holding that the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of criminal defense are not the 23 kind of special circumstances or irreparable harm that justify federal court intervention
How later courts described this case
- holding that the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of criminal defense are not the 23 kind of special circumstances or irreparable harm that justify federal court intervention
- “When the question is whether a 27 federal court should enjoin a pending state-court proceeding, even irreparable injury is 28 insufficient unless it is both great and immediate.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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10 ANGEL PINEDA SANCHEZ, No. 2:23-cv-01115 TLN DB P
11 Petitioner,
12 v. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
13 TRISTAN LEMON,
14 Respondent.
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16 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas
17 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition. (ECF No. 10.) As set
18 forth below, all requirements are met for abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54
19 (1971). Accordingly, the petition should be dismissed without prejudice.
20 I. Procedural Background
21 A jury convicted petitioner of ten counts of lewd acts on a child and three counts of oral
22 copulation of a child. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) On October 22, 2021, the Sacramento County Superior
23 court sentenced petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 65 years to life. (Id.) The California Court
24 of Appeals, Third Appellate District, affirmed the judgment but remanded for sentencing. (Id. at
25 2.) The California Supreme Court denied a petition for review. (Id.)
26 Petitioner constructively filed the present federal petition on June 6, 2023, noting in the
27 petition he was still awaiting resentencing by the superior court. (ECF No. 1 at 15.) Petitioner
28 seeks a reversal of the judgment of conviction through the present petition. (Id.)
1 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on January 16, 2024, arguing the court should
2 abstain from proceeding on the federal petition because petitioner filed the federal petition prior
3 to his resentencing and prior to his resentencing becoming final. (ECF No. 10.) Petitioner has not
4 opposed the motion to abstain in writing or filed a statement of non-opposition. Pursuant to Local
5 Rule 230(c) and the court’s warning to petitioner (see ECF No. 15), the court may construe
6 petitioner’s failure to file a timely opposition as non-opposition and consent to grant the motion.
7 II. Legal Standards
8 The petition should be dismissed if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached
9 exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief[.]” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254
10 Cases; see also White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989). Principles of comity and
11 federalism weigh against a federal court interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings by
12 granting injunctive or declaratory relief absent extraordinary circumstances. Younger, 401 U.S. at
13 43-54. Younger abstention is required when (1) state proceedings, judicial in nature, are pending;
14 (2) state proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford
15 adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issue. See Middlesex County Ethic Comm. v.
16 Garden State Bar Ass’n., 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). “When a case falls within the proscription of
17 Younger, a district court must dismiss the federal action.” Fresh Int’l Corp. v. Agricultural Labor
18 Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986).
19 The Younger doctrine stems from the long standing public policy against federal court
20 interference with state court proceedings. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43. Federal courts should not
21 enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions absent a showing of the state’s bad faith or harassment.
22 Id. at 46, 53-54 (holding that the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of criminal defense are not the
23 kind of special circumstances or irreparable harm that justify federal court intervention); Dubinka
24 v. Judges of the Superior Court, 23 F.3d 218, 225-26 (9th Cir. 1994). Irreparable harm alone is
25 insufficient to warrant federal intervention unless the irreparable harm is both great and
26 immediate. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 538 n.17 (1984) (“When the question is whether a
27 federal court should enjoin a pending state-court proceeding, even irreparable injury is
28 insufficient unless it is both great and immediate.”) (quotations and citations omitted).
1 III. Discussion
2 The first prong of Younger is met because petitioner was awaiting resentencing in state
3 court when he filed the present petition. The pendency of the state proceedings is determined at
4 the time the federal petition is filed. See Beltran v. California, 871 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1988).
5 State proceedings are ongoing if appellate remedies have not been exhausted. See generally
6 Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608-09 (1975). A petitioner must await the outcome of the
7 state appellate proceeding “even where the issue to be challenged in the writ of habeas corpus has
8 been finally settled in the state courts.” Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983).
9 Second, an important state interest is necessarily implicated in petitioner’s criminal
10 resentencing proceeding. “[T]he States’ interest in administering their criminal justice systems
11 free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should
12 influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986)
13 (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45).
14 Finally, the court considers whether the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to
15 raise the constitutional issue(s). By their nature, state criminal proceedings provide an opportunity
16 for constitutional questions to be presented. Federal courts must assume state procedures will
17 afford an adequate opportunity for consideration of constitutional claims “in the absence of
18 unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987);
19 Commc’ns Telesystems Int’l v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 196 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1999)
20 (“The ‘adequate opportunity’ prong of Younger ... requires only the absence of ‘procedural bars’
21 to raising a federal claim in the state proceedings.”). Thus, district courts have widely recognized
22 that federal habeas proceedings regarding the validity of a conviction have the practical effect of
23 enjoining or interfering with any ongoing state judicial proceedings in the underlying criminal
24 case even when the ongoing state proceeding is limited to sentencing. See Azevedo v. Pfeiffer,
25 No. 2:21-CV-0187-KJM-AC-P, 2023 WL 2746058, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023), report and
26 recommendation adopted, No. 2:21-CV-0187-DJC-AC-P, 2023 WL 3571950 (E.D. Cal. May 19,
27 2023); Nunn v. Hill, No. 2:22-CV-01396-TLN-EFB-HC, 2022 WL 17813156, at *1 (E.D. Cal.
28 Dec. 12, 2022) (“District courts in the Ninth Circuit have routinely determined [the Younger]
1 criteria are met where an individual files a federal habeas petition while his state resentencing
2 proceedings are ongoing.”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Nunn v. Johnson, No.
3 2:22-CV-01396-TLN-EFB, 2023 WL 2189154 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2023).
4 Circumstances such as irreparable harm, bad faith or harassment by the state in
5 prosecution, or state court bias against petitioner’s federal claims may support an exception to
6 abstention in extraordinary cases. Middlesex County Ethics Comm’n, 457 U.S. at 435; Brown v.
7 Ahern, 676 F.3d 899, 900-901 (9th Cir. 2012). However, petitioner’s failure to oppose the motion
8 has waived any assertion of extraordinary circumstances in this instance. In any event, the record
9 is devoid of support for such an exception.
10 The Younger abstention doctrine requires dismissal even though the result of a dismissal
11 may be that petitioner simply refiles the petition. Mays v. Villanueva, No. 2:21-CV-6195-CAS-
12 MAR, 2021 WL 5507844, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2021), report and recommendation adopted,
13 No. 2:21-CV-6195-CAS-MAR, 2021 WL 5507053 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2021). Because the
14 requirements for Younger abstention are met, the petition must be dismissed without prejudice.
15 See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973); Beltran, 871 F.2d at 782.
16 ////
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1 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
2 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:
3 1. Respondent’s unopposed motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) be granted.
4 2. The petition be dismissed without prejudice.
5 3. The court decline to issue the certificate of appealability referenced in 28 U.S.C. §
6 2253.
7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
8 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within fourteen days
9 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
10 | objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
11 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the
12 | objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The
13 | parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to
14 | appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Y1st, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
15 | Dated: June 14, 2024
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18 ORAH BARNES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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