Jackson v. RKW Residential

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-cv-23595-ALTMAN

RIONNE JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

RKW RESIDENTIAL,

Defendant.

______________________________/

ORDER

Our Plaintiff, Rionne Jackson, has brought a civil-rights complaint against Defendant RKW

Residential for refusing to accept Jackson’s payment towards a lease application. See Complaint [ECF

No. 1] at 4 (“I submitted an application along with my tender of payment to the property manager

[and] they did not apply it to the account required for them to open.”). But “[f]ederal courts have an

obligation to examine sua sponte their own jurisdiction over a case, notwithstanding the contentions of

the parties.” DeRoy v. Carnival Corp., 963 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999)). After reviewing the Complaint, we find that we lack

subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. We therefore DISMISS the Plaintiff’s

Complaint. He’ll have thirty days to file an amended complaint.

THE LAW

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511

U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The “party bringing the claim,” therefore, must first “establish[ ] federal subject

matter jurisdiction” before a federal court can review a claim on its merits, Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v.

APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254,

1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam))— “[r]egardless of whether [the] plaintiff is represented by a veteran

attorney or, as in this civil case, proceeds pro se,” Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1365 (11th Cir. 1994)

Although “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys

and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003), that

“leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party” or to “rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action,” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132

F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998). And, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-

matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); see also Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all

in any cause.” (cleaned up)).

ANALYSIS

“Congress granted federal courts jurisdiction over two general types of cases: cases that ‘arise

under’ federal law, [28 U.S.C.] § 1331, and cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000

and there is diversity of citizenship among the parties, [28 U.S.C.] § 1332(a).” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.

v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435, 437 (2019). Jackson appears to be trying to invoke our federal-question

jurisdiction under § 1331, since he alleges that the Defendant violated the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §

1983 and “Section 16 [of the] Federal Reserve Act.” Complaint at 3. But Jackson has failed to show

that we can exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over his suit under either § 1331 or § 1332.

First, we don’t have federal-question jurisdiction over this action because Jackson cannot allege

“a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Hakki v. Sec’y, Dep’t

of Veterans Affs., 7 F.4th 1012, 1031 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513

(2006)). The Complaint relies on two federal statutes—§ 1983 and 12 U.S.C. § 411 (otherwise known

as Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act)—but Jackson doesn’t make out a colorable claim under

either statute. As to § 1983, “a plaintiff must demonstrate both (1) that the defendant deprived [him]

of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law and (2) that such a deprivation occurred under

color of state law.” Arrington v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). The

“under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private conduct, no

matter how discriminatory or wrongful.’” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)

(quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)). Since the sole Defendant in this case is a private

“leasing agency,” see Complaint at 7, Jackson cannot state a claim under § 198, see, e.g., Shell v. Foulkes,

362 F. App’x 23, 28 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Given that Shell’s complaint alleged only private action by his

landlord and not state action, the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a

§ 1983 claim.”); Dumond v. Carrington, 2022 WL 1121741, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2022) (Altman, J.)

(“Unsurprisingly, the Eleventh Circuit routinely affirms dismissals of state-law, landlord-tenant claims

that plaintiffs have disguised as § 1983 claims.” (first citing Davis v. Ryan Oaks Apartment, 357 F. App’x

237, 238 (11th Cir. 2009); and then citing Douse v. Metro Storage, LLC, 770 F. App’x 550, 551 (11th Cir.

2019))).

Nor can Jackson use Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act as a jurisdictional hook. That

statute gives the “Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System” the power to “put[ ] Federal

reserve notes into circulation by supplying them to the [Federal Reserve banks].” United States v. Wells

Fargo & Co., 943 F.3d 588, 603 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 411–12). The Federal Reserve Act (it

goes without saying) has nothing to do with this case—which involves a property manager’s alleged

refusal to “appropriately apply [Jackson’s] payment” to a lease application. Complaint at 7. And, even

if it did, Section 16 “does not provide plaintiffs with a private right of action and therefore does not

establish federal question jurisdiction.” White v. Lake Union Ga. Partners LLC, 2023 WL 6036842, at *2

(N.D. Ga. July 14, 2023); see also Timothy Francis McTigue Tr. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 2018 WL

11652222, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2018) (Bloom, J.) (“[T]here is no basis for jurisdiction of a private

action under 12 U.S.C. § 411.”). Because this isn’t a civil action that “aris[es] under the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States,” we lack federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331.

Second, Jackson hasn’t alleged that the parties are completely diverse, so we cannot exercise

diversity jurisdiction under § 1332. There are two requirements to our diversity jurisdiction. One, the

plaintiff must show that “there is complete diversity of parties, meaning that no plaintiff is a citizen

of the same State as any defendant.” Jackson, 587 U.S. at 450; see also Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, 154

F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity; every plaintiff

must be diverse from every defendant.”). Two, the “amount in controversy” between the parties must

“exceed[ ] $75,000.” Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005).1 Jackson is “a domiciliary of

Miami-Dade County in the state of Florida,” Complaint at 7, so he’s a citizen of Florida for diversity

purposes, see McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Citizenship is equivalent to

‘domicile’ for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.”).

But we simply have no clue what RKW Residential’s citizenship is (or even what type of

business entity it is). All Jackson says is that the Defendant “is authorized to conduct business within

the [S]tate of Florida[.]” Complaint at 7. This won’t do. To establish diversity jurisdiction, Jackson

first needs to tell us whether the Defendant is a corporation or a non-corporate entity, such as an LLC

or partnership. If it’s a corporation, the Defendant will be a citizen “of its state or foreign country of

incorporation and its principal place of business.” ECB USA, Inc. v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., __ F.4th __,

2024 WL 3975776, at *4 (11th Cir. Aug. 29, 2024). If the Defendant is an LLC or some other non-

corporate entity, then it “is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen.”

Flintlock Constr. Servs., LLC v. Well-Come Holdings, LLC, 710 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013) (cleaned

up). It will be Jackson’s responsibility to “sufficiently allege the citizenship[ ]” of RKW Residential by

“list[ing] the citizenship of all the members of the [company].” Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast

SCH Holdings LLC, 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004). Of course, if the Defendant is a citizen of

1 Jackson has met the “amount-in-controversy” requirement under § 1332 by alleging that “[t]he

disputed amount stands at $156,408[.]” Complaint at 7.

Florida under the applicable test, we won’t be able to exercise diversity jurisdiction over this case. See

Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287 (“Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity; every plaintiff must be

diverse from every defendant.”’).

In general, a pro se plaintiff must be given “at least one opportunity to amend [his] claims . . .

if 1t appears a more carefully drafted complaint might state a clatm upon which relief can be granted|[.)”

v. Bieluch, 251 F.3d 1045, 1048 (11th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). We'll therefore allow Jackson to file

an amended complaint, which must establish a proper basis for our subject-matter jurisdiction over

the case. But Jackson won’t be given any other chances to meet this baseline requirement. If Jackson’s

amended complaint fails to establish our subject-matter jurisdiction, we'll dismiss it w2thout leave to

amend.

* * *

Accordingly, we hereby ORDER and ADJUDGE as follows:

1. The Plaintiff's Complaint [ECF No. 1] is sva sponte DISMISSED without prejudice for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction.

2. The Plaintiff shall file his amended complaint by October 18, 2024.

3. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case for administrative purposes.

DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District “aC 18, 2024.

ROYK.ALTMAN ———™

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: Rionne Jackson, pro se