“[A] request to stay summary judgment under [Rule 56(d
How later courts described this case
- “[A] request to stay summary judgment under [Rule 56(d
- holding that employers may be vicariously liable for the intentional torts of employees acting within the course and scope of employment
- “Summary judgment is appropriate if, after discovery, there is no genuine dispute over material fact”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KEITH STEWART, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 23-2371
HOFS, LLC, ET AL. SECTION “R” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiffs Keith and Linda Stewart’s motion for
partial summary judgment.1 Defendants HOFS, LLC (“HOFS”),2 Travelers
Property Casualty Company of America (“Travelers”), and the Phoenix
Insurance Company (“Phoenix”) oppose this motion.3 Because substantial
discovery has not yet occurred, and defendants have identified discovery
necessary to present their opposition, the Court denies the motion as
premature.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the fatal shooting of Zakary Stewart by his
coworker, Brian Taylor. Taylor currently faces criminal charges in
1 R. Doc. 24.
2 R. Doc. 31.
3 R. Doc. 32.
connection with the shooting and trial is set for August 12, 2024.4 See State
of Louisiana v. Brian Taylor, Dkt. No. 0713F202, 22nd Judicial District, Div.
“G,” Parish of St. Tammany, State of Louisiana. Plaintiffs, Stewart’s
surviving father and mother, filed this action in June 2023 in Louisiana state
court seeking damages for their son’s wrongful death under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2315.1(A)(2) and article 2315.2(A)(2).5 Defendants Travelers
and Phoenix, HOFS’ insurers, removed this action in July 2023.6
Plaintiffs allege that HOFS—the owner of the auto dealership in Slidell,
Louisiana where Stewart and Taylor worked and where the shooting
occurred—is vicariously liable under Louisiana law for the alleged
intentional torts of Taylor against Stewart,7 or, in the alternative, that HOFS
was negligent in its hiring, training, supervision, management, discipline,
and retention of Taylor, and failed to take reasonable steps to protect Stewart
from Taylor’s alleged violent tendencies.8 Plaintiffs allege that Taylor shot
Stewart within the course and scope of his employment because the shooting
occurred on business premises during work hours, and had its origins in an
earlier conflict between the two about how, after detailing a car sold by
4 See R. Doc. 31-5.
5 R. Doc. 1-1.
6 R. Doc. 1.
7 Id. ¶¶ 15-22.
8 Id. ¶¶ 23-26.
Stewart, Taylor did not “bring [the car] back around and give the keys” to
Stewart, but instead “backed the vehicle up and went straight back to
detail.”9 Plaintiffs also allege that over a series of weeks leading up to the
shooting, multiple employees attempted to discuss the escalating conflict
with dealership management, who did nothing.10 Plaintiffs assert that the
inaction of those in charge of the dealership fits within a broader pattern of
an absentee employer and an overly permissive workplace, in which
employees regularly drank alcohol and smoked marijuana on the premises
during work hours.11
Plaintiffs now seek partial summary judgment declaring HOFS
vicariously liable for Taylor’s actions or that HOFS’ negligence caused
Stewart’s wrongful death.12 Defendants have filed a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(d) declaration averring that they cannot present facts essential
to justify their opposition because evidence regarding the shooting is
currently being held by the State as a part of Taylor’s criminal proceedings.13
9 See R. Doc. 24-1 at 16 (citing R. Doc. 24-7 at 55:24-57:24).
10 See id. ¶¶ 25, 34, 64, 65.
11 See id. ¶¶ 16, 18-20, 23, 68, 69, 88, 115.
12 R. Doc. 24.
13 R. Doc. 31-5.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment therefore “assumes some discovery.”
Brown v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 311 F. 3d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 2002);
see also F.D.I.C. v. Shrader & York, 991 F. 2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“Summary judgment is appropriate if, after discovery, there is no genuine
dispute over material fact”) (emphasis added). Although the Court may “cut
off discovery when the record shows that further discovery is not likely to
produce the facts needed to withstand the motion for summary judgment,” a
party must be “given a full and fair opportunity to discover information
essential to its opposition to summary judgment.” Brown, 311 F. 3d at 333.
Under Rule 56(d), the Court may “defer considering the motion [for
summary judgment] or deny it” if a “nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to
justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1). Rule 56(d) discovery motions
are “broadly favored and should be liberally granted,” because the rule is
designed to “safeguard non-moving parties from summary judgment
motions they cannot adequately oppose.” Culwell v. City of Fort Worth, 468
F. 3d 868, 871 (5th Cir. 2006). The proper “way of requesting additional
time for discovery is for the nonmoving party to present an affidavit
containing specific facts explaining [its] failure to respond to the adverse
party’s motion for summary judgment via counter affidavits establishing
genuine issues of material fact for trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc.,
939 F. 2d 1257, 1266 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Raby v. Livingston, 600 F. 3d
552, 561 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[A] request to stay summary judgment under [Rule
56(d)] must set forth a plausible basis for believing that specified facts,
susceptible of collection within a reasonable time frame, probably exist and
indicate how the emergent facts, if adduced, will influence the outcome of
the pending summary judgment motion.”).
III. DISCUSSION
A Rule 56(d) denial of plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment
is appropriate here.
Defendants have identified by declaration specific discovery they need
and the relevance of what is sought. Specifically, defendants seek evidence
now held by the State in the criminal proceeding, including text messages
between Stewart and Taylor in the period leading up to the shooting and
surveillance footage of the shooting and the altercation that preceded it.14
Defendants also state that they intend to depose other employees who had
previously provided testimony only in the context of the workers’
compensation proceedings, where the defense attorney asked no questions
in the majority of depositions.15
Defendants have also demonstrated that this further discovery may
influence the outcome of the pending summary judgment motion. Three
weeks elapsed between the alleged argument about how Taylor returned a
detailed car and the shooting.16 Text messages between Stewart and Taylor
leading up to the shooting may undermine plaintiffs’ allegation that the
conflict between Stewart and Taylor was primarily employment rooted. See
LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216, 216 (La. 1974) (holding that employers
may be vicariously liable for the intentional torts of employees acting within
the course and scope of employment). Parties have already testified that
during those three weeks, Stewart and Taylor had multiple arguments “over
race”17 that involved “a lot of name-calling”18 and included Stewart calling
14 See R. Doc. 31-5.
15 See R. Doc. 32 at 7-10.
16 See. R. Doc. 24-2 ¶¶ 50-51, 64, 111.
17 R. Doc. 24-7 at 58:18.
18 R. Doc. 24-6 at 42:13-14.
Taylor “racial slurs and threatening him to do this and that.”19 Defendants
may also obtain relevant testimony from employee witnesses to rebut
plaintiffs’ allegations of vicarious liability and negligence.
And lastly, defendants have explained why this discovery could not
have been obtained earlier. The District Attorney’s Office for the 22nd
Judicial District Court maintains sole possession of the text messages
between Taylor and Stewart and other evidence to be used in the criminal
proceedings and will not produce any of the discovery to any party in the civil
litigation while the criminal case is still pending.20 Defendants have
therefore met their burden under Rule 56(d), and plaintiffs’ motion for
partial summary judgment is denied. See Fed. R. Civ. P 56(d)(1).
19 R. Doc. 32-22 at 17:16-17.
20 R. Doc. 31-5 ¶¶ 9, 11.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary
judgment is DENIED as premature.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _22nc_ day of July, 2024.
Lorn Varo
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE