Opinion

Galinov v. Nazarov-Galinov

Court
District Court, S.D. Florida
Filed
Jul 30, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.3%

“[t]ransparency is pivotal to public perception of the judiciary’s legitimacy and independence”

How later courts described this case

  • “[t]ransparency is pivotal to public perception of the judiciary’s legitimacy and independence”
  • “What happens in the federal courts is presumptively open to public scrutiny.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

CASE NO. 24-cv-22337-WILLIAMS/GOODMAN

DMITRI GALINOV,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAREN NAZAROV-GALINOV,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S EXPEDITED MOTION

TO SEAL DOCKET ENTRIES 18 AND 19

Plaintiff Dmitri Galinov moves [ECF No. 20], on an expedited basis, for an Order

sealing Defendant Karen Nazarov-Galinov’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 18] and her

Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 19]. The parties are

embroiled in an acrimonious divorce proceeding in Miami-Dade Circuit Court.

Plaintiff’s expedited motion contends that Defendant attached hundreds of pages

of “confidential” records from those state court divorce proceedings to these submissions.

Defendant contends that this Court should abstain from remaining involved in this case

in order to avoid interfering with the divorce case pending in state court. United States

District Judge Kathleen M. Williams referred this matter to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 and the Magistrate Rules of the Local Rules for the Southern District of Florida. [ECF

No. 4].

For the reasons outlined below, the Undersigned denies the expedited motion.

Plaintiff has not alleged that the documents he wants to remain secret are subject

to the attorney-client privilege, nor the work-product doctrine. He does not contend that

they are trade secrets, nor does he say that they disclose personal health information,

medical test results, Social Security numbers, or the proprietary business information of

a competitor.

Instead, he wants the documents and information relegated to under-seal status

because, like in many lawsuits, he prefers that the public not have access to the allegations,

evidence, and purported evidence which parties routinely hurl at each other in high-

energy litigation.

But this position runs afoul of the fundamental open nature of our court records.

All court filings are presumptively a matter of public record and cannot be sealed

absent specific legal authority or court order. See Local Rule S.D. Fla. 5.4(a); Hicklin Eng'g,

L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006) (“What happens in the federal courts is

presumptively open to public scrutiny.”).

To be sure, information exchanged during pretrial discovery is not generally

considered to be public information and can be restricted upon a showing of good cause.

See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785

F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1986). However, parties generally cannot keep from public view

discovery materials filed with the court in connection with dispositive motions. See

Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Leucadia Inc.

v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 1993).

A district court may, in its discretion, enter a protective order shielding discovery

materials from public disclosure upon a showing of good cause and when the balance of

interests favor entering the order. See Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d

1304, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th

Cir. 1985). Because trial courts are “in the best position to weigh fairly the competing

needs and interests of parties affected by discovery” and because of “[t]he unique

character of the discovery process,” trial courts have “substantial latitude” to determine

when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required. Seattle

Times Co., 467 U.S. at 36.

Here, the Undersigned focuses on the fact that the documents and information

from the divorce litigation concern substantive rulings which this Court will need to make

soon -- not a mere discovery dust-up where there is not the same public access to

substantive records. Specifically, the material relates to Plaintiff’s request for a

preliminary injunction and Defendant’s challenges to this Court’s jurisdiction and

whether it should even entertain (or abstain from) this case in the first place.

When discovery materials are filed in connection with a substantive pretrial

motion, the public’s common law right of access attaches to the documents and the veil

of secrecy must be lifted. Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 480 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir.

2007). The sealing proponent may overcome this common law right of access by showing

good cause, i.e., that the balance tips in its favor to keep the material sealed and against

the public’s common law right of access. Id. at 1246 (citation omitted); Emess Capital, LLC

v. Rothstein, 841 F.Supp.2d 1251, 1254-55 (S.D. Fla. 2012).

In addition, the “confidential” records are not sealed in the state court divorce

litigation. To the contrary, they are already in the public record on the State Court docket.

Indeed, Plaintiff’s motion to seal concerns documents that anyone (regardless of whether

they are an attorney or have any involvement in this divorce proceeding) can review by

simply going in person to the State’s Clerk’s Office. Therefore, to provide one illustration:

a journalist, one of Plaintiff’s neighbors, a blogger, a stay-at-home parent, a business

adversary, or a long-time enemy could easily review the same state court documents

which Plaintiff wants to seal here.

And they could access those records without proffering a reason why.

Given this practical reality (i.e., the toothpaste is already out of the tube, or the

toothpaste can be readily squeezed out of the state court tube by anyone, at any time), the

Undersigned denies the motion -- albeit without prejudice. If Plaintiff can pinpoint

specific documents in the attachments which generate bona fide grounds for under-seal

status (e.g., to provide a few purely hypothetical illustrations: a party’s medical diagnosis

is being discussed; there are comments about a person’s atypical sexual habits; or there

are comments about a minor child’s learning challenges in school), then he may file a

renewed motion targeting the specific references. But, if Plaintiff chooses to travel down

that road, then he must, as required by Local Rule 7.1, first have a pre-filing conferral

with defense counsel.

Sealing the submissions generates practical difficulties for the Court, a point which

is not discussed in Plaintiff’s expedited motion. If the Court were to seal these two

submissions, then any Report and Recommendations or Order on the related motions

would either have to be sealed or filed in redacted fashion. This would require the Court

to comb through the ruling to see which portions, if any, arose from an under-seal

comment or exhibit.

Redacting a ruling’s discussion on these substantive matters could implicate

serious public policy concerns. Cf. Vineyard Vines, LLC v. MacBeth Collection, L.L.C., No.

3:14CV01096(SALM), 2019 WL 12024583, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 1, 2019) (discussion of

negative consequences arising from redacting the total amount of fees and costs claimed).

“[P]ublic confidence in our judicial system cannot long be maintained where

important judicial decisions are made behind closed doors and then announced in

conclusive terms to the public, with the record supporting the court’s decision sealed

from public view.” Id. (quoting Procaps S.A. v. Patheon Inc., No. 12-24356-CIV, 2013 WL

5928586, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2013)); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco v. Fed. Trade

Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he natural desire of parties to shield

prejudicial information contained in judicial records from competitors and the public . . .

cannot be accommodated by courts without seriously undermining the tradition of an

open judicial system. Indeed, common sense tells us that the greater the motivation [an

entity] has to shield its operations, the greater the public’s need to know.”).

Moreover, the Undersigned is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s conclusory claim that

“the records are irrelevant to any contested issues or [Defendant’s] argument” and “only

serve ‘to gratify private spite or promote public scandal’ through the publication of ‘the

painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case.’” [ECF No. 24, p.2]. To the

contrary, “[a]ny step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view

makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat and requires rigorous justification.” United

States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[t]ransparency is pivotal to public perception

of the judiciary’s legitimacy and independence”).

By way of summary, the Undersigned denies the motion without prejudice but if

Plaintiff has good grounds to contend that specific documents and/or information

watrants under-seal status then I will give him the opportunity to submit a more-focused

motion.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, in Miami, Florida, on July 30, 2024.

JL If

Jénathan Goodman

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

The Honorable Kathleen M. Williams

All Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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