a Charge naming MHM Support Services (Doc. 1-1). In

light of this, it appears that any claims against MHM Support Services are barred for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies, but Defendants did not move to Dismiss MHM Support Services on this basis. The parties

have not parsed out separate or particular roles or liabilities between the two Defendants and those distinctions

appear to be immaterial to the ultimate outcome.

an entity for Canon law purposes only and was formed in accordance with the Canonical

Statutes; it is not incorporated under the civil laws of any state (id. ¶ 3). Mercy Health is the

civil legal entity created and organized under Missouri law, through which Mercy Health

Ministries and the Catholic Church perform their healthcare services and mission work (id. ¶ 4).

Mercy Health, Mercy Health Ministries, and all of Mercy Health’s other wholly-owned

subsidiaries are listed in the Official Catholic Directory, can own property in the name of the

Catholic Church, and according to the IRS, are religious non-profit organizations (id. ¶ 6).

Mercy Health’s Board of Directors consists of four nuns from the religious order of the Sisters of

Mercy and is accountable to the Vatican Dicastery of the Congregation for the Institutes of

Consecrated Life and Societies of Apostolic Life (id. ¶ 7).

Mercy Health’s mission statement provides, “As the Sisters of Mercy before us, we bring

to life the healing ministry of Jesus through our compassionate care and exceptional service” (id.

¶ 5). Mercy Health’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws identify its purpose as continuing the

healing acts of Jesus Christ in accordance with the doctrines and tenets of the Catholic Church

(id. ¶ 8). Mercy follows the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services

promulgated by the United States Conference of Bishops (id. ¶ 9). At Mercy, prayer is

communicated over the public address system at least once per day and the workplace is adorned

with religious imagery (id. ¶ 10).

MHM Support Services is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mercy Health (id. ¶ 11).

According to MHM Support Services’ Bylaws, its purpose is “to witness to Christ’s concern for

the care of the sick and injured and the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church regarding

Christian health services and charity . . . .” (id. ¶ 12). Additionally, MHM Support Services was

organized “[t]o perform activities related to the provision of health services under the

sponsorship of MHM,” or Mercy Health Ministry, “the pontifical public juridic person granted

juridic personality by decree of the Congregation for Institutes of Consecrated Life and Societies

of Apostolic Life, dated May 15, 2008 . . . . .” (id. ¶ 13). MHM Support Services is listed in the

Official Catholic Directory (id. ¶ 14).

B. Plaintiff’s Employment and Termination

Plaintiff worked for Mercy as a Vendor Management Office manager (Doc. 20 ¶ 16).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Mercy Health and other Mercy subsidiaries and entities

instituted a COVID-19 Vaccination Policy, which required all employees to receive a COVID-19

vaccine unless they requested, and were approved for, a religious or medical exemption from the

mandatory policy (id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff submitted a religious exemption request based on his

Catholic religious belief (id. ¶ 18). Plaintiff’s request was denied, he did not get vaccinated, and

he was terminated on October 28, 2021 (id. ¶ 19).

On an unknown date, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Missouri Commission on

Human Rights (“MCHR”) (see id. ¶ 22). On July 17, 2023, the MCHR issued a Notice of

Termination of Proceedings, and dismissed Plaintiff’s Charge on the basis that it lacked

jurisdiction because Mercy and all of its wholly-owned subsidiaries and affiliates are “owned

and operated by a religious organization” (id. ¶ 15). The MCHR has dismissed numerous

discrimination charges against Mercy on this basis, including Plaintiff’s (id.).

On May 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC naming

Mercy Health as the Respondent (id. ¶ 21, Doc. 1 ¶ 53). An attachment to Plaintiff’s Complaint,

however, reflects that Plaintiff filed his Charge on August 23, 2022 (Doc. 1-1 at 3). On January

31, 2023, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue, which Plaintiff claims he received

on February 6, 2023 (Doc. 1 ¶ 55).

C. Plaintiff’s Complaint

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges religious discrimination under Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and in

Count II, Plaintiff alleges retaliation under Title VII U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and seeks actual,

compensatory, and punitive damages, costs, attorney’s fees, interest, and all other available legal

and equitable relief (Doc. 1 at 8-10).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court may grant a motion for

summary judgment if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The burden is on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op. Inc.,

838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). Once the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine

issue of material fact, the “opponent must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth affirmative evidence and

specific facts by affidavit and other evidence showing a genuine factual dispute that must be

resolved at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at

324. “[A] dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ only ‘if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Herring v. Canada Life Assur.

Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

Furthermore, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences must

be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,

409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005). The evidence is not weighed, and no credibility

determinations are made. Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2008).

IV. ANALYSIS

In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims fail as a

matter of law because he did not timely file a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, and even

if he did, the claims still fail because Defendants are exempt from religious discrimination and

retaliation liability under Title VII (Doc. 19 at 2). Contrarily, Plaintiff asserts that his EEOC

claims were timely because they were subject to the 300-day deadline as a result of his filing a

complaint with a State agency, the MCHR (Doc. 27 at 2). Plaintiff also argues that a fact-

specific inquiry is necessary to determine whether Defendants are exempt from liability under

Title VII (id. at 2-3).

A. Timeliness of EEOC Claims

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims are barred because he failed to file his Charge of

Discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the unlawful employment practice, and

Plaintiff, therefore, failed to exhaust his administrative remedies (Doc. 21 at 3-4). Plaintiff both

alleges and admits that his employment was terminated on October 28, 2021, and that he filed his

charge of discrimination on May 12, 2022 (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 6, 51, 53, Doc. 28 at 1), equating to a

span of 196 days between termination and filing.4 Plaintiff asserts that he had 300 days to file

his charge under the relevant statute, as a result of filing a claim with a state agency (Doc. 27 at

2). Defendants disagree however, arguing that the 300-day filing deadline applies when a Fair

Employment Practices (“FEP”) agency, such as the MCHR, has authority to investigate the

discrimination charge (Doc. 21 at 5). In this case, however, where the State FEP agency does

not have the authority to investigate the discrimination charge and the state anti-discrimination

4 Defendants argue and the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s own copy of the Charge filed with the EEOC contains a

claim date of August 25, 2022, which Defendants assert equates to a filing date of 299 days post-termination, but by

the Court’s calculation, equates to 301 days post-termination (Doc. 1-1 at 3).

statute does not provide protection from the discrimination alleged, then the 180-day filing

deadline applies (id.). Defendants assert that the MCHR does not have the authority or the

jurisdiction to grant or seek relief on behalf of Plaintiff and against Defendants because Mercy is

a religious organization owned and/or operated by the Catholic Church (id. at 6). As a religious

organization, Defendants assert they are exempt from the definition of employer under the

MHRA, that the MCHR consistently determines that it lacks jurisdiction over discrimination

charges filed against Mercy and did so with regard to Plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination

specifically, and therefore Plaintiff was subject to the 180-day filing deadline (id.).

Title VII requires “that an employee complaining of discrimination follow administrative

procedures before filing a lawsuit in federal court,” including “filing a charge of discrimination

with the EEOC within 180 days of an allegedly unlawful employment practice.” Kirklin v.

Joshen Paper & Packaging of Ark. Co., 911 F.3d 530, 534 (8th Cir. 2018). Exhaustion of

administrative remedies is considered central to the Title VII statutory scheme. Williams v. Little

Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994). The exhaustion requirement exists to

provide “the EEOC the first opportunity to investigate discriminatory practices and enables it to

perform its roles of obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliatory efforts.” Id. An

individual must meet two requirements to exhaust administrative remedies: “(1) timely file a

charge of discrimination with the EEOC setting forth the facts and nature of the charge and (2)

receive notice of the right to sue.” Id. citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (c), (e). “Failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that a defendant must prove.” Kirklin, 911 F.3d

at 534 citing Miles v. Bellfontaine Habilitation Ctr., 481 F.3d 1106, 1107 (8th Cir. 2007) (per

curiam).

More specifically, “Title VII requires that before a plaintiff can bring suit in court to

allege unlawful discrimination, [he] must file a timely charge with the EEOC or a state or local

agency with authority to seek relief.” Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 850

(8th Cir. 2012), citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536

U.S. 101, 109 (2002); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); Williams, 21

F.3d at 222. The statute provides:

A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days

after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge

(including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment

practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made

within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment

practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted

proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief

from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon

receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the

person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful

employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the

State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law,

whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission

with the State or local agency.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (emphases added). In other words, a claimant must file a charge

of discrimination within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act, unless the claimant has first

begun proceedings with a State agency with authority to grant relief, and in that case, a claimant

has 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred to file the charge with the

EEOC. See id.

Under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(a), the EEOC may designate state and local agencies as “FEP

agencies.” See MacDonald v. Grace Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006). The

MCHR is designated by the EEOC as an FEP agency without any exceptions. 29 C.F.R. §

1601.74(a). Under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), however, the term “employer,”

specifically excludes “corporations and associations owned or operated by religious or sectarian

organizations.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.010(8). In other words, such corporations are “not subject

to the employment discrimination provisions set forth in Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.055.” Wirth v.

College of the Ozarks, 26 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1187 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 26, 1998).

“The EEOC’s regulations provide that the 180-day time limit applies if the State or local

agency FEP agency lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a charge.” MacDonald, 457 F.3d at

1082. The EEOC’s regulations specifically state:

A jurisdiction having a FEP agency without subject matter jurisdiction over a

charge (e.g., an agency which does not cover sex discrimination or does not cover

nonprofit organizations) is equivalent to a jurisdiction having no FEP agency.

Charges over which a FEP agency has no subject matter jurisdiction are filed with

the Commission upon receipt and are timely filed if received by the Commission

within 180 days from the date of the alleged violation.

29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(2) (emphases added).

It is undisputed that on July 17, 2023, the MCHR issued a Notice of Termination of

Proceedings to Plaintiff’s Charge, dismissing his Charge and stating that it lacked jurisdiction

because Mercy was owned and operated by a religious organization (Doc. 20 at ¶ 22). The 180-

day deadline, and not the 300-day deadline applies in this case because the MCHR did not have

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. See MacDonald, 457 F.3d at 1088 (finding that the relevant

FEP did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s charges and therefore the 180-

day time limit applied).

Assuming Plaintiff filed his Charge with the EEOC on May 12, 2022 (and not August 25,

2022, as his own evidence suggests), he failed to meet the 180-day filing deadline, and

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Kirklin, 911 F.3d at 534 (it

is proper for a district court to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant when plaintiff files

a charge with the EEOC out of time and therefore fails to exhaust administrative remedies).

Furthermore, even if the Court determined that Plaintiff’s claims were timely filed,

Defendants are still entitled to summary judgment because they are exempted from Title VII

religious discrimination liability as a religious organization.

B. Religious Exemption

Defendants assert that even if Plaintiff had timely filed his discrimination charge,

Defendants are still entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims because Mercy is a

religious organization exempt from Title VII’s prohibitions against religious discrimination and

retaliation (Docs. 19 at 2; 21 at 7-15). Plaintiff responds that the previous cases determining

Mercy’s status as a religious organization do not directly address the facts currently before the

Court and a fact-specific inquiry and examination are necessary (Doc. 27 at 2, 3). Based on

precedent as well as the facts currently before it, the Court agrees that Defendants are exempt

from religious discrimination and retaliation claims, and Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law.

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for any employer “to . . . discharge any individual, or

otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A qualifying “religious organization,” however, is exempt from

claims of religious discrimination. Jacobs v. Mercy Health, No. 4:22-cv-01204-AGF, 2024 WL

894861, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 1, 2024). “To ‘minimize governmental interference with the

decision-making process in religions,’ Congress amended Title VII to exempt a qualifying

‘religious organization’ from claims of religious discrimination ‘with respect to the employment

of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on’ by such

organizations.” Id. quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). If “an entity is determined to be a ‘religious

organization,’ courts do not inquire into the organization’s justifications behind its employment

decisions.” Jacobs, 2024 WL 894861, at *4 quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue,

490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).

Title VII does not define “religious entity,” resulting in courts considering “a variety of

factors when analyzing whether an employer falls within the scope of the § 2000e-1(a)

exemption.” Conway v. Mercy Hosp. St. Louis, No. 4:22-CV-1113 RLW, 2024 WL 551892, at

*3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 2024) (quoting Boydston v. Mercy Hosp. Ardmore, Inc., No. CIV-18-444-

G, 2020 WL 1448112, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 25, 2020). Although the Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals has not yet established guidance for determining whether an entity is a religious

organization under Title VII, “this district and several others have relied on the Third Circuit’s

approach in LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center Association, 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d

Cir. 2007).” Jacobs, 2024 WL 894861 at *4. In LeBoon, the Third Circuit utilized nine factors

to determine whether an entity is a religious organization under the statute’s exemption:

(1) whether the entity operates for a profit, (2) whether it produces a secular

product, (3) whether the entity’s articles of incorporation or other pertinent

documents state a religious purpose, (4) whether it is owned, affiliated with or

financially supported by a formally religious entity such as a church or

synagogue, (5) whether a formally religious entity participates in the

management, for instance by having representatives on the board of trustees, (6)

whether the entity holds itself out to the public as secular or sectarian, (7) whether

the entity regularly includes prayer or other forms of worship in its activities, (8)

whether it includes religious instruction in its curriculum, to the extent it is an

educational institution, and (9) whether its membership is made up by

coreligionists.

LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 226; Conway, 2024 WL 551892 at *4 (citing LeBoon factors); Jacobs, 2024

WL 894861 at *4 (citing LeBoon factors). The LeBoon court noted that “not all factors would be

relevant in all cases, and that the weight given to each factor would vary from case to case.”

Conway, 2024 WL 551892 at *4, citing LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 227.

This Court has recently considered Title VII’s implications on Mercy Health in several

cases, and in each of these cases, determined that Mercy and any subsidiaries and entities are

religious organizations. (See Jacobs, 2024 WL 894861; Conway, 2024 WL 551892; Burlison v.

Mercy Hospital South, No. 4:22-cv-01017-SEP, 2023 WL 4560796 (E.D. Mo. July 17, 2023).

The Jacobs court highlighted several relevant cases:

[s]everal district courts, including in this district, have already found other

subsidiaries and entities within the Mercy Health Network to be religious

organizations exempt from claims of Title VII religious discrimination and

retaliation. Recently, in Conway, the court, applying the LeBoon factors, found

that Defendant Mercy Hospital St. Louis—a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mercy

Health—was a religious entity subject to exemption of Title VII religious

discrimination claims. 2024 WL 551892, at *4-5; see Burlison v. Mercy Hosp. S.,

No. 4:22-cv-01017-SEP, 2023 WL 4560796, at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 17, 2023)

(granting defendant Mercy Hospital South's motion to dismiss; stating “courts

have routinely found that Mercy Hospital entities qualify for the religious-

organization exemption from Title VII”; collecting cases); Boydston, 2020 WL

1448112, at *6 (granting summary judgment for a Mercy Health affiliate because

it is a religious organization exempt from Title VII religious discrimination

claims); Jenkins v. Mercy Hosp. Rogers, No. 5:19-CV-05221, 2020 WL 1271371,

at *2 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 17, 2020) (describing Mercy as the “sort of entity

described in the religious organization exemption from Title VII”); Young v. St.

John's Mercy Health Sys., No. 4:10-CV-824-TIA, 2011 WL 9155, at *5 (E.D.

Mo. Jan. 3, 2011) (finding that Mercy Health entities fell within the MHRA's

exemptions for corporations owned and operated by religious groups);

Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1037 (finding no genuine issue of material fact

that Mercy is “unequivocally religious.”).

Jacobs, at *4.

In congruence with the decisions in this district and several other districts, examination of

the record before the Court under the LeBoon framework clearly establishes that Defendants are

exempt, as a religious organization, under Title VII, as described below.

With respect to the first factor, Mercy is a non-profit healthcare provider and it and any

affiliates (including MHM Support Services) are listed in the Official Catholic Directory, which

identifies religious institutions operated by the Roman Catholic Church and confirms their

religious tax-exempt status by the IRS (Docs. 20 at ¶¶ 6, 14; 21 at 14).

As to the second factor, although Defendants provide secular services such as medical

care or treatment, this “is not, alone, determinative of whether the entity qualifies for a religious

exemption.” Jacobs, 2024 WL 894861, at *5 quoting Conway, 2024 WL 551892, at *5. Courts

look at whether the entity’s activities are “clearly motivated by religious purpose and in

accordance with religious doctrine,” even where the activities themselves are secular. Jacobs,

2024 WL 894861, at *5. Mercy Health’s mission statement reflects its religious purpose: “As

the Sisters of Mercy before us, we bring to life the healing ministry of Jesus through our

compassionate care and exceptional service.” (Doc. 20 at ¶ 5). Additionally, Mercy adheres to

Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services promulgated by the United

States Conference of Bishops (id. at ¶ 9). It is also undisputed that MHM Support Services was

“organized ‘[t]o perform activities related to the provision of health services under the

sponsorship of [Mercy Health Ministry],”’ the “pontifical public juridic person granted juridic

personality by decree of the Congregation for Institutes of Consecrated Life and Societies of

Apostolic Life.” (id. at ¶ 13). In accordance with findings in previous cases, the undisputed

facts show that even though Defendants perform secular activities, the activities are clearly

motivated by religious purpose and in accordance with religious doctrine. See Jacobs, 2024 WL

894861, at *5 citing Boydston, 2020 WL 1448112, at *5 (“Treatment of the sick through medical

science and technology is an action that may be motivated by a religious purpose and reflect

religious character.” ); Conway, 2024 WL 551892, at *5 (finding that the second factor was less

relevant because Mercy’s secular medical service was “overshadowed by Defendant’s readily

apparent religious purpose and character.”).

Regarding factors three and four, Mercy’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws state its

purpose is “continuing the healing acts of Jesus Christ in accordance with the doctrines and

tenets of the Catholic Church” (Doc. 20 at ¶ 8). MHM Support Service’s bylaws state its

purpose is “to witness to Christ’s concern for the care of the sick and injured and the teaching of

the Roman Catholic Church regarding Christian health services and charity . . . .” (id. at ¶ 12).

Also, Mercy is the civil legal entity created and organized under Missouri law through which

Mercy Health Ministries and the Catholic Church perform their healthcare services and mission

work (id. at ¶ 4). Further, it is undisputed that Mercy is owned and operated by the Catholic

Church (id. at ¶¶ 1-15, 22).

With respect to the fifth factor, it is undisputed that MHM Support Services is a wholly-

owned subsidiary of Mercy Health (id. at ¶ 11). MHM is a public juridic personality of the

Roman Catholic Church, organized under the Catholic Church’s Canon law (id. at ¶ 2). Mercy’s

Board of Directors consists of four nuns from the religious order of the Sisters of Mercy and is

accountable to the Vatican Dicastery of the Congregation for the Institutes of Consecrated Life

and Societies of Apostolic Life (id. at ¶ 7).

As to factors six, seven, and eight, Mercy’s workplace is adorned with religious imagery

and prayer is communicated over the public address system at least once per day (id. at ¶ 10).

Finally, no evidence or arguments before the Court relate to the ninth factor, whether

membership is made up of coreligionists, but this factor alone should be afforded little weight in

light of the overwhelming religious affiliation, purpose, and character set forth by the other

factors. See Jacobs, 2024 WL 894861, at *5.

Considering all of these factors together, Defendants are religious entities within the

meaning of Title VII’s exemption, and the exemption shields them from religious discrimination

claims, including claims arising from disputes over vaccination requirements. See Jacobs, 2024

WL 894861; Conway, 2024 WL 551892; Burlison, 2023 WL 4560796. Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment as a matter of law as exempt from Title VII religious discrimination

claims. Based on the reasoning above, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21)

is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. A

separate judgment will accompany this memorandum and order.

Dated this 16th day of July, 2024.

/s/ Noelle C. Collins

NOELLE C. COLLINS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE