Opinion

Kay v. Frodl

Court
District Court, D. Massachusetts
Filed
Aug 14, 2024
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

Unitepd States District Court

District of Massachusetts

)

Val Kay, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

) Civil Action No.

Deb Frodl et al., ) 22-10977-NMG

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, J.

Plaintiff Val Kay (“Kay” or “plaintiff”) brought a

shareholder derivative action, on behalf on XL Fleet Corp.

(“Company”) against current and former directors and officers

(“defendants”) of the Company and Pivotal Investment Corporation

II (“Pivotal”). After a comprehensive settlement of the case,

she now seeks approval of attorneys’ fees which defendant

opposes (Docket No. 76).

I. Background

XL Hybrids is a Delaware corporation founded in 2009, which

provides electrification solutions for light and medium

commercial vehicles in North America. In 2020, XL Hybrids

entered into a merger agreement with the special purpose

acquisition company (“SPAC”) Pivotal. The resulting company was

renamed XL Fleet Corp. (“the Company”).

Plaintiff, a shareholder of the Company, contends that the

individual defendants induced Pivotal shareholders to approve

the merger with XL Hybrids through a series of false and

misleading statements about the Company’s pipeline figures,

supply chain problems, active and returning customers and

ability to provide the purported technological benefit. As a

result of those alleged omissions and misrepresentations,

defendant’s assessment of the Company’s prospects and future

revenue projections was overstated.

In December, 2020, the merger was completed. Thereafter,

defendants purportedly issued a series of false or misleading

press releases concerning adverse material facts about the

Company’s revenue forecasts, logistics and the due diligence

conducted by the defendants prior to the merger’s completion.

In 2021, a report was published by Muddy Waters, a due diligence

research company, which detailed the alleged misrepresentations

and the actual condition of the Company. As a result of the

report, the stock price of the Company declined significantly.

In June, 2022, plaintiff filed a verified stockholder

derivative complaint in this Court against defendants asserting

violation of the Exchange Act and claims against the individual

defendants for breach of fiduciary duty and abuse of corporate

assts among other things. In January, 2023 the parties filed

and received approval of a joint stipulation to stay this action

until the conclusion of discovery in the related Federal

Securities Action. In March, 2024, the parties reached a

settlement and moved for preliminary approval which the Court

allowed.

Under the terms of the proposed settlement, the Company’s

Board of Directors will address the core wrongdoing addressed in

this action and strengthen the Company’s governance by adopting

immediate reforms which include, but are not limited to: (1)

improvements to the Audit and Compensation Committees; (2)

recoupment of certain incentive-based and performance-based

compensation wrongfully paid to Company officers upon

determination of serious misconduct; (3) creation of an

Investment Committee; and (4) appointment of an additional

independent director. The reforms are to remain in effect for

four years.

In addition to moving for approval of the settlement,

counsel for plaintiff moved for attorney’s fees in the amount of

$2,500,000. Defendants oppose the motion for fees and counter

that no more than $200,000 in fees should be awarded.

In early August, 2024, the Court approved the settlement,

and heard oral argument on the attorneys’ fees matter and took

the latter under advisement.

II. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

In deciding a motion for an award of attorney’s fees, the

Court may consider the following factors: 1) the benefits

achieved in the action, 2) the presence or absence of

substantial objections, 3) counsel’s skill, standing and

ability, 4) the complexities of the litigation, 5) the financial

risks of non-payment 5) the time devoted by counsel 6) and the

awards made in similar cases. See, e.g., Ford v. Takeda

Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc., 2023 WL 3679031, at * 1 (D. Mass.

Mar. 31, 2023).

A. Benefits of the Reforms

The settlement in this case includes several reforms

including, inter alia, creation of a new independent director to

serve on the Board, empowering the Audit Committee to monitor

internal risk and public reporting compliance, retention of an

independent consultant for compensation related matters, the

formalization of the Investment Committee and appointment of a

lead independent director in the event that the Chair of the

Board and CEO are the same person.

Plaintiff contends that each reform confers substantial

benefit on the Company and justifies the award of substantial

attorneys’ fees. The settlement also commits the Company to

adopt and maintain the reforms for at least four years, a time

frame which plaintiff contends will ensure their endurance.

Defendants respond that the reforms were not nearly as

significant as plaintiff suggests. Specifically, as to the

independent director, defendants insist that the Company had

already appointed a new independent director before the

settlement and that, furthermore the Board was already a

majority independent.

At oral argument, plaintiff clarified that, while a

majority of directors prior to the settlement were “independent”

as defined by the New York Stock Exchange guidelines, the Board

was not majority independent in practical terms because three of

the six directors were allegedly involved with the purported

misrepresentations at the heart of the derivative action. The

Court agrees that to the extent several of the reforms are

redundant of preexisting conditions at the Company, the

formalization of good governance practices is essential to

maintaining compliance with the security laws on a permanent

basis.

B. Comparable Cases

The Court also considers comparable cases when determining

an appropriate award. Plaintiff cites cases in which courts

have awarded substantial attorneys’ fees where the appointment

of an independent director was the primary benefit achieved by

the litigation. See, e.g., Hollywood Firefighters’ Pension Fund

v. Malone, 2021 WL 5179219 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 2021). She also

cites purportedly similar derivative actions that were settled

at the pleading stage and resulted in awards of attorneys’ fees

in excess of $3,500,000. See In re CoreCivic, Inc. S’holder

Derivative Litig., No. 3:16-CV-03040 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2022).

Defendants rejoin that other cases cited by plaintiff are

distinguishable because 1) most of the attorneys’ fees awarded

were negotiated and agreed-to by all parties and 2) the

settlements included both significant monetary payments and

governance reforms. The Court agrees with defendant and finds

that most of the cases cited by plaintiff are distinguishable

from the case at bar.

Furthermore, plaintiff does not adequately take into

account the lodestar calculations in the allegedly analogous

cases. For instance, in In re Southern Co. S’holder Derivative

Litig., 2022 WL 4545614 (N.D. Ga. 2022), the settlement included

only corporate governance reforms and the parties had agreed to

a fee award of $4.16M, which represented a lodestar multiplier

of 0.84.

C. Complexity

The parties dispute the degree of complexity involved in

the litigation. Defendant contends that plaintiff primarily

“piggybacked” off the related securities litigation. At oral

argument, plaintiff asserted that all the related litigation

concerning XL Fleet stemmed from the same Muddy Waters report on

misrepresentations by the Company.

The Court also acknowledges defendant’s contention that the

litigation in this case did not reach dispositive motions or

discovery. See In re Oclaro, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. C-11-

3176 EMC, 2014 WL 4684993, at *6 (reducing fees where plaintiffs

“essentially piggybacked” on related securities class actions).

Unlike some of the cases cited by defendant, however, this case

was not settled immediately and the Court gives credence to

plaintiff’s effort to facilitate a global resolution.

D. Quality of Representation and Risk of Non-payment

Plaintiff contends that counsel provided high caliber

representation and pursued the action on a fully contingent

basis, without any assurance of receiving any fees or

reimbursement for their out-of-pocket expenses. While there is

nothing unusual about plaintiff’s counsel taking cases such as

this one on a contingency basis, the Court acknowledges that

fact in plaintiff’s favor.

E. Hours Expended and Lodestar

Plaintiff explains that

in the First Circuit, a lodestar calculation is not

required. Nonetheless, one may be performed as a

cross-check to ensure that the [fee] award is fair and

reasonable.

Ford, 2023 WL 3679031, at *2 (citing In re Thirteen Appeals

Arising out of the San Juan Dupont Plana Hotel Fire Litig., 56

F.3d 296, 307 (1st Cir. 1995)). Not including litigation

expenses, which this Court has already allowed, plaintiff has

calculated her lodestar fee at just under $1 million.

Plaintiff contends that a multiplier of approximately 2.5

is reasonable, given the substantial benefits received and the

range of multipliers approved in other security and stockholder

derivative actions.

Defendants reply that the mean multiplier in other follow-

on derivative suits is around 0.94. The related Securities

Class Action, which was initiated prior to this stockholder

derivative actions, used a multiplier of 1.33 and imposed a

larger risk on counsel.

F. Conclusion

An analysis of the factors above demonstrates that both

parties make persuasive arguments in different respects.

Defendant understates the impact of the independent director and

plaintiff overstates the comparability of the cases she cites as

analogous. The appropriate award is in between the divergent

poles suggested by the parties. The lodestar is a helpful

indicator as to the reasonableness of the request and the Court

is convinced that a multiplier of 1 is suitable in this case

which did result in substantial reforms but also was resolved

without resort to dispositive motions and with the assistance of

other litigation. The 1.33 lodestar multiplier awarded in the

related Securities Class Action is similarly instructive. The

Court will award plaintiff, $1,000,000 in attorneys’ fees, i.e.

his approximate lodestar with no upward or downward multiplier.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the motion of plaintiff, Val

Kay, for attorneys’ fees (Docket No. 76) is ALLOWED, in part,

and DENIED, in part. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees in

the amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000).

So ordered.

_/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton__

Nathaniel M. Gorton

United States District Judge

Dated: August 14, 2024

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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