Dent v. Williams

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CEDRIC DENT CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 23-3104

JASON R. WILLIAMS, ET AL. SECTION “O”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion1 of

Defendant Orleans Parish District Attorney Jason R. Williams to dismiss Plaintiff

Cedric Dent’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Dent alleges he was wrongfully convicted and

imprisoned because the Office of the Orleans Parish District Attorney (“OPDA”)

suppressed material evidence favorable to him. Williams contends Dent fails to state

a Section 1983 claim because the acts of the OPDA attorneys who prosecuted Dent

are attributable to the State of Louisiana—not the OPDA. Williams’s argument rests

on the reasoning of a 2022 en banc Fifth Circuit opinion holding that certain Dallas

County judges act for the State of Texas—not for Dallas County—when setting bail

schedules. See Daves v. Dall. Cnty., 22 F.4th 522, 534–40 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc).

1 ECF No. 11.

The Court is not the first to consider Williams’s argument; five sections of the

Court have rejected it.2 The Court agrees with its sister sections: Burge v. Parish of

St. Tammany’s holding—a Louisiana district attorney acts for her office when making

Brady decisions—requires the Court to reject Williams’s argument. 187 F.3d 452, 470

(5th Cir. 1999). Burge is binding. The Court is “not free” to avoid it on the ground that

Daves “abrogated” or “implicitly overruled” it. See In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc.,

19 F.4th 787, 789 (5th Cir. 2021). And even if Daves worked the intervening change

in law that Williams says it did, that conclusion is the Fifth Circuit’s to draw. See id.

Accordingly, for these reasons and those that follow, Williams’s motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This civil-rights case arises from Plaintiff Cedric Dent’s claim that he was

wrongfully convicted of the second-degree murder of Anthony Melton and imprisoned

for almost 25 years because the OPDA violated its obligations under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and suppressed material evidence favorable to him.3

According to the complaint, the OPDA prosecuted Dent for Melton’s second-

degree murder.4 Dent was arrested in 1997 and convicted by a non-unanimous jury

in 1999 after a less-than-two-hour trial.5 Dent alleges that “[t]he State’s only evidence

at trial was the testimony of Jerry Hamilton, the decedent’s 18-year-old cousin who

2 See Floyd v. Dillmann, 659 F. Supp. 3d 724, 728–29 (E.D. La. 2023) (Milazzo, J.); Williams v.

Williams, No. 23-CV-1922, 2023 WL 6160990, at *2–4 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2023) (Africk, J.); Jones v.

Williams, No. 22-CV-5097, 2023 WL 3211865, at *3–4 (E.D. La. May 2, 2023) (Ashe, J.); Reeder v.

Williams, No. 22-CV-4614, 2023 WL 2771481, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2023) (Zainey, J.); Smith v.

Williams, No. 22-CV-1550, 2023 WL 2263841, at *6–10 (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2023) (Brown, C.J.).

3 See generally ECF No. 1.

4 Id. at ¶ 3.

5 Id. at ¶¶ 2, 6.

viewed the perpetrator for a few moments in a dark lot.”6 Dent was sentenced to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole.7

Dent alleges that he was convicted of Melton’s second-degree murder because

the OPDA suppressed material evidence favorable to him.8 According to Dent, the

OPDA “suppressed exculpatory information documenting Mr. Hamilton’s different

accounts of what he saw the night of the crime and the significant inconsistencies in

his narrative.”9 Dent alleges that the OPDA “also suppressed at least three other key

documents—Detective Michael Buras’s handwritten notes, his Major Offense Report

Form, and an unredacted version of his incident report . . . .”10 According to Dent,

these documents “contained several pieces of exculpatory information, including how

Mr. Dent became a subject of NOPD’s investigation, a potential death threat in a

message left on Mr. Melton’s pager several hours before he was shot, a message from

Mr. Hamilton left on the pager less than thirty minutes before the shooting, and the

existence of a second witness named ‘Rodney,’ who provided a description of the

perpetrator that did not match Mr. Dent’s appearance at the time of arrest.”11

After some of these “key documents” were disclosed to Dent in November 2021,

the OPDA moved to vacate Dent’s conviction.12 The Orleans Parish Criminal District

Court obliged: It vacated Dent’s conviction in August 2022.13

6 Id. at ¶ 7.

7 Id. at ¶ 11.

8 Id.

9 Id. at ¶ 9.

10 Id. at ¶10.

11 Id.

12 Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15.

13 Id. at ¶ 16.

This Section 1983 suit followed. In it, Dent alleges that his conviction was “a

direct and proximate result” of the OPDA’s “longstanding policy or custom of

violating the constitutional rights of defendants it prosecuted by not disclosing

information favorable to their defense.”14 Dent alleges that the OPDA had an

unconstitutional written Brady policy15 and an unconstitutional “unwritten policy or

custom of not disclosing favorable information to defendants charged with crimes.”16

Dent sues Williams in his official capacity as the OPDA’s policymaker.17

Pointing to the OPDA’s allegedly unconstitutional Brady policies, Dent alleges that

Williams is liable under Section 1983 in his official capacity as the Orleans Parish

District Attorney because the OPDA violated Dent’s rights under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments by withholding information about the Melton murder that

was favorable to Dent and material to Dent’s guilt or innocence.18

Now, Williams moves to dismiss Dent’s complaint for failure to state a claim

under Rule 12(b)(6).19 He principally contends that the Fifth Circuit’s 2022 en banc

opinion in Daves requires the Court to hold that the OPDA attorneys who prosecuted

Dent were acting for the State of Louisiana rather than the OPDA.20 Dent opposes.21

14 Id. at ¶17.

15 See, e.g., id. at ¶¶168–172.

16 Id. at ¶ 173.

17 Id. at ¶23.

18 Id. at ¶ 202.

19 ECF No. 11.

20 Id. at 1–2.

21 ECF No. 13.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint that does not

meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard should be dismissed for failing to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “[T]he pleading standard

Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitations

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Ultimately, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Although ‘[courts] accept all well-pled facts as

true, construing all reasonable inferences in the complaint in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal

conclusions are not accepted as true.’” Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840, 843 (5th Cir.

2024) (quoting Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023)).

III. ANALYSIS

Williams contends that Dent fails to state a Section 1983 claim against him

because, under Daves, the acts of the OPDA attorneys who prosecuted Dent are

attributable to the State of Louisiana—not the OPDA.22 Williams reasons that Daves

“established a new legal standard” for determining the level of government for which

a putative policymaker acts for purposes of Section 1983 liability.23 And Williams

says that the Section 1983 level-of-government analysis that Daves requires is

“different from, and irreconcilable with, Burge.”24 But Dent reads Daves and Burge

differently. He rejoins that Burge forecloses Williams’s attributable-to-the-state

argument, that Burge survives Daves, and that Burge is correct in any event.25 Dent

adds that five sections of this Court have already rejected Williams’s Daves-based

argument and held that Burge controls the question presented here.26

Williams’s motion to dismiss turns on the interplay between Daves and Burge.

So, the Court first (A) provides background on Burge, Daves, and the Section 1983

and local-government-entity-liability principles driving those decisions. The Court

then (B) considers whether Burge continues to bind the Court post-Daves. Because

the Court concludes that it does, the Court denies Williams’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

22 ECF No. 11-1 at 2–3.

23 Id. at 2.

24 Id. at 32.

25 ECF No. 13 at 1–24.

26 Id. at 3 & n.1.

A. Burge, Daves, and Local-Government-Entity Liability

Section 1983 permits Dent to sue “[e]very person” who violates his federal

rights “under color of” state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “States and their officials are not

‘persons’ under Section 1983.” Daves, 22 F.4th at 532 (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). But municipalities and “other local government

units”—including district attorney’s offices like the OPDA—are “persons” suable

under Section 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 & n.54 (1978);

see Burge, 187 F.3d at 470 (observing that “the district attorney’s office resembles

other local government entities”). Dent may sue under Section 1983 “those officials

or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local

governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular

constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.

701, 737 (1989). The “local governmental actor” here is the OPDA, and the “action

alleged to have caused the particular constitutional . . . violation” is the OPDA’s

alleged adoption of unconstitutional written and unwritten Brady policies. See id.

Dent’s “official-capacity suit against a local officer, like [Williams], is a suit

against the local government itself”—here, the OPDA. Pipkins v. Stewart, 105 F.4th

358, 360 (5th Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 658). Holding a local

government entity like the OPDA liable “require[s] three elements: ‘(1) a

policymaker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a violation of a constitutional right whose

moving force is the policy or custom.’” Arnone v. Dall. Cnty., 29 F.4th 262, 265–66

(5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 389 (5th Cir.

2018) (en banc)). Here, that means the OPDA “is not liable for just any official policy

that violated [Dent’s] constitutional rights.” Id. at 266. The OPDA instead “can be

held liable only for those [official policies] decided or acquiesced to by [an] [OPDA]

policymaker.” Id. (citing Jett, 491 U.S. at 737). Williams contends that the OPDA is

not liable for the allegedly unconstitutional written and unwritten Brady policies

underlying Dent’s Section 1983 claim because those alleged policies “were done and

made on behalf of” the State of Louisiana—not the OPDA.27 Put differently, Williams

submits that those alleged policies were “decided or acquiesced to by” a policymaker

for the State of Louisiana rather than a policymaker for the OPDA.28 Id.

“A policymaker is an ‘official[ ] whose decisions represent the official policy of

the local governmental unit.’” Id. (quoting Jett, 491 U.S. at 737). But a “dual-hat

problem” arises if the putative policymaker “sometimes acts for” one governmental

entity, “and sometimes acts for another governmental entity, like the state.” Id. When

that “dual-hat problem” is presented, courts “have to weigh state law and the

policymaker’s complained-of actions” to “decide which entity is to blame.” Id. Citing

that “dual-hat problem,” Williams submits that the State—not the OPDA—is the

“entity . . . to blame” for the allegedly unconstitutional Brady policies here. See id.

“The controlling Supreme Court decision on [that] dual-hat problem is

McMillian v. Monroe County[, 520 U.S. 781 (1997)].” Id. McMillian held that

“Alabama sheriffs, when executing their law enforcement duties, represent the State

of Alabama, not their counties.” McMillian, 520 U.S. at 793. In so holding, the

27 ECF No. 11-1 at 11 (boldface deleted).

28 Id.

Supreme Court “explained that courts do not categorize officials ‘in some categorical

all or nothing manner.’” Arnone, 29 F.4th at 266 (quoting McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785).

“Rather, courts must ‘ask whether governmental officials are final policymakers for

the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue.’” Id. (quoting

McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785). And “[t]hat inquiry turns on the official’s ‘actual

function’ under ‘relevant state law.’” Id. (quoting McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786).

Two years after McMillian issued, a Fifth Circuit panel in Burge applied

McMillian’s dual-hat analysis to a suit just like this one—an official-capacity Section

1983 suit against a Louisiana district attorney for alleged Brady violations. See 187

F.3d at 468–70. Burge held that the Louisiana district attorney’s office—not the State

of Louisiana—is the “entity . . . liable under § 1983 in an ‘official capacity’ suit for a

district attorney’s policies that cause constitutional torts related to the failure to

disclose material evidence favorable to criminal defendants.” Id. at 469. In no

uncertain terms, Burge “conclude[d] that, in a suit against a district attorney in his

official capacity under § 1983 for constitutional torts caused by the district attorney’s

policies regarding the acquisition, security, and disclosure of Brady material, a

victory for the the plaintiff imposes liability on the district attorney’s office as an

independent local entity.” Id. at 470. Burge’s level-of-government analysis rested on

McMillian and “Louisiana constitutional and statutory law . . . .” Id. at 468–70.

The en banc Fifth Circuit’s 2022 Daves opinion “clarifies how to attribute a

policymaker’s actions under McMillian.” Arnone, 29 F.4th at 267. The Daves plaintiffs

sued Dallas County, some Dallas County district and county judges, and others under

Section 1983, aiming to enjoin enforcement of Dallas County’s bail system on the

ground that it “subjected . . . indigent arrestees . . . to an unconstitutional system of

wealth-based detention.” 22 F.4th at 527–29 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Surveying Texas law, the en banc Fifth Circuit held that the Dallas County

district and county judges acted as Texas policymakers—not Dallas County

policymakers—when setting the challenged bail schedules. See id. at 540–41. The en

banc court explained that, under McMillian, courts “examine function, not funding,

when deciding whether an official is acting for the state or local government in a case

brought pursuant to Section 1983.” Id. at 533. “The focus” of that examination, the

court continued, is “the specific relevant function, i.e., the act that is being challenged

in the litigation.” Id. The en banc court “also held that McMillian’s inquiry is distinct

from what [the Fifth Circuit] use[s] to decide whether an official is a state actor for

Eleventh Amendment purposes.” Arnone, 29 F.4th at 267 (citing Daves, 22 F.4th at

534, 533–34). But the en banc court did not mention Burge or suggest that it or other

Fifth Circuit policymaker precedents applying McMillian would need to be revisited.

B. Burge’s Bindingness Post-Daves

The parties dispute Burge’s impact on Williams’s motion. Dent contends that

Burge binds the Court and forecloses Williams’s attributable-to-the state argument,29

as five other sections of this Court have held.30 But Williams submits that Burge “does

29 See, e.g., ECF No. 13 at 3.

30 See Floyd, 659 F. Supp. 3d at 728 (rejecting Williams’s argument because “the Fifth Circuit

[in Burge] has already foreclosed a holding that a district attorney is acting for the State in creating

Brady policies under Louisiana law”); Williams, 2023 WL 6160990, at *4 (rejecting Williams’s

argument because “the reasoning of Burge has not been undermined” and Burge “remains binding

precedent”); Jones, 2023 WL 3211865, at *3 (“appl[ying] the Fifth Circuit’s binding precedent in Burge

not squarely answer the question presented.”31 Williams contends that Burge’s

“reasoning has been undermined by Daves and cannot stand,”32 and that Burge “has

been implicitly overruled in relevant part by Daves.”33 Williams counsels that the

Court “should not . . . follow[ ]” the opinions of five other sections of this Court

rejecting the same Daves-based arguments because he says those opinions “are

unpersuasive.”34 But Williams does not dispute that the Court must deny his motion

if Burge does two things: (1) answers the question presented and (2) continues to bind

the Court post-Daves. Burge does both. So, the Court denies Williams’s motion.

Burge answers the question presented. That question is whether a Louisiana

district attorney’s office is the entity liable in an official-capacity Section 1983 suit

against a Louisiana district attorney for constitutional violations caused by the Brady

policies of her office. Burge says “yes”: “[I]n a suit against a district attorney in his

official capacity under § 1983 for constitutional torts caused by the district attorney’s

policies regarding the acquisition, security, and disclosure of Brady material, a

victory for the plaintiff imposes liability on the district attorney’s office as an

independent local entity.” 187 F.3d at 470; accord, e.g., Williams, 2023 WL 6160990,

at *2 (concluding that Burge “directly addressed whether Louisiana [d]istrict

[a]ttorney’s offices act as state or local entities”); Jones, 2023 WL 3211865, at *3

to conclude that Williams’s motion to dismiss should be denied”); Reeder, 2023 WL 2771481, at *3

(rejecting Williams’s argument because “Burge does control and Burge remains good and binding law

following Daves”); Smith, 2023 WL 2263841, at *7 (rejecting Williams’s argument because, among

other reasons, Burge “clearly answers the issue presented in [Williams’s] motion”).

31 ECF No. 11-1 at 18 (boldface deleted).

32 Id. at 19.

33 ECF No. 20 at 4 (boldface deleted).

34 ECF No. 11-1 at 22 (boldface deleted).

(concluding that Burge answered “the precise question presented” in Williams’s

materially identical motion); Smith, 2023 WL 2263841, at *7 (concluding that Burge

“clearly answers the issue presented” in another materially identical motion).

Burge binds the Court. “[A] legally indistinguishable decision of [the Fifth

Circuit] must be followed by other panels of [the Fifth Circuit] and district courts

unless overruled en banc or by the United States Supreme Court.” Campbell v. Sonat

Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115, 1121 n.8 (5th Cir. 1992). Williams does not

contend the Supreme Court overruled Burge; he says the en banc Fifth Circuit

“implicitly overruled”35 it in Daves. His argument fails for two independent reasons.

First, the Court may not declare Burge “implicitly overruled” by Daves. See In

re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc., 19 F.4th at 789. A district court may not avoid

applying an otherwise binding Fifth Circuit precedent based on the district court’s

first-instance conclusion that an intervening change in Fifth Circuit law has

occurred—even if one has in fact occurred. See id. (concluding a district court correctly

considered itself bound by a Fifth Circuit precedent, despite an intervening change

in law that implicitly overruled the precedent). Whether Burge survives Daves is for

the Fifth Circuit to decide in the first instance. See id. Until then, the Court is “not

free” to declare Burge “overturn[ed].” Id.; accord Jones, 2023 WL 3211865, at *3.36

35 ECF No. 20 at 4 (boldface deleted).

36 To be sure, Williams “disagrees that a district court lacks authority to follow the methodology

required under more recent en banc appellate precedent and reach the result logically required by that

methodology, even if that result cannot be reconciled with earlier circuit precedent.” ECF No. 11-1 at

31. But Williams does not engage with In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc., or cite any authority

empowering a district court to declare a Fifth Circuit precedent implicitly overruled based on an

intervening change in Fifth Circuit law that the Fifth Circuit itself has not recognized. See id.

Second, even if the Court were free to decide if Burge survives Daves, the Court

would hold that it does. “An ‘en banc decision cannot overturn a binding published

panel decision unless it does so clearly.’” United States v. Lamartiniere, 100 F.4th

625, 640 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Vega, 960 F.3d 669, 675 (5th Cir.

2020)). Daves did not “clearly” overrule Burge for reasons already given by five other

sections37 of this Court.38 Among other reasons, (1) Daves does not mention Burge or

otherwise state that pre-Daves dual-hat cases, as a class, must be revisited to conform

to the dual-hat analysis in Daves; (2) Daves analyzes the role of state-court judges

under Texas law, whereas Burge analyzes the role of Louisiana district attorneys

under Louisiana law;39 (3) Daves and Burge rely on McMillian and conduct

essentially the same inquiry under McMillian;40 and (4) the Fifth Circuit has applied

Burge post-Daves to a Section 1983 suit against a Louisiana district attorney.41

37 Williams faults some of the opinions of other sections of this Court for failing to “defend the

correctness of the Burge decision,” ECF No. 11-1 at 22; for failing to “explain how the same result

[reached in Burge] could be reached considering the factors relied on in Daves,” id. at 22–23; and for

“not discuss[ing]” or inadequately discussing “the factors that were actually considered and given

weight in McMillian, Daves, or Burge,” id. at 32. Because those opinions correctly concluded that Burge

controls and remains binding, however, there was no reason to do what Williams suggests. Burge

would be no less binding even if it were “flawed.” Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., 548 F.3d 375,

378 (5th Cir. 2008); see also, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Abbott, 604 F. Supp. 3d 463,

493 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (three-judge district court) (principles underlying the rule of orderliness

governing the treatment of published Fifth Circuit panel opinions by other Fifth Circuit panels apply

by implication and forbid district courts from “overturn[ing] decisions of prior panels”).

38 See Floyd, 659 F. Supp. 3d at 728–29; Williams, 2023 WL 6160990, at *2–4; Jones, 2023 WL

3211865, at *3–4; Reeder, 2023 WL 2771481, at *2–3; Smith, 2023 WL 2263841, at *6–10.

39 See Jones, 2023 WL 3211865, at *3; Smith, 2023 WL 2263841, at *7.

40 See Williams, 2023 WL 6160990, at *3.

41 See Smith, 2023 WL 2263841, at *3 & n.115 (citing Kimble v. Jefferson Par. Sheriff’s Off.,

No. 22-30078, 2023 WL 1793876, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2023) (per curiam)).

* * *

The Court must apply Burge because it is a published Fifth Circuit precedent

that answers the question raised in Williams’s motion, and it continues to bind this

Court post-Daves. The Court may not arrogate to itself the authority to decide in the

first instance that Daves implicitly overrules Burge. It is for the Fifth Circuit to first

decide if Burge survives Daves. But even if the Court could properly make that

decision before the Fifth Circuit does so, the Court would hold that Burge survives

Daves because Daves does not clearly overrule Burge. Finally, Burge compels the

Court to conclude that the Brady policies underlying Dent’s Section 1983 claim are

attributable to the OPDA “as an independent local entity.” 187 F.3d at 470. Because

those policies are attributable to the OPDA, Dent’s suit does not “seek to hold the

[OPDA] liable for alleged actions of Orleans Parish prosecutors that are attributable

to the State of Louisiana,”42 and Williams’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Williams’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

motion‘? to dismiss Dent’s complaint is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13th day of September, 2024.

Rie Sx

BRANDON 8. LONG □□

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

42 ECF No. 11-1 at 3.

483 ECF No. 11.

14