Gilbert v. City of Minneapolis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Desmond Gilbert, Case No. 21-CV-02350 (JMB/LIB)

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

City of Minneapolis, Minneapolis

Police Officers Christopher Kelley,

Evan Komarek, and Joseph Foxley,

in their individual and official

capacities,

Defendants.

Lucas J. Kaster and Matthew H. Morgan, Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Minneapolis, MN, for

Plaintiff Desmond Gilbert.

Heather P. Robertson, Kristin R. Sarff, Sharda R. Enslin, Minneapolis City Attorney’s

Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants City of Minneapolis, Minneapolis Police

Officers Christopher Kelley, Evan Komarek, and Joseph Foxley, in their individual and

official capacities.

Plaintiff Desmond Gilbert brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against three Minneapolis Police Officers: Christopher Kelley, Evan Komarek, and Joseph

Foxley (the Officer Defendants) and the City of Minneapolis (the City). Gilbert alleges

that the Officer Defendants used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment

when they arrested him on October 29, 2019. Gilbert also asserts municipal liability claims

against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). Gilbert now moves for summary judgment

on his municipal liability claims (Counts II and III). (Doc. No. 35.) For the reasons set

forth below, the Court denies Gilbert’s motion.

BACKGROUND

The facts underlying Gilbert’s section 1983 claims are largely disputed by the

parties. The facts relevant to resolving Gilbert’s motion, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the City as the non-moving party, are summarized below.

A. Gilbert’s Arrest

On the evening of October 29, 2019, an anonymous caller called 911 to report “a lot

of yelling coming from next door” and noted the noise was possibly coming from the

second or third floor of an apartment complex nearby. (Doc. No. 40 at 3; Doc. No. 68-2B.)

Three police officers, Officer Michael Kennedy, Officer Joel Hagen, and Sergeant Jamy

Schwartz, responded to the call. (Doc. No. 41 at 18, 20, 23.) Upon arrival to the scene,

the officers heard yelling coming from the Passage Apartments. (Doc. No. 68-4 at 28 (filed

under seal); Doc. No. 68-3 at 33–34 (filed under seal); Doc. No. 39-11 at 61:17–62:7.) The

officers entered the apartment complex and walked through the building to determine

where the sound was coming from. (Doc. No. 68-4 at 29 (filed under seal); Doc. No. 68-3

at 37–38 (filed under seal); Doc. No. 39-11 at 68:11–69:1.) The officers located the

apartment where the noise was coming from and knocked on the door. (Doc. No. 68-4 at

31–32 (filed under seal); Doc. No. 68-3 at 37–39 (filed under seal); Doc. No. 39-11 at

68:11–69:9.)

A woman, Michelle Adams, answered the door. (Doc. No. 39-1 at 70:14–25, 89:16–

20; Doc. No. 39-5 at 00:43.) A man, Emmanuel Culver, stood behind Adams as she spoke

with the officers. (Doc. No. 39-5 at 00:43–01:03.) Officer Kennedy entered the threshold

of the apartment. (Id. at 1:00–1:04.) Culver objected to Officer Kennedy’s entry into the

apartment and asked if the officers had a search warrant. (Id.) Officer Kennedy brought

Culver out into the hallway of the apartment building to secure him against a hallway wall.

(Id. at 1:04–1:44.)

Shortly thereafter, Adams, Gilbert, and Keona Carter all entered the hallway from

the apartment. (Doc. No. 39-4 at 4:45–58.) Adams and Carter yelled at the officers. (Id.)

Adams began recording the officers. (Id. at 5:42.) Gilbert left the hallway and re-entered

the apartment. (Id.) Gilbert came back into the hallway and spoke with Sergeant Schwartz.

(Id. at 5:40–44.) An “officer needs help” call was sent out by dispatch or inadvertently

generated by one of the three officers’ radios around this time, and the Officer Defendants

responded to that call. (Doc. No. 68-3 at 51 (filed under seal); Doc. No. 68-4 at 148 (filed

under seal); Doc. No. 39-11 at 70:8–9.)

Officer Kelley pulled Gilbert away from the scene and used an armbar across

Gilbert’s chest to pin him against the wall. (Doc. No. 39-7 at 1:16; Doc. No. 39-4 at 6:14;

Doc. No. 68-2E at 2:05; Doc. No. 39-12 at 1:49; Doc. No. 41 at 16.) Moments later, Officer

Kelley deployed chemical irritant, or mace, onto Gilbert’s face. (Doc. No. 39-7 at 1:17–

1:19; Doc. No. 41 at 16.) Officers Komarek and Foxley then took Gilbert to the ground

and placed him into the prone position. (Doc. No. 39-13 at 2:05–2:15.) Officer Komarek

then used his knee to pin Gilbert’s head to the ground. (Doc. No. 39-13 at 2:10; Doc. No.

41 at 15.) Simultaneously, Officer Foxley used his knee to pin Gilbert’s lower back to the

ground and handcuffed him. (Doc. No. 39-12 at 1:49–2:15.) The Officers’ body worn

camera footage1 shows that Gilbert began to convulse. (Doc. No. 39-12 at 2:35–4:50.)

Gilbert says that, at this time, he had a seizure. (Doc. No. 37 at 14.) The City, however,

characterizes Gilbert’s movements as “thrashing.” (Doc. No. 70 at 25.) Officers requested

Emergency Medical Services (EMS). (Doc. No. 39-12 at 3:30.) EMS arrived and took

Gilbert to the hospital, where he spent the night. (Id. at 15:30; Doc. No. 39-19 at 127:3–

10.) Gilbert was put on concussion protocol and later received treatment for a slanted

pelvis. (Doc. No. 39-19 at 129:17–20, 144:2–14:1.) Gilbert also suffered night terrors

following the incident. (Id. at 145:4–11.)

B. The Investigations and Reports of the Minnesota Department of Human

Rights and the United States Department of Justice

After the killing of George Floyd in May 2020—and after Gilbert’s October 2019

arrest—both the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR) and the United States

Department of Justice (DOJ) launched pattern or practice investigations of the Minneapolis

Police Department (MPD).2 (See Doc. No. 39-15 [hereinafter, “MDHR Report”] at 6; Doc.

No. 39-16 [hereinafter, “DOJ Report”] at 5.) The MDHR published its report on April 27,

2022 (MDHR Report), based on a review of the time period from January 2010 through

December 2020. (MDHR Report at 2, 12.) The MDHR found that “there is probable cause

1 Officer Kelley’s body worn camera appears to have only recorded the events that took

place after Gilbert was taken to the ground by Officers Komarek and Foxley. (See Doc.

No. 68-2J.)

2 The MDHR initiated its investigation under the pattern-or-practice provision of the

Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363A.12. (See MDHR Report at 6.) The DOJ

initiated its investigation under the pattern-or-practice provision of the Violent Crime

Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141. (See DOJ Report at 11.)

that the City and MPD engage in a pattern or practice of race discrimination in violation of

the Minnesota Human Rights Act.” (Id. at 9.) Specifically, the MDHR Report found that

MPD engages in a pattern or practice of discriminatory policing as shown by racial

disparities in how MPD officers use force against, stop, search, and arrest Black

individuals. (Id.)

The DOJ published its report on June 16, 2023, based on a review of the time period

from January 2016 through August 2022. (DOJ Report at 2, 11.) The DOJ Report found

that the DOJ “has reasonable cause to believe that the City of Minneapolis and the

Minneapolis Police Department engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives

people of their rights under the Constitution and federal law.” (Id. at 5.) Specifically, the

DOJ found that MPD uses excessive force, including unjustified deadly force and other

types of force and that the MPD unlawfully discriminates against Black people in its

enforcement activities. (Id.)

C. This Action

On October 21, 2021, Gilbert filed a three-count Complaint against the City of

Minneapolis and the Officer Defendants under section 1983. (Doc. No. 1 [hereinafter,

“Compl.”].) In Count I, Gilbert alleges that the Officer Defendants used excessive force

when arresting him, thereby depriving him of his civil rights in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. (Compl. ¶¶ 94–102.) In Counts II and III, Gilbert alleges that the City is

liable for the Officer Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 103–113.)

To address Gilbert’s motion, the Court must first determine the type of municipal

liability pleaded in each count. To be clear, a municipality may be liable under section

1983 if any of the following occurs: (1) an official municipal policy violates the

constitution; (2) an authorized municipal representative directs another employee to take

unconstitutional action; (3) an unwritten custom, that violates the constitution, is so

widespread that it has the force of law; and (4) the municipality fails to train or supervise

municipal employees. See Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th

Cir. 2013) (citing Monell for the proposition that a municipality may be liable under section

1983 if the constitutional violation resulted from “an official municipal policy” or “an

unofficial custom,” and citing Canton for the proposition that a municipality may be liable

if the constitutional violation resulted from “a deliberately indifferent failure to train or

supervise”) (quotations omitted); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,

480–81 (1986) (explaining that a municipality may be liable under section 1983 if an

authorized decisionmaker directed a particular unconstitutional course of action that

resulted in the complained-of injury).

Counts II and III include overlapping and repetitive language, with both counts

referring to municipal liability on the basis of an unwritten custom and on the basis of a

failure to train. (Compl. ¶¶ 104, 105, 110, 111.) For purposes of the instant motion, the

Court construes Count II as asserting a section 1983 claim of municipal liability pursuant

to Monell on the basis that the City maintained an unwritten custom of using excessive

force.3 The Court construes Count III as asserting a section 1983 claim of municipal

3 The Court cannot construe Count II as raising an “official policy” variety of Monell

liability because there is no allegation identifying any official policy that violated the

constitution. Likewise, the Court does not construe Count II as raising the Pembaur variety

of Monell liability because there is no allegation that any authorized City representative

liability pursuant to Canton on the basis that the City failed to adequately train or supervise

its employees, including the Officer Defendants, in avoiding the use of excessive force and

unlawful restraint maneuvers.4

DISCUSSION

Gilbert now moves for summary judgment on Counts II and III.5 In response, the

City argues that the record includes questions of fact. The Court concludes, as explained

directed an employee to take the allegedly unconstitutional action that resulted in Gilbert’s

injuries.

In his briefs, Gilbert appears to argue that summary judgment is warranted because the City

maintained an official policy that permitted officers to utilize head and neck restraints and

an unwritten custom of aggression instead of de-escalation. In Counts II and III of his

Complaint, however, Gilbert does not allege these things as official policies or unwritten

customs. Evidence of policies or customs concerning neck restraints and de-escalation

could support Gilbert’s more general claims that the City maintained an unofficial custom

of using excessive force and that the City failed to train police officers to avoid the use of

excessive force and unlawful restraint maneuvers, but the Court cannot agree with Gilbert

that summary judgment is proper based on a specific policy or custom that Gilbert

identified in his argument but did not specifically mention in the language of either Count

II or Count III. In addition, disputed factual issues remain as to whether Gilbert was ever

subject to a neck restraint and as to the adequacy of the training provided. Atkinson, 709

F.3d at 1216 (noting that absent a facially unlawful policy, plaintiff’s claims are analyzed

under the deliberate indifference analysis).

4 The Court construes Count III in this way because the allegations are narrowly tied to

failure to train and supervise MPD officers to avoid the use of excessive force and unlawful

restraint maneuvers. The language used in the Complaint does not raise an “unwritten

custom” variety of Monell liability because any allegations that are consistent with that

claim are repetitive of, and subsumed by, the claim raised in Count II. Moreover, the

language used in Count III does not raise either an “official policy” or Pembaur variety of

Monell liability.

5 The City argues that the motion is premature because Gilbert must prove the constitutional

violation in Count I in order for the City to be liable. In his reply brief, Gilbert concedes

that the City is correct: establishing Count I is an essential element of the claims of

municipal liability raised in Counts II and III. See Schoettle v. Jefferson Cnty., 788 F.3d

855, 861–62 (8th Cir. 2015) (stating that a municipality cannot be held liable under Monell

below, that there remain genuine disputes of material fact as to both counts, precluding

entry of summary judgment.6

As a threshold matter, the Court reiterates the well-established standard that applies

to Gilbert’s motion. Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit,

and a dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could lead a reasonable jury to return

a verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The

evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn

where there is no underlying constitutional violation). Gilbert also concedes that summary

judgment is precluded by questions of fact concerning the elements of Count I. Gilbert

asks this Court to presume he has proven Count I, and to rule on the summary judgment

motion in a manner akin to entering a directed verdict on the second phase of a two-part

bifurcated trial. The Court assumes without deciding that Gilbert can prevail at trial on

Count I and declines to deny the motion as premature.

6 The City also asks the Court to conclude that the Officer Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity and, on that basis, deny Gilbert’s summary judgment motion. (See

Doc. No. 70.) However, the City made no dispositive motion of its own on this basis, and

it cited to no authority that supports the proposition that the Court may decide qualified

immunity absent a dispositive motion to do so. Instead, the City relies on authority that

suggests the opposite. See Payne v. Britten, 749 F.3d 697, 702 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that

defendants are entitled to “a reasoned denial or grant of their claim of qualified immunity”

at any permissible stage of the proceedings in “which a proper motion is filed.” (emphasis

added)); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226 (1991) (analyzing agent’s motion for

summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds); see also Lampkins v. Thompson, 337

F.3d 1009, 1014 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Although procedurally unusual, the qualified immunity

defense is not waived or lost if a case proceeds to trial.”). The Court declines to address

qualified immunity at this time.

in their favor. Id. at 255. Further, on a motion for summary judgment, “the court does not

weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or attempt to discern the truth of any

factual issue.” Morris v. City of Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008).

I. Count II

Gilbert argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Count II because the

record evidence demonstrates that the City7 maintained a widespread custom of using

excessive force. To prevail on his motion for summary judgment, Gilbert must

demonstrate that the undisputed record evidence establishes each of the following elements

of his claim: (1) the existence of a pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the

municipality’s employees that is continuing, persistent, and so widespread that it has the

effect of law; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the

municipality’s policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and

(3) that the plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the municipality’s custom, i.e., that the

custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation. Meier v. City of St. Louis,

7 It is well established that police departments are not entities subject to liability under

section 1983, and the Court construes the Complaint to assert that the City had an unofficial

custom of using excessive force. See Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th

Cir. 1992); see also De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Jail, Corr. Inst., 18 F. Appx 436, 437

(8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that a county jail and county sheriff’s department were

not legal entities subject to suit under section 1983 and quoting Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d

1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Sheriff’s departments and police departments are not usually

considered legal entities subject to suit.”)). Similarly, Gilbert’s claims against the Officer

Defendants in their official capacities are analyzed as claims against the City. See Morris

v. Cradduck, 954 F.3d 1055, 1060 (8th Cir. 2020) (stating section 1983 claims against

municipal officials in their official capacities are treated as claims against the

municipality).

78 F.4th 1052, 1057–58 (8th Cir. 2023). The record presented here contains genuine issues

of material fact regarding all three elements of the Monell claim raised in Count II.

Gilbert argues that the DOJ Report and the MDHR Report establish, beyond dispute,

the first element of Count II.8 (E.g., MDHR Report at 45 (concluding that “[b]y teaching

an approach to policing that emphasizes aggression, MPD creates a culture that results in

unnecessary escalation and/or excessive force during encounters with community

members”); DOJ Report at 14, 15 (concluding that “MPD officers routinely use excessive

force, often when no force is necessary” and that the “MPD’s pattern or practice of using

excessive force violates the law”).) Gilbert also emphasizes a March 29, 2019 citizen

complaint alleging numerous policy violations against Officer Kelley, including that

Officer Kelley told the complainant, “If you report me, I don’t care; go ahead, nothing will

happen.” (Doc. No. 50 at 2.)

This record evidence, however, is disputed by the City, precluding summary

judgment of Count II. See, e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“Credibility determinations,

8 In its briefing, the City notes that it intends to seek exclusion of both the MDHR Report

and DOJ Report at trial. (Doc. No. 70 at 53 n.12.) However, the City does not expressly

request that the Court strike the MDHR Report and DOJ Report or otherwise refrain from

considering the reports when resolving the pending motion for summary judgment. The

Court observes that the reports contain hearsay statements but acknowledges that Federal

Rule of Evidence 803(8)(A)(iii) provides an exception to the rule against hearsay for “[a]

record or statement of a public office if . . . it sets out . . . in a civil case . . . factual findings

from a legally authorized investigation.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(iii). Absent a request to

strike the reports, and because the City makes no argument that the reports did not result

from legally authorized investigations, the Court concludes that, for the purposes of

summary judgment, the evidence relied upon by Gilbert is properly before this Court. At

this time, the Court does not address the admissibility of the reports at trial.

the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are

jury functions.”). The Court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding

the factual statements in the reports, the extent to which the facts of this case are similar to

the fact patterns summarized in the reports, and the weight to be given to the reports, which

both assessed police conduct that post-dates the incident in question. Moreover, the City

contests Gilbert’s characterization of MPD training and emphasizes written policies

discouraging the use of excessive force. (E.g., Doc. No. 39-18 [hereinafter, “MPD Policy”]

at 84 (“MPD is committed to unbiased policing” and “[n]o person shall be singled out or

treated differently as a consequence of his/her race”); Id. at 94 (“sworn MPD employees

shall only use the amount of force that is objectively reasonable”); Id. at 97 (“officers shall

use de-escalation tactics”). Given the conflicting evidence in the record, the Court cannot

conclude that, as a matter of law, MPD had an unwritten custom of using excessive force

that became so widespread it had the effect and force of law. Brewington v. Keener, 902

F.3d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 2018) (“[I]n the face of an express municipal policy prohibiting

excessive force, two incidents of excessive force—even assumed to be true—cannot be

considered a pattern of widespread and pervasive unconstitutional conduct.”); but see Ware

v. Jackson Cnty., 150 F.3d 873, 882 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he existence of written policies

of a defendant are of no moment in the face of evidence that such policies are neither

followed nor enforced.”).

Gilbert also argues that reasonable jurors would necessarily find in his favor on the

second element of Count II: that the City either showed deliberate indifference toward or

tacitly authorized the wrongful conduct after being put on notice of it. Notice is the

touchstone of deliberate indifference in the context of section 1983 municipal liability,

Atkinson, 709 F.3d at 1216, and Gilbert argues that the City received sufficient constructive

notice for the following two reasons: (1) the reports reviewed complaints of excessive force

spanning a long period of time; and (2) the DOJ Report referenced findings of racial

disparities in the use of force in a 2018 Hennepin County Public Defender report and a

2015 ACLU report. (Doc. No. 37 at 46–47; DOJ Report at 46).

The Court concludes, contrary to Gilbert’s argument, that the issue of constructive

notice is not so one-sided that Gilbert is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Whether

the complaints referenced in the DOJ and MDHR reports (and the findings of racial

disparities in the Hennepin County Public Defender and ACLU reports) are sufficient to

constitute tacit authorization or deliberate indifference requires an inferential step—one

that falls within the province of the jury, not the Court. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

Moreover, the general nature of the findings in the reports, without more, cannot establish

as a matter of law that previous complaints bear sufficient factual similarity to establish the

second element of this claim. See Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1205 (8th Cir.

1999) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the municipality where the plaintiff

presented evidence of previous complaints, but did not show that “the incidents giving rise

to these [previous] complaints [bore] some factual similarity” to the circumstances

surrounding the section 1983 claim at issue); see also Brewington, 902 F.3d at 802

(affirming summary judgment in favor of the municipality where the plaintiff presented

evidence of prior complaints, but the existence of these complaints was insufficient to

satisfy this element of Monell and listing cases, including Pineda v. City of Houston, 291

F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that eleven previous incidents of police

misconduct was not sufficient to establish this element)).

Finally, questions of fact also preclude summary judgment when considering the

third element: causation. Gilbert must establish that reasonable jurors would find a causal

link between the complained-of injuries and the unwritten custom of using excessive force.

See Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 779–80 (8th Cir. 1994) (“As long as the

causal link is not too tenuous, the question whether the municipal policy or custom

proximately caused the constitutional infringement should be left to the jury.”); see also

Ware, 150 F.3d at 884–85 (concluding that the jury could find a causal link between the

municipality’s failure to address past instances of similar misconduct and the subsequent

violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights). In this case, Gilbert does not develop any

explicit causation argument or otherwise identify evidence concerning this element.

Absent such evidence, the Court must deny the summary judgment motion on Count II.

II. Count III

In Count III, Gilbert asserts that the City is liable under Canton for failing to

properly train and supervise MPD officers to avoid the use of excessive force and unlawful

restraint maneuvers. (Compl. ¶¶ 109–113.) To prevail on summary judgment, Gilbert

must demonstrate that there is no a genuine dispute of material fact on the following three

elements of his claim: (1) the City’s police officer training and supervision practices were

inadequate; (2) the City was deliberately indifferent to the rights of others in adopting these

training and supervision practices, and the City’s failure to train and supervise was a result

of deliberate and conscious choices it made; and (3) the City’s alleged training and

supervision deficiencies caused Gilbert’s constitutional deprivation. See Ulrich v. Pope

Cnty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2013). Again, the record presented contains fact

disputes that preclude summary judgment of Count III.

To support its motion concerning the first element, Gilbert again relies on the

findings in the reports. (E.g., MDHR Report at 47 (finding that “MPD officers receive

insufficient in-service training with respect to use of force”); DOJ Report at 83 (finding

that MPD’s training contained “systemic deficiencies . . . that contribute to the pattern or

practice of violations” and that “revealed an overreliance on using force during

encounters”).) The reports also faulted MPD for failing to adequately investigate or

discipline officers for their conduct. (MDHR Report at 43, 45 (finding that “MPD creates

a culture that results in unnecessary escalation and/or excessive force during encounters

with community members,” stating that “[m]any officers reported . . . that violating a

policy is not a significant problem because MPD does not hold officers accountable when

policies are violated,” and concluding that “supervisors are not adequately reviewing and

assessing inaccuracies or false statements made by officers in their use of force reports”);

DOJ Report at 81 (noting that “[d]iscipline for MPD officer misconduct is rare” and “[e]ven

when officers admit policy violations, they may not be held accountable.”). Other evidence

in the record, however, suggests that MPD officers were sufficiently trained in appropriate

restraint techniques and avoiding the use of force. (See Doc. Nos. 68-1, 68-5, 68-6 (filed

under seal).) Given this conflicting evidence, genuine issues of material fact remain

concerning the adequacy of the training provided to members of the MPD.

To establish the second element: that the City “had notice that the training

procedures and supervision were inadequate and likely to result in a constitutional

violation,” Brewington, 902 F.3d at 803, Gilbert emphasizes the findings in the reports

concerning the knowledge that City officials may have had. (MDHR Report at 69 (finding

that “[f]ormer and current Mayors, City officials, Police Chiefs, and high-level MPD

officials acknowledge that there is a problem with MPD’s organizational culture that

results in racial disparities”); (DOJ Report at 46 (quoting Mayor Jacob Frey as stating that

“[w]e knew, and continue to know, there is disparate treatment” of communities of color),

83 (finding that “City and MPD leaders were candid in their assessment of MPD’s training

programs, saying, ‘[W]e have had a lot of problems’”).) These statements and findings,

however, are general in nature and do not concern specific training deficiencies. Nor do

they refer precisely to the pertinent period of time preceding the 2019 incident at issue in

this matter. Without more definitive evidence, the Court cannot grant summary judgment.

Whether City policymakers had constructive notice or actual notice of the training

deficiencies is a question for the jury. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994) (“[L]iability is appropriate when policymakers are ‘on

actual or constructive notice’ of the need to train.”).

Finally, as to the element of causation, Gilbert has failed to identify evidence that

would relate to or establish that the allegedly deficient training caused his injuries. Without

such an argument, Gilbert cannot prevail on the motion for summary judgment.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: Gilbert’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc.

No. 35) is DENIED.

Dated: July 26, 2024 /s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan

Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan

United States District Court