“All that is required to satisfy the exhaustion doctrine is that the federal claims be fairly presented to the state courts in one full round of litigation.”
How later courts described this case
- “All that is required to satisfy the exhaustion doctrine is that the federal claims be fairly presented to the state courts in one full round of litigation.”
- first citing Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1976); then citing Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037, 1064 (11th Cir. 2001)
- discussing differences in characterizing unlabeled motion for reconsideration as either under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)
- district courts may take judicial notice of public state records
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ROZINA RHONDA JONES-WILLIAMS, )
)
Petitioner, )
v. ) No. 4:23-cv-00544 SEP
)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY JUSTICE )
CENTER, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is self-represented Petitioner Rozina Jones-Williams’s motion for
reconsideration, Doc. [15]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
On September 11, 2023, the Court denied and dismissed Petitioner’s application for writ
of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Docs. [13], [14]. Petitioner filed a motion
titled, “Motion for Leave to Reopen Rule 59(b)(3) Fraud and Motion for Leave for Rehearing or
and Appeal, 48 U.S.C. § 872 Pursuant to Rule 59(b)(3), Rule 60(b)(6), Rule 59(e), Rule 91.04,
91.03 and Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1259, 28 U.S.C.A. 1333, 28 U.S.C. § 1446.” Doc. [15]. The
Court interprets the filing as a notice of appeal and a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal.
In her motion for reconsideration, Petitioner claims that she thought she had fully
exhausted her state court remedies before filing her petition for writ of habeas corpus. She
argues that she exhausted her claims in the three separate criminal court cases, in the Missouri
Court of Appeals, and in the Missouri Supreme Court. Doc. [15] at 7. Petitioner also repeats
many of the same, or similar, arguments she made in her earlier briefs, including that: (1) she
has been denied due process with respect to the criminal actions against her, id. at 2; (2) the State
of Missouri committed fraud and misrepresentation with respect to the charges filed against her,
id. at 3; (3) she has been held illegally (despite being placed on bond) as a “war debt” and in
contravention of her emancipation and citizenship of another nation, id. at 8, 9; (4) she has been
denied access to the courts, as some of her mail has been returned to her or not forwarded by the
trial courts to the Missouri Court of Appeals, id. at 7, 8; (5) she was unlawfully taken from
Georgia and forced into Missouri by a foreign power, id. 10, 11; and (6) her public defender is a
“reprobator” against her, because she “affirm[ed]” a speedy trial on March 28, 2023, in state
court, but the court and her counsel “forced a § 552.020 on [her] that day,” id. at 12.1
DISCUSSION
“The filing of a notice of appeal . . . confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and
divests the district court o[f] its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.”
Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 73 F.3d 819, 822 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer
Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)). But filing a notice of appeal does not prevent a district court
from taking action in furtherance of the appeal or from hearing motions on matters that are
collateral to those at issue on appeal. Mahone v. Ray, 326 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2003) (first
citing Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1976); then citing Doe v.
Bush, 261 F.3d 1037, 1064 (11th Cir. 2001)). If an appeal is pending, a district court retains
jurisdiction to deny a motion for relief from a judgment because a denial is in furtherance of an
appeal. Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58-60. When presented with a Rule 60(b) motion after a notice of
appeal has been filed, a district court should consider the motion and assess its merits. Hunter v.
Underwood, 362 F.3d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 2004).
The title of Petitioner’s motion indicates she intends to bring it under both Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e) (motion to alter or amend the judgment) and Rule 60(b) (relief from
judgment for mistake or other reason). See Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 164-65,
168-69 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussing differences in characterizing unlabeled motion for
reconsideration as either under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)). Rule 59(e) motions are limited to
correcting “manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” United
States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Innovative
Home Health Care, Inc. v. P.T.-O.T. Assocs. of the Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284, 1286 (8th Cir.
1998)). Such motions cannot be used to introduce new evidence, tender new legal theories, or
raise arguments that could have been presented prior to judgment. District courts have broad
discretion in determining whether to grant a Rule 59(e) motion. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
1 Petitioner appears to be referring to a mental health exam under Missouri Revised Statute § 552.020.
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
“Rule 60(b) provides for ‘extraordinary relief which may be granted only upon an adequate
showing of exceptional circumstances.’” U.S. Xpress Enters., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 320
F.3d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Young, 806 F.2d 805, 806 (8th Cir.
1987)). It is not intended to be a vehicle for seeking reconsideration of merits arguments that
were previously considered by the court. Broadway v. Norris, 193 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 1999).
After reviewing Petitioner’s arguments, the Court finds no grounds for granting relief
under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Petitioner’s motion fails to point to any mistake, newly
discovered evidence, fraud, or other basis for reconsideration of the Court’s judgment. Instead,
the motion mostly revisits the same arguments Petitioner made in earlier filings. Petitioner states
that she thought she exhausted several of her claims, such as speedy trial, excessive bail, and
unlawful arrest, in the Missouri state courts. But Petitioner did not provide case citations to the
Missouri Court of Appeals cases in which she purportedly exhausted those claims. She has also
failed to provide copies of the motions/briefs she claims she attempted to file in the Missouri
Court of Appeals. The Court has been unable to find evidence of exhaustion on review of
Petitioner’s cases on Missouri’s Case.net.2 To the extent Petitioner believes that her motions to
the Missouri Court of Appeals were lost in the mail, not mailed by individuals at the place she
was incarcerated or held for a mental exam, or not forwarded to the appellate courts by the
criminal trial courts she originally sent them to, she has not provided copies of her original
motions or detailed explanations as to when the documents were written and mailed to the
Missouri Court of Appeals. There is nothing in the record to substantiate that Petitioner filed, or
2 Petitioner’s underlying state court cases were reviewed on Case.net, Missouri’s online case management
system. The Court takes judicial notice of those public records. See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th
Cir. 2007) (district courts may take judicial notice of public state records).
attempted to file, an appeal with the Missouri Court of Appeals related to her speedy trial,
excessive bail, unlawful arrest, prosecutorial misconduct, or unlawful extradition claims, and
thus the Court has no basis to find that Petitioner attempted to exhaust her state court remedies.
See Wayne v. Mo. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 83 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 1996) (“All that is
required to satisfy the exhaustion doctrine is that the federal claims be fairly presented to the
state courts in one full round of litigation.”); see also Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. of Ky., 410 US.
484, 493 (1973); Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 1980); Wingo v. Ciccone, 507
F.2d 354, 357 n.11 (8th Cir. 1974). Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), their factual allegations cannot be conclusory and must state a
claim as a matter of law. Johnson v. Stark, 717 F.2d 1550, 1552 (8th Cir. 1983). The Court
“will not supply additional facts” or “construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that
have not been pleaded.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Dunn vy.
White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir.1989)). Because there are no exceptional circumstances to
justify extraordinary relief, Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is denied. No certificate of
appealability will issue, as Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of
the application for writ of habeas corpus, Doc. [15], is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue.
Dated this 27" day of November, 2023.
Chat Lilie
SARAH E. PITLY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE