Opinion

(PC) Christopher v. State of CA

Court
District Court, E.D. California
Filed
Sep 4, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.2%

“[S]tate departmental 16 regulations do not establish a federal constitutional violation.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[S]tate departmental 16 regulations do not establish a federal constitutional violation.”
  • “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not 17 sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.”
  • “[I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially 13 cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”
  • “State officials 23 sued in their official capacities are generally entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 PAUL CHRISTOPHER AND CARREA Case No. 2:23-cv-01525-DJC-JDP (PC)

CHRISTOPHER,

12 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiffs,

13 THAT THIS THE FEDERAL CLAIMS IN

v. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT BE

14 DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., AMEND AND THE STATE LAW CLAIMS

15 BE REMANDED

Defendants.

16 ECF No. 11

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21 Plaintiffs, a state prisoner and his father, bring this action alleging various violations of

22 their federal and state rights in connection with an incident that occurred at California State

23 Prison, Lancaster (“Lancaster”) in 2020. ECF No. 11 at 7-15. The claims are brought against

24 Governor Gavin Newsom, former California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

25 (“CDCR”) Secretary Kathleen Allison, CDCR itself, and the State of California.1 For the reasons

26 stated below, none of plaintiff’s federal claims are cognizable, and I find that they should be

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1 Various “Doe” defendants are also implicated in the caption, but none are referred to

28 specifically in the body of the complaint. ECF No. 11 at 1-2.

1 dismissed without leave to amend. Absent any actionable federal claim, this court should decline

2 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and those claims should

3 be remanded to state court.

4 Screening Order

5 I. Screening and Pleading Requirements

6 A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental

7 entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable

8 claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

9 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

10 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2).

11 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief,

12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

13 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not

14 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

15 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

16 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not

17 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024,

18 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that

19 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264

20 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted).

21 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404

22 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it

23 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

24 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017).

25 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements

26 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251,

27 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

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1 II. Analysis

2 Plaintiff Paul Christopher, a state prison inmate, was incarcerated at Lancaster in January

3 2020. ECF No. 11 at 7-8. Plaintiffs allege that around January 24, 2020, unnamed prison guards

4 at that institution placed Paul Christopher in a prisoner classification area that jeopardized his

5 safety. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiffs emphasize that Paul Christopher was in a wheelchair and that

6 unnamed officers allegedly told other inmates in the area that his crime of conviction involved

7 “[doing something] to a child.” Id. at 10-11. Plaintiff do not specifically allege that any physical

8 harm actually befell Paul Christopher on that day.

9 Plaintiffs’ initial contention is that the guards’ conduct at Lancaster, for which defendants

10 Newsom and Allison are responsible, violates federal and state criminal law. Id. at 20. Criminal

11 law cannot undergird a section 1983 civil suit, however. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.

12 614, 619 (1973) (“[I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially

13 cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). Neither is there any

14 federal liability, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ suggestions to the contrary, for violations of CDCR

15 policy. See Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[S]tate departmental

16 regulations do not establish a federal constitutional violation.”) (emphasis in original).

17 Additionally, with respect to defendants CDCR and the State of California, the Eleventh

18 Amendment bars claims for money damages like those here. See Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964,

19 969 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars individuals from bringing lawsuits against a

20 state for money damages or other retrospective relief.”) (quoting Arizona Students’ Ass’n v.

21 Arizona Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2016)). The Eleventh Amendment also bars

22 claims against defendants Newsom and Allison in their official capacities. Id. (“State officials

23 sued in their official capacities are generally entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).

24 And plaintiffs’ federal claims against Newsom and Allison in their personal capacities

25 also fail. There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

26 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather, a supervisory defendant is liable only for the misconduct of

27 their subordinates if they participate in or directed them, or if they knew of the violations and

28 failed to act to prevent them. Id. Here, plaintiffs vaguely allege that Governor Newsom and

1 former secretary Allison must have known of the misconduct allegedly occurring at Lancaster.

2 ECF No. 11 at 16. Plaintiffs allege both have “been around a long time and know of the atrocities

3 of the defendants . . . .” Id. Such allegations are insufficient. See Sullivan v. Biter, No. 1:15-cv-

4 243 DAD SAB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65165, *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017) (“Conclusory

5 allegations that various prison officials knew or should have known about constitutional

6 violations occurring against plaintiff simply because of their general supervisory role are

7 insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). In this instance, the allegations are

8 especially unlikely given the defendants’ respective positions. Governor Newsom has overall

9 responsibility for the administration and enforcement of state laws, and it is unlikely, absent some

10 specific allegation to the contrary, that he knew about or had any involvement in misconduct

11 occurring at a single state prison. Similarly, there is no allegation that former secretary Allison

12 was, during her tenure, specifically involved in the day-to-day operations of Lancaster or that she

13 had reason to know about the incident raised here. Finally, I note that plaintiffs’ vague

14 allegations of a conspiracy among defendants and officials at Lancaster are too threadbare to

15 support the advancement of the claims. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

16 1982) (“Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not

17 sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.”).

18 In light of the foregoing, I find that plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead any federal

19 claim. In so finding, I note that plaintiffs allege various wrongs that can only be attributed to

20 unnamed guards and correctional staff at Lancaster. None of those individuals is either named as

21 a defendant to this complaint or specifically identified as a “Doe” within the allegations.

22 Accordingly, I find it unnecessary to consider whether any viable claims might exist if personnel

23 could be identified. Absent any federal claim, I find that the court should decline to exercise

24 jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims; those claims should be remanded to state court.

25 Decker v. Shasta Cty., No. 2:16-cv-1179 KJN P, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134358, *8 (E.D. Cal.

26 Aug. 22, 2017) (“Moreover, absent federal claims, this action cannot proceed solely on the basis

27 of state law claims. Although the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law

28 claims, a plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law.”).

1 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:

2 1. The federal claims in amended complaint, ECF No. 11, be DISMISSED without leave

3 | to amend for failure to state a cognizable claim.

4 2. The court decline to exercise continued supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

5 | state law claims.

6 3. This case be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the

7 | County of Sacramento.

8 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

9 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of

10 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the

11 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to

12 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed

13 | within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

14 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

15 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

16 1991).

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18 IT IS SO ORDERED.

19 ( 1 Sty —

Dated: _ September 4, 2024

20 JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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