Opinion

Merryman v. St. Johns River Water Management District

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Oct 30, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.3%

outlining four broad categories of impermissible shotgun pleadings

How later courts described this case

  • outlining four broad categories of impermissible shotgun pleadings
  • admonishing district court for not striking shotgun complaint on its own initiative
  • explaining that the “‘established procedure . . . requires that only one licensed to practice law may conduct proceedings in court for anyone other than [her]self’” (internal quotation omitted)
  • affirming denial of class certification because a pro se litigant cannot bring an action on behalf of others similarly situated

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

WILLIAM MERRYMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs. Case No. 3:24-cv-658-MMH-SJH

ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER

MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court sua sponte. Plaintiffs initiated this

action on July 1, 2024, with the filing of a form Complaint for Violation of Civil

Rights (Doc. 1). On July 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an amended Complaint for

Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 6; Amended Complaint) naming fifty-eight

Defendants. Upon independent review, the Court finds that the Amended

Complaint is improperly drafted and due to be stricken. In the analysis that

follows, the Court will discuss the problems with the Amended Complaint as

currently drafted and provide Plaintiffs with the opportunity to file a second

amended complaint. Plaintiffs should carefully review this Order and consider

using the resources available for pro se litigants, cited below, before filing a

second amended complaint. Failure to comply with the pleading requirements

set forth in this Order may result in the dismissal of this action without further

notice.

While pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those

drafted by an attorney, Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986),

the pro se litigant is still required to “conform to procedural rules.” Riley v.

Fairbanks Capital Corp., 222 F. App’x 897, 898 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Loren

v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002)).1 The Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure (Rule(s)) require that a complaint contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule

8(a)(2). “A complaint need not specify in detail the precise theory giving rise to

recovery. All that is required is that the defendant be on notice as to the claim

being asserted against him and the grounds on which it rests.” Evans v.

McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 964 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

However, despite Rule 8(a)’s liberal pleading requirement, “a complaint must

still contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material

1 All filings with the Court must be made in accordance with the requirements of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Florida (“Local Rules”). The Local Rules are available for review at

www.flmd.uscourts.gov, and a copy may be obtained by visiting the Clerk’s Office. The Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure are available in the law libraries of state courthouses.

In citing to Riley, the Court notes that it does not rely on unpublished opinions as

binding precedent; however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them

persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir.

2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

elements of a cause of action.” Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th

Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted).

In addition, Rule 10 requires a plaintiff to state his claim “in numbered

paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.”

Rule 10(b). Rules 8 and 10 work together “to require the pleader to present his

claims discretely and succinctly, so that his adversary can discern what he is

claiming and frame a responsive pleading, the court can determine which facts

support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon

which relief can be granted, and, at trial, the court can determine that evidence

which is relevant and that which is not.” Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079,

1082 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). “Where the allegations of a complaint

are ‘vague and ambiguous - leaving the reader to guess at precisely what the

plaintiff [is] claiming,’ the court should order a repleader.” Holbrook v. Castle

Key Ins. Co., 405 F. App’x 459, 460 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Byrne v. Nezhat,

261 F.3d 1075, 1128 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Significantly, a complaint may not run afoul of the Eleventh Circuit’s

prohibition against shotgun pleading. See generally Weiland v. Palm Beach

County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015) (outlining four

broad categories of impermissible shotgun pleadings). The Eleventh Circuit has

unequivocally instructed that shotgun pleadings are “altogether unacceptable.”

Cramer v. State of Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Cook v.

Randolph County, 573 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We have had much to

say about shotgun pleadings, none of which is favorable.”) (collecting cases).

Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has engaged in a “thirty-year salvo of criticism

aimed at shotgun pleadings, and there is no ceasefire in sight.” See Weiland,

792 F.3d at 1321 & n.9 (collecting cases). As the Court in Cramer recognized,

“[s]hotgun pleadings, whether filed by plaintiff or defendant, exact an

intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchanneled

discovery, and impose unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the

court’s parajudicial personnel and resources.” Cramer, 117 F.3d at 1263. When

faced with the burden of deciphering a shotgun pleading, it is the trial court’s

obligation to strike the pleading on its own initiative, and force the plaintiff to

replead to the extent possible under Rule 11. See id. (admonishing district court

for not striking shotgun complaint on its own initiative); see also Weiland, 792

F.3d at 1321 n.10 (“[W]e have also advised that when a defendant fails to [move

for a more definite statement], the district court ought to take the initiative to

dismiss or strike the shotgun pleading and give the plaintiff an opportunity to

replead.”).

In Weiland, the Eleventh Circuit identified four types of shotgun

pleadings. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23. As relevant here, one such type

of improper pleading occurs where the drafter “commits the sin of not

separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Id. at

1322–23 n.13 (collecting cases). Indeed, Rule 10(b) requires that: “[i]f doing so

would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or

occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count or defense.” See Rule 10(b);

see also Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Central Fla. Cmty. College, 77 F.3d 364,

366 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a properly drawn complaint “will present

each claim for relief in a separate count, as required by Rule 10(b), and with

such clarity and precision that the defendant will be able to discern what the

plaintiff is claiming and to frame a responsive pleading” (internal footnote

omitted)). Another form of shotgun pleading is a complaint “replete with

conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any

particular cause of action.” See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322. In addition,

complaints “asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions,

or which of the defendants the claim is brought against,” are also characterized

as impermissible shotgun pleadings. Id. at 1323. “The unifying characteristic

of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and

in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims

against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id.

Here, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint violates several of the foregoing

principles. Plaintiffs fail to use numbered paragraphs as required by Rule 10

and instead present their claims in narrative form. This is improper. In

addition, Plaintiffs adopt a shotgun manner of pleading in that they fail to

separate each cause of action or claim for relief into a different count. For

example, “Claim 1” is titled “Violation of Right to Petition and Due Process by

SJRWMD” and appears to include claims premised on the right to petition

under the First Amendment, procedural due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment, a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of those rights, as

well as “deprivation of [Plaintiffs’] right to honest services, and more.” See

Amended Complaint at 35. Similarly, in “Claim 2,” Plaintiffs appear to group

together several causes of action premised on distinct constitutional and

statutory violations. See id. at 38-39 (listing purported violations of the First

Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and “Federal Environmental Statutes”).

This practice continues throughout the Amended Complaint.

Moreover, while Plaintiffs do make some effort to broadly identify which

claims are against which Defendants and how each Defendant is generally

responsible, the Amended Complaint is nevertheless replete with vague and

conclusory allegations making it difficult to discern the precise claim being

asserted and the factual basis for each claim as to each Defendant.

Compounding the problem, Plaintiffs conclude the Amended Complaint with a

lengthy list of the relief they seek, including extensive injunctive and

declaratory relief. But these demands for relief are largely untethered to any

particular Defendant or cause of action. As such, it is entirely unclear which

claims allegedly give rise to Plaintiffs’ right to the myriad forms of relief they

seek.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court will strike Plaintiffs’ Amended

Complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading and direct Plaintiffs to file a

second amended complaint. See Holbrook, 405 Fed. Appx at 460-61 (“The

district court has the inherent authority sua sponte to require the plaintiff to

file a more definite statement.”). In repleading, Plaintiffs must use numbered

paragraphs to assert their allegations, “each limited as far as practicable to a

single set of circumstances.” See Rule 10(b). Pursuant to Rules 8(a)(2) and

10(b), in the second amended complaint Plaintiffs shall set forth separate

causes of action in numbered counts against specific defendants and which

present “a short and plain statement” of Plaintiffs’ claims demonstrating that

Plaintiffs are entitled to relief. See Rules 8(a)(2), 10(b). Plaintiffs must avoid

the shotgun pleading deficiencies set forth above and describe in sufficient

detail the factual basis for each of their claims, how each Defendant is

responsible, and the relief they seek.

Because the Court is ordering Plaintiffs to replead, the Court will deny

the pending motions to dismiss as moot and set a new briefing schedule. The

Court also will deny Plaintiffs’ recently filed Motion for Preliminary Injunction

(Doc. 39) without prejudice to refiling, if warranted, after submission of a

properly drafted complaint. In drafting the second amended complaint,

Plaintiffs should carefully review this Order as well as the arguments raised in

the motions to dismiss. Further opportunities to amend are unlikely and failure

to comply with the pleading requirements set forth in this Order may result in

the dismissal of this action without further notice.

Prior to filing the second amended complaint, the Court encourages

Plaintiffs to consider consulting with a legal aid organization that offers free

legal services, such as Jacksonville Area Legal Aid (JALA). Alternatively, the

Jacksonville Federal Court Bar Association operates a Legal Information

Program. Through that program, pro se litigants may meet with a lawyer for

free to ask general questions about procedures governing cases in federal court.

Plaintiffs may call the Clerk’s Office at (904) 549-1900 to request an

appointment. More information about the program is available on the Court’s

website at www.flmd.uscourts.gov/legal-information-program.2

Finally, the Court notes that although the caption of the Amended

Complaint lists both William and Ashley Merryman as Plaintiffs, only William

Merryman has signed the pleadings and other filings in this case. Pursuant to

Rule 11, “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed . . .

2 If Plaintiffs choose to continue to proceed without the assistance of an attorney, the

Court recommends that they visit the Court’s website (www.flmd.uscourts.gov). Under the tab

entitled, “For Litigants,” there is a section entitled, “Litigants without Lawyers.” In this

section, there are many resources available to pro se parties, including a Handbook called

“Guide for Proceeding Without A Lawyer.” If Plaintiffs do not have access to the internet, one

free copy of the Handbook may be obtained by visiting or mailing the Clerk’s Office and

presenting this Order to the deputy clerk.

by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.” As such, if Ashley

Merryman intends to proceed as a plaintiff in this action, she must sign the

second amended complaint, and any subsequent motions or filings, on her own

behalf. Indeed, William Merryman, as a pro se litigant, is not permitted to

represent Ashely Merryman’s interests in this lawsuit. See Timson v. Sampson,

518 F.3d 870, 873–74 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the “‘established

procedure . . . requires that only one licensed to practice law may conduct

proceedings in court for anyone other than [her]self’” (internal quotation

omitted)); Johnson v. Brown, 581 F. App’x 777, 781 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming

denial of class certification because a pro se litigant cannot bring an action on

behalf of others similarly situated); Franklin v. Garden State Life Ins., 462 F.

App’x 928, 930 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The right to appear pro se, however, is limited

to those parties conducting ‘their own cases’ and does not apply to persons

representing the interests of others.”).

In accordance with the foregoing, it is

ORDERED:

1. The amended Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 6) is

STRICKEN.

2. Plaintiffs may file a second amended complaint consistent with the

directives of this Order on or before November 19, 2024. Failure to do

so may result in a dismissal of this action.

3. The pending motions to dismiss (Docs. 18, 19, 20) are DENIED without

prejudice as moot.

4, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 39) is DENIED

without prejudice.

5. Defendants shall respond to the second amended complaint on or before

December 10, 2024.

6. If Defendants file any motions pursuant to Rule 12, Plaintiffs shall have

up to and including January 7, 2025, to respond to those motions.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 30th day of

October, 2024.

United States District Judge

Ie11

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Pro Se Parties

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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