Opinion

Haywood v. Wexford Health Sources Inc.

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Sep 3, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.4%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

)

DONALD HAYWOOD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 22-cv-1007-RJD

v. )

)

ANTHONY WILLS, et al., )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff, formerly incarcerated within the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”),

filed this lawsuit pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Doc. 1. He alleged

that Defendants violated his Constitutional rights at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”).

The Court recruited counsel for him. Doc. 114. Now pending before the Court is a Motion for

Summary Judgment on the issue of administrative remedy exhaustion (Docs. 122 and 123) filed

by Defendant Michael Moldenhauer. Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 130) and, as explained

further, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED. Also pending is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to file

Third Amended Complaint. Doc. 131. Defendants do not object, and Plaintiff’s Motion is

GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s claim against Physician Assistant Michael Moldenhauer

Following the Court’s initial threshold review conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1915A,

Plaintiff’s case proceeded as a single claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution against multiple defendants, including “John Doe Physician

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Assistant.” Plaintiff (through his Court-recruited counsel) named Physician Assistant (“PA”)

Michael Moldenhauer in his First Amended Complaint. Doc. 38. In the Second Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he suffered from a debilitating autoimmune disease and that, until

September 9, 2021, Plaintiff had been incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center and was

transferred to the University of Illinois Medical Center in Chicago every six weeks for treatment.

Doc. 98, ¶¶19, 20. Plaintiff transferred to Menard Correctional Center on September 9, 2021 and

saw PA Moldenhauer on September 9, 2021.1 Doc. 130, ¶3. PA Moldenhauer told Plaintiff

that he had too many permits and “you’re used to the way people up north treat you; I’m going to

wake you up fast because this is a white man’s prison.” Id., ¶31. PA Moldenhauer terminated

most of Plaintiff’s permits, including one that allowed him to wear arm braces for chronic joint

and bone pain. Id. Plaintiff told PA Moldenhauer that he was having significant stomach pain,

and PA Moldenhauer said that “he was done” and Plaintiff “wanted too much.” Id., ¶32.

Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance on that same day regarding his medical permits. Doc.

98-1, p. 5.

On September 22, 2021, Plaintiff was transferred to Cook County Correctional Center for

a resentencing hearing. Doc. 98, ¶36. On September 23, 2021, the Warden at Menard

determined Plaintiff’s emergency grievance was not an emergency and should be submitted

“according to normal procedure.” Doc. 98-1, p. 5. However, at that point, Plaintiff was at the

1 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleged that he saw Defendant Moldenhauer on September 14, 2021, not

September 9. In his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff explains that he actually saw Defendant

Moldenhauer on September 9, 2021 and he corrects the date of that visit in his proposed third amended complaint.

Doc. 131-1, ¶30. The date of the visit is a genuine issue of material fact because Plaintiff submitted his emergency

grievance on September 9; if Plaintiff did not see Michael Moldenhauer until September 14, then Plaintiff likely could

not have exhausted his administrative remedies against him. Considering that Defendant Moldenhauer did not

respond to Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Material Facts, and considering the record in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff (as the Court must on Defendant’s summary judgment motion), the Court considers September 9, 2021 to

be the date of Plaintiff’s encounter with Defendant Moldenhauer.

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Cook County Correctional Center and did not return to Menard until February 2022. Doc. 98,

¶36.

Exhaustion Requirements

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), prisoners are required to exhaust available administrative

remedies prior to filing lawsuits in federal court. “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each

step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Pozo v. McCaughtry,

286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies

have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on

the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.” Perez v.

Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). “[A]ll dismissals under § 1997e(a)

should be without prejudice.” Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004).

An inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections must first submit a

written grievance within 60 days after the discovery of the incident or problem to his or her

institutional counselor, unless certain discrete issues are being grieved. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §

504.810(a). The grievance must contain the following:

…. factual details regarding each aspect of the offender's complaint, including what

happened, when, where and the name of each person who is the subject of or who

is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision does not preclude an offender

from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are not known, but the

offender must include as much descriptive information about the individual as

possible.

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.870(b).

If the complaint is not resolved through a counselor, the grievance is considered by a

Grievance Officer who must render a written recommendation to the Chief Administrative Officer

— usually the Warden — within 2 months of receipt, “when reasonably feasible under the

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circumstances.” Id. §504.830(e). The CAO then advises the inmate of a decision on the

grievance. Id.

The inmate may request that his grievance be treated as an emergency by sending it directly

to the CAO. Id. §_504.840. If the CAO determines that the grievance constitutes an emergency,

he/she will expedite its processing. Id. §_504.840(b). If the CAO determines that expedited

review is not necessary, the grievance will be returned to the inmate with instructions to submit it

through the regular channels. Id. §_504.840(c).

An inmate may appeal the decision of the Chief Administrative Officer in writing within

30 days to the Administrative Review Board for a final decision. Id. §_504.850(a); see also Dole

v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2006). The ARB will submit a written report of its

findings and recommendations to the Director who shall review the same and make a final

determination within 6 months of receipt of the appeal. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d) and

(e). Inmates who intend to file suit are required to follow all steps and instructions in the

grievance process before filing with the Court in order to “[allow prisons] to address complaints

about the program [they administer] before being subjected to suit, [reduce] litigation to the extent

complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and [improve] litigation that does occur by leading to the

preparation of a useful record.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). However, an inmate is

only required to exhaust the administrative remedies that are available to him. Ross v. Blake, 578

U.S. 632, 642 (2016).

Defendant Moldenhauer’s Summary Judgment Motion

The burden rests with Defendant to establish that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Smallwood v. Williams, 59 F. 4th 306, 315 (7th Cir.

2023). Defendant Moldenhauer contends that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

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remedies regarding Defendant Moldenhauer’s refusal to issue permits to Plaintiff upon his arrival

at Menard. In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Moldenhauer does not address the

emergency grievance Plaintiff submitted on September 9, 2021, presumably because Defendant

Moldenhauer’s Motion presupposes that Plaintiff saw him on September 14, 2021 (as alleged in

the Second Amended Complaint). However, Defendant Moldenahauer’s summary judgment

motion also does not address Plaintiff’s transfer to Cook County Correctional Center from

September 22, 2021-February 2022 and whether there were administrative remedies available to

Plaintiff during that time.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion does not carry his burden on summary judgment to

establish that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

Considering the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, it appears that Plaintiff

attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding Defendant Moldenhauer’s refusal to

issue him permits on September 9, 2021 by submitting an emergency grievance on that same day.

However, Plaintiff’s transfer to Cook County Correctional Center on September 22, 2021 (one day

before the Warden at Menard determined Plaintiff’s grievance was not an emergency and Plaintiff

should complete the standard grievance process) rendered the remainder of the grievance process

unavailable to Plaintiff. Defendant Moldenhauer’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 122) is

DENIED.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 131)

Since Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint, the Court recruited new counsel for

Plaintiff because his previous counsel retired. Docs. 109, 114. Plaintiff’s new counsel filed a

Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint. Doc. 131. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(a) provides that a party may amend a pleading and that leave to amend should be freely given

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"when justice so requires." The Seventh Circuit maintains a liberal attitude toward the amendment

of pleadings "so that cases may be decided on the merits and not on the basis of technicalities."

Stern v. U.S. Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir. 1977). The Circuit has recognized that

"the complaint merely serves to put the defendant on notice and is to be freely amended or

constructively amended as the case develops, as long as amendments do not unfairly surprise or

prejudice the defendant." Toth v. USX Corp., 883 F.2d 1297, 1298 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Winger

v. Winger, 82 F.3d 140, 144 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 649

(7th Cir. 1985)) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create [a system] in which the complaint

does not fix the plaintiff's rights but may be amended at any time to conform to the evidence.").

Leave to amend may be denied because of undue delay, dilatory motive or futility. Guise v. BMW

Mortgage, LLC, 377 F.3d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint clarifies that he saw Defendant Moldenhauer on

September 9, not September 14. Doc. 131-1, ¶30. Finding that Plaintiff's proposed third

amended complaint is neither unduly delayed nor futile nor brought with dilatory motive and

noting that Defendants do not object, Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. 131) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is

ORDERED to file his proposed third amended complaint as the Third Amended Complaint by

September 5, 2024.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 3, 2024

s/ Reona J. Daly

Hon. Reona J. Daly

United States Magistrate Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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