The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
SANDRA CORBIN and JOHN
CORBIN,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No: 2:22-cv-394-JES-KCD
BILL PRUMMELL, JR., in his
official capacity as Sheriff
of the Charlotte County,
Florida’s Sheriff’s Office,
DAVID GENSIMORE,
individually and in his
official capacity as a
Deputy for the Charlotte
County Sheriff’s Office,
AARON WILLIAMS, individually
and in his official capacity
as a Deputy for the
Charlotte County Sheriff’s
Office, KENRICK ROGUSKA,
individually and in his
official capacity as a
Deputy for the Charlotte
County Sheriff’s Office, and
MICHAEL DAVIDSON,
individually and in his
official capacity as a
Deputy for the Charlotte
County Sheriff’s Office,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to
Exclude the Expert Testimony of Teri L. Stockham (Doc. #111) filed
on April 26, 2024. Defendants filed a Response in Opposition (Doc.
#118) on May 15, 2024. With permission from the Court, Plaintiffs
filed a Reply (Doc. #124) on June 4, 2024. For the reasons set
forth below, the motion is denied.
I.
The Court recently summarized the facts of this case:
On or about November 29, 2019, Deputy Michael
Davidson (Deputy Davidson) made a traffic stop of a
vehicle driven by John Corbin (Mr. Corbin) after
observing the vehicle swerving on the road. Deputy
Davidson caused the vehicle to pull into a McDonalds
parking lot. Sandra Corbin (Mrs. Corbin) was in the
passenger seat in the vehicle driven by her husband.
After both Mr. and Mrs. Corbin admitted to drinking a
few beers, Mr. Corbin consented to a field sobriety test
and was escorted by Deputy Davidson to a more level
parking lot approximately fifty to one hundred feet
away. Mrs. Corbin stayed in the car. Deputy Aaron
Williams (Deputy Williams), who had recently arrived at
the scene in a separate vehicle, stood between the Corbin
vehicle containing Mrs. Corbin and the sobriety testing
site where Mr. Corbin and Deputy Davidson were located.
At some point, Mrs. Corbin exited the vehicle.
Deputy Williams approached and told her to get back into
the vehicle. According to Deputy Williams, he also told
her to remain in the vehicle. Mrs. Corbin got back into
the vehicle, but she did not remain there. Approximately
five minutes later, Mrs. Corbin exited the vehicle for
a second time. Deputy Williams told her to stop. What
happened next is disputed. Deputy Williams asserts Mrs.
Corbin did not stop, told Deputy Williams he would have
to arrest her, and pulled away from his attempts to grab
her wrists. At that point, Deputy Williams asserts, he
swept Mrs. Corbin’s leg from underneath her, bringing
her to the ground. On the other hand, Mrs. Corbin asserts
that she immediately stopped when told to do so by Deputy
Williams and before Deputy Williams positioned himself
in front of her, and she uttered the single word “my”
before Deputy Williams swept her legs from underneath
her.
It is undisputed that Mrs. Corbin found herself on
the ground and laying in her own urine. Mrs. Corbin was
screaming that her leg was broken and complaining of leg
pain, but there was no visible physical sign of a broken
leg.1 Deputy Williams handcuffed Mrs. Corbin and called
for backup. Sergeant David Gensimore (Sgt. Gensimore)
arrived and with Deputy Williams attempted to have Mrs.
Corbin stand up.2 After Mrs. Corbin was unable to do so,
the officers called paramedics. Upon the arrival of
paramedics, Mrs. Corbin was placed on a stretcher and
moved to an ambulance. The ambulance transported Mrs.
Corbin and Deputy Williams to the hospital, where she
was diagnosed with a fractured tibia. Two days later,
Mrs. Corbin underwent leg surgery. About a year later
she underwent a total knee replacement.
Mrs. Corbin was charged with resisting arrest
without violence and disorderly intoxication, but the
state did not prosecute the charges. Mr. Corbin was
arrested that night for driving under the influence and
1 Though Mrs. Corbin’s counsel labelled the lack of a physical
sign of a broken leg as being disputed, (Doc. #128, p. 6, ¶ 29),
Mrs. Corbin’s own sworn testimony says otherwise:
Were there any physical signs that you could see
regarding your leg after Defendant Williams kicked your
leg that made you think your leg was broken?
A. No, not that I recall.
Q. Okay.
A. Just pain.
Q. So are you sure or -- because you said no, then you
said not that you recall. So is it just that you can't
remember at all?
A. No, it was pain. Pain was the only thing that made me
think it was broken.
Sandra Corbin Dep. 76:16-77:3. “When a party has given clear
answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence
of any genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot
thereafter create such an issue . . . .” Van T. Junkins &
Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th
Cir. 1984).
2 Contrary to Deputy Williams’ recollection of events, Mrs.
Corbin asserts Deputy Williams first attempted to stand her up by
himself before calling for backup. Compare Sandra Corbin Dep. 85:3-
8, with Williams Dep. 88:3-5.
was issued a warning for failure to drive in a single
lane.
(Doc. #131, pp. 4-6.) Mr. and Mrs. Corbin brought this lawsuit,
alleging § 1983 false arrest, among other claims. Mr. and Mrs.
Corbin now move to exclude the testimony of Defendants’ proposed
expert, Teri L. Stockham, a forensic toxicologist who opines that:
Ms. Sandra Corbin was intoxicated such that her
normal faculties were impaired at the time of this
incident. This opinion is based on scientific evidence
of the hospital serum ethanol result of 206 mg/dL almost
two hours after the incident. To compare this value to
the DUI statute for impaired driving in Florida, the
units would be changed to g/dL which also equals g%.
Serum ethanol would be converted to whole blood ethanol.
In this case 206 mg/dL serum ethanol would become 0.17-
0.19 g% whole blood ethanol (BAC). At this BAC I would
expect the following signs and symptoms of intoxication:
emotional instability or exaggerated emotional states;
loss of judgement; impairment of perception, memory, and
comprehension; increased reaction time; reduced visual
acuity and peripheral vision; slurred speech; confusion.
Further my opinion is supported by observations of
EMS personnel who smelled ethanol and state Ms. Corbin
displayed characteristics of ethanol intoxication such
as belligerence and being uncooperative. Statements in
their report reflect that Ms. Corbin drank several beers
prior to the incident.
I also opine that Ms. Corbin had more than two beers
as stated in her Answers to Interrogatories and her
deposition.
(Doc. #111-1, pp. 2-3.)
II.
Admission of expert opinion evidence is governed by Fed. R.
Evid. 702, which provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the
proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more
likely than not that:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or
data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and
(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable
application of the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). In Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court held that the trial court
has a “gatekeeper” function designed to ensure that any and all
expert testimony is both relevant and reliable. The importance of
this gatekeeping function “cannot be overstated.” United States v.
Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004)(en banc).
In determining the admissibility of expert testimony under
Rule 702, the Court applies a “rigorous” three-part inquiry.
Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260. “Expert testimony is admissible if (1)
the expert is qualified to testify on the topic at issue, (2) the
methodology used by the expert is sufficiently reliable, and (3)
the testimony will assist the trier of fact.” Club Car, Inc. v.
Club Car (Quebec) Imp., Inc., 362 F.3d 775, 780 (11th Cir. 2004),
abrogated on other grounds by Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food
Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1258 n.7 (11th Cir. 2010). In
short, “the expert must be qualified; his methodology must be
reliable; and his testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact.”
Doe v. Rollins Coll., 77 F.4th 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2023). “The
proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden of establishing
each requirement by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .” Id.
“Even expert testimony which satisfies these three
requirements, however, may nonetheless be excluded under Rule 403
if the probative value of the expert testimony is substantially
outweighed by its potential to confuse or mislead the jury, or if
it is cumulative or needlessly time consuming.” Frazier, 387 F.3d
at 1263. The admission of expert testimony is a matter within the
discretion of the trial court. Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v.
Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1103 (11th Cir.
2005); Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1258.
III.
Mr. and Mrs. Corbin argue that Stockham is not qualified to
testify on Mrs. Corbin’s state of mind, behavior, etc., that her
opinion is not based on reliable scientific or technical testing,
and that the testimony will not assist the trier of fact.
Defendants disagree. The Court will analyze each argument.
A. Stockham is qualified
“A witness is qualified as an expert if he is the type of person
who should be testifying on the matter at hand.” Moore v. Intuitive
Surgical, Inc., 995 F.3d 839, 852 (11th Cir. 2021). “[E]xpert
status may be based on ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education.’” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).
Stockham holds three degrees: A Bachelor of Science in
chemistry, a Master of Science in forensic science and forensic
toxicology, and a Doctor of Philosophy in pharmacology and
toxicology. She has thirty-five years of toxicology experience,
including a stint as Chief Toxicologist at Broward County Medical
Examiner’s office. Plaintiffs argue that Stockham, as a
toxicologist, is not qualified to opine on how Mrs. Corbin
comported herself during the night in question since Stockham
“never met with Mrs. Corbin, nor discussed the events of November
29, 2019, to ascertain or even ha[ve] a modicum of insight as to
Mrs. Corbin’s state of mind . . . .” (Doc. #111, p. 12.) Plaintiffs’
argument misconstrues Stockham’s offered testimony and applies a
higher bar for the qualification of an expert than precedent
requires.
Stockham is not testifying that she personally knows Mrs. Corbin
behaved a certain way during the night in question. She is offering
testimony regarding Mrs. Corbin’s blood alcohol content (BAC) and
the “signs and symptoms” she would “expect” with that BAC. (Doc.
#111-1, p. 3.) Stockham is qualified as an expert to interpret BAC
“not because of h[er] familiarity with [Mrs. Corbin], but because
of h[er] familiarity with the analysis [s]he was tasked with
performing.” Moore, 995 F.3d at 853. Indeed, “[a]s a toxicologist,
Dr. [Stockham] is qualified to opine generally on the effects of
alcohol on a person.” Waters v. AIG Claims, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 3d
1120, 1133 (M.D. Ala. 2022). The first prong is satisfied.
B. Stockham’s methodology is sufficiently reliable
The non-exhaustive factors a court considers in ascertaining
the reliability of scientific expert opinion are: “(1) whether the
expert's theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory
has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known
or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique;
and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the
scientific community.” Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK
Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003)(citing McCorvey v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002)).
The “basic foundation for admissibility” is that the expert's
opinions be firmly supported “by appropriate validation.” Frazier,
387 F.3d at 1261.
Plaintiffs argue Stockham’s testimony is not reliable for
many reasons, including because it relies not on statistical data
but on Mrs. Corbin’s blood alcohol level taken two hours after the
event and does not consider pertinent deposition testimony or Mrs.
Corbin’s alcohol tolerance level. Defendants counter that Mrs.
Corbin’s BAC levels are reliable. The Court agrees.
Stockham’s opinion is based “on scientific evidence of the
hospital serum ethanol result of 206 mg/dL” which she converts to
BAC. (Doc. #111-1, p. 2.) Her opinion is reliable because it is
generally accepted that alcohol content levels give reliable
estimates of a person’s intoxication, and “[a]nalysis of blood
samples gives the most accurate results.” McCormick On Evid. §
205.1 (8th ed. 2022)(citing Fitzgerald & Hume, The Single Chemical
Test for Intoxication: A Challenge to Admissibility, 66 Mass. L.
Rev. 23 (1981)). Plaintiffs remaining arguments miss the mark.
Even if accepted as true that, for example, certain deposition
testimony was omitted, misstated, or contradicted and that
pertinent information such as Mrs. Corbin’s age, fatigue, or food
consumption was overlooked, any such shortcomings would go to the
weight of the evidence, not to admissibility. See Giusto v. Int'l
Paper Co., 571 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2021)(“[A]ny
conflict between an expert's proffered testimony and the
underlying evidence or facts goes to the weight—not admissibility—
of the testimony.”). “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof
are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. The second prong
is satisfied.
C. Stockham’s testimony will assist the trier of fact
The third requirement asks “whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. at
593. Commonly referred to as the “helpfulness” inquiry, expert
testimony can properly be applied and is helpful if it relates to
any issue in the case and if it concerns matters that are beyond
the understanding of an average lay person. Prosper v. Martin, 989
F.3d 1242, 1249 (11th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiffs argue that “an opinion or determination of
intoxication” is unhelpful here as Florida’s driving under the
influence statute is irrelevant and “there is no requisite or
comparable BAC level under” Florida’s disorderly intoxication
statute, Fla. Stat. § 856.011. (Doc.#111, pp. 8-9.) Defendants
counter that Stockham’s testimony would be helpful since Mrs.
Corbin “was arrested for disorderly intoxication,” and that
“without Dr. Stockham converting the [206 mg/dL test result] to
blood alcohol content, the jury will not know how to interpret the
result and determine [Mrs. Corbin’s] level of intoxication” while
adding “that “Stockham’s reference to the .08 standard [under
Florida’s driving under the influence statute] only helps to
explain [Mrs. Corbin’s] level of intoxication.” (Doc. #118, pp.
6, 8-9.) The Court agrees.
Plaintiffs have sued Williams for § 1983 false arrest, among
other claims. “To succeed on a false arrest claim, a plaintiff
must establish (1) a lack of probable cause and (2) an arrest.”
Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1180 (11th Cir. 2022). “[T]he
correct legal standard to evaluate whether an officer had probable
cause to seize a suspect is to ‘ask whether a reasonable officer
could conclude . . . that there was a substantial chance of
criminal activity.’” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th
Cir. 2022) (alteration in original)(quoting Dist. of Columbia v.
Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018)). See also Ingram v. Kubik, 30
F.4th 1241, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022); Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th
1172, 1180 (11th Cir. 2022). “Probable cause does not require
conclusive evidence and ‘is not a high bar.’” Id. In assessing
probable cause, courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances, i.e, “the whole picture”, by “exam[ing] the events
leading up to the arrest, and then decid[ing] whether these
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” Wesby, 583
U.S. at 586, 588 (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371
(2003)). “Whether an officer possesses probable cause or arguable
probable cause depends on the elements of the alleged crime and
the operative fact pattern.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala.,
608 F.3d 724, 735 (11th Cir. 2010)(citing Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137–
38; Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004)).
A Williams defense to Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim is that
he had probable cause to arrest Mrs. Corbin for disorderly
intoxication pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 856.011. “[U]nder the plain
language of the statute, ‘disorderly intoxication’ is defined and
proscribed in two distinct ways: (1) where the person is
intoxicated and endangers the safety of another person or property;
and (2) where the person is intoxicated or drinks alcohol in a
public place or on a public conveyance and causes a public
disturbance.” Palancar v. State, 204 So. 3d 473, 475 (Fla. 4th DCA
2016)(alteration in original)(quoting Royster v. State, 643 So.2d
61, 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
“The results of the blood alcohol test indicate that [Mrs.
Corbin] was intoxicated at the time of [the event]. Proof of [Mrs.
Corbin]'s intoxication is, of course, highly relevant to and
probative of one of the ultimate questions before the jury” of
whether Williams had probable cause to arrest Mrs. Corbin for
disorderly intoxication. Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d
1147, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981).3 Stockham’s opinions regarding Mrs.
Corbin’s BAC and the effects expected of a person with that level
of BAC “are helpful for the factfinder because, although the
general effects of alcohol consumption are commonly known, the
methodology for determining an individual's BAC and an opinion on
the associated physiological manifestations of a specific BAC
level are beyond the understanding and experience of the average
lay citizen and goes to the ultimate finding” of whether Mrs.
3 The Eleventh Circuit “ha[s] adopted as binding precedent
all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981, as well
as all decisions issued after that date by a Unit B panel of the
former Fifth Circuit.” In re Forrest, 47 F.4th 1229, 1235 n.3 (11th
Cir. 2022)(citing Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34
(11th Cir. 1982)).
Corbin was intoxicated. Chappell v. Carnival Corp., 666 F. Supp.
3d 1316, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2023). The third prong is satisfied.
None of Plaintiffs’ arguments to exclude Stockham’s testimony
are persuasive. Stockham is qualified, her outlined opinion above
is reliable, helpful, relevant, and its probative value does not
outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading of the jury.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED :
Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Teri L.
Stockham (Doc. #111) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 25th day of
July, 2024.
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SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies:
Counsel of Record