Opinion

Wilkerson v. Gladson

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Sep 12, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.3%

affirming denial of class certification because a pro se litigant cannot bring an action on behalf of others similarly situated

How later courts described this case

  • affirming denial of class certification because a pro se litigant cannot bring an action on behalf of others similarly situated
  • explaining that the “‘established procedure … requires that only one licensed to practice law may conduct proceedings in court for anyone other than [her]self’” (internal quotation omitted)
  • “The right to appear pro se, however, is limited to those parties conducting ‘their own cases’ and does not apply to persons representing the interests of others.”
  • noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

MALISA WILKERSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:24-cv-372-MMH-PRL

WILLIAM MCDONALD GLADSON,

et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court sua sponte. Plaintiff Malisa Wilkerson,

who is proceeding pro se, initiated this action on July 31, 2024, by filing a

Complaint for a Civil Case (Doc. 1; Complaint) against Defendants William

Gladson, William Woods, and Peter Brigham. Wilkerson set forth her claims on

the Court’s COMPLAINT FOR A CIVIL CASE form, and also attached several

documents. See generally id. On August 9, 2024, the Court sua sponte entered

an order striking the Complaint and directing Wilkerson to file an amended

complaint. (Doc. 3; Order).

In the Order striking the Complaint, the Court explained:

Upon independent review, the Court finds that the Complaint is

deficient in several ways and due to be stricken. In the analysis that

follows, the Court will discuss some of the problems with the

Complaint and provide Wilkerson with the opportunity to file an

amended complaint consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure (Rule(s)). Wilkerson should carefully review this Order

and consider utilizing the resources available for pro se litigants,

cited below, before filing an amended complaint. Failure to comply

with the pleading requirements set forth in this Order may result

in the dismissal of this action without further notice.

Id. at 1–2. As examples of the deficiencies in Wilkerson’s Complaint, the Court

noted that Wilkerson appeared to be bringing claims on behalf of Malachi

Stocker, who did not sign the Complaint. Id. at 2–3. Accordingly, the Court

directed Wilkerson to “assert only her own legal claims” in her amended

complaint. Id. at 3.1 The Court also noted that the Complaint violated Rule

8(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), which requires that

Wilkerson present “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that” she

is entitled to relief. Id. at 6. And the Court explained that Wilkerson’s manner

of pleading in the Complaint ran afoul of the Eleventh Circuit’s prohibition on

“shotgun pleadings.” Id. at 5–7. In doing so, the Court directed Wilkerson to

authority that explains what constitutes a shotgun pleading. Id. Of particular

1 As to the need to assert only her own legal claims, the Court directed Wilkerson to Timson

v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 873–74 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the “‘established

procedure … requires that only one licensed to practice law may conduct proceedings in court

for anyone other than [her]self’” (internal quotation omitted)); Johnson v. Brown, 581 F. App’x

777, 781 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of class certification because a pro se litigant cannot

bring an action on behalf of others similarly situated); and Franklin v. Garden State Life Ins.,

462 F. App’x 928, 930 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The right to appear pro se, however, is limited to those

parties conducting ‘their own cases’ and does not apply to persons representing the interests

of others.”).

relevance to Wilkerson’s claims, the Court explained:

[I]n a case with multiple defendants, the complaint should contain

specific allegations with respect to each defendant; it is insufficient

to assert “multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or

omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.”

See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323

& n.14 (11th Cir. 2015).

Id. at 5. In assessing the Complaint, the Court concluded, “[I]t is unclear what

claim or claims Wilkerson intends to raise in this action, let alone which specific

facts support any specific claim against any specific defendant.” Id. at 7. In light

of these deficiencies, the Court terminated Stocker as a Plaintiff and directed

that Wilkerson “may file an amended complaint consistent with the directives

of this Order[.]” Id. at 8. The Court also advised Wilkerson to consult an

organization that provides free legal services, “such as Community Legal

Services of Mid-Florida,” and of the availability of legal resources for pro se

parties. Id. at 8, 8 n.2.

On September 3, 2024, Wilkerson filed a pleading captioned “Demand

Motion to Discovery, Demand Motion to Dismiss, Demand Relief and Remedy,”

which appears to be her amended complaint. See generally (Doc. 4; First

Amended Complaint).2 The first 18 pages of the First Amended Complaint

contain what appear to be copy-and-pasted sections of scripture, sayings,

2 The Court reformatted the caption slightly for readability.

Federal Rules of Evidence, and caselaw. See First Amended Complaint at 1–19.

Beginning on page 19, Wilkerson includes a section captioned “Truth and Facts”

that is a narrative summary by Stocker essentially alleging that Stocker has

been falsely detained by law enforcement in Marion County. Id. at 19. In this

section, Stocker does identify his particular grievances with each Defendant,

but, for the most part, presents only bare assertions devoid of specific factual

allegations. See, e.g., id. (“Peter … Brigham, as Administrative Judge, breached

his duty as fiduciary trustee, not to cause harm or damages, as per his oath of

office.”). On page 21, Wilkerson identifies the “Relief and Remedy Sought” and

lists eight actions she and Stocker ask the Court to take. Id. at 21. Wilkerson

signs the First Amended Complaint as an “active agent on behalf of Malachi

Stocker[.]” Id. at 22. Wilkerson also attaches three documents to the First

Amended Complaint: a notarization, a partially redacted copy of Stocker’s birth

certificate, and a power of attorney granted by Stocker to Wilkerson. See id. at

23–32.

Upon careful review of the First Amended Complaint, the Court finds that

it contains many of the same deficiencies as the original Complaint. First,

despite the Court’s directive that “[i]n the amended complaint, Wilkerson must

assert only her own legal claims,” see Order at 3, Wilkerson continues to pursue

Stocker’s claims related to his current confinement. Wilkerson appears to

believe that the power of attorney granted to her by Stocker allows her to do so,

but she is mistaken. While the Court understands how Wilkerson could have

arrived at this conclusion (given that the title of the document is, after all,

“Power of Attorney”), a power of attorney does not allow a person to sign

pleadings or other filings with a court on another person’s behalf. See, e.g., Ohio

Nat. Life Assur. Corp. v. Langkau, No. 3:06-CV-290-J-33MCR, 2007 WL

1951500, *1 (M.D. Fla. July 2, 2007) (explaining that while someone “may

prosecute his claims pro se … that privilege is personal to him as a party to

th[e] case[.] … He may not allow a non-attorney to exercise that privilege on his

behalf, even through a power of attorney. A power of attorney may not be used

to circumvent state law prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law.”)

(quotation marks, quoted authority, and alterations omitted).3

Additionally, the First Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleading. Most

of the text of the First Amended Complaint is quoted material from the Bible,

the Rules of Evidence, and unknown sources. See generally First Amended

Complaint. Importantly, there are few discernible allegations of fact, and none

that have to do with Wilkerson, the only party who signed the document. See

3 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not binding, they may be

cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir.

2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any other district

court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects.”).

generally id. Wilkerson presents no identifiable counts, nor does she identify

which factual assertions support which claims for relief or which Defendant is

implicated in any claim. As before, “as currently drafted, Defendants cannot be

expected to frame a responsive pleading.” See Order at 7 (quoted).

Significantly, this Court has the “inherent authority to dismiss a

complaint on shotgun-pleading grounds.” Sarhan v. Miami Dade Coll., 800 F.

App’x 769, 772 (11th Cir. 2020). Before doing so, “the district court must first

explain how the pleading violates the shotgun-pleading rule and give the

plaintiff at least one opportunity to re-plead the complaint.” See Arrington v.

Green, 757 F. App’x 796, 797 (11th Cir. 2018). Where the pleader fails to remedy

the problem after being given a chance to do so, dismissal of a shotgun pleading

with prejudice is warranted. See Tran v. City of Holmes Beach, 817 F. App’x

911, 915 (11th Cir. 2020). Here, the Court has provided Wilkerson an

opportunity to remedy the pleading deficiencies in her complaints and she has

failed to do so. On this record, the Court is convinced that Wilkerson is unable

or unwilling to comply with the Court’s directives and that nothing less than

dismissal will suffice. See Sarhan, 800 F. App’x at 772. “Even pro se plaintiffs

must comply with pleading rules or face judgment day,” Tran, 817 F. App’x at

915, and for Wilkerson, that day has come. Despite the Court’s guidance on the

problems with her Complaint, and an opportunity to fix those deficiencies,

Wilkerson’s First Amended Complaint remains an indecipherable shotgun

pleading and problematically, one filed on behalf of a party that Wilkerson is

not authorized to represent. While dismissal with prejudice would be

appropriate given Wilkerson’s failure to remedy her pleading, because she is

attempting to bring claims on Stocker’s behalf the Court finds it appropriate to

dismiss this action without prejudice to Stocker refiling on his own behalf.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Malisa Wilkerson’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 4) is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate any deadlines or

pending motions as moot and close the file.

3. The Clerk of the Court is further directed to enter judgment in

accordance with this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers this 12th day of September, 2024.

United States District Judge

_7-

Lc33

Copy to:

Malisa Wilkerson

2425 NW 58th Place

Ocala, FL 34475

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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