“[A]s per company policy, when he was on jobs that were vessel jobs, they were required to be on site a full half hour before the commencement of the job. . . . [T]he thirty minute waiting time was not part of billing records . . . .”
How later courts described this case
- “[A]s per company policy, when he was on jobs that were vessel jobs, they were required to be on site a full half hour before the commencement of the job. . . . [T]he thirty minute waiting time was not part of billing records . . . .”
- “The ‘right of a common law remedy,’ so saved to suitors, does not . . . include attempted changes by the States in the substantive admiralty law[.]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN RE COOPER T. SMITH
MOORING COMPANY, INC. CIVIL ACTION
NO: 23-1106
SECTION: “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Claimant’s Re-Urged Motion to Dissolve
Restraining Order (Doc. 22) and Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on Seaman Status (Doc. 11). For the following reasons, Claimant’s Re-Urged
Motion to Dissolve Restraining Order is GRANTED, and Petitioner’s Motion
for Summary Judgment on Seaman Status is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an incident aboard M/V MISS CHERYL on
September 21, 2021, while M/V MISS CHERYL was “providing line handling
services to pull Barge GM 5001 off ground when it was located near Bonnet
Carre Anchorage, Mile 127 a.h.p. lower Mississippi River.”1 Claimant Corey
Darcoa reported that he injured his back when handling a shackle during the
operation. At the time of the incident, Claimant was employed by Petitioner
1 Doc. 1 at 2.
Cooper T. Smith Mooring Co., Inc., and Petitioner was the owner and operator
of M/V MISS CHERYL. On December 28, 2022, Claimant Cory Daroca filed a
petition in the 29th Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Charles,
asserting Jones Act, general maritime law unseaworthiness, and maintenance
and cure claims arising out of the incident.2
On March 20, 2023, Petitioner filed a Complaint for Exoneration from or
Limitation of Liability for all claims arising out of the operation and use of M/V
MISS CHERYL on September 21, 2021.3 On April 4, 2023, this Court granted
Petitioner’s Motion for Approval of Security, Restraining Claims, and Issuance
of Notice to Claimants, setting a monition date of July 30, 2023. On July 25,
2023, Claimant filed an Answer and Claim against Cooper T. Smith Mooring
Company, asserting Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance
and cure claims in this Court.4
Petitioner thereafter moved this Court to dissolve the injunction and
allow him to proceed with his claims in state court. The Court denied the
motion without prejudice to the right to be re-urged because Claimant’s
stipulation “fail[ed] to adequately protect Petitioner’s right to limit liability.”5
Claimant now submits an amended stipulation and re-urges this Court to
dissolve the April 4, 2023 injunction. Petitioner opposes.6
LEGAL STANDARD
The Limitation Act provides in pertinent part that “the liability of the
owner of a vessel for any claim, debt, or liability described in subsection (b)
2 Doc. 9-1 at 1.
3 Doc. 1.
4 Doc. 5.
5 Doc. 22 at 5.
6 Doc. 25. See also Docs. 11 & 17 (incorporated by reference).
shall not exceed the value of the vessel and pending freight.”7 Liabilities
subject to limitation
are those arising from any embezzlement, loss, or destruction of
any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board the
vessel, any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or any act, matter,
or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred,
without the privity or knowledge of the owner.8
An owner of a vessel may bring a civil action in a district court of the United
States for limitation of liability.9
“Courts have had difficulty interpreting the interaction between the
Limitation Act and the ‘saving to suitors’ clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789.”10
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that “the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of . . . [a]ny civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”11 Tension exists between the
saving to suitors clause and the Limitation Act because “[o]ne gives suitors the
right to a choice of remedies, and the other statute gives vessel owners the
right to seek limitation of liability in federal court.”12
In easing this tension, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that “claims may
proceed outside the limitation action (1) if they total less than the value of the
vessel, or (2) if the claimants stipulate that the federal court has exclusive
jurisdiction over the limitation of liability proceeding and that they will not
seek to enforce a greater damage award until the limitation action has been
7 46 U.S.C. § 30523(a).
8 Id. § 30523(b).
9 Id. § 30529(a). See also FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. R. F(2).
10 In re Tetra Applied Techs. LP, 362 F.3d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 2004).
11 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
12 Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 449 (2001) (citing Langnes v. Green,
282 U.S. 531, 544 (1931)).
heard by the federal court.”13 “Thus, if the necessary stipulations are provided
to protect the rights of the shipowner under the Limitation Act, the claimants
may proceed in state court.”14 Once a court is satisfied that the vessel owner’s
right to seek limitation of liability is protected, the decision to dissolve the
injunction is “one of discretion in every case.”15
LAW AND ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, Petitioner asks this Court to rule on its pending
Motion for Summary Judgment on Seaman Status before ruling on Claimant’s
Motion to Dissolve Injunction. In support of this request, Petitioner argues that
“[t]he summary judgment evidence on seaman status shows [Darcoa’s] claim
is not one that is saved under the savings clause because Lewis [v. Lewis &
Clark Marine, Inc.] recognized that the injunction to allow a claim to proceed
in state court could not be used to alter maritime substantive law.”16
The Court finds Petitioner’s arguments to be misplaced. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “the saving to suitors clause preserves
remedies and the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over some admiralty
and maritime claims.”17 In interpreting which “remedies” were saved under
the clause, the Supreme Court has instructed that the saving to suitors clause
only saves “the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is
13 In re Tetra, 362 F.3d at 341 (quoting Odeco Oil & Gas Co. v. Bonnette, 4 F.3d 401, 404 (5th
Cir. 1993)). See also Langnes, 282 U.S. at 541–43 (holding that where a single claimant
files suit in state court and the owner files a petition for limitation of liability in federal
court, the federal court must allow the claimant’s action to proceed in state court while
retaining jurisdiction over the limitation of liability action); Ex Parte Green, 286 U.S. 437,
439–40 (1932).
14 In re Tetra, 362 F.3d at 341 (citing Lewis, 531 U.S. at 454).
15 Lewis, 531 U.S. at 449 (quoting Langnes, 282 U.S. at 544).
16 Doc. 16 at 9.
17 Lewis, 531 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added).
competent to give it.”18 The Court’s determination of whether Claimant has a
saved remedy therefore does not require consideration of the merits of his
claim, as suggested by Petitioner, but rather, consideration of the nature of the
proceedings at hand. Proceedings in rem—as opposed to proceedings in
personam—are not common-law remedies and therefore not saved to suitors.19
Claimant’s Jones Act claims are in personam and therefore a saved remedy
under 18 U.S.C. § 1333.20
The Court also finds that Claimant does not ask the State to “alter
maritime substantive law” as argued by Petitioner.21 Indeed, in opposition to
Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on seaman status, Claimant does
not argue for a change in law or to “ignore the 30% rule of Chandris.”22 Rather,
Claimant argues that Petitioner has undercalculated his time spent on vessels
and that he meets the durational requirement to qualify as a seaman under
Chandris v. Latsis.23 And even so, the cases cited by Petitioner are
18 Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918) (quoting Moses Taylor, 71 U.S.
411 (1866)).
19 Id. (citing Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. at 431). The Supreme Court has “defined the saving to
suitors clause as a grant to state courts of in personam jurisdiction, concurrent with
admiralty courts.” Lewis, 531 U.S. at 445 (citing Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264
U.S. 109, 123 (1924)).
20 “A Jones Act claim is an in personam action for a seaman who suffers injury in the course
of employment due to negligence of his employer, the vessel owner, or crew members.”
Lewis, 531 U.S. at 441 (internal citations omitted).
21 Doc. 16 at 9.
22 Id. at 10. Moreover, Petitioner fails to explain why a state trial court would be incapable of
applying well-established federal law to Claimant’s Jones Act claims. In fact, state courts
regularly apply “the 30% rule of Chandris.” See, e.g., Little v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 So. 2d
933, 935–36 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999); Lovejoy v. Bergeaux, 862 So. 2d 490, 494–95 (La. App.
3d Cir. 2003); Bell v. Dunn, 924 So. 2d 224, 231 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2005); Richard v. Mike
Hooks, Inc., 799 So. 2d 462, 465 (La. 2001).
23 See, e.g., Doc. 17 at 3 (“In his declaration he states that a far more substantial amount of
time, approximately seventy-five percent[,] involved activity in service of the vessel. He
states that many of the dock jobs listed on the time sheets submitted by [Petitioner] . . .
involved the use of vessels.”); id. (“[A]s per company policy, when he was on jobs that were
vessel jobs, they were required to be on site a full half hour before the commencement of
the job. . . . [T]he thirty minute waiting time was not part of billing records . . . .”). To be
inapplicable.24 Petitioner has failed to point to any state law remedy that would
change substantive admiralty law. Accordingly, each of Petitioner’s arguments
fail, and the Court declines to consider the merits of Petitioner’s Motion for
Summary Judgment on Seaman Status at this time.
The Court now turns to the merits of Claimant’s Re-Urged Motion to
Dissolve Restraining Order. Because Claimant has not stipulated that his
claims total less than the value of the vessel, the Court must consider whether
his stipulation fully protects Petitioner’s right to limit liability.25 The Fifth
Circuit has generally required that, for claims to proceed outside the limitation
action, all claimants must stipulate that “the federal court has exclusive
jurisdiction over the limitation of liability proceeding and that they will not
seek to enforce a greater damage award until the limitation action has been
heard by the federal court.”26
Claimant has filed a claim in the limitation proceeding.27 He has
consented to waive any claim of res judicata relevant to the issue of limited
sure, the Court only considers these arguments in deciding whether to first rule on
Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, as Petitioner argues that a change of
substantive law is not an available remedy to which Claimant would be entitled under the
saving to suitors clause. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1); Lewis, 531 U.S. at 445 (“The ‘right of a
common law remedy,’ so saved to suitors, does not . . . include attempted changes by the
States in the substantive admiralty law[.]”).
24 See Lewis, 531 U.S. at 445 (citing Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 123). In Red Cross Line, the
Supreme Court upheld a New York arbitration statute, holding that it did not conflict with
substantive maritime law. In so holding, the Court recognized that states may not make
changes in substantive admiralty law, but the state courts may provide a remedy in
personam, as opposed to in rem, for a cause of action over which it has concurrent
jurisdiction. Thus, the Court held that “New York, therefore, had the power to confer upon
its courts the authority to compel parties within its jurisdiction to specifically perform an
agreement for arbitration which is invalid by the general maritime law, as well as by the
law of the state . . . .” Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 123–24. In this case, Petitioner fails to
identify any state remedy that would change substantive admiralty law.
25 See Odeco, 4 F.3d at 405.
26 In re Tetra, 362 F.3d at 341 (quoting Odeco, 4 F.3d at 404).
27 Doc. 5.
liability based on any judgment obtained in the state court, and he has
conceded the petitioner shipowner’s right to litigate all issues relating to
limitation in the limitation proceeding.28 Now, Claimant has also stipulated
that “he will not seek to enforce a greater damage award until the limitation
action has been heard by this federal court.”29 Accordingly, the Court finds that
Claimant’s stipulation adequately protects Petitioner’s right to limit liability,
and the Court will exercise its discretion and permit Claimant to proceed
outside this limitation action.
Having lifted the stay of Claimant’s state court proceedings, the Court
turns to Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Seaman Status.
Considering a similar fact pattern, another section of this Court has explained:
[Petitioner] seeks partial summary judgment on [Claimant’s]
status as a Jones Act seaman. “The issue of seaman status is . . .
not jurisdictional to the limitation proceeding.” In fact, Jones Act
seaman [sic] are not the only persons entitled to file claims in
limitation proceedings. Therefore, whether [Claimant] is a Jones
Act seaman is irrelevant to this limitation proceeding.30
Claimant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Seaman status must therefore
be denied.
28 Doc. 22-1 at 1 (“[Claimant] waives any claim of res judicata concerning limited liability
based on a state court judgment and stipulates that petitioner . . . be permitted to litigate
issues relating to limitation of liability in this Court should claimant . . . obtain a judgment
in state court in excess of limitation fund provided.”) (emphasis added).
29 See id.; In re Tetra, 362 F.3d at 341 (quoting Odeco, 4 F.3d at 404).
30 Matter of Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 689, 692 (E.D. La. 1990)
(citing In re Double D Dredging Co., 467 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1972); Lloyd’s Leasing,
Ltd. v. Conoco, 868 F.2d 1447, 1448 (5th Cir. 1989)) (internal footnote omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Claimant’s Motion to Dissolve Restraining
Order (Doc. 22) is GRANTED, and Petitioner’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on Seaman Status (Doc. 11) is DENIED.
IT IS ORDERED that the injunction entered by the Court on April 4,
2023, is hereby DISSOLVED to allow Claimant to proceed in his state court
action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the injunction entered by the Court
on April 4, 2023, is hereby CONTINUED against entry of judgment and
enforcement of any recovery awarded pending the outcome of this limitation
proceeding.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 31st day of July, 2024.
g TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE