Anderson v. Wexford Health Services

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LAMAR ANDERSON,

#M32519,

Plaintiff, Case No. 22-cv-00221-SPM

v.

MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI, et al.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on motions for summary judgment on the issue of

exhaustion filed by Defendants Siddiqui, Caldwell, Lang, and Crain. (Doc. 34, 37). Plaintiff has

filed a response in opposition to the motions, and Defendants Siddqui and Caldwell filed a reply

brief. (Doc. 42, 43). For the following reasons, the motions are denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Lamar Anderson, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is

currently incarcerated a Western Illinois Correctional Center, initiated this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights that occurred at Menard Correctional

Center (“Menard”). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that over seven years ago he developed

eczema while at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”). (Doc. 1). The condition causes his

skin to crack, bleed, and itch. After trying various treatments, the medical providers at Stateville

began to successfully treat Plaintiff’s eczema with Benadryl and an ointment. At some point,

Plaintiff was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”), where the providers

prescribed different medication for the eczema. These new medications did not work, and

eventually, Plaintiff resumed taking Benadryl and using the ointment prescribed at Stateville. The

medical staff wrote the details concerning the unsuccessful and successful treatments in Plaintiff’s

medical files.

On December 4, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred to Menard. Once Plaintiff finished his

eczema medication, Benadryl and the ointment, that had previously been prescribed and successful

at both Stateville and Pontiac, medical staff at Menard refused to renew his prescriptions. Rather,

they prescribed medicines that they knew did not effectively treat his condition. Plaintiff wrote a

grievance, and Defendants renewed the Benadryl prescription. However, when this prescription

was completed, Nurse Lang refused to provide Plaintiff with a refill and stated they were going to

try another medication. Plaintiff spoke to Dr. Siddiqui, Dr. Caldwell, and Nurse Practitioner

Moldenhauer about how the new treatment for his eczema was not working. Despite these

conversations, Defendants continued to not renew the Benadryl and ointment prescription.

Eventually, after filing a grievance, Plaintiff received a prescription for Benadryl and his ointment

cream, but he repeatedly would not receive timely refills or follow-up appointments.

Following review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, Plaintiff is proceeding

with an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Siddiqui, Dr. Caldwell, Nurse

Practitioner Moldenhauer, Health Care Unit Administrator Crain, and Nurse Lang for failing to

provide him adequate treatment for his eczema. (Doc. 8).

On November 13, 2023, Defendants Siddiqui, Caldwell, Crain, and Lang filed motions for

summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to

initiating this lawsuit, and therefore, his claims against them should be dismissed. (Doc. 34, 35,

37).1 Plaintiff opposes the motions. (Doc. 42).

1 Defendant Moldenhauer did not file a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion by the deadline of

November 13, 2023, so the defense is DEEMED WAIVED by this Defendant. (See Doc. 31).

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Any doubt about the

existence of a genuine issue must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Lawrence v.

Kenosha Cty., 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law when the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and admissions, along

with affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

Courts generally cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment. See

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is not to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, when the

motion for summary judgment pertains to a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies,

the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing and resolve contested

issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s efforts to exhaust. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th

Cir. 2008); Roberts v. Neal, 745 F. 3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 2014). Where there is no disputed issue

of fact, a hearing is not necessary.

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA states, in pertinent part, that “no action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,

by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that

“[t]his circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion”). Exhaustion of available

administrative remedies must occur before the suit is filed. Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398

(7th Cir. 2004). Moreover, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in

the place, and at the time, the prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d

1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2005). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to properly utilize a prison’s grievance

process, “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner’s claim

can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. The statutory purpose of the PLRA is to

“afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing

the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). This allows the prison

administration an opportunity to fix the problem or to reduce the damages and perhaps shed light

on factual disputes that may arise in litigation even if the prison administration’s solution does not

fully satisfy the prisoner. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023-24. To allow otherwise would frustrate the

purpose of the grievance process. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 526 (2002).

III. Grievance Procedure

As an inmate in the custody of IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance

procedures laid out in the Illinois Administrative Code (“grievance procedures”). 20 ILL. ADMIN.

CODE § 504.800, et seq. The grievance procedures direct an inmate is to file a grievance first with

the Counselor within 60 days of the discovery of an incident. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §

504.810(a). The grievance form must:

[C]ontain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,

including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the

subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision does not

preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are not

known, but the offender must include as much descriptive information about the

individual as possible.

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through routine

channels are then sent to a Grievance Officer. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.820(a). The

Grievance Officer will review the grievance and provide a written response to the inmate. See 20

ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). The Grievance Officer must submit his findings to the Chief

Administrative Officer (“CAO”) within two months after receiving the grievance. 20 ILL. ADMIN.

CODE § 504.830(e). The CAO then reviews the findings and recommendation of the Grievance

Officer and issues a written decision to the inmate. Id. If the inmate is not satisfied with the

response, he can file an appeal with the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). See 20 ILL.

ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal within 30 days after the date of the

decision by the CAO. Id. Only after a grievance is reviewed by the ARB is it deemed exhausted.

See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023–24.

ANALYSIS

There is one grievance that Defendants do not dispute was filed properly according to

grievance procedures by Plaintiff, Grievance #236-10-21. In this grievance, which was filed as an

emergency, Plaintiff recites the difficulties of receiving effective and consistent treatment for his

eczema over the past six years at Stateville, Pontiac, and now at Menard. (Doc. 42, p. 41-42). He

states that after his transfer to Menard in 2016, he had to file grievances in order to receive proper

care for his eczema. He was eventually seen by a dermatologist who prescribed a cream and

Benadryl. Despite being given a prescription by a specialist, he continues to not receive timely

refills, and he routinely is not scheduled for follow-up exams with a nurse or a doctor when he

completes his prescriptions, even after submitting medical care requests. As of filing the grievance,

the last doctor he saw was Defendant Moldenhauer, who wrongly reduced his Benadryl

prescription to one pill a day. Moldenhauer told Plaintiff that he would again refer Plaintiff to see

a dermatologist, but Plaintiff complains that he has not had an appointment. Plaintiff also grieves

that he has been in segregation for a week and been denied Benadryl and his ointment since his

cell transfer. He states that he has stopped nurses and submitted sick call slips requesting his

medicine but was told that “getting Benadryl was a onetime thing.” Plaintiff requests to see a “skin

doctor or a medical judge,” and to have all his “rights to file a 2-1401 about this on-going situation

[he has] been having for the past 6 years.” Plaintiff writes, “This is a[n] emergency. [I’m] in pain.”

(Id.).

Defendants argue that Grievance #236-10-21 cannot serve to exhaust Plaintiff’s claims

because it does not meet the grievance content requirements laid out in the grievance procedures

and fails to properly put Menard on notice of the alleged problems involving them. The grievance

procedures specifically direct inmates to provide the “name of each person who is the subject of

or who is otherwise involved in the complaint” or “include as much descriptive information about

the individual as possible.” (Doc. 35, p. 13; Doc. 37, p. 7) (citing 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 504.810(c)).

In Grievance #236-10-21, Plaintiff does not name the Defendants or describe their individual

conduct or their participation in his care. Defendants state that Plaintiff’s failure to identify them

and include sufficient factual details regarding his allegations against them means that this

grievance cannot exhaust his claims.

Plaintiff argues that he wrote Grievance #236-10-21 to grieve the overall poor medical care

he had received for his skin condition at Menard. (Doc. 42, p. 11-12). He points out that in the

grievance he provides details about his treatment since 2015 and how he has had to continuously

file grievances and sick call requests in order to be seen by a dermatologist and receive medication

refills. Plaintiff argues that Grievance #236-10-21 sufficiently informs Menard that he has been

denied adequate medical care and an effective course of treatment by all the doctors and nurses

who have treated him since his transfer. (Id.).

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Grievance #236-10-21 meets the content requirements

of the grievance procedures and sufficiently put prison officials on notice regarding his issues with

receiving adequate medical care while at Menard. Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, Grievance

#236-10-21 is not limited to Plaintiff’s discontentment with his treatment by Moldenhauer. He

clearly grieves with sufficient particularity the ongoing issues he has had with his treatment since

his transfer. Although, Plaintiff does not name the individual defendants in his grievance, this

omission is not “fatal to the issue of exhaustion.” See Arce v. Wexford Health Services, No. 18-cv-

1348-SMY-GCS, 2019 WL 6702692, at *5 (Oct. 9, 2019). The grievance process is not intended

to provide individual notice to each defendant who might be sued later, and a grievance is not “per

se inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances.” Jones v.

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). In cases such as this, “where Plaintiff is claiming a broad denial

of treatment by the health care unit as a whole, he will not be found at fault for failing to name

each, individual health care provider.” Morgan v. Carter, No. 12 C 6445, 2012 WL 5877481, at

*2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2012). In Grievance #236-10-21, Plaintiff clearly states that he is continually

is being denied effective treatment and needed medication. He also claims he is not being

scheduled for necessary appointments with medical providers, inside and outside the facility. The

grievance serves its function of providing Menard officials with (1) notice of Plaintiff’s constant

issues receiving adequate medical care for his eczema, which involves all members of his

healthcare team, and (2) enough information for officials to investigate and attempt to alleviate the

problem. See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 219;

Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013)). Thus, the grievance successfully serves to

exhaust Plaintiff’s claims against medical providers Dr. Siddiqui, Dr. Caldwell, and Nurse Lang.

As for Health Care Administrator Crain, Plaintiff claims that she was deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs and contributed to the denial of adequate medical care by

reviewing his grievance and providing false information in her response. (Doc. 1, p. 4). Because

Crain was a part of the grievance process and provided a detailed response to the Counselor after

reviewing Grievance #236-10-21, Plaintiff did not need to file a separate, additional grievance

against Crain. See Barrow v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 14-CV-800-NJR-DGW, 2015 WL

5010104, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 24,2014) (“Relevant case law demonstrates that a previously

submitted grievance will suffice to exhaust for future events so long as the prisoner remained in

the same situation.”). “[C]ourts have found that prison officials who are named in grievance

responses, or who directly participate in fielding grievances have ample notice for exhaustion

purposes.” Tacket v. Mitchell, No. 22-cv-1260-DWD, 2024 WL 1483988, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 5,

2024) (citations omitted). Grievance #236-10-21 provided Crain with notice of his dissatisfaction

with the care he was receiving, and she had an opportunity to investigate and intervene if necessary,

and therefore, he exhausted his claims against her.

Because the Court finds that Grievance #236-10-21 served to exhaust Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendants, the Court will not address the other three grievance also submitted by

Defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment.2

DISPOSITION

For the reasons stated above, the motion for summary judgment filed by Caldwell and

Siddiqui is DENIED, and the motion for summary judgment filed by Crain and Lang is DENIED.

(Doc. 34, 37).

2 Grievance dated February 1, 2017, Grievance #434-3-18, and Grievance #191-11-19.

The stay on merits discovery is LIFTED, and the parties can proceed with discovery on

the merits. A new scheduling order will be entered by separate order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 21, 2024

s/Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge