Francis v. Lafayette Parish

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

BYRON FRANCIS, JR. CASE NO. 6:22-CV-06094

VERSUS JUDGE ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS

SHERIFF’S OFFICE LAFAYETTE PARISH MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHITEHURST

RULING

Before the Court is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or alternatively for Summary

Judgment [ECF No. 15], filed by Defendant, Sheriff Mark Garber as Sheriff of the Lafayette Parish

Sheriff’s Office (“LPSO”). Plaintiff Byron Francis, Jr. opposes the motion.! For the reasons that

follow, the motion is GRANTED IN PART.

I.

BACKGROUND

Byron Francis, Jr. brings this suit, alleging that on September 8, 2021, he and his girlfriend

were pulled over by an LPSO employee for having illegally tinted windows.” Francis asserts that

the officer asked for consent to search the vehicle, which was denied, and so a second officer with

the canine unit was summoned.’ Thereafter, officers found a small amount of marijuana in

Francis’s girlfriend’s purse, whereupon they “began to arrest her, handcuffing her and treating her

roughly.“ Francis alleges that when he asked the officers why they were handling his girlfriend

so roughly, the officers handcuffed him, threw him to the ground and began to beat him, “slamming

his head into the pavement at least three times.”> According to Francis, he then informed the

ECF No. 23.

> ECF No. 1-1 at 4.

3 Id.

‘Td.

5 Td. at 4-5.

officers that the marijuana was his, whereupon he was arrested and brought to jail.° Francis alleges

that after he was jailed, “the officer who had arrived with the canine unit and another officer took

him out of the [holding] cell, telling him that he had a visitor.”’ The officers then brought Francis

(in handcuffs) to a different location, whereupon the officer with the canine unit “punched him in

the gut,” and the second officer “beat him with a nightstick.”®

On October 20, 2021, Francis was charged with nine offenses arising out of this incident.

On August 17, 2023, Francis pleaded nolo contendere to Count 5, which charged as follows:

COUNT 5: in that Byron Francis Jr., on or about September 8, 2021, while in the

Parish of Lafayette, did knowingly, intentionally and willfully use violence, force,

extortionate threats or true threats upon Agent Cpl. Lam Bui, a public official with

the Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office, with the intent to influence the official’s

conduct in relation to the official’s position, employment or duty; or in retaliation

or retribution for actions taken by the elected official as part of the official’s official

duties, in violation of the provisions of La. R.S. 14:122 (Public Intimidation and

Retaliation — Felony).!°

The remaining eight counts were dismissed.!!

On September 2, 2022, Francis filed suit in state court solely against the “Lafayette Parish

Sheriff’s Office,” in its capacity as “a political body of the Parish of Lafayette.”!* Therein, Francis

asserted the LPSO was vicariously liable for the negligent and intentionally tortious conduct

committed by its officer-employees.'? He additionally asserted that the LPSO was independently

° Id. at 5.

Id.

8 Id.

° ECF No. 15-6.

10 Td. at 1; ECF No. 15-8 at 1.

ECF No. 15-8 at 1. The dismissed charges were: possession with intent to distribute marijuana (Count 1),

possession of marijuana while in a drug free zone (Count 2), resisting a police officer with force or violence

(Count 3), self-mutilation by a prisoner (Count 4), public intimidation and retaliation against Deputy

Sheriffs Alex Marks and Joshua Jones (Counts 6 and 7), attempted simple escape (Count 8), and possession

of drug paraphernalia (Count 9). ECF No. 15-6 at 1-2.

ECF No. 6 at 5.

3 Td. at 6, 10-11.

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liable for its failure to train, supervise and discipline its officers with respect to excessive use of

force, and for adopting “[a]dopting official policies, practices, and customs that provided for the

failure to properly train and supervise its officers.”!* On November 30, 2022, Sheriff Mark Garber,

in his capacity as Sheriff of the LPSO, removed the suit to this Court on the basis of federal

question jurisdiction.'>

On December 1, 2022, Francis filed a Supplemental and Amended Petition, which added

three fictitious defendants to this suit—Officers A, B and C.!° The supplemental and amended

pleading alleges it was Officer A who pulled Francis over for illegally tinted windows, Officer B

was the officer assigned to the canine unit, and Officer C was the employee who beat Francis with

a nightstick after he was arrested and jailed.!’ In addition to his previous causes of action, Francis

added claims against the individual officers for their negligent and intentionally tortious conduct,

and he added a claim against the officers for the violation of his “constitutional rights under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution to be secure in his person and free

from the unreasonable use of excessive force.”'® Only the LPSO, through Sheriff Garber, has

answered the suit.!? Francis has not sought leave to amend the Complaint to properly name the

individual officers Francis alleges are personally liable for the alleged conduct.*° The LPSO now

moves for judgment on the pleadings, or alternatively, for summary judgment, asserting “the

undisputed material facts do not establish any basis of liability for this governmental defendant

4 Td. at 6-7, § 12.

' ECF No. 1.

16 ECF No. 6 at 42.

Td. at 42-43.

18 Tq. at 43-44, [J 12-13.

ECF No. 7.

?° Tt is unclear why Francis did not name the forgoing officers, as three officers involved in Francis’s arrest

were named in the Bill of Information issued on October 20, 2021, and four officers are identified in the

affidavit of arrest created on September 8, 2021. ECF No. 15-6 at 2; ECF No. 26-2 at 1.

Page 3 of 9

under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or state law.””! The Court finds the pending motion is appropriately

analyzed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.”

Il.

LEGAL STANDARD

The standard for a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings “is the same as that

for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”” To survive such a motion, the

complaint must set forth sufficient factual allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.”*4 The plausibility standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.””° “A pleading that offers labels and

conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements” will not suffice, nor will a complaint that

merely tenders “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.””’ When deciding such a

motion, “[t]he court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.”’® However, this tenet does not apply to conclusory allegations, unwarranted

deductions, or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, as such assertions do not constitute

ECF No. 15 at 1.

The parties identify very few facts beyond those asserted in the pleadings, none of which would change

the result of the ruling under Rule 12(c). See e.g. ECF Nos. 21-1 and 23-1.

3 Johnson vy. Miller, 98 F.4th 580, 583 (Sth Cir. 2024) (quoting Bosarge v. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics, 796

F.3d 435, 439 (Sth Cir. 2015)).

4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Twombly at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and not merely create “a suspicion [of] a legally

cognizable right of action.”) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)).

Iqbal at 678.

27 Td, (internal quotation marks, alterations omitted) (quoting Twombly at 555, 557).

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Iqbal at 679 (“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity

and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”).

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“well-pleaded facts.””? The court generally “must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings,

including attachments thereto.”2° One exception to this rule is that district courts “may permissibly

refer to matters of public record.”?!

Il.

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s claim of municipal liability.

LPSO argues Francis’s complaint fails to “sufficiently establish any municipal liability,”

because: (1) vicarious liability will not support a municipal liability claim under Section 1983, and

(2) Francis’s complaint fails to allege “any unconstitutional policy or procedure of the LPSO.”°?

Francis contends he has adequately pleaded a claim of municipal liability.*? Francis’s claim against

the LPSO under § 1983 states as follows:

The Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office was negligent and/or otherwise at fault

in the following respects:

A. Failing to properly train its officers regarding the use of excessive force;

B. Failing to properly supervise and discipline its officers with respect to their

use of excessive force;

C. Adopting official policies, practices, and customs that provided for the

failure to properly train and supervise its officers.*4

It is well-established that a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on a theory

of respondeat superior.*> Rather, a municipality will be liable only when the municipality itself

Twombly at 555.

3° Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).

31 Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (Sth Cir. 1994); see also Test Masters Educational Services,

Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 n.2 (Sth Cir. 2005).

3? ECF No. 15-2 at 2.

33 ECF No. 23 at 6-8.

34 ECF No. 6 at 44, 14.

35 Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Peterson v. City

of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 847 (Sth Cir. 2009).

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causes the constitutional violation through the execution of its policies or customs.*® To establish

municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must first identify either an official policy promulgated

by a municipal policy maker, or a custom so widespread and common that it fairly represents

municipal policy. The plaintiff must then show that the policy or custom was the moving force

behind the violation of plaintiff’s constitutional right.*’ “To proceed beyond the pleading stage, a

complaint’s ‘description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional

violation cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.’”>8 Here, Francis fails to identify in

his complaint (or in his opposition memorandum) any policy or custom adopted by the LPSO that

led to the alleged use of excessive force against him. Nor has Francis pleaded (or even argued) any

facts showing a causal relationship between any policy or custom adopted by the LPSO and the

alleged constitutional violation. As such, Francis has failed to state a claim for liability based on

policy or custom.°?

Francis additionally alleges that the LPSO failed to properly train, supervise, and discipline

its employees with respect to the use of excessive force. A claim asserting a municipality failed to

train, supervise or discipline its employees is a type of Monell claim.*° To establish such a claim,

36 City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)

(under § 1983, “local governments are responsible only for their own illegal acts”) (internal quotation marks

omitted); Peterson at 847 (a municipality “is liable only for acts directly attributable to it ‘through some

official action or imprimatur’”) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (Sth Cir. 2001)).

37 Hutcheson v. Dallas County, Texas, 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pineda v. City of Hous.,

291 F.3d 325, 328 (Sth Cir. 2002)); Henderson v. Harris County, Texas, 51 FAth 125, 130 (Sth Cir. 2022);

Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578-79.

38 Pefia y. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018) (alteration omitted) (quoting Spiller

v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997)).

° See e.g. Pefia at 622 (“To proceed beyond the pleading state, a complaint’s ‘description of a policy or

custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation . . . cannot be conclusory; it must

contain specific facts.’”) (quoting Spiller at 167); Verastique v. City of Dallas, Texas, 106 F.4th 427, 431

(5th Cir. 2024) (The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face; legal conclusions, mere labels, threadbare recitals of the elements of the

claim, conclusory statements, and naked assertions devoid of factual enhancement will not suffice).

40 Henderson, 51 F Ath at 130; Verastique, 106 F.4th at 432.

Page 6 of 9

a plaintiff show: (1) the municipality failed to train, supervise or discipline the officers involved;

(2) there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise, train or discipline and the

alleged violation of constitutional rights; and (3) the failure to train, supervise or discipline

constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.4! To show deliberate

indifference, a plaintiff ordinarily must show a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by

untrained employees.”** However, in a very narrow range of circumstances, a plaintiff can

establish deliberate indifference through the “single-incident exception.”* “A municipality’s

culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to

train.” Here, Francis’s complaint is wholly devoid of any factual allegations indicating that the

LPSO failed to train, supervise or discipline its employees with respect to the use of excessive

force, that there is a causal connection between such failures and the officers’ alleged use of

excessive force, or that the LPSO’s failures constitute deliberate indifference to Francis’s

constitutional right to be free of excessive force.*? Accordingly, Francis has failed to state a claim

on this theory of municipal liability. In sum, because Francis has not alleged an official policy

promulgated by the LPSO caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights, nor pleaded factual

“| Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482; Verastique at 432.

Connick, 563 U.S. at 62.

‘3 Henderson at 131; see also Hutcheson at 482-83 (The single-incident exception is generally reserved for

situations in which there is no training whatsoever; it requires proving that a “highly predictable

consequence” of the lack of training would be the specific constitutional injury sued upon); see also Connick

at 63.

“4 Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822-23 (1985)); see also Connick

at 70 (“[P]roving that a municipality itself actually caused a constitutional violation by failing to train the

offending employee presents ‘difficult problems of proof,’ and we must adhere to a ‘stringent standard of

fault,’ lest municipal liability under § 1983 collapse into respondeat superior.”) (quoting Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., OKI. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407, 410 (1997)).

See e.g. Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (Sth Cir. 2011) (the complaint

“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (the plausibility standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged”); Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 483.

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allegations supporting a failure-to-train theory of municipal liability, Francis’s § 1983 claims

against the LPSO will be dismissed with prejudice.

B. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claim of Excessive Force.

The Court finds Francis’s claim of excessive force against the fictitious officers should be

dismissed for failure to prosecute. In the Fifth Circuit, “the mere naming of a person through use

of a fictitious name does not make that person a party absent voluntary appearance or proper

service of process.’“° Here, Officers A, B and C have neither been served with process, nor have

they made an appearance. Because Francis has never amended his Complaint to properly name the

defendant officers, and because the LPSO does not represent the unidentified officers, they are not

parties to this suit.*” Further, while Francis has not sought leave to amend his pleadings to properly

name the officers, even were the Court to grant leave sua sponte, amendment here would be futile.

The statute of limitations on this claim expired almost two years ago, and any amendment to

substitute named officials for the fictitious defendants would not relate back under Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(c).*8 Accordingly, Francis’s claim of excessive force against the fictitious officer-defendants is

dismissed with prejudice.*”

C. Remaining State Law Claims

Having granted summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on all of Francis’s federal claims,

only Francis's state law claims remain for resolution. A district court may decline to exercise

46 Nagle v. Lee, 807 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 1987).

47 See ECF No. 7 at 1, § 1; ECF No. 13 at 2, no. 5. The Court notes that in the parties’ Rule 26(f) report,

filed on December 8, 2023, counsel for Francis stated he “anticipates amending the Petition for Damages

herein to name the officers involved in the alleged incident,” but he has not done so as of this date. ECF

No. 13 at 4. The deadline for joinder of parties and amendment of pleadings passed on June 21, 2024. ECF

Seceg Winzer v. Kaufman County, 916 F.3d 464, 470-71 (Sth Cir. 2019); Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d

315, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1998).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Colle v. Brazos Cnty., Tex., 981 F.2d 237, 242-43 (5 Cir. 1993).

Page 8 of 9

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if all claims over which it had original jurisdiction

have been dismissed.’ The general rule in this Circuit is that district courts should decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in such circumstances.*! After an

examination of the statutory and common law factors, the Court finds no reason to depart from the

general rule here.*” Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state law claims, and those claims will be remanded to state court.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this Ruling, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or

alternatively for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 15], filed by Defendant, Sheriff Mark Garber as

Sheriff of the Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office (“LPSO”), is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff’s §

1983 claims asserted against the Lafayette Parish Sheriff's Office and the fictitious officer-

defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and his remaining state law claims are

REMANDED to state court. . .

THUS DONE in Chambers on this 2G, of July, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT CO

50 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

>! See e.g. Enochs v. Lampasas County, 641 F.3d 155, 161, 163 (5™ Cir. 2011); Brookshire Bros. Holding,

Inc. v. Dayco Products, Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5 Cir. 2009).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); Enochs at 161.

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