Smith v. Community Hospital

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 CANDACE SMITH, Case No. 1:24-cv-00589-BAM

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO

13 v. ACTION

14 COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION

15 Defendants.

(Doc. 4)

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FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

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18 Plaintiff Candace Smith (“Plaintiff”) proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil

19 action. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons that follow, the Court will recommend that this action be

20 dismissed for failure to obey a court order, for lack of jurisdiction, and for failure to state a

21 cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted.

22 I. Background

23 Plaintiff initiated this action on May 16, 2024. (Doc. 1.) On July 2, 2024, the Court

24 screened Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and determined that the

25 complaint failed to comply with the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,

26 failed to allege this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and failed to state a cognizable claim for

27 relief. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend within thirty (30) days of service of the Court’s

28 order. (Doc. 4.) Plaintiff was expressly warned that if she failed to file an amended complaint in

1 compliance with the Court’s order, then the Court would recommend dismissal of this action for

2 failure to obey a court order, for lack of jurisdiction, and for failure to state a cognizable claim

3 upon which relief may be granted. (Id. at 5.) The deadline for Plaintiff to file her amended

4 complaint has passed and Plaintiff has not complied with the Court’s order. The Court therefore

5 will recommend dismissal of this action.

6 II. Failure to Comply with Rule 8, Allege Jurisdiction, and State a Cognizable

7 Claim

8 A. Screening Requirement and Standard

9 The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding in pro se and in forma

10 pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to

11 dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

12 granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

13 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

14 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

15 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

16 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

17 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

18 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as

19 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

20 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

21 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires

22 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable

23 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret

24 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully

25 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility

26 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

27 B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Allegations

28 Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Community Regional Hospital; (2) Saint

1 Agnes Hospital; (3) Kaiser & Kennesaw Hospital; and (4) United Health Care. (Doc. 1 at 2-3.)

2 Plaintiff filed the complaint using the Court’s complaint form. In the statement of claim

3 section of the form, Plaintiff alleges as follows:

4 Upon such stating purposeful and criminal conducted charges against the

incumbents of hospital that purposely mislead details of triplet pregnancy. Upon

5 such commited felonist acts against myself by commiting a malepractice w/o

detail & purposely druggings, over dose & mislead details of pregnancy. Did not

6 remove dying fetuses

7 (Doc. 1 at 1) (unedited text). As relief, Plaintiff appears to seek monetary damages and

8 restoration of health. (Id. at 6.)

9 C. Discussion

10 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

11 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and

12 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

13 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

14 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

15 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

16 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

17 at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are

18 not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557.

19 Plaintiff’s complaint is not a plain statement of her claims. While short, Plaintiff’s

20 complaint does not clearly state what happened, when it happened, and who was involved.

21 Without basic factual allegations, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff states a cognizable

22 claim for relief.

23 2. Federal Court Jurisdiction

24 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may adjudicate only those cases

25 authorized by the Unites States Constitution and Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

26 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Federal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary

27 appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993)

28 (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)). Without

1 jurisdiction, the district court must dismiss the case. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v.

2 California State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Generally, there are

3 two bases for subject matter jurisdiction: (1) diversity jurisdiction; and (2) federal question

4 jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. As pled, the complaint fails to allege this Court’s subject

5 matter jurisdiction.

6 Plaintiff has not alleged diversity jurisdiction. Instead, Plaintiff claims that this action is

7 based on federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal

8 district courts have jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or

9 treaties of the United States.” “A case ‘arises under’ federal law either where federal law creates

10 the cause of action or ‘where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on

11 some construction of federal law.’” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086,

12 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,

13 463 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983)). The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by

14 the “well-pleaded complaint rule.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

15 Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question

16 is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Id.

17 Plaintiff does not allege any violation arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

18 the United States. Indeed, Plaintiff does not cite any particular federal statute or constitutional

19 provision that would be applicable to the allegations in her complaint. Thus, Plaintiff's

20 complaint does not establish federal question jurisdiction.

21 3. Criminal Prosecution

22 Although not entirely clear, it appears from Plaintiff’s complaint that she is attempting to

23 bring criminal charges against defendants. As a private citizen, Plaintiff has no authority to

24 criminally prosecute anyone. See Turner v. Salorio, No. 1:19-cv-01620-DAD-BAM (PC), 2020

25 WL 1974207, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2020); see also Sn v. Gariah, No. 2:22-cv-01796-KJM-

26 CKD (PS), 2022 WL 17722617, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2022) (indicating federal law does not

27 allow a private citizen to bring a criminal prosecution against another citizen).

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1 III. Failure to Obey a Court Order

2 A. Legal Standard

3 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with

4 any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . .

5 within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their

6 dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where

7 appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A

8 court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action,

9 failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran,

10 46 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v.

11 Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order

12 requiring amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir.

13 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order).

14 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: (1)

15 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its

16 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of

17 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan,

18 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988).

19 B. Discussion

20 Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint is overdue. The action cannot proceed without

21 Plaintiff’s cooperation and compliance with the Court’s order. Moreover, the Court cannot hold

22 this case in abeyance awaiting compliance by Plaintiff. The Court additionally cannot

23 effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating her case. Thus, the Court finds that

24 both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal.

25 The third factor, risk of prejudice to the defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, as a

26 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action.

27 Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs

28 against dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

1 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose

2 responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes

3 progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods.

4 Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

5 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the Court’s order will result in

6 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

7 1262; Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s July 2, 2024 screening

8 order expressly warned Plaintiff that her failure to comply would result in a recommendation for

9 dismissal of this action. (Doc. 4 at 5.) Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal could result

10 from her noncompliance.

11 Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that

12 would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further

13 unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status in this action

14 indicates that monetary sanctions are of little use, and the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is

15 likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating her case.

16 III. Conclusion and Recommendation

17 The Clerk of the Court is HEREBY DIRECTED to randomly assign a District Judge to

18 this action.

19 For the reasons stated, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed

20 based on Plaintiff’s failure to obey the Court’s order, for lack of jurisdiction, and for failure to

21 state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted.

22 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

23 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

24 fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may

25 file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to

26 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file

27 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the

28 magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir.

1 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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4 Dated: August 12, 2024 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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