“In the areas of the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction, the district courts must tread 22 lightly. … Representational issues fall within the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction.”
How later courts described this case
- “In the areas of the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction, the district courts must tread 22 lightly. … Representational issues fall within the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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7 JUAN GARCIA, Case No. 24-cv-03068-JSC
8 Plaintiff,
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO
9 v. PLAINTIFF RE: STANDING
10 JAY BRADSHAW, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 59
Defendants.
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13 Plaintiff Juan Garcia alleges the defendant trust funds and trustees (collectively
14 “Defendants”) violated ERISA by failing to accept trust fund contributions from his employer,
15 AFI, after October 2023. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 69-70.) Defendants move to dismiss the claims on the
16 grounds that, among other things, Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. (Dkt. No. 59 at 15-18.)1
17 Standing is a matter of a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Renee v. Duncan, 686
18 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 2012). To demonstrate Article III standing, “[t]he plaintiff must have
19 (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant,
20 and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
21 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (cleaned up). The plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing these
22 elements.” Id. When, “a case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly . . . allege facts
23 demonstrating each element.” Id. (cleaned up).
24 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a party to assert a defense of lack of
25 subject matter jurisdiction. A jurisdictional attack may be factual or facial. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d
26 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). A facial attack “asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint
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1 are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373
2 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “The district court resolves a facial attack as it would a motion
3 to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all
4 reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the court determines whether the allegations are
5 sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court's jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117,
6 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). But on a factual attack, a defendant presents extrinsic evidence, so “the
7 court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373
8 F.3d at 1039. “When the defendant raises a factual attack, the plaintiff must support [his]
9 jurisdictional allegations with ‘competent proof,’ under the same evidentiary standard that governs
10 in the summary judgment context.” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted).
11 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants make a facial attack on Plaintiff’s standing to make
12 claims regarding trust funds other than the health care plan. (Dkt. 59 at 15-16.) They point out
13 Plaintiff alleges nothing about how their refusal to accept contributions for these other funds has
14 injured Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff’s opposition, however, completely ignores the issue. As it is
15 Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate Article III standing, Plaintiff is ordered to show cause how he
16 has standing to bring claims regarding these other funds.2
17 For the health plan-related claims, Defendants make a factual attack asserting that any
18 injury to Plaintiff is not fairly traceable to Defendants given the relevant collective bargaining
19 agreement and the health plan show Plaintiff is eligible for health care plan benefits only if his
20 employer is required by the collective bargaining agreement to make contributions to the plan.
21 (Dkt. Nos. 59 at 8; 59-2 at 10 § 9; 59-4 § 47.) And the employer’ contributions to the health care
22 plan are as specified in the collective bargaining agreement. (Dkt. No. 59-2 at 11 § 7.) Plaintiff
23 alleges the collective bargaining agreement expired (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 28), but that his employer’s
24 obligation to make payments continues after expiration until a lawful impasse occurs. (Dkt. No. 1
25 at ¶ 56 (“Section 47 of the CBA specifies that the…contribution obligations continue after the
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2 A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including lack of standing, is without
1 termination date of the Agreement unless and until a lawful impasse occurs[]”; Dkt. No. 59-4 §
2 47.) So, as Plaintiff’s opposition reveals, this Court’s ability to grant Plaintiff the relief he seeks
3 turns on this Court having the jurisdiction to decide that the union did not declare a lawful
4 impasse. (Dkt. 64 at 7 (“Defendants, and each of them, had and continue to have a fiduciary duty
5 to Plaintiff and the Plan Participants to continue to accept AFI’s contributions unless and until AFI
6 and the Union reached a lawful impasse and the Union properly disclaimed interest in representing
7 AFI’s employees.”); id. at 11 (“Due to the improper and unlawful nature of the Union’s attempt to
8 disclaim interest, no impasse was reached, and Defendant Trustees remain obligated to accept and
9 credit AFI’s contributions.”).) Indeed, Plaintiff spends most of his opposition addressing the issue
10 of whether there was a lawful impasse between AFI and the Union. (Id. at 7, 11, 16-20.)
11 But, according to evidence Plaintiff attaches to his opposition, the employer previously
12 filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) complaining the Union had
13 prematurely declared impasse and unlawfully refused to accept employee contributions. (Dkt. No.
14 65-9 at 2-3.) The NLRB dismissed these charges and determined “[t]he Union lawfully
15 disclaimed interest as the representative of employees on August 30, 2023.” (Id. at 3.) While the
16 employer has the right to appeal the dismissal to the NLRB’s General Counsel, Plaintiff’s
17 opposition does not address how this Court has jurisdiction to determine the Union did not
18 lawfully disclaim representing the employees while that very same issue is pending before the
19 NLRB. See United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus.,
20 Steamfitters & Refrigeration Union, Loc. 342, AFL-CIO v. Valley Engineers, 975 F.2d 611, 613
21 (9th Cir. 1992) (“In the areas of the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction, the district courts must tread
22 lightly. … Representational issues fall within the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction.”) (citing Local 3-
23 193 v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 611 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1980)). And it also does not address
24 how this Court could make a decision contrary to that of the NLRB, especially given that neither
25 the employer nor the union are parties to this action.
26 Plaintiff shall respond to this Order to Show Cause by October 30, 2024. In lieu of filing a
27 response, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by that same date, provided Plaintiff has a good
1 to Plaintiff's order to show cause response, if any, by November 7, 2024. In the meantime, the
2 || hearing and case management conference scheduled for October 30, 2024 are VACATED to be
3 rescheduled as needed.
4 This Order disposes of Docket No. 59.
5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
6 Dated: October 18, 2024
; ne
CQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY
8 United States District Judge
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