The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RYAN BROWN,
Petitioner,
Honorable Linda V. Parker
v. Case No. 21-cv-11371
CONNIE HORTON,
Respondent.
___________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND LEAVE
TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
This is a habeas action filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner
Ryan Brown challenges his 2016 plea-based convictions for possession with intent
to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 333.7401(2)(A)(iv), and second or subsequent offense under Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 333.7413, in the Circuit Court for Oakland County, Michigan. In his application
for habeas relief, Brown raises two claims of error concerning: (1) the time credit
given at the probation revocation sentencing and (2) the failure to execute the
probation warrant with due diligence. Respondent answered the petition,
contending that Brown’s claims are procedurally defaulted and lack merit.
For the reasons below, the Court denies the petition because each claim is
without merit and barred by Brown’s procedural defaults. The Court also denies a
certificate of appealability and leave to appeal in forma pauperis should Brown
choose to appeal this decision.
I. Background
In 2016, Brown pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver less than
50 grams of cocaine as a fourth habitual offender, and as his second or subsequent
offense. Predicated upon an aiding and abetting theory, Brown admitted that he
drove an individual to Pontiac for the purpose of purchasing 23 grams of cocaine
that would later be sold to others. (ECF No. 9-15 at PageID. 266.) On May 17,
2016, the state trial court sentenced Brown to two years’ probation and to serve
365 days in jail with credit for 672 days. (ECF No. 9-16 at PageID. 280.) On
October 3, 2017, the trial court found that Brown violated the terms of his
probation. (ECF No. 9-18 at PageID. 316.) On October 10, 2017, the trial court
sentenced Brown to 5 to 20 years’ imprisonment with credit for 707 days served.
(ECF No. 9-19 at PageID. 333.)
Brown filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court
of Appeals raising a single claim challenging the reasonableness of his sentence.
On January 17, 2019, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied the application for
“lack of merit in the grounds presented.” (ECF No. 9-27 at PageID. 453.) Brown
then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which
was denied on July 2, 2019, because the court was “not persuaded that the
questions presented should be reviewed[.]” People v. Brown, 929 N.W.2d 374
(Mich. 2019).
On January 2, 2020, Brown filed a motion for relief from judgment in the
trial court arguing that his probation violation should have been dismissed due to
the probation department’s lack of due diligence in initiating the warrant or, in the
alternative, that he is entitled to jail credit for time served while awaiting his
pending criminal trial in the Ottawa County Circuit Court. (ECF No. 9-22 at
PageID. 386-394.) On June 17, 2020, the trial court denied the motion under
Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D)(3). (ECF No. 9-24 at PageID. 448-450.)
Brown then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan
Court of Appeals, which denied the application on January 26, 2021, because
Brown “failed to establish that the trial court erred in denying the motion for relief
from judgment.” (ECF No. 9-29 at PageID. 691.) Brown did not file an
application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court.
Brown then filed the current habeas petition in this Court, which he signed
and dated on May 31, 2021. The petition raises the same claims asserted in his
state-court post-conviction motion. (ECF No. 1 at PageID. 5-7.) Respondent
maintains that these claims are barred by procedural default, lack merit, and do not
warrant habeas relief. (ECF No. 8.)
II. Legal Standard
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if
the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme
Court on a question of law, or if the state court decides a case differently than the
Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000). An “unreasonable application” occurs
when “a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court]
to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409.
AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court
rulings,” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal citations omitted). A
“state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief
so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). A “readiness to attribute error [to a state
court] is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the
law.” Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).
A state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct on federal
habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption is rebutted only
with clear and convincing evidence. Id. Moreover, for claims adjudicated on the
merits in state court, habeas review is “limited to the record that was before the
state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
III. Discussion
Respondent argues that Brown is not entitled to habeas relief because his
claims are unexhausted in the state courts and, therefore, procedurally defaulted.
The Court agrees. A prisoner filing a habeas petition under § 2254 must first
exhaust state remedies. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)
(“state prisoners must give the state courts one full fair opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established
appellate review process”); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994). To
satisfy this requirement, the claims must be “fairly presented” to the state courts,
meaning that the petitioner must have asserted both the factual and legal bases for
the claims in the state courts. McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir.
2000); see also Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 806 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing
McMeans). The claims must be presented to the state courts also as federal
constitutional issues. See Koontz v. Glossa, 731 F.2d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1984).
For Michigan prisoners, each issue must be presented to both the Michigan
Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court to satisfy the exhaustion
requirement. See Hafley v. Sowders, 902 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1990). While the
exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, a “strong presumption” exists that a
petitioner must exhaust all available state remedies before seeking federal habeas
review. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131, 134-35 (1987). The burden is on
the petitioner to prove exhaustion. See Rust, 17 F.3d at 160.
Here, Brown fails to show that he properly exhausted his habeas claims in
the state courts and provides no excuse for his procedural default. While he seems
to have raised his habeas claims in his motion for relief from judgment before the
trial court and then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with the
Michigan Court of Appeals, he did not seek leave to appeal with the Michigan
Supreme Court. His claims, therefore, are unexhausted.
Moreover, Brown no longer has an available means by which to exhaust his
claims as he already filed a motion for relief from judgment with the state trial
court. Any attempt to file a second motion for relief from judgment would be
futile. Under Michigan Court Rule 6.502(G), a defendant cannot file a second or
subsequent motion for relief from judgment in the state trial court unless the
defendant can show a retroactive change in the law or new evidence that was not
discovered before the first motion. See Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(2). Brown’s
unexhausted claims do not fall within the exceptions for filing a second motion.
Because Brown did not fully exhaust his claims in the state courts and no
longer has an available remedy to do so, the claims are now defaulted.
When a habeas petitioner fails to properly present a claim to the state courts
and is barred from pursuing further relief under state law, the petitioner has
procedurally defaulted the claim for purposes of federal habeas review. See Gray
v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996); Pudelski v. Wilson, 576 F.3d 595, 605
(6th Cir. 2009) (citing Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Federal habeas relief generally is precluded on claims that have not been presented
to the state courts in accordance with the state’s procedural rules. Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85-87 (1977). A state prisoner who fails to comply with a
state’s procedural rules waives the right to federal habeas review absent a showing
of cause for noncompliance and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged
constitutional violation or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991); Nields v. Bradshaw, 482 F.3d 442 (6th
Cir. 2007); Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 784-85 (6th Cir. 1996).
In this case, Brown neither alleges nor establishes cause to excuse his
procedural default. And because Brown fails to show cause for his procedural
default, the Court need not reach the prejudice issue. See Smith v. Murray, 477
U.S. 527, 533 (1986). But even if the Court considered the prejudice component,
prejudice cannot result when neither of the claims are cognizable on habeas
review. For instance, Brown’s claims regarding the applicable time credit at
sentencing and execution of the probation warrant both concern violations of state
law. It is well-settled that habeas relief may not be based upon a perceived
violation of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 72 (1991).
Brown also fails to show that failure to consider the claims would result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. In an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional error has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent, a federal court may consider the constitutional claims presented even in
the absence of a showing of cause for procedural default. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537-
38. Such a claim of innocence requires a petitioner to support the allegations of
constitutional error with new reliable evidence that was not presented at trial.
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). But Brown has not presented any new,
reliable evidence to support an assertion of innocence. (See ECF 1.) The Court
thus may not consider his defaulted claims as a ground for a writ of habeas corpus.
For these reasons, Brown is not entitled to habeas relief and the Court denies the
petition.
IV. Certificate of Appealability
The Court also denies Brown a certificate of appealability. To obtain a
certificate of appealability, an inmate must make a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this showing, the
applicant is required to show that reasonable jurists could debate whether, or agree
that, the petition should have been resolved in a different manner, or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). When a habeas petition is denied on
procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability may issue only “when the
prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Id. at 484.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, reasonable jurists would not find this
Court’s assessment of Brown’s claims to be debatable or wrong or that its
procedural ruling was incorrect. Brown is not entitled to leave to appeal in forma
pauperis because such an appeal could not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED
WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability and leave
to proceed in forma pauperis are DENIED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: July 9, 2024
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, July 9, 2024, by electronic and/or U.S.
First Class mail.
s/Aaron Flanigan
Case Manager