Rodriguez v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

IRDI REYNARDO MOTA RODRIGUEZ,

v. Case No. 8:21-cr-65-VMC-CPT

8:23-cv-396-VMC-CPT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

_______________________________/

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Irdi Reynardo Mota

Rodriguez’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. ## 1, 2; Crim. Doc. ##

113, 114), which was filed on February 9, 2023. The United

States of America responded on June 8, 2023. (Civ. Doc. #

10). Mota Rodriguez failed to file a reply. For the reasons

that follow, the Motion is denied.

I. Background

On February 18, 2021, a federal grand jury in Tampa

returned an indictment against Mota Rodriguez. (Crim. Doc. #

11). He was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess

with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine

while aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States (Count One), and possession with intent to

distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine (Count Two).

(Id.). On December 6, 2021, Mota Rodriguez entered a guilty

plea to Count One pursuant to a plea agreement. (Crim. Doc.

## 72, 75, 86, 89).

During the change of plea hearing, Mota Rodriguez

affirmed — through an interpreter and under oath — that he

had reviewed all the facts and evidence with his counsel.

(Crim. Doc. # 115 at 10). Mota Rodriguez was fully satisfied

with the advice and representation he received from counsel.

(Id.). He understood all the terms of the plea agreement and

received no outside promises in exchange for his plea. (Id.

at 18). The Court warned Mota Rodriguez that he could not

withdraw his guilty plea if his sentence was higher than he

expected. (Id. at 22). Mota Rodriguez recognized his limited

right to appeal and the valuable rights he lost, including

the right to proceed to trial. (Id. at 22–26). He also

understood the elements of the offense and that he faced a

mandatory-minimum term of 10 years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 19–

20, 25–26).

Also during the change of plea hearing, the United States

recited the factual basis, which included that the vessel was

in international waters, the vessel had no indicia of

nationality, and no one claimed a nationality for the vessel.

(Id. at 27–30). Indeed, the plea agreement asserts:

None of the individuals on board claimed to be the

person in charge, and none claimed nationality for

the vessel, after being requested to do so by an

officer authorized to enforce provisions of United

States 1aw. . . . Since no indicia of nationality

was observed on the [vessel] and no claim of

nationality was made for the vessel after a request

was made, the [vessel] was treated as without

nationality, and subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States.

(Crim. Doc. # 89 at 17-18). Mota Rodriguez agreed that those

facts were true and accurate. (Crim. Doc. # 115 at 30). When

asked if he had “any disagreement with those facts,” Mota

Rodriguez said “No, sir, everything is perfect.” (Id.).

Having determined that a factual basis supported the charges,

the Court found Mota Rodriguez’s guilty plea to be knowing

and voluntary. (Id. at 31).

The Court adjudicated him guilty. (Crim. Doc. # 86). The

Court subsequently sentenced Mota Rodriguez to 87 months’

imprisonment, a below guidelines sentence. (Crim. Doc. #

108). Mota Rodriguez did not appeal.

Now, Mota Rodriguez seeks post-conviction relief. (Civ.

Doc. ## 1, 2; Crim. Doc. ## 113, 114). The United States has

responded. (Civ. Doc. # 10). Mota Rodriguez did not file a

reply. The Motion is ripe for review.

II. Discussion

Mota Rodriguez bears the burden of proving that he is

entitled to relief under Section 2255. Rivers v. United

States, 777 F.3d 1304, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015). He raises eight

grounds for relief in his 2255 Motion. (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 1).

They are:

(1) “Petitioner was subject to violations of his

constitutional rights under the 6th Amendment to

the US Constitution requiring effective assistance

of counsel.”

(2) “Violation the [] 8th amendment requiring no

unusual or cruel punishment.”

(3) “Violations to the 5th amendment against self-

incrimination and speedy trial.”

(4) “Violations of due process of law according to

the 4th and 14th amendment to the US Constitution.”

(5) “Violation of unconstitutional law coming from

Congress ([Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act

(“MDLEA”)]).”

(6) “Violation of implementation of MDLEA requiring

a ‘stateless vessel’ that petitioner denies that

the vessel was ‘stateless’ and petitioner claims no

jurisdiction because vessel was not in ‘high

seas.’”

(7) “Violation to the congressional intention of

MDLEA because court and US government assumed

wrongly that the shipment of vessel was destined to

the US.”

(8) “Violation of prosecution by choosing US

District Court for Southern Florida Tampa Division

as the venue of the Court instead of the US District

Court of Puerto Rico that had the right venue, just

because the US District Court Of Puerto Rico, that

is in the 1st US Circuit had found MDLEA lacking

constitutional validity in the case of US V. Jessy

Davila (January 2022), choosing Southern Florida as

a venue deprived defendant of his 14th amendments

rights and violation of due process of law.”

(Id.).

These claims are timely raised. (Civ. Doc. # 10 at 4).

But the government argues that grounds two through eight are

procedurally defaulted and, regardless, all claims fail on

the merits.

A. Procedural Default

The Court agrees with the United States that Mota

Rodriguez could have raised his arguments contained in

Grounds Two through Eight on direct appeal. (Civ. Doc. # 10

at 6). But Mota Rodriguez did not file an appeal and, thus,

failed to exhaust these arguments on direct appeal. Thus, he

defaulted these claims.

To avoid the default, Mota Rodriguez must establish one

of two narrow exceptions. The exceptions to the requirement

that Mota Rodriguez have raised these arguments on direct

appeal are (1) “cause and actual prejudice” or (2) that he is

“actually innocent.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,

615 (1998).

Mota Rodriguez has not established cause and prejudice.

Cause “ordinarily requires a showing of some external

impediment preventing [Mota Rodriguez] from constructing or

raising the claim.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 479

(1986). “Ineffective assistance of counsel may satisfy the

cause exception to a procedural bar.” United States v. Nyhuis,

211 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000).

Although he does not address his counsel’s conduct in

relation to cause and prejudice (or explicitly address cause

and prejudice at all), the Court liberally construes Mota

Rodriguez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Ground

One as also being an attempt to establish cause. However,

this construed attempt to establish cause fails because the

“claim of ineffective assistance must have merit.” Id. For

the reasons explained later as to Ground One, Mota Rodriguez’s

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has no merit.

Because Mota Rodriguez cannot establish cause, the Court need

not address prejudice.

Nor has Mota Rodriguez shown that he is actually

innocent. “Actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere

legal insufficiency.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 615 (1998). A

petitioner like Mota Rodriguez “must show that it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted

him in the light of the new evidence.” Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 327 (1995). Here, Mota Rodriguez does not claim in

his Section 2255 Motion that he is actually innocent. Nor has

he presented any evidence of actual innocence — that is,

evidence making it more likely than not that no reasonable

juror would have found him guilty. See Korcz v. United States,

No. 219CR00193RDPJHE1, 2023 WL 2998483, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Apr.

18, 2023) (“Petitioner has not presented any evidence

suggesting she is actually innocent, so she may only avoid

default by demonstrating cause and prejudice.”).

Thus, Mota Rodriguez has procedurally defaulted on

Grounds Two through Eight. His Section 2255 Motion as to these

grounds must be denied for this reason and no evidentiary

hearing is required. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494

(1991) (“The petitioner’s opportunity to meet the burden of

cause and prejudice will not include an evidentiary hearing

if the district court determines as a matter of law that

petitioner cannot satisfy the standard.”).

B. Merits

Alternatively, the Court agrees with the United States

that all grounds fail on the merits.

1. Ground Five

In Ground Five, Mota Rodriguez asserts that he suffered

a “Violation of unconstitutional law coming from Congress

(MDLEA).” (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 1). According to Mota Rodriguez,

“the MDLEA law is lacking constitutional validity because it

exceeded the power of US Congress.” (Id. at 2). He also claims

that the MDLEA is unconstitutional as applied to him because

“he and the other two passengers of the ship established a

claim of Dominican Republic’s sovereignty by claiming

nationality to that country thus again asserting lack of

jurisdiction of US Courts.” (Id.).

The argument that the MDLEA is facially unconstitutional

fails because “[t]he constitutionality of the MDLEA is well

established by circuit precedent.” Borja v. United States,

No. 8:22-cr-97-TPB-AEP, 2024 WL 3090556, at *2 (M.D. Fla.

June 20, 2024) (denying 2255 motion raising similar

arguments); United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284, 1292 (11th

Cir. 2023) (“To the extent Gruezo asserts that §

70502(d)(1)(B) [of the MDLEA] is facially unconstitutional,

our prior precedent forecloses his facial challenge.”), cert.

denied, 144 S. Ct. 178 (2023). The Eleventh Circuit, which

controls the decisions of this Court, “has held that the MDLEA

is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Felonies

Clause as applied to drug trafficking crimes without a ‘nexus’

to the United States.” United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949

F.3d 567, 587 (11th Cir. 2020). The Eleventh Circuit has also

held that “the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not

prohibit the trial and conviction of aliens captured on the

high seas while drug trafficking because the MDLEA provides

clear notice that all nations prohibit and condemn drug

trafficking aboard stateless vessels on the high seas.” Id.

Mota Rodriguez’s reliance on the First Circuit’s United

States v. Davila-Reyes, 23 F.4th 153 (1st Cir. 2022), reh’g

en banc granted, opinion withdrawn, 38 F.4th 288 (1st Cir.

2022), and on reh’g en banc, 84 F.4th 400 (1st Cir. 2023), is

unavailing. The Eleventh Circuit has “decline[d] to adopt the

holding of the First Circuit’s now-withdrawn opinion in

Davila-Reyes given [the Eleventh Circuit’s] precedent

concluding that other provisions of the MDLEA are

constitutional under the Felonies Clause.” United States v.

Santos-Santana, No. 22-10367, 2022 WL 17973602, at *7 (11th

Cir. Dec. 28, 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Vasquez-Rijo v.

United States, 143 S. Ct. 2599 (2023).

Likewise, Mota Rodriguez’s argument that the MDLEA is

unconstitutional as applied to him lacks merit. Mota

Rodriguez acknowledged under oath at his change of plea

hearing that the vessel was in international waters at the

time of the interdiction, the vessel had no indicia of

nationality, and no one claimed a nationality for the vessel

when asked. (Crim. Doc. # 115 at 27-30); see Cabezas-Montano,

949 F.3d at 589 n.14 (finding that the Coast Guard boarding

team’s questions are “sufficient” to establish the vessel is

stateless if they “ask all defendants if anyone wished to

make a claim of nationality for the vessel” because then “any

individual who possessed the authority to make a claim of

registry or nationality for the vessel was given the

opportunity to do so at the request of a duly authorized

officer”). Thus, as Mota Rodriguez agreed, “the [vessel] was

treated as without nationality, and subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States.” (Crim. Doc. # 115 at 29).

Mota Rodriguez has not satisfied the heavy burden of

showing that his statements under oath admitting these facts

during his plea colloquy were false. See Winthrop-Redin v.

United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014)

(“[B]ecause Winthrop–Redin made statements under oath at a

plea colloquy, ‘he bears a heavy burden to show his statements

were false.’” (citation omitted)); see also Patel v. United

States, 252 F. App’x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2007) (“There is a

strong presumption that statements made during the plea

colloquy are true. Consequently, a defendant bears a heavy

burden to show that his statements under oath were false.”

(citations omitted)). The Court does not credit Mota

Rodriguez’s new conclusory allegations that the vessel was

not stateless and was not in international waters. (Civ. Doc.

# 2 at 1-2, 4).

Furthermore, by virtue of pleading guilty, Mota

Rodriguez waived all non-jurisdictional arguments, including

the argument that his vessel was not stateless. See Wilson v.

United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A

defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives all

nonjurisdictional challenges to the constitutionality of the

conviction, and only an attack on the voluntary and knowing

nature of the plea can be sustained.”); United States v. Ruiz,

811 F. App’x 540, 543 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Ruiz’s guilty plea

also means he has waived his arguments that the government

proffered insufficient evidence to support his conviction and

that the district court relied on improper evidence to show

that the vessel was stateless and therefore subject to the

United States’ jurisdiction under the MDLEA. Ruiz’s argument

that his vessel was not stateless is a challenge to the

district court’s finding that the Coast Guard complied with

the MDLEA, not to the subject matter jurisdiction of the

district court.” (emphasis added)).

For these reasons, the Motion is denied as to Ground

Five.

2. Grounds Three, Four, and Six through Eight

In Grounds Three, Four, Six, Seven, and Eight, Mota

Rodriguez contends his conviction should be set aside because

(1) he was not brought before a court within 72 hours, (2)

the correct venue was Puerto Rico, (3) his right against self-

incrimination was violated, and (4) his offense had no nexus

to the United States. (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 1-2, 6). Each argument

fails.

Regarding venue, the MDLEA explicitly provides that a

defendant “may be tried in any district” if “the offense was

begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere outside

the jurisdiction of any particular State or district.” 46

U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2). Thus, it was not improper for this case

to be brought in this Court.

Next, Mota Rodriguez is incorrect that there is a 72-

hour deadline to bring a defendant before a magistrate judge.

Rather, a person arrested outside the United States must be

brought before a magistrate judge “without unnecessary

delay.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(B). “[V]arious factors are

considered in determining whether a delay was unnecessary,

including: (1) the distance between the location of the

defendant’s arrest in international waters and the U.S. port

he was brought to; (2) the time between the defendant’s

arrival at the U.S. port and his presentment to the magistrate

judge; (3) any evidence of mistreatment or improper

interrogation during the delay; and (4) any reason for the

delay, like exigent circumstances or emergencies.” Cabezas-

Montano, 949 F.3d at 591. Here, Mota Rodriguez has not

established that the either ten-day or fourteen-day delay

before he appeared before a magistrate judge was

unreasonable. See Id. at 593 (finding, under plain error

review, that a 49-day delay was not unreasonable for

defendants arrested on the high seas more than 200 miles from

the coast of Guatemala and El Salvador); United States v.

Purvis, 768 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a

five-day delay was reasonable for defendants arrested on the

high seas approximately 350 miles from Key West).

As to his right against self-incrimination, the Eleventh

Circuit “has long recognized that the Coast Guard’s routine

stop, boarding and inspection of an American vessel on the

high seas does not normally rise to the level of custodial

detention thus requiring Miranda warnings.” United States v.

Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299, 302–03 (11th Cir. 1988); see also

Gruezo, 66 F.4th at 1292 (rejecting argument that “the MDLEA

violates [a defendant’s] Miranda rights because it does not

require law enforcement to inform the master of the vessel of

the consequences of failing to make a claim of nationality or

registry”). Thus, Mota Rodriguez has not established that his

Fifth Amendment right was violated by the Coast Guard here.

Additionally, Mota Rodriguez’s due process rights were

not violated, even if there was no “nexus” between the offense

and the United States. See Gruezo, 66 F.4th at 1293 (“Gruezo

fails to show that the absence of a ‘minimum contacts’ or

‘nexus’ requirement in the MDLEA violates the Due Process

Clause.”); United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1186

(11th Cir. 2016) (rejecting argument that “the MDLEA violates

the Due Process Clause because it does not require proof of

a nexus between the United States and a defendant”). Indeed,

the Eleventh Circuit “has held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause does not prohibit the trial and conviction of

aliens captured on the high seas while drug trafficking

because the MDLEA provides clear notice that all nations

prohibit and condemn drug trafficking aboard stateless

vessels on the high seas.” Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 587.

Notwithstanding the above, Mota Rodriguez’s knowing and

voluntary guilty plea forecloses each of the arguments in

Grounds Three, Four, and Six through Eight. “A valid guilty

plea [] renders irrelevant — and thereby prevents the

defendant from appealing — the constitutionality of case-

related government conduct that takes place before the plea

is entered.” Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 182 (2018).

Therefore, these arguments are waived. See Wilson, 962 F.2d

at 997 (“A defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives all

nonjurisdictional challenges to the constitutionality of the

conviction, and only an attack on the voluntary and knowing

nature of the plea can be sustained.”); United States v.

Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Castillo’s

guilty plea forecloses his argument ‘that the 19 day delay

before [he] appeared before a magistrate [judge] . . . [was]

unreasonable’ and ‘violate[d] due process.’” (citation

omitted)); Tiemens v. United States, 724 F.2d 928, 929 (11th

Cir. 1984) (guilty plea waives speedy trial and due process

challenges in a section 2255 proceeding); Franklin v. United

States, 589 F.2d 192, 194–95 (5th Cir. 1979) (guilty plea

waives claims regarding Miranda warnings, coerced

confessions, perjury, and illegal searches and seizures in a

section 2255 proceeding).

Finally, to the extent Mota Rodriguez references the

Fourth Amendment briefly (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 3-4), the Court

agrees with the United States that this claim is not

cognizable. (Civ. Doc. # 10 at 5 n.2); see also Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) (“[W]here the [government]

has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of

a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require

that a [] prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on

the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional

search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”). Regardless,

as mentioned before, Mota Rodriguez waived this argument by

pleading guilty. See Wilson, 962 F.2d at 997 (“A defendant

who enters a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional

challenges to the constitutionality of the conviction, and

only an attack on the voluntary and knowing nature of the

plea can be sustained.”).

The Motion is denied as to these grounds.

3. Ground Two

In Ground Two, Mota Rodriguez argues that his Eighth

Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment was

violated by the Coast Guard when they detained him. (Civ.

Doc. # 2 at 1). He complains that he was “transferred to the

US Coast Guard vessel chained, left to sleep [] on the floor,

without a mattress and under unsanitary conditions, for at

least 10 days before being transferred to US territory in

Tampa, Florida.” (Id. at 2).

The Court agrees with the United States that this claim

“is conclusory, unsupported, and insufficient to entitle him

to relief.” (Civ. Doc. # 10 at 17); see United States v.

Jones, 614 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Appellant Jones first

contends that the Government engaged in a conspiracy to

violate his constitutional rights. Appellant states no

specific facts in support of his allegation and there is

nothing in the record that suggests or implies that such a

conspiracy existed. Jones’ conclusory statement, therefore,

is insufficient to state a constitutional claim.”); Tejada v.

Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that

conclusory statements, unsupported by specific facts or the

record, are insufficient to demonstrate entitlement to habeas

relief).

Furthermore, this claim is waived because Mota Rodriguez

pled guilty. See Class, 583 U.S. at 182 (“A valid guilty plea

[] renders irrelevant — and thereby prevents the defendant

from appealing — the constitutionality of case-related

government conduct that takes place before the plea is

entered.”); United States v. Rodriguez-Diaz, No. 8:18-cr-343-

SDM-MRM, 2023 WL 2264140, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2023)

(denying 2255 motion alleging, among other things, cruel

treatment by the Coast Guard because petitioner’s guilty plea

waived such challenges).

The Motion is denied as to Ground Two.

4. Ground One

In Ground One, Mota Rodriguez asserts he “was subject to

violations of his constitutional rights under the 6th

Amendment to the US Constitution requiring effective

assistance of counsel.” (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 1). He argues that

his counsel was ineffective for not raising the argument that

either the “MDLEA is unconstitutional or it was applied in an

unconstitutional way to” Mota Rodriguez. (Id. at 5). Mota

Rodriguez further states that counsel was ineffective “by not

rising [sic] any of these violations [of Mota Rodriguez’s

Eighth and Fifth Amendment rights] at his plea hearing or his

sentencing hearing and for coercing verbally [Mota Rodriguez]

to plead guilty to an unconstitutional law and or an

unconstitutional way the law was enforce[d].” (Id. at 6).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must show that (1) his counsel’s

performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance

prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, Mota

Rodriguez must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence

“that particular and identified acts or omissions of counsel

‘were outside the wide range of professionally competent

assistance.’” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314

(11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). In other words, Mota

Rodriguez must show that “no competent counsel would have

taken the action that his counsel did take.” Id. at 1315. In

deciding whether an attorney’s performance was deficient,

courts are “highly deferential” and “indulge [the] strong

presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable and

that counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise

of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 1314 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

To satisfy Strickland’s second prong — prejudice — Mota

Rodriguez must show that “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “[I]f

a claim fails to satisfy the prejudice component, the Court

need not make a ruling on the performance component.” Ortiz

v. United States, No 8:15-cr-409-VMC-JSS, 2017 WL 6021645, at

*2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2017).

This claim fails. To the extent Mota Rodriguez now claims

in one sentence that his counsel coerced him into pleading

guilty, this conclusory allegation is insufficient to entitle

him to relief. See Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1217 (“The

district court is entitled to discredit a defendant’s newly-

minted story about being threatened when that story is

supported only by the defendant’s conclusory statements.”);

Borja, 2024 WL 3090556, at *3 (“Parra Borja’s one-sentence

claim in Ground Two that counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by not protecting his constitutional rights is

vague, conclusory, unsupported, and insufficient to sustain

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”). Also, his

earlier statements under oath at his change of plea hearing

refute this new allegation. Mota Rodriguez swore at his change

of plea hearing that no one “threaten[ed], coerce[d], or

force[d] [him] in any way to get [him] to consent to pleading

guilty.” (Crim. Doc. # 115 at 9-10). He agreed that no one

made him any promises “to get [him] to consent to pleading

guilty” and that he had an opportunity “to review all of the

facts and all of the evidence in this case with [his] lawyer.”

(Id. at 10). Mota Rodriguez cannot now claim otherwise. See

Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1217 (“[B]ecause Winthrop–Redin

made statements under oath at a plea colloquy, ‘he bears a

heavy burden to show his statements were false.’” (citation

omitted)). Mota Rodriguez has not satisfied the heavy burden

of showing that his statements at his change of plea hearing

were false. Thus, his argument about counsel’s alleged

coercion fails. His plea was knowing and voluntary.

Regarding counsel’s failure to raise an argument that

the MDLEA is unconstitutional or at least unconstitutional as

applied to Mota Rodriguez, “this claim is foreclosed by

binding precedent.” Borja, 2024 WL 3090556, at *2. As the

Court already addressed in denying Ground Five, the Eleventh

Circuit has held that the MDLEA is constitutional. Cabezas-

Montano, 949 F.3d at 587. Also, Mota Rodriguez’s argument

that his vessel was not stateless or was not in international

waters lacks merit for the reasons explained as to Ground

Five. See Ruiz, 811 F. App’x at 543 (explaining that “Ruiz’s

argument that his vessel was not stateless is a challenge to

the district court’s finding that the Coast Guard complied

with the MDLEA, not to the subject matter jurisdiction of the

district court,” and such argument was waived by Ruiz’s guilty

plea).

Because Mota Rodriguez’s arguments concerning the MDLEA

lack merit, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise

those arguments. See Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1520 (11th

Cir. 1990) (“Counsel cannot be labeled ineffective for

failing to raise issues which have no merit.”); Borja, 2024

WL 3090556, at *3 (“Parra Borja demonstrates neither that

counsel performed deficiently nor that he was prejudiced by

counsel’s performance in not challenging the

constitutionality of the MDLEA. . . . [H]is challenge to the

constitutionality of the MDLEA is foreclosed by binding

precedent. And, counsel does not perform deficiently by

failing to assert an argument that binding precedent

forecloses.”). And Mota Rodriguez was not prejudiced by that

failure. See United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974

(11th Cir. 1992) (“[A] lawyer’s failure to preserve a

meritless issue plainly cannot prejudice a client.”).

Likewise, because Mota Rodriguez’s arguments about the Fifth

Amendment and Eighth Amendment lack merit for the reasons

previously explained, his ineffective assistance claim based

on those same arguments fails too.

“Furthermore, by pleading guilty, [Mota Rodriguez]

waived claims based on events that occurred before entry of

the plea, including a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel” that is not based on the decision to plead guilty.

Borja, 2024 WL 3090556, at *3; see also Wilson, 962 F.2d at

997 (“A defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives all

nonjurisdictional challenges to the constitutionality of the

conviction, and only an attack on the voluntary and knowing

nature of the plea can be sustained.”). Thus, Mota Rodriguez

has waived his ineffective assistance claim regarding

counsel’s failure to raise arguments about the MDLEA, the

Fifth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment.

The Motion is denied as to Ground One.

III. Evidentiary Hearing

As the Court readily determined that all of Mota

Rodriguez’s grounds lack merit, no evidentiary hearing is

required. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (stating that an evidentiary

hearing is not necessary if “the motion and the files and

records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is

entitled to no relief”); see also Hernandez v. United States,

778 F.3d 1230, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 2015)(“To establish that he

is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, Hernandez had to allege

facts that would prove that his counsel performed deficiently

and that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient

performance.”).

IV. Certificate of Appealability and Leave to Appeal In

Forma Pauperis Denied

The Court declines to issue a certificate of

appealability because Mota Rodriguez has failed to make a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right

as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2). Nor will the Court

authorize Mota Rodriguez to proceed on appeal in forma

pauperis because such an appeal would not be taken in good

faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (3). Mota Rodriguez shall be

required to pay the full amount of the appellate filing fee

pursuant to Section 1915(b) (1) and (2).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

Irdi Reynardo Mota Rodriguez’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc.

## 1, 2; Crim. Doc. ## 113, 114) is DENIED. The Clerk is

directed to enter judgment for the United States of America

and to close this case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

20th day of September, 2024.

tiyio 9. Henerby

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

24