Bush v. Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

PATRICK BUSH,

Plaintiff,

v. Civ. No. MJM-24-1547

ANTHONY BROWN, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Patrick Bush (“Plaintiff”) filed this civil complaint on June 5, 2024, alleging a

violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1. The Complaint is

accompanied by motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF Nos. 2 & 5, which

are granted. Plaintiff also filed a supplement to the Complaint. ECF No. 4. Because Plaintiff

proceeds IFP, this Court is obligated to screen the Complaint, as supplemented, for sufficiency.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A district court “shall dismiss [a] case” filed by a plaintiff proceeding IFP if

the court determines that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

A self-represented party’s complaint must be construed liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, a pro se plaintiff must still carry “the burden of alleging sufficient

facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110

(10th Cir. 1991). With those standards in mind, and for the following reasons, Plaintiff’s

Complaint must be dismissed.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff names two defendants: Anthony Brown, the Attorney General

for the State of Maryland; and the St. Mary’s County State’s Attorney. ECF No. 1. He states that

on March 1, 2024, he discovered that he was being unlawfully confined. He asserts that a docket

entry in his criminal case shows that he should have been released on or after January 18, 2017.

Id. Attached to the initial Complaint is a copy of a docket sheet that appears to indicate that

Plaintiff’s criminal trial was postponed on January 18, 2017. ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff also attached

to his Complaint portions of the case State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310 (Md. 1979). ECF No. 1-1 at 1.

In his Supplemental Complaint, Plaintiff appears to argue that the State failed to show good cause

to postpone his criminal trial and/or failed to file a motion for postponement as required under

Hicks. ECF No. 4. He asserts that although the conduct in his case and the Hicks case were

identical, he received a different outcome demonstrating that he was discriminated against. Id. He

asserts that his right to due process has been violated and seeks compensatory damages and

immediate release. Id.

Review of Maryland Judiciary Case Search1 demonstrates that Plaintiff was found guilty

of first-degree murder and related offenses in the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County on

September 14, 2017, and sentenced to a term of life plus 35 years’ incarceration.

Here, Plaintiff appears to pursue a civil action based on alleged deficiencies in his criminal

case in state court. Such a cause of action is prohibited under the Supreme Court’s decision in

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 486–87 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that claims

challenging the legality of a conviction are not cognizable in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

unless and until the conviction is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned, and complaints

containing such claims must therefore be dismissed without prejudice. Id. Plaintiff’s claims will

1 https://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/inquirySearch.jis (last visited June 20, 2024).

be dismissed without prejudice. Unless and until the conviction is invalidated, they may not be

pursued.

Furthermore, Plaintiff is attempting to bring this action against Attorney General Anthony

Brown pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but does not allege any facts regarding the defendant’s

conduct. To the extent he is seeking to hold Brown accountable in his supervisory capacity as the

Attorney General for the State of Maryland, the claim must be dismissed. Liability under § 1983

attaches only upon personal participation by a defendant in the alleged constitutional violation. It

is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 claims. See

Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no respondeat superior liability under §

1983). Liability of supervisory officials “is not based on ordinary principles of respondeat

superior, but rather is premised on ‘a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit

authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries

they inflict on those committed to their care.’” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir.

2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)).

Supervisory liability under § 1983 must be supported with evidence that: (1) the supervisor

had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a

pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the

supervisor’s response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or

tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link

between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Given the absence of any personal

involvement by Attorney General Brown, or any facts to establish supervisory liability, Plaintiff’s

claims against him must be dismissed.

Finally, Plaintiff cannot sue the St. Mary’s County State’s Attorney for the performance of

prosecutorial functions. Maryland State’s Attorneys enjoy absolute immunity when performing

prosecutorial functions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–23 (1976); Kalina v. Fletcher,

522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997); Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 118 (4th Cir. 2018). Absolute immunity

protects prosecutors’ “vigorous and fearless performance” of their duties, which is “essential to a

fair, impartial the criminal justice system.” Nero, 890 F.3d at 117 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–

28). “Because absolute immunity safeguards the process, not the person, it extends only to actions

‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Id. At 117–18 (quoting

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31). Thus, absolute prosecutorial immunity turns on whether the

prosecutor’s actions are closely associated with judicial process. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,

479 (1991) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422–23). The Court must use a “functional approach” to

“determine whether a particular act is ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase.’” Nero, 890

F.3d at 118 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). The particular act alleged in the instant case is the

prosecutor’s decision to postpone Plaintiff’s criminal trial. Such an act is intimately associated

with the judicial process. Plaintiff’s claims against the St. Mary’s County State’s Attorney are

therefore subject to dismissal.

For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed.2

A separate Order follows.

7/16/24

Date Matthew J. Maddox

United States District Judge

2 To the extent Plaintiff believes he is detained in violation of the constitution or laws of the United

States he may file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.