Evans v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

ADRIAN EVANS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-195-WFJ-LSG

RICKY DIXON, SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant Ricky Dixon’s motion to

dismiss pro se Plaintiff Adrian Evans’s civil-rights complaint. (Doc. 15). Although

afforded the opportunity, Mr. Evans did not file an opposition. (Doc. 16). Upon careful

consideration, the Court denies the motion to dismiss.

I. Background

For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the

complaint as true. Mr. Evans is a Florida prisoner incarcerated at Avon Park Correctional

Institution. (Doc. 1 at 4). He practices Islam, which requires him to “grow a free-flowing

beard.” (Id. at 5). In October 2023, prison officials ordered him to “shave his beard to a

[length] not exceeding” a half inch. (Id.) This directive followed from the grooming policy

of the Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”), which states that “[a]ll inmates shall

elect either to be clean shaven or to grow and maintain a half-inch beard.” (Doc. 15-3 at

7). Mr. Evans alleges that, by forcing him to shave his beard, prison officials “substantially

burden[ed] [his] sincere Muslim religious [beliefs].” (Doc. 1 at 5). Accordingly, he seeks

“a religious exemption from the [FDOC’s] grooming policy [that would] permit [him] to

grow a free-flowing beard.” (Id.)

Mr. Evans sues Ricky Dixon, the FDOC Secretary, in his official capacity. (Id. at

2). He asserts that the forced shaving of his beard violated the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment. (Id. at 3).

The Secretary moves to dismiss the complaint, arguing that (1) Mr. Evans failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies, and (2) the complaint fails to state a claim under

RLUIPA or the First Amendment. (Doc. 15). As noted above, Mr. Evans did not respond

to the motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the Court must decide whether the complaint is

subject to dismissal based on the papers in the record. See Giummo v. Olsen, 701 F. App’x

922, 924 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that dismissing a complaint solely because a

motion to dismiss is technically unopposed would be an abuse of discretion); Tucker v.

United States-U.S. Postal Serv., No. 2:22-cv-13-SPC-NPM, 2022 WL 911580, at *1 (M.D.

Fla. Mar. 29, 2022) (“[C]ourts cannot grant 12(b)(6) motions just because they are

unopposed.”).

II. Standard of Review

A complaint withstands dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if

the alleged facts state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This

standard does not require detailed factual allegations but demands more than an unadorned

accusation. Id. All facts are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Consideration

should be limited “to the well-pleaded factual allegations, documents central to or

referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed.” La Grasta v. First Union Sec.,

Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

III. Analysis

A. Exhaustion

The Secretary contends that Mr. Evans failed to comply with the pre-suit exhaustion

requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Doc. 15 at 4-7). The PLRA

requires prisoners to exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before filing

suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[W]hen a state provides a grievance procedure

for its prisoners, . . . an inmate alleging harm suffered from prison conditions must file a

grievance and exhaust the remedies available under that procedure before pursuing a [42

U.S.C.] § 1983 lawsuit.” Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 2015). A

prisoner must “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the

applicable procedural rules.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The “applicable

procedural rules” “are defined by the prison grievance process itself, not by the PLRA.”

Sims v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 75 F.4th 1224, 1230 (11th Cir. 2023). Thus, courts “look

to the requirements of the applicable prison grievance system to determine the boundaries

of proper exhaustion.” Id.

The Secretary does not dispute that Mr. Evans exhausted the FDOC’s grievance

procedure. That procedure requires prisoners to “(1) file an informal grievance with a

designated prison staff member; (2) file a formal grievance with the institution’s warden;

and then (3) submit an appeal to the Secretary of the FDOC.” Dimanche, 783 F.3d at 1211.

Mr. Evans alleges—and the Secretary does not contest—that he followed this three-step

process. (Doc. 1 at 6-8).

The Secretary contends, however, that Mr. Evans was required to pursue an

additional procedure to exhaust his remedies. According to the Secretary, Mr. Evans “seeks

to change the rule that governs the permitted length of an inmate’s beard.” (Doc. 15 at 5).

Thus, the Secretary maintains, Mr. Evans was required not only to complete the three-step

grievance process, but also to submit a petition to initiate rulemaking under Fla. Stat. §

120.54(7). (Id. at 4-6). That provision allows any person “having substantial interest in an

agency rule [to] petition an agency to adopt, amend, or repeal a rule.” Fla. Stat. §

120.54(7)(a). The Secretary says that Mr. Evans was on notice of this requirement because

the FDOC’s inmate handbook states that, “[i]f you wish to request that the Department

adopt, amend, or repeal a rule, you must also file a Petition to Initiate Rulemaking.” (Doc.

15-3 at 18). Because Mr. Evans did not file a petition to initiate rulemaking, the Secretary

contends that he failed to “exhaust all of the administrative remedies available to him.”

(Doc. 15 at 6).

The Secretary has not established that Mr. Evans failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies. See Whatley v. Smith, 898 F.3d 1072, 1082 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The burden . . . is

on the defendant to show that the plaintiff has not exhausted properly his administrative

remedies.”). Another court in this district recently rejected a similar exhaustion defense. In

Denson v. Dixon, the plaintiff alleged that the FDOC’s grooming policy “prohibiting male

inmates from growing beards longer than half an inch unlawfully interfere[d] with his

statutory right under [RLUIPA] to practice his Sunni Muslim religion.” Denson v. Dixon,

No. 2:17-cv-648-JES-NPM, 2023 WL 5200482, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2023). The

defendant sought dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at *5. It was

“undisputed that [the plaintiff] exhausted the FDOC’s grievance procedures, but [the

defendant] argue[d] [that the plaintiff] was also required to challenge the grooming policy

by filing a petition to initiate a rulemaking change under Florida’s Administrative

Procedure Act.” Id. The court disagreed, reasoning that the plaintiff was “not seeking to

alter an FDOC rule.” Id. at *6. Instead, the operative complaint made “clear that [the

plaintiff sought] an exemption from—not a change of—the grooming policy.” Id. Thus,

the court held that the plaintiff’s “exhaustion of the FDOC grievance procedures satisfied

the PLRA’s pre-suit requirements.” Id.

The same logic applies here. Like the plaintiff in Denson, Mr. Evans does not seek

to amend or repeal the FDOC’s grooming policy. Rather, he requests “a religious

exemption from the [] grooming policy [that would] permit [him] to grow a free-flowing

beard.” (Doc. 1 at 5). Because Mr. Evans is not seeking to amend or repeal the grooming

policy, he was not required to file a petition to initiate rulemaking. See Cook v. Jones, No.

3:16-cv-568-TKW-EMT, 2019 WL 6868982, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2019) (inmate not

required to submit petition to initiate rulemaking because the “measure of relief for

prevailing on his claim would be the issuance of his [prayer] mat, not any change to the

rules of the FDOC”), adopted by 2019 WL 6841976 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2019). Therefore,

Mr. Evans properly exhausted his administrative remedies by completing the FDOC’s

three-step grievance process.

B. First Amendment

The Secretary argues that Mr. Evans fails to “state an actionable First Amendment

claim as to [the] FDOC’s beard grooming policy.” (Doc. 15 at 9). “To plead a valid free

exercise claim, [a plaintiff] must allege that the government has impermissibly burdened

one of his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1294

(11th Cir. 2007). “Although prison inmates retain protections afforded by the First

Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, prison officials may impose limitations on an inmate’s

exercise of sincerely held religious beliefs if the limitations are ‘reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.’” Johnson v. Brown, 581 F. App’x 777, 780 (11th Cir.

2014) (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).

Mr. Evans states a plausible free exercise claim. He alleges that the tenets of Islam

require him to “grow a free-flowing beard,” that prison officials enforced the FDOC’s

grooming policy by ordering him to “shave his beard to a [length] not exceeding” a half

inch, and that as a result he was forced to “contravene his Muslim belief[s].” (Doc. 1 at 5).

Taken as true, these allegations are sufficient to plead that the Secretary “impermissibly

burdened one of [Mr. Evans’s] ‘sincerely held religious beliefs.’” Watts, 495 F.3d at 1294.

The question becomes whether the application of the grooming policy to Mr. Evans was

“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Johnson, 581 F. App’x at 780. To

make that determination, the Court asks “(1) whether there is a valid, rational connection

between the regulation and a legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2)

whether there are alternative means of exercising the asserted constitutional right that

remain open to [Mr. Evans]; (3) whether and the extent to which accommodation of the

asserted right will have an impact on prison staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison

resources generally; and (4) whether the regulation represents an exaggerated response to

prison concerns.” Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2000).

At this early stage of the litigation, the Court “cannot evaluate whether the alleged

restrictions on [Mr. Evans’s] religious practice were reasonable in light of the[se] four . . .

factors.” Johnson, 581 F. App’x at 781; see also Saleem v. Evans, 866 F.2d 1313, 1316-17

(11th Cir. 1989) (prisoner’s free exercise claim should not be dismissed for failure to state

a claim unless the complaint’s allegations show the state has a legitimate justification for

regulating a prisoner’s religious practices or the claim is “so facially idiosyncratic” that no

state justification is required). For example, the Court cannot yet determine “whether and

the extent to which accommodation of the asserted right will have an impact on prison

staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources generally.” Hakim, 223 F.3d at 1247.

Nor can the Court evaluate whether the grooming policy “represents an exaggerated

response to prison concerns.” Id. at 1248. In these circumstances, “the facts surrounding

[the] justification for [the grooming policy] must be developed to determine whether

impermissible infringement has occurred.” Saleem, 866 F.2d at 1317. Accordingly, the

Court declines to dismiss the free exercise claim at this stage. See Tootle v. Long, No. 1:20-

cv-235-SPB-RAL, 2021 WL 3610034, at *5 (W.D. Pa. July 19, 2021) (“[O]ften a factual

record is necessary to assess whether the regulation or practice is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.”), adopted by 2021 WL 3603621 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 13,

2021).

C. RLUIPA

The Court likewise concludes that Mr. Evans states a plausible RLUIPA claim.

RLUIPA “protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their

religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission and

accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721

(2005). Under RLUIPA, “[o]nce a plaintiff proves that a challenged practice substantially

burdens his religious exercise, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the policy is

the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.” Rich v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 532 (11th Cir. 2013). “The least-restrictive-means

standard is exceptionally demanding, and it requires the government to show that it lacks

other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the

exercise of religion by the objecting party.”1 Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 364-65 (2015).

As noted above, Mr. Evans alleges that by ordering him to “shave his beard to a

[length] not exceeding” a half inch, prison officials forced him to “contravene his Muslim

belief[s],” which require “a free-flowing beard.” (Doc. 1 at 5). Accepted as true, these

allegations are sufficient to plead that the application of the grooming policy to Mr. Evans

“substantially burden[ed] his religious exercise.” Rich, 716 F.3d at 532. The burden thus

“shifts to the [Secretary] to show that the policy is the least restrictive means of furthering

1 “RLUIPA provides greater religious protection than the First Amendment.” Dorman v. Aronofsky, 36

F.4th 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2022).

a compelling government interest.” Id. This “calls for an individualized, context-specific

inquiry.” Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 981 (11th Cir. 2017).

The Secretary acknowledges that “Florida courts have permitted religious

exceptions to [the] FDOC’s half-inch beard grooming policy under RLUIPA.” (Doc. 15 at

10 (collecting cases)). The Secretary maintains, however, that the relief Mr. Evans seeks is

“distinguishable” because he “seeks to grow a ‘free-flowing’ beard, not a beard of any

defined/estimated length.” (Id.) According to the Secretary, because the FDOC has “a

compelling government interest in disallowing” free-flowing beards, Mr. Evans “fails to

state an actionable RLUIPA claim.” (Id. at 11).

This argument is unpersuasive. The Secretary is correct that Mr. Evans seeks to

grow a “free-flowing beard” in accordance with his Muslim faith. (Doc. 1 at 5). But this is

not necessarily fatal to his RLUIPA claim. In Denson v. Dixon, the plaintiff—an FDOC

inmate—sought to grow “a beard of unrestricted length.” 2023 WL 5200482, at *3. After

a two-day bench trial, the court found that the Secretary had “not shown that applying the

grooming policy to [the plaintiff], and denying his request for an exemption from the

grooming policy, [was] the least restrictive means to further any of [the FDOC’s]

compelling governmental interests.” Id. at *9. Thus, the court ruled that the plaintiff was

“entitled to a declaratory judgment that he be allowed to grow an untrimmed beard,” and

that he had “satisfied all the elements required for a permanent injunction barring the

FDOC from enforcing the grooming policy against [him].” Id.

The Secretary may or may not be able to satisfy his burden under RLUIPA in Mr.

Evans’s case. At this early stage of the litigation, however, the Court cannot say that

RLUIPA forecloses relief simply because Mr. Evans seeks to grow a “free-flowing beard.”

(Doc. 1 at 5). Further factual development is required before the Court can conduct the

“individualized, context-specific inquiry” called for by RLUIPA. Smith, 848 F.3d at 981;

see also Heywood v. Dixon, No. 4:23-cv-474-AW-MAF, 2024 WL 3676386, at *2 (N.D.

Fla. Aug. 2, 2024) (“It could be that even if [plaintiffs] allegations turn out to be true, the

burden [on his religious exercise] was still permissible [under RLUIPA]. But the

government must show that, which has not happened at this stage [i.e., the motion-to-

dismiss stage].”). Thus, the Court declines to dismiss the RLUIPA claim.?

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1. The Secretary’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) is DENIED.

2. The Secretary must answer the complaint (Doc. 1) within fourteen days of the

date of this order.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on October 16, 2024.

WILLIAM F. iS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

? The Secretary cites Smith v. Owens, 13 F.4th 1319 (11th Cir. 2021), but that case does not support

dismissal of the RLUIPA claim at the pleading stage. Smith was an appeal from a bench trial. The Eleventh

Circuit upheld as “not clearly erroneous” “[t]he district court’s determination that it was reasonable for the

[Georgia Department of Corrections] to conclude that allowing [the plaintiff] to grow an untrimmed beard

would be both unmanageable and dangerous.” /d. at 1322. But that ruling was based on the evidence

presented at trial, including the plaintiff’s “extensive disciplinary record” and criminal history. /d. at 1329.

No such evidence is before the Court in Mr. Evans’s case.

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