Vaiano v. Apple Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-11515-RGS

VINCENT VAIANO

v.

APPLE INC.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

July 10, 2024

STEARNS, D.J.

Plaintiff Vincent Vaiano, an iPhone owner, sues defendant Apple Inc.

for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent

infliction of emotional distress, and violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A.

Apple moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons,

the court will allow the motion.1

DISCUSSION

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

1 Vaiano failed to file any opposition by the deadline (with application

of the mailing rule, July 5, 2024).

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Two basic principles guide the

court’s analysis. “First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim

for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679. A claim is facially

plausible if its factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

“Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint, ‘however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Tibbs v. Gender Dysphoria Grp., 2024 WL

1773863, at *3 (D. Mass. April 24, 2024), quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007). “Where the court cannot ascertain the nature and basis

of any legitimate claims, however, it is under no obligation to rewrite the

pleadings on their behalf.” Id.

I. Contract Claims (Counts I & II)

“In order to state a viable breach of contract claim under

Massachusetts law, [a] plaintiff[] must prove that a valid, binding contract

existed, the defendant breached the terms of the contract, and the plaintiff[]

sustained damages as a result of the breach.” Brooks v. AIG SunAmerica

Life Assur. Co., 480 F.3d 579, 586 (1st Cir. 2007).

Vaiano stumbles at the first step. Although he cursorily states that he

“entered into a contract with” Apple, see Compl. [Dkt # 1-1] ¶¶ 53, 58, he fails

to “describe the alleged terms of the contract with enough specificity to

provide a defendant with the requisite notice of the nature of the claim,” Foss

v. Marvic, 365 F. Supp. 3d 164, 167 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d sub nom. Foss v.

Marvic Inc., 994 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2021); see also Brooks, 480 F.3d 579, 586

(1st Cir. 2007) (“Plaintiffs also must do more than allege, in conclusory

fashion, that the defendant breached the contract, by describing, with

‘substantial certainty,’ the specific contractual promise the defendant failed

to keep.”). Counts I and II2 accordingly must be dismissed.

II. Privacy Claim (Count III)

Because “Massachusetts has never recognized a common-law cause of

action for invasion of privacy,” Vaiano’s claim must arise from the privacy

statute. Webb v. Injured Workers Pharmacy, LLC, 2023 WL 5938606, at *4

(D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2023), quoting Axford v. TGM Andover Park, LLC, 2021

2 “[T]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing governs

conduct of parties after they have entered into a contract; without a contract,

there is no covenant to be breached.” Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary

v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 412 F.3d 215, 230 (1st Cir. 2005).

WL 681953, at *13 (D. Mass Feb. 22, 2021). “A plaintiff bringing a statutory

invasion of privacy claim must plead two elements: ‘[1] a gathering and

dissemination of facts of a private nature that [2] resulted in an

unreasonable, substantial, or serious interference with his privacy.’” Id.,

quoting Hayes v. Mirick, 378 F. Supp. 3d 109, 117 (D. Mass. 2019).

Although Vaiano broadly alleges that Apple accessed his “personal

information and data,” Compl. ¶¶ 8, 11, 14, 33, he fails to provide any further

detail to identify the relevant “facts of a private nature,” flouting the notice

pleading requirement. His cursory allegations of dissemination, moreover,

fall short of plausibly demonstrating substantial or unreasonable

interference with his privacy. Count III accordingly must be dismissed.

III. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count IV)

“To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under

Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must allege ‘(1) that the defendant either

intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known that

emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct

was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the conduct caused the plaintiff

emotional distress; and (4) that the emotional distress was severe and of a

nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.’” Brown v.

JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2023 WL 3511363, at *3 (D. Mass. May 17, 2023),

quoting Hussain v. Hosking, 2016 WL 696095, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 19,

2016); see also Howcroft v. Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 596 (2001). “To

be considered extreme and outrageous, the defendant’s conduct must be

beyond all bounds of decency and . . . utterly intolerable in a civilized

community.” Jones v. Maloney, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 745, 750 (2009) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Complaint lacks any factual allegations which might plausibly

allow the court to infer that Apple engaged in any “extreme” or “outrageous”

conduct, let alone that it did so with the requisite intentional or knowing

intent. Count IV accordingly must be dismissed.

IV. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count V)

“To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under

Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must allege ‘(1) negligence; (2) emotional

distress; (3) causation; (4) physical harm manifested by objective

symptomatology; and (5) that a reasonable person would have suffered

emotional distress under the circumstances of the case.’” Brown, 2023 WL

3511363, at *3 (D. Mass. May 17, 2023), quoting Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386

Mass. 540, 557 (1982).

Again, the pleading falls short. Vaiano does not allege any facts from

which the court can plausibly infer that Apple owed him any duty of care.

Nor does he allege emotional distress with sufficient specificity to survive a

motion to dismiss. See Sullivan v. Bos. Gas Co., 414 Mass. 129, 137 (1993)

(“In order to satisfy Payton, plaintiffs must provide an objective

corroboration of the emotional distress alleged. A successful negligent

infliction of emotional distress claim, in other words, must do more than

allege mere upset, dismay, humiliation, grief and anger.”) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Count V accordingly must be dismissed.

V. Chapter 93A (Count VI)

Chapter 93A prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or

deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Mass.

Gen. Law ch. 93A, § 2. “A practice or act is unfair under Chapter 93A if it is

(1) within the penumbra of a common law, statutory, or other established

concept of unfairness; (2) immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;

or (3) causes substantial injury to competitors or other business people.”

Leet v. Cellco P’ship, 480 F. Supp. 2d 422, 434 (D. Mass. 2007) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). And a practice is deceptive “if it has

the capacity to mislead consumers, acting reasonably under the

circumstances, to act differently than they otherwise would have.” Gottlieb

v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 57 F.4th 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2022) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

Vaiano has not identified any misrepresentations on the part of Apple,

and none of the conduct alleged in the Complaint rises to the level of unfair

or unethical. Count VI accordingly must be dismissed.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is ALLOWED. The

Clerk will dismiss the case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Richard G. Stearns

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE