Hamilton v. Crete Carrier Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

DEMAREA HAMILTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-574-MMH-MCR

CRETE CARRIER CORPORATION

and JANE DOE,

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to

State Court and Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. 11; Motion), filed on

June 20, 2024. On July 5, 2024, Defendant Crete Carrier Corporation (Crete)

timely filed its response in opposition. See generally Defendant’s Response in

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court (Doc. 12; Response).

Accordingly, this matter is ripe for the Court’s consideration. Upon review of

the Motion, Response, and the record in this case, the Court finds that Crete

has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in

controversy in this action exceeds $75,0000. Accordingly, the Motion is due to

be granted.

I. Procedural History and Background

Plaintiff Demarea Hamilton initiated this personal injury action on

March 19, 2023, in the Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit in and for

Putnam County, Florida. See generally Complaint (Doc. 1-1 at 4–6). In his

original Complaint, Hamilton alleged that Crete employees negligently packed

a trailer with wooden pallets, which fell and struck Hamilton on October 19,

2022, when he “opened the door to the trailer.” See id. ¶¶ 6–7.1 Hamilton later

filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 6) in state court on May 22, 2023. In his

Amended Complaint, Hamilton asserts that he has incurred “permanent or

continuing” losses, and that he suffered bodily injuries “resulting in pain and

suffering, disability, disfigurement, permanent and significant scarring, mental

anguish, loss of the capacity for the enjoyment of life, expense of hospitalization,

medical and nursing care and treatment, loss of earning, loss of the ability to

1 In an abundance of caution, these facts are drawn from Hamilton’s original

Complaint and not his Amended Complaint because—despite its increased length—in the

Amended Complaint Hamilton includes less detail about the circumstances of his injuries. But

the Court emphasizes that the Amended Complaint, not the original Complaint, is the

operative pleading in this action. See Malowney v. Federal Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d

1342, 1345 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that “[a]n amended complaint supersedes a previously

filed complaint”). Notably, when a plaintiff amends his complaint, “‘the original pleading is

abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of the pleader’s averments against his

adversary.’” See Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006)).

Despite this, Hamilton argues in his Motion that “he was injured by stacked wood pallets”

while “unloading a trailer.” See Motion at 4. Regardless, even if Hamilton had included these

additional details in his Amended Complaint, it would not affect the Court’s conclusion that

this case is due to be remanded. Accordingly, the Court includes these additional facts for

completeness.

earn money, and aggravation of a previously existing condition.”2 See Amended

Complaint ¶ 17. After more than a year of litigation in state court, Hamilton

served Crete with a proposal for settlement in the amount of $4,500,000

pursuant to section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes. See Proposal for Settlement

(Doc. 1-3). Crete then removed the case to this Court on June 7, 2024. See

generally Notice of Removal (Doc. 1; Notice).

In the Notice, Crete asserts that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over

this action under § 1332(a) because the parties are completely diverse and the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See id. ¶ 2.3 According to Crete, it first

learned that this action was removable when Hamilton served his Proposal for

Settlement. Id. Although a party ordinarily may not remove a case based on

diversity jurisdiction more than one year after the action commenced, Crete

2 Despite alleging in the Amended Complaint that his damages include lost earnings,

Hamilton has responded to interrogatories stating that he is “not making a wage claim” in

this case. See Plaintiff’s Answer to Interrogatories (Doc. 1-2; Answer to Interrogatories) ¶ 2

(objecting to the relevance of a question about past employment and rates of pay). When asked

if he is claiming any past or future loss of earnings or income, Hamilton answered “[n]ot at

this time.” Id. ¶ 10.

3 In the Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint in this action, Hamilton

added a claim for negligence against Crete Carrier Corporation’s “store manager” under the

fictitious name “Jane Doe.” See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 19–20 (alleging Jane Doe’s

involvement on information and belief, and asserting that Jane Doe is “personally liable” for

Hamilton’s injuries). In their filings in this Court, neither party lists Jane Doe in the case

caption or otherwise acknowledges her status as a Defendant in this case. Hamilton does not

address the Count against Doe in arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

But pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, “the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names

shall be disregarded” in “determining whether a civil action is removable” based on the Court’s

diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1). Accordingly, the presence of this additional

defendant does not affect the Court’s analysis of the Motion. See Howell v. Trib. Ent. Co., 106

F.3d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1997) (listing “exceptions” to the general rule that Doe defendants “are

not permitted in federal diversity suits”).

asserts that Hamilton acted in “bad faith” by delaying discovery, responding

incompletely to discovery requests, and “actively obfuscat[ing]” the amount in

controversy. Id. ¶ 17–18. Crete thus argues that the one-year limit in

§ 1446(c)(1) does not bar removal in this case.

On June 11, 2024, the Court sua sponte entered an order questioning

whether Crete’s Notice was timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) and (c)(1).

See generally Order (Doc. 8; Removal Order). In the Removal Order, the Court

explained that if Hamilton sought to challenge the timeliness of the Notice, he

must do so by July 5, 2024. Id. at 2. The Court also noted that a failure to file

such a motion on or before July 5, 2024, may be construed as a waiver of

Hamilton’s right to challenge any procedural defect in Crete’s removal of this

case. Id.

Hamilton now moves to remand this case to state court, arguing that

Crete failed to establish the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the

evidence, and that it waived its right to remove the case by taking “substantial

defensive action” in state court. See generally Motion. Crete disputes these

assertions in its Response. See generally Response. Crete also contends that

Hamilton waived any argument that its removal was untimely by failing to

address the issue in its Motion. See id. at 1, 3, 14–15.

With respect to the amount in controversy, the Court notes that while

Hamilton has not pleaded a specific amount of damages, in the Amended

Complaint he alleges that the value of his claim exceeds $50,000 exclusive of

interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. See Amended Complaint ¶ 1. And on the

Civil Cover Sheet Hamilton filed with his original Complaint in state court, he

represented that the value of his claim was between $50,001 and $75,000. See

Civil Cover Sheet at 1 (Doc. 1-1 at 1; Civil Cover Sheet). According to Crete,

discovery in this case has revealed only approximately $37,000 in past medical

bills. See Notice ¶ 17. Despite these facts, Crete contends that Hamilton’s

Proposal for Settlement, combined with his alleged injuries, future losses, and

continuing damages, sufficiently establish that the amount in controversy

exceeds the Court’s jurisdictional threshold. Id. ¶ 15.

II. Applicable Law

“If a state-court complaint states a case that satisfies federal

jurisdictional requirements, a defendant may remove the action to federal court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).” See Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d

1058, 1060 (11th Cir. 2010). The removing party bears the burden of

demonstrating that federal jurisdiction exists. Kirkland v. Midland Mtg. Co.,

243 F.3d 1277, 1281 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza

II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2010).4 Where, as here, the defendant

4 Although Pretka involved removal under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005

(CAFA), it interpreted and applied the general removal procedures; indeed, with limited

exception, “CAFA’s removal provision expressly adopts the procedures of the general removal

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446.” Pretka, 608 F.3d at 756–57 & n.11 (citations omitted). Thus, the

Court finds Pretka’s analysis applicable to the case at bar. See Bender v. Mazda Motor Corp.,

relies on diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a) as the basis for removal, it must

show both that the parties to the action are of diverse citizenship and that the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269

F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). In this case, Hamilton does not dispute that

the parties are of diverse citizenship.5 See Motion at 1. Therefore, the only

jurisdictional question before the Court concerns whether the amount in

controversy requirement has been satisfied. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319.

“Where the plaintiff has not plead[ed] a specific amount of damages . . .

the defendant is required to show . . . by a preponderance of the evidence that

the amount in controversy can more likely than not be satisfied.” Kirkland, 243

F.3d at 1281 n.5; see also Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752 (quoting Williams, 269 F.3d

at 1319); Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061. “In some cases, this burden requires the

removing defendant to provide additional evidence demonstrating that removal

is proper.” Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061. However, in other cases, “it may be ‘facially

apparent’ from the pleading itself that the amount in controversy exceeds the

jurisdictional minimum, even when ‘the complaint does not claim a specific

amount of damages.’” Id. (quoting Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754). In determining

whether the amount in controversy requirement is met, the Court “focuses on

how much is in controversy at the time of removal, not later.” Pretka, 608 F.3d

657 F.3d 1200, 1204 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011); Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061-62.

5 According to Crete, Hamilton and Crete are citizens of Florida and Nebraska,

respectively. See Notice ¶¶ 4–5.

at 751 (citations omitted); see also Poore v. Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co., 218 F.3d

1287, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that “the district court must determine

whether it had subject matter jurisdiction at the time of removal”), overruled

on other grounds by Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co, 508 F.3d 639, 640–41 (11th

Cir. 2007); Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 946 (11th Cir.

2000).

A court may not speculate or guess as to the amount in controversy. See

Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752. However, “Eleventh Circuit precedent permits district

courts to make ‘reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other

reasonable extrapolations’ from the pleadings to determine whether it is facially

apparent that a case is removable.” Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061–62 (quoting Pretka,

608 F.3d at 754). Indeed, “courts may use their judicial experience and common

sense in determining whether the case stated in a complaint meets federal

jurisdictional requirements.” Id. at 1062. Moreover, “a removing defendant is

not required to prove the amount in controversy beyond all doubt or to banish

all uncertainty about it.” Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754. All that is required is that a

removing defendant show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount

in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement. See id. at 752. However,

in considering the propriety of a removal, federal courts consistently caution

that removal statutes must be strictly construed, and all doubts resolved in

favor of remand. See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir.

1994); see also Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941)

(“Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should

actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own

jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.”) (internal

citations omitted). Nonetheless, when it is clear that the jurisdictional

minimum is likely met, a district court should acknowledge the value of the

claim, even if it is unspecified by the plaintiff. See Roe, 613 F.3d at 1064. To do

otherwise would abdicate the court’s statutory right to hear the case, and

reward a plaintiff for “employing the kinds of manipulative devices against

which the Supreme Court has admonished us to be vigilant.” See id.

III. Discussion

As an initial matter, Hamilton does not argue that the Court should

remand this case because removal was untimely.6 It therefore appears that

Hamilton has waived his challenge to the timeliness of the removal. See Wilson

v. Gen. Motors Corp., 888 F.2d 779, 781, n.1 (11th Cir. 1989) (explaining that

untimely removal is not a jurisdictional defect and therefore “may be waived”).

The Court thus does not address the timeliness issue and instead turns its

attention to the amount in controversy.

6 Hamilton asserts that Crete’s argument that he acted in bad faith is an attempt to

“avoid the one-year time limit for removal.” See Motion at 3. And he also contends that Crete’s

filing of the Notice “exceeded the one-year limit for removal.” See id. at 5. But he does so only

in the introduction and background sections of his Motion, and he presents no substantive

argument that the Court should remand the case on this basis.

Crete argues that several pieces of evidence establish that the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000, including Hamilton’s assertion that he has

suffered damages in “excess of $50,000,” and the fact that his “claims stem from

an incident of several pallets” hitting him “in the head, neck, shoulder, and

arm.” See Response at 8. Crete also contends that Hamilton “has identified no

less than 12 categories of damages” which “provide some support for this Court’s

jurisdiction,”7 and it cites medical records which (among other things) “indicate

that [Hamilton] was referred to a neurologist” for a head injury and received

“ongoing treatment . . . for about a year following the incident.” Id. Crete does

not appear to argue that these facts—standing alone—are sufficient to establish

the Court’s jurisdiction.8 But taking these facts together with Hamilton’s

$4,500,000 Proposal for Settlement and his “refusal to stipulate to damages

below the jurisdictional threshold,” Crete contends that it has met its burden of

showing that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Response at 4–5.

7 Crete argues that the “12 categories of damages” are “not conclusory allegations.” See

Response at 8. This contention is plainly without merit. Hamilton alleges that he has suffered

“bodily injury in and about [his] body and extremities, resulting in pain and suffering,

disability, disfigurement, permanent and significant scarring, mental anguish, loss of the

capacity for the enjoyment of life, expense of hospitalization, medical and nursing care and

treatment, loss of earning, loss of the ability to earn money, and aggravation of a previously

existing condition.” See Amended Complaint ¶ 17. While the Court expresses no opinion about

whether Hamilton may ultimately be able to prove such damages, the boilerplate list of

“categories of damages,” which lacks any supporting detail, is entirely conclusory.

8 Indeed, Crete asserts in its Notice that it could not have ascertained that the amount

in controversy exceeded the Court’s jurisdictional threshold before Hamilton served his “May

9, 2024, proposal for settlement.” See Notice ¶ 17 (contending that removal was timely because

this was Crete’s “first opportunity” to “learn that the action was removable”).

Crete points out that Hamilton made his Proposal for Settlement after

significant litigation and pursuant “to section 768.79” of the Florida Statutes,

so it is “not merely an unsupported demand letter.” See id. at 9. “[A]lthough

there may be some merit” to the argument that a proposal for settlement

“pursuant to Florida Statutes section 768.79 is entitled to more weight than a

pre-suit demand,” such an offer, standing alone, “is not enough to satisfy [a]

[d]efendant’s burden” of establishing the amount in controversy. See Brooks v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 6:18-cv-554-Orl-37DCI, 2018 WL 3761045, at *3

(M.D. Fla. July 2, 2018) (recommending that the case be remanded to state

court, despite an offer for judgment which exceeded the jurisdictional threshold,

where the defendant “provided the [c]ourt with no information whatsoever

regarding the nature or severity of [p]laintiff’s injuries” to indicate whether the

offer was “a reasonable assessment of the value of [p]laintiff’s claim”), report

and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3545421 (July 24, 2018).9 And when a

settlement offer “reflect[s] puffing and posturing” it “is entitled to little weight

in measuring the preponderance of the evidence.” Jackson v. Select Portfolio

Servicing, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1281 (S.D. Ala. 2009); see also Alilin v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 6:14-cv-1183-Orl-41DAB, 2014 WL

9 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not binding, they

may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310

(11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any

other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects”).

7734262, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2014). Notably, “‘settlement offers that

provide specific information to support the plaintiff's claim for damages suggest

the plaintiff is offering a reasonable assessment of the value of his claim and

are entitled to more weight.’” Alilin, 2014 WL 7734262, at *2 (quoting Jackson,

651 F. Supp. 2d at 1281). But, here, Hamilton’s Proposal for Settlement lacks

any specific information to explain why $4,500,000 is a reasonable assessment

of the value of his claim, nor does the record in this case support such a

conclusion. The Proposal for Settlement therefore does little to establish that

the amount in controversy in this action exceeds the Court’s jurisdictional

threshold.

Crete’s reliance on Hamilton’s past medical bills of $37,000 is similarly

unavailing. According to Crete, Hamilton has already incurred past medical

bills equal to half of the $75,000 amount in controversy threshold and “expected

future medical damages will far exceed the threshold.” Response at 10-11. But

this statement is nothing more than rank speculation. Crete points to no

evidence in support of any specific future medical care that might be required

much less the cost or frequency of such care. And the documents that Crete

attaches to the Response show no medical care after April of 2023. As such, this

evidence fails to support a finding that the amount in controversy in this action

exceeds $75,000.

Crete’s reliance on Hamilton’s post-removal failure to stipulate that the

amount in controversy is less than $75,000 also fails. As with a proposal for

settlement, a “refusal to stipulate to damages not exceeding the jurisdictional

minimum,” standing alone, “is not enough to establish that the threshold

amount has been met.” See Brown v. Fam. Dollar Store of Fla., LLC, No. 6:19-

cv-2323-Orl-78DCI, 2020 WL 13349079, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 29, 2020) (citing

Williams, 269 F.3d at 1320). On the record before the Court, and even in

conjunction with the rest of the evidence, Hamilton’s refusal to stipulate to the

amount of damages is simply unpersuasive.10 Accordingly, Crete has failed to

meet its burden of establishing that the amount in controversy in this action

exceeds the Court’s jurisdictional threshold.11

For all the foregoing reasons, Crete has not shown by a preponderance of

the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the Court’s jurisdictional

threshold. The Motion is therefore due to be granted, and this case remanded

to the state court in which it originated.12

10 It is likewise unpersuasive that Hamilton “does not actually state that the amount

in controversy is less than $75,000” in his Motion, and instead “merely states that Crete did

not provide sufficient evidence that the amount in controversy” exceeds the jurisdictional

threshold. See Response at 11. Crete is the party seeking to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction, so

Crete has the burden to show that jurisdiction is proper. See Kirkland, 243 F.3d at 1281 n.5.

11 Because Crete has not met this burden, the Court need not determine whether Crete

waived its ability to remove this case to federal court.

12 In the Response, Crete “requests that the issue be clarified through jurisdictional

discovery” if the Court determines that it has presented insufficient evidence of the amount

in controversy. See Response at 11 n.2. This request is due to be denied. When a defendant

“files a notice of removal prior to receiving clear evidence that the action satisfies the

jurisdictional requirements,” the “natural consequence . . . is remand to state court.” Lowery

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff Demarea Hamilton’s Motion to Remand to State Court and

Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. 11) is GRANTED.

2. The case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court for the Seventh

Judicial Circuit in and for Putnam County, Florida.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a certified copy of this

Order to the clerk of that court, terminate any pending motions,

and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on August 27, 2024.

United States District Judge

160/lc31

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Clerk, Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit

in and for Putnam County, Florida

v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2007). As such, the Court will not wait

“to allow [Crete] to discover the potential factual basis for jurisdiction” before remanding the

case. See id. at 1217.